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Abstract
This thesis addresses specific questions in relation to the role of identity in women 
workers’ collective organising in developing countries. How do gender and economic 
regimes shape the construction of women workers’ collective identity? Through what 
strategies do union women manage competing identities in their efforts to mobilise 
women workers? How do they address the risks attached to claiming recognition as a 
group when this may validate essentialist notions of identity? What types of alliances 
are possible when the construction of group identity includes particular women and 
workers but excludes others? How do women workers balance struggles for recognition 
with struggles for redistribution within trade unions and in the labour market and 
economy more generally?
To begin to answer these questions, this thesis draws on new social movement theory to 
examine how union women are motivated by their experience of identity and in turn 
politicise this identity to mobilise and organise other women. It is also informed by 
feminist critical theory which draws attention to the ways in which some women utilise 
gender, class and other differences to argue for recognition of group specificity and for 
representation in political structures of decision-making. At the basis of this research is 
information gathered through in-depth interviews with women workers in a variety of 
workers’ organisations in Thailand and Indonesia and secondary sources gathered 
during field work in these two countries.
In the context of struggles for recognition and redistribution, this thesis argues that 
many women workers want to be recognised as a distinct group with equal rights to 
participation and political voice. It suggests that whether they portray themselves and 
frame their issues as a distinct group of women or as a group of workers, depends 
largely on local and global gender and economic regimes.
This research adds to the existing literature on women workers’ resistance to patriarchal 
control in the workplace by focusing on women workers’ collective organising rather 
than individualistic strategies of resistance. It offers a detailed analysis o f the processes 
of mobilisation and organisation, and suggests that many women workers consciously 
emphasise gender and/or class difference in these processes. This work contributes to
the literature on feminism and social movements by demonstrating the role of identity 
and the politics of difference in social movement organisations and their struggles
vi
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Introduction
Women in trade unions
Why do women workers in developing countries mobilise and organise collectively in 
trade unions and other workers’ organisations? What kinds of identity politics affect 
their joining? Answering these questions requires us to take a close look at trade unions 
as social movements, at women’s role in gendered institutions, and at women’s 
challenges to dominant or hegemonic identities as women, as workers, as mothers, as 
neighbours, and as religious followers. For women occupy many identities, some of 
which will generate social or political action. This thesis combines feminist critical 
theory with new social movement theory to examine the complexities of -  and tensions 
between -  individual and collective identities through which women workers mobilise 
and organise under diverse structures of labour regulation and labour control and in 
diverse cultural environments. Understanding the role of identity in social movements is 
vital for understanding the modalities of collective action among particular groups of 
women.
Trade unions are often portrayed in Western, conservative media as anachronistic and 
politicised organisations, and by feminists as organisations that defend the entrenched 
interests of white, male workers in formal employment. When it comes to the struggle 
for social justice and the eradication of poverty worldwide, observers in high-income 
countries would be forgiven for believing that trade unions had been replaced by the 
anti-globalisation movement, the environmental movement, and various grassroots 
organisations, both in developing and in developed countries. But such assumptions 
obscure the fact that trade unions in the often poverty-affected and poorly regulated 
economies of developing countries have not developed according to the same criteria 
and the same trajectory as they did in most advanced economies. Rather than becoming 
irrelevant institutions linked to old methods of production of the twentieth century, 
some trade unions have fought back to regain relevance and to sustain membership. 
They are slowly adopting the new instruments and strategies for workers’ organising 
that globalised production methods and organisational features of many companies 
increasingly require.
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Trade unions are not often associated with gender equality struggles. As gendered 
institutions, they have their own particular struggle with gender equality which is far 
from over and which in many places may just be starting. During the past decade, much 
has been written about the position and role of women in trade unions in high-income 
countries and women’s challenges to sexual politics in such institutions and their 
activities (Ledwith and Colgan 2002; Briskin 1999; Franzway 2002; Pocock 1997a; 
Baiser 1987; Fonow 1998; Beckwith 1998). In their attempts to stabilise falling 
membership rates and to accommodate the growing number of women workers, many 
trade unions have recognised women’s struggles and campaigns for equal treatment and 
against discrimination as part of their agenda. By participating and contributing as 
members and as aspiring leaders, union women have continued to put pressure on their 
organisations to address women’s grievances, both in the workplace and within trade 
union hierarchies.
In developing countries, these processes have also started to occur. Still little is known 
about how women challenge or conform to gender norms and values in trade unions in 
these countries, and how these norms and values interact with other identities based on 
which women mobilise and organise. This thesis investigates how union women 
construct, contest, and reproduce particular identities in their struggle for representation 
in unions and participation in industrial relations.
Women workers organising
At various points in history, a range of economic, political, cultural, and religious 
factors have impacted on the conditions under which women work and on their 
responses to these conditions. A growing body of feminist research has analysed the 
impact of labour control in the workplace and the gender division of labour on women 
workers’ propensity to organise (Arifin 1988; Lee 1998; Martens and Mitter 1994; 
Rowbotham and Mitter 1994; Saptari 1995; Tilly 1981). Others have examined the 
impact of religious authorities (Mather 1988); women’s double or triple roles and 
commitments (Franzway 2002); and the masculine bias in organisations and institutions 
(Goetz 1997; Hensman 1996 and 2002; Ledwith and Colgan 2002; Franzway 2002). 
Without doubt, many more observations can be made with regard to these factors and 
their interplay at particular geographic and historical intersections.
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While building on this work, this thesis will question the role and importance of gender 
identity relative to other identities in women workers’ efforts to mobilise and organise 
collectively. Feminists have extensively debated the difficulties involved in speaking 
about women as a group without generalising about all women and essentialising 
womanhood. How can we speak about women workers mobilising and organising as 
women and on the basis of gender identity while overcoming these difficulties of 
homogenising and uni versah sing ‘women’ as a category? The work of Iris Young 
(1995) is helpful here to distinguish between gender as “seriality” or passive experience 
of gender constraints as opposed to gender as a source of relevant and common 
attributes that provide a meaningful identity for social movement activism. Where 
gender identity is (made) relevant in collective mobilising and organising -  and this by 
no means occurs in all cases -  it may either conform to or challenge hegemonic gender 
identities. The latter are constantly reformulated and reproduced through gender 
regimes, defined by Connell as “a pattern in gender arrangements ... of an institution” 
(2002:53). The gender regimes of organisations and institutions in society “are part of 
wider patterns which also endure over time” and which Connell terms “the gender order 
of a society” (2002:54). The term ‘gender regime’ is used in this thesis to call attention 
to the pervasive nature of gender norms and values and their reproduction through the 
discourses and practices of organisations and institutions. Among these organisations 
and institutions are trade unions, corporations, religious institutions, families, 
households, and educational institutions.
Gender regimes operate in conjunction with economic regimes that in Southeast Asia 
are now increasingly characterised by neo-liberal capitalist modes of production and 
labour control. Such regimes are, however, by no means all-encompassing and -  in 
Thailand and Indonesia -  bear strong traces of discourses of self-sufficiency, 
nationalism, and cooperative production. Gender and economic regimes in trade unions 
and in the workplace can variously encourage and constrain women workers’ 
mobilisation and organisation in the workplace and in their communities. The gender 
order of society, in turn, shapes how women workers frame their demands and what 
resources and which supporters they seek to draw upon in their struggles. This is not to 
say that class position is not important for these women: they clearly face practical 
constraints related to their position as factory, office or home-based workers and they 
struggle with what it means to be a worker in their community and society. Yet, some 
women workers experience class as ‘seriality’ that is not acted upon in collective
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movement. Perceptions of worker identity are also gendered, and subject to challenges 
by women workers, who aim to replace them with more gender equal definitions and 
meanings of worker/work.
This thesis argues that gender regimes, in conjunction with the above-mentioned 
political, economic, cultural, and religious factors, pose barriers to some women 
workers but motivate others to engage in not just individual action, but also collective 
action. Aside from personal background (which will not be discussed in detail in this 
thesis), motivation for collective action also stems from organisations providing 
incentives to potential and current members, framing demands in order to attract 
supporters, drawing on existing networks and connecting with other movements. Most 
of these actions, as they have been outlined in social movement theory, will also be 
gendered. They involve men and women differently and build on -  or instead challenge 
-  accepted ways of being and doing for men and women. As such, they are part of the 
gender order of society (Connell 2002:54).
Yet, women anywhere in the world are by no means passive recipients of this gender 
order or in equal measure affected by it. Instead, they help to shape and reproduce it, 
and at times contest and recreate it. Through their union membership or union activism, 
some women workers accept dominant gender regimes (that in most instances draw on 
patriarchy), while others contest these same gender regimes and the identities they 
construct. This raises the question about when and why women workers decide to 
mediate and challenge gender norms, especially in their efforts to mobilise and organise 
other women. When these women workers challenge what Franzway (2002) calls the 
‘sexual politics’ of trade unions -  that is, “the complex gender relationships of power as 
domination, resistance, alliances, and pleasures that are central to all social institutions” 
(Franzway 2002:2) -  what different and sometimes conflicting identities do they bring 
to their collective action? How and why do they move from ‘seriality’ to becoming a 
group with collective attributes around a politicised identity? How does this shape their 
demands for redistribution or for recognition? To what extent do they challenge 
hegemonic identities created and sustained by institutions and organisations in society at 
large, and particularly by the state, their employers/managers, and their trade unions? 
This thesis draws on feminist critical theory and theories of new social movements to 
attempt to answer these questions.
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Methodology: Thailand and Indonesia
Although workers around the world are increasingly facing similar employment 
relations and economic pressures, the political and economic context in which they 
contribute to their jobs and their organisations differs widely from one country to 
another and from one sector or company to another. The particular gender dimensions 
that each culture, religion, and history bring to this puzzle make the use of case studies a 
relevant and valuable method to investigate women’s negotiation of identities in trade 
unions. This thesis offers case studies analysing women workers in Thailand and 
Indonesia, with the aim to draw out factors that influence and shape the individual and 
collective identities of women workers who mobilise and organise collectively.
Thailand and Indonesia represent two countries in Southeast Asia where women have 
found increasing employment opportunities during the past three decades. Such 
opportunities have arisen mostly in labour-intensive light manufacturing and service 
industries, but many women continue to work in or have shifted to home-based 
manufacturing work. Regardless of the employment relations under which these women 
work, much of their work is lowly paid and loosely regulated. In both countries, the 
existence o f a steady stream of migrant women willing (but often forced) to work for 
low wages makes unionisation and workers’ protest more difficult. Both countries also 
share some economic and political characteristics, such as their paths o f economic 
development, their incorporation into the global economy, the low rate o f business 
regulation by central and local governments, and restrictive labour legislation. 
Nevertheless, significant differences between the two countries can be found in their 
systems of industrial relations and their gender regimes. These similarities and 
differences are discussed in detail in subsequent chapters.
Questions about identity and social movement activism could be posed in relation to 
any capitalist economy in Southeast Asia. Yet, Thailand and Indonesia also provide 
good examples of the gradual emergence and growth o f semi-autonomous women 
workers’ organisations. The existence of the Women Workers’ Unity Group in Bangkok 
and the Forum for Indonesian Women Union Leaders and Activists in Jakarta makes 
Thailand and Indonesia particularly relevant choices for case studies. Similar groups 
uniting women from trade unions have emerged elsewhere in Asia. In some cases, 
however, these groups are either of very recent origin and fledgling (Malaysia) or the 
incorporation of women into the formal labour force has been a recent development
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compared with most of Southeast Asia (Bangladesh). Even though they have no contact 
with each other, the groups in Thailand and Indonesia are similar in size, organisational 
structure, membership, and stated aims. While affiliated with national trade union 
federations, these organisations conduct their own fund-raising activities and, for the 
most part, enjoy independence in decision-making over programmes and activities. As 
such, they provide a rich source of examples of strategies and activities developed by 
women workers.
The choice of countries is influenced also by my personal and professional links with 
both. My work on gender and employment for the Regional Office for Asia and the 
Pacific of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in Bangkok between 1997 and 
1999 afforded me valuable insights into relevant theoretical and policy issues through 
direct access to events, resources and government, business, and trade union leaders. 
Such access through the ILO and its counterparts also became available to me when I 
moved to Indonesia in mid-2002 where I have worked as an occasional consultant for 
the ILO office in Jakarta. However, this link with the ILO also proved problematic at 
times in both countries. In a show of strong political awareness, many women workers 
expressed criticism of the ILO’s role in labour legislation formulation and regulation, 
and of the perceived lack of concrete action for women workers on the part of the 
organisation. Pointing out that I had voluntarily left my ILO job, was now only 
associated with the organisation on a casual basis, and in no way gave the organisation 
access to my interview transcripts, helped to ease the concerns of many of these women.
This thesis focuses on women working in the formal and semi-formal economy in urban 
areas of Thailand and Indonesia, and in particular those women who have become 
members and leaders of trade unions and other workers’ organisations. While it focuses 
on collective forms of protest rather than individual ones, it does not exclude informal 
and spontaneous protest actions. But why not examine organising among migrant 
workers, sex workers, or other groups of marginalised women workers? In Southeast 
and East Asia, migrant workers have established their own associations in recent years, 
independently or in association with non-governmental organisations (NGOs). For 
example, Indonesian women domestic workers in Hong Kong and Singapore have 
united in local self-help and advocacy groups with transnational linkages. Sex workers 
in Thailand and Indonesia have also started to organise and act collectively, through 
groups like Empower. However, much has already been written in the past few years on
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organising by women migrant and sex workers (e.g. Wee and Sim 2003; Kempadoo and 
Doezema 1998).
Moreover, some of the obstacles to and incentives for organising experienced by these 
groups are very specific to the nature of their work and their position as workers. In 
contrast, the experiences of women in formal workplaces are more easily compared 
across sectors and also refer to a much larger number of women workers. The urban 
focus of the research is the effective result of the relative scarcity of women union 
members and leaders in rural areas in Southeast Asia, with the exception of the 
plantation sector. But again, the plantation sector constitutes a special case from which 
it is not easy to generalise or even extract conclusions for women workers more 
broadly. Although some rural women workers’ organisations have emerged, the 
existence o f the two women workers’ organisations in Thailand and Indonesia was a 
deciding factor in favour of focusing this research on urban, formal women workers.
Feminist and social movement literatures
This thesis draws on a combination of sources, primary among which are fieldwork 
interviews, government and official documentation, and secondary sources. Given the 
inter-disciplinary nature of the thesis, the secondary sources used in it are from a variety 
of disciplines. The thesis is situated in feminist critical theory and social movement 
theory. Within feminist critical theory, I draw on literature examining women workers’ 
construction as cheap, flexible labour in the context of economic restructuring (e.g. 
Brodie 1994; Enloe 1990; Lim 1990; Marchand and Runyan 2000; Mies 1986; Mohanty 
1997; Mills 1998; Ong 1991; Pearson 1998; Pearson and Theobald 1998; Saptari 1995; 
Ward 1990; Wolf 1992). These writings provide insights into women’s experiences in 
and resistance to the global division of labour and globalisation. I also draw extensively 
on literature concerning women in social movements such as women’s movements (e.g. 
Alvarez 1990; Alvarez et al. 2003; Basu 1996; Blackburn 2004; Ferree and Martin 
1995; Kaplan 1997; Lind 1992 and 2000; Molyneux 1998; Ray and Korteweg 1999; 
Stienstra 1999 and 2000).
A third area of feminist literature on which this thesis builds is women in trade unions 
and in organisations in general (e.g. Baiser 1987; Chhachhi and Pittin 1996; Cockbum 
1994; Franzway 2002; Goetz 1997; Hensman 1996 and 2002; Ledwith and Colgan
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2002; Pocock 1997a; Rowbotham and Mitter 1994). This literature details women’s 
experiences in gendered institutions such as trade unions and their attempts to challenge 
the sexual politics of these institutions (Franzway 2002). Lastly, the field of women in 
politics has brought forth a large literature, of which writings on women and 
representation have been useful for this thesis (e.g. Jonasdottir 1988; Karam 1998; 
Phillips 1995 and 2003; Rai 2002a and 2002b). To structure my thinking about gender 
and gender relations -  both theoretically and in relation to Third World women -  
around these four areas of feminist literature, this thesis draws on feminist critical 
writings, among others by Connell (2002), Mohanty (1997 and 2003), White (1999) and 
Young (1995), on the construction of women as a category and identity, and on 
differences between women.
Of the various theories on social movements, this thesis draws predominantly on those 
of new social movements (Castells 1997; Cohen and Rai 2000; Escobar 1992; Keck and 
Sikkink 1998; Melucci 1989). These theories have been applied to women’s movements 
but whether labour movements can be called new social movements is disputed. This 
thesis also makes use of major works in the resource mobilisation tradition that has 
sought to explain the emergence and activities of traditional and contemporary social 
movements, though largely without attention to gender or women (McAdam, McCarthy 
and Zald 1996; Stryker, Owens and White 2000; Tarrow 1998). While the new social 
movement literature has focused on identity matters in social movements, the resource 
mobilisation tradition concerns itself mostly with ‘down to earth’ operational matters. 
Finally, the literature on labour in Thailand and Indonesia used in this thesis is largely 
situated in the political economy tradition (Brown 1997, 2001 and 2004; Frenkel 1993; 
Frenkel and Harrod 1995; Hadiz 1997, 2000, 2001 and 2002; Hewison 1997; Lambert 
1997; Lawler and Chokechai 2000; Manning 1998).
In addition to this academic literature, the thesis also draws on articles from major daily 
newspapers in Thailand and Indonesia, as well as reports by NGOs, international 
organisations, and government agencies. These include the International Labour 
Organization, the World Bank, and NGOs such as the Asian Migrant Resource Center, 
the Committee of Asian Women, Friends of Women, and Oxfam. The detail on 
Indonesia observed in some chapters is a result of the greater availability of literature in 
English on women, women workers, and trade unions concerning Indonesia than 
Thailand.
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Fieldwork methodology
The fieldwork for this thesis was conducted in Thailand (September 2001-January 2002, 
May 2002 and May 2003) and in Indonesia (most intensively October 2002-March 2003 
but continuing thereafter). Prior to the start of the fieldwork, I obtained clearance from 
the Australian National University for my human ethics protocol. According to this 
protocol, each of those I interviewed was given the option to remain anonymous. 
Acknowledgement o f names in subsequent chapters indicates that those interviewed 
consented to me using their names; in cases where anonymity was requested, the use of 
pseudonyms has been indicated in the footnotes.
I identify three main categories of women workers in manufacturing or white-collar 
work: those who have never been members of trade unions or other workers’ groups 
because these do not exist or are not allowed to exist in or around their workplaces; 
those who are members but who are usually silent and do not join meetings, 
negotiations or other activities such as rallies and marches; and those who are leaders 
and activists and who are vocal in public gatherings. Due to the nature o f my research, I 
will speak mainly about the third category. Most o f those interviewed lived in major 
urban centres. Initially, I primarily interviewed active members o f the two women 
workers’ organisations mentioned above, but the circle gradually expanded to include 
their friends and colleagues, former members, women from other trade unions (who 
were not members of the women workers’ organisations), and activists from support 
organisations. In Indonesia, I met with women workers, NGO activists, and academics 
in Jakarta and surrounding industrial areas (Bekasi, Tangerang, and Bogor), Yogjakarta, 
Surabaya, Semarang, and Medan. In Thailand, my field interviews were limited to 
Bangkok and surrounding industrial areas (Rangsit, Phrapradaeng, and Omnoi-Omyai). 
Almost all o f those I interviewed were women, except for a handful of male academics 
and NGO activists.
Interviews were semi-structured and were conducted in person, with the exception of 
one telephone interview. In most cases, interviews took place in the union or NGO 
office (with varying degrees of privacy), though a few were conducted at workers’ 
homes or in public places such as restaurants or hotel lobbies (sometimes to seek 
privacy from other union officers). I interviewed approximately 45 to 50 people in each
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country, of whom the majority were women trade union members and leaders. Others 
interviewed included male union leaders, staff from labour-oriented NGOs and 
international organisations, researchers and academics, and journalists. These (usually 
informal) interviews lasted anywhere between one and four hours and were semi- 
structured, using the same list of questions for each interview (with minor modifications 
depending on the organisational background of the individual). In addition to these 
interviews, the research in this thesis is based on participant observation conducted over 
the course of the fieldwork periods. This included trade union planning meetings, 
annual conferences, education sessions, and informal get-togethers on the sidelines of 
formal proceedings.
Positionality
Living in Jakarta since September 2002 allowed me to form and maintain close contact 
with many of the women interviewed for this project. This has probably been an 
advantage for my research in the sense that it allowed me frequent access to informants 
as well as local written sources relevant to the project. On the other hand, it heightens 
the problematic nature of my position as a researcher. Rejecting modernist claims of the 
possibility of dispassionate, rational objectivity in research, many feminists have written 
about the importance of understanding the impact of positionality on research findings. 
This is no less important in my own case, as boundaries of gender, age, class, 
linguistics, religion and race were apparent at some point or another (and often 
simultaneously).
Without doubt, these differences between my informants and me played an important 
role in mediating the information that was exchanged. When asked to explain why I, as 
an educated, white, European, and seemingly rich woman, was interested in the lives 
and stories of disadvantaged, lowly educated Thai and Indonesian women, I would take 
the opportunity to explain my background and the origins of my interest. In most 
interviews, I volunteered such information so that the person interviewed felt more 
comfortable with my presence as well as to indicate my own willingness not only to ask 
but also to answer questions.
Some of my interviews with male unionists featured sexist jokes and sexual innuendo, 
based on my age and the fact that I was assumed to be unmarried. Not surprisingly, on
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such occasions male unionists denied the existence of gender discrimination in their 
organisations. In other interviews, women union members doubted my ability to 
understand their hardships, as I was to them obviously from a different class. Some 
discussions that featured religion as a topic -  especially Islam in Indonesia -  were either 
shortened based on my informant’s assumption that I as a Christian would not 
understand anyway, or extended excessively in the hope that I as a Christian could be 
made to understand some essential aspect of the person’s religion. I tried as much as 
possible, given the limited time available for the interviews, to show empathy, display 
some knowledge of local issues and circumstances, and put people at ease with small 
talk and jokes. But notwithstanding these efforts, it is likely that the Indonesian and 
Thai women and men I spoke with tailored their answers to their understanding of what 
I wanted to hear or what I could understand or relate to.
Of these diverse barriers, the linguistic barrier deserves to be mentioned in greater 
detail. In Indonesia, all interviews were conducted in Indonesian, the national language 
of education for all informants. Only a handful of these interviews (five in total) were 
taped on audiocassette, each time with prior permission of the person interviewed. I 
decided to tape interviews if the person spoke unclearly or rapidly (to be able to check 
my understanding of the discussion afterwards); if the person was a vital member o f the 
women workers’ groups examined in this thesis; and/or if  I expected the person to be 
familiar with formal interviews based on their exposure to the media and other 
researchers. Whether or not interviews were taped, I took detailed notes on each 
occasion, augmented by impressions and memories immediately afterwards.
In Thailand, on the other hand, all interviews (except those in which informants were 
not Thai or were comfortable speaking English) were conducted with the assistance of 
an interpreter who translated each question and answer. This interpreter had previously 
worked for a Bangkok-based labour-oriented NGO, and was therefore already 
acquainted with a few of the women union activists whom I wanted to interview. 
Taping all interviews (again, with prior permission) allowed us to check her translation 
afterwards, transcribe interviews, and make corrections to my interpretation where 
necessary. In addition, listening to the taped interviews gave me a chance to reflect on 
how the phrasing of my questions or the tone of my voice may have influenced the 
responses. Finally, listening to the tape recording made me realise that those
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interviewed had, at times, made gentle fun of my inability to understand more than only 
basic Thai.
By virtue of living in Indonesia over a longer period of time, I had the chance to meet 
my informants periodically. In some cases, I initiated follow-up meetings to ask 
additional questions. In other cases, I received invitations from women workers to join 
their activities. Where I conducted participant observation, I had usually been invited as 
observer or resource person, though at times union women used my attendance to show 
participants that there was a foreigner who cared about their problems. Although I was 
thus able to gather more detailed and better longitudinal information about Indonesian 
women in trade unions, I was also often put in difficult positions. Not only did I find it 
hard to explain that my full-time writing imposed time constraints on attending women 
workers’ gatherings, I also became more than a researcher to many of these women. 
Pleas for financial assistance (made by both individuals and groups), requests for 
technical advice (on anything from union negotiations with employers to gender 
mainstreaming), and invitations to social gatherings clearly changed my position from 
that of outsider to potential resource and discussion partner. While this undeniably 
influenced these women’s views of me, it also meant that I could ask more probing 
questions where relevant to the research. In the chapters describing fieldwork findings, I 
have indicated where I believe my own position as researcher or as friend may 
particularly have influenced the responses provided.
Terms and definitions: a “conceptual map”
Terms such as ‘trade unions’, ‘worker’ and ‘gender equality’ have over the course of 
many years become invested with particular meanings. This thesis analyses particular 
ways in which women workers have contested these terms and have attempted to assign 
to them new or expanded meanings. It is therefore important to indicate briefly at the 
start how these and other important terms will be used in this thesis. A more detailed 
debate and an exploration of relevant literature will be pursued in subsequent chapters.
Trade union
Historically, the term ‘trade union’ referred to the organisations established by factory 
or office workers to defend their interests through collective bargaining. ‘Freedom of 
association’ as set out in relevant International Labour Conventions refers to the right of
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workers to set up through free and democratic means officially registered organisations 
that can represent workers in negotiations with employers. In this thesis, ‘trade union’ 
will refer to such organisations with official registration and with membership 
consisting of formally employed workers. However, in recent years, the continuing 
flexibilisation of work has made many workers ineligible to join or establish trade 
unions. Increased international recognition of home-based work and domestic work as 
forms of employment have made women working under such arrangements increasingly 
aware of the need to organise and the possibilities for doing so. While these 
developments have expanded the potential membership of trade unions, the concept of 
trade unions as it is formalised in labour legislation in many countries continues to be 
based on formal, full-time, and stable employment. Such requirements have led workers 
who do not fulfil this definition to choose not to register their trade union or to establish 
other types of organisations such as associations, co-operatives, and producer groups. 
While they may not be registered as trade unions, such organisations have very similar 
functions and aims. As used in this thesis, the term ‘trade union’ will therefore refer to 
traditional trade unions as well as these less formal groups, regardless of their official 
status or their members’ employment status.
Worker
Similar to the term ‘trade union’, who and what is a ‘worker’ has been the subject of 
extensive debate and contestation. Traditional Marxist thought defines a worker as a 
male, full-time employee who sells his labour but does not own either the means of 
production or its product, and who is subject to wage discipline (see for example Lee 
1998 for a feminist perspective on Marxist theories of production and labour control). 
Challenging male-biased perceptions of the man as breadwinner and the woman as 
additional or occasional income-earner, feminists have widened the coverage of the 
term ‘worker’ (see for example Pocock 1997b and Pruegl 1999). Yet, in many instances 
(e.g. labour law), ‘worker’ still refers primarily to a man. In addition, gender bias makes 
many traditional trade unions unable to see women as workers or to consider women’s 
demands and needs as issues of concern to trade unions. In this thesis, however, the 
general term ‘worker’ refers to both men and women, and encompasses all forms of 
employment status. Where workers in the formal economy are distinguished from, for 
example, domestic workers, home-based workers, or contract workers, I will usually 
refer to these groups with this full specification.
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Gender
The term ‘gender’ is frequently misunderstood, as it is confused with ‘sex’ (i.e. taken as 
natural) or taken to refer only to women or to the dichotomous statistical categories of 
‘male’ and ‘female’. I will use the term ‘gender’ to refer to what Connell calls “the 
structure of social relations that centres on the reproductive arena, and the set of 
practices (governed by this structure) that bring reproductive distinctions between 
bodies into social processes” (2002:10). This definition has the advantage of navigating 
between structure and agency in the creation and reproduction of gender through bodily 
experiences, discourses, and practices. At the same time, this definition avoids a time- 
specific binary conception of male versus female and equality versus difference.
Gender regime
As mentioned above, the term ‘gender regime’ is taken from Connell who defines it as 
“a pattern in gender arrangements ... of an institution” (2002:53). The term ‘gender 
regime’ in this thesis refers to the pervasive nature of gender norms and values 
throughout organisations and institutions such as trade unions, workplaces, the family, 
the household, and schools. The term also encompasses the constant but sometimes 
imperceptible processes of reproduction of these gender arrangements through, and in, 
those organisations and institutions.
Gender equality
The term ‘gender equality’ is often associated with a liberal feminist discourse that 
considers unequal treatment and access the main problems for women. According to 
this perspective, the cure for women’s current disadvantages is legal means to enforce 
equal treatment and educational efforts to prevent discrimination. In this thesis, the term 
‘gender equality’ refers to more than equal treatment and the absence of discrimination. 
Instead, it encompasses the re-evaluation of the masculine and feminine and all things 
and beings associated with these terms, and the removal of this value-laden binary from 
all fields, from philosophy and law to health and education. It therefore includes both 
theoretical and practical advances for women and men.
Social movements
Definitions of ‘social movements’ can be found in both sociology and political science. 
As Cohen and Rai recount, there are transformative, reformative, redemptive or 
alternative movements, and social movements have been termed unpredictable,
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irrational, unreasonable, and disorganised (2000:2-5). Yet, most definitions share three 
common elements: a conscious attempt to achieve a goal through grouping and 
organising; the expression of dissent or grievances by those who lack power; and the 
use of “confrontational and socially disruptive tactics” in order to gain attention (Cohen 
and Rai 2000:5). Castells defines social movements as “purposive collective actions 
whose outcome, in victory as in defeat, transforms the values and institutions of 
society” (1997:3). Similarly, Tarrow (1998) distinguishes between collective action and 
social movements, the latter being an expression of sustained and contentious action by 
groups of people. Thus, social movements can comprise a multitude of organisations 
with more or less the same goal, as is seen, for example, in many women’s movements. 
On the basis of these definitions, this thesis will offer a distinction between mobilising 
and organising collectively. The former refers to the process of uniting people for what 
may initially only be collective action, while the latter refers to the activities of a social 
movement or one of its organisations.
Activism
Activism captures a wide range of behaviours at the micro or macro level that are 
usually associated with collective action. This thesis uses the term ‘activism’ to refer to 
any sustained and visible (or audible) support for a particular aim of an individual or 
group. In referring to visible action, I acknowledge that much important work to sustain 
social movements goes on behind the scenes, invisible to the larger public. However, in 
the context of this thesis, activism will refer to street rallies, pamphlet writing, 
collective organising work, outreach efforts, and other activities that coalesce around a 
particular goal and are undertaken in the “public sphere”.
Feminism
Definitions of ‘feminism’ abound, but most have in common a focus on discourses and 
practices that resist patriarchy by fighting against discrimination based on gender (or 
against women) and challenging unequal gender relations. Franzway defines ‘feminism’ 
as “all ideologies, activities and policies whose goal is to remove discrimination against 
women and to break down the male domination of society” (2002:15). This definition 
will be used throughout this thesis.
15
Women ’s movements
Post-modern and critical feminists point out the diversity among women and the 
existence of multiple feminisms (Alexander and Mohanty 1997). Similarly, there is 
much diversity among women’s movements and to speak of only one women’s 
movement would be inappropriate. The term ‘women’s movements’ as used in this 
thesis refers to any sustained and large-scale collective action by and for women who 
act upon their group membership in the category ‘women’, but without regard for which 
particular women this action may include. Thus, women’s movements are not 
necessarily progressive, feminist or in favour of gender equality, and may include 
reactionary women’s groups that are avowedly anti-feminist. Only where groups, 
organisations or movements have publicly or, in my interviews with them, stated 
feminist claims (and have used the word feminist) do I describe them as feminist.
Identity
In this thesis, the term ‘identity’ is primarily used to refer to “self-ascription as 
belonging to a group with others who similarly identify themselves, who affirm or are 
committed together to a set of values, practices, and meanings” (Young 1995:120). 
Thus, it is not used here in a psychological sense, as has been done in writings about 
social movements from a social identity perspective.
Chapter outline
This thesis brings together feminist theories about gender, difference, and representation 
with ideas about social movements to examine on the basis of what identity (or 
identities) women workers mobilise and organise collectively. Because trade unions and 
women workers’ organisations are part of social movements, Chapter One describes 
some recent approaches to social movements, and evaluates feminist contributions to 
this field, with focus on women’s position in trade unions, and trade unions as social 
movements. Feminist analyses of women workers and of social movements have 
strengthened considerably our understanding of the obstacles to women workers’ 
participation in trade unions that arise from labour regulation and labour control 
processes in the context of globalisation and neo-liberal restructuring. Based on this 
review, Chapter One argues for the need to analyse women workers’ organisations from 
a social movement perspective because this can demonstrate the processes through 
which women workers construct and contest collective identities.
16
Chapter Two outlines a theoretical perspective on the processes through which women 
workers constitute, reproduce, and/or contest hegemonic identities as workers, as 
women, and any other identity that might be significant to them. It applies critical 
(including post-modem) feminist theories to argue that identities and interests are 
closely linked and matter in mobilising and organising efforts by union women. Taking 
note of recent feminist debates on claims of women as a single group, this chapter 
argues that gender and class identities (or combinations thereof) shape forms of 
collective action by women workers, depending on the nature of gender and economic 
regimes. The chapter will argue that in some instances, women workers centre their 
collective action on struggles for redistribution based on a collective identity as 
workers. In other instances, women workers politicise gender identity to provide the 
basis for struggles for recognition of women workers as a group. Young’s (1995) 
suggestion to consider gender as seriality is useful here to link feminist theories of the 
politics of identity and representation with the question how women workers can 
organise effectively as women without reinforcing generalisations or hegemonic 
conceptions of womanhood and gender identity.
Much of women workers’ mobilising and organising in developing countries is strongly 
influenced by the political and economic circumstances in which they work and live. 
The degree to which the state facilitates or obstructs women’s and workers’ political 
representation is relevant here, as is the extent of labour regulation and labour control. 
Chapters Three and Four explore and compare the importance of labour regulation, 
women’s labour market participation and position, and political space for civil society 
in Thailand and Indonesia. Although this thesis is not a comparative study in the strict 
sense of the word, these chapters conclude that differences in labour regulation may 
influence the ability and likelihood of women workers organising collectively in the two 
countries under discussion.
To complement the context presented in the previous two chapters, Chapter Five 
analyses dominant gender regimes and gender relations and their impact on women in 
trade unions and other workers’ organisations in Thailand and Indonesia. This chapter 
argues that hegemonic gender regimes pose significant challenges to women workers’ 
organisations. Yet, in Indonesia, the dominant gender regime is conducive to organising 
by women workers because of its emphasis on a common womanhood, in contrast to
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Thai society where gender signifies most importantly in conjunction with other markers 
of difference such as class. Chapter Five concludes by presenting available data on 
women in trade unions in Thailand and Indonesia, and analysing the obstacles to 
women’s participation and leadership in trade unions.
Chapters Six and Seven provide detailed findings of the fieldwork conducted in 
Thailand and Indonesia. These chapters track the emergence and operations of two 
women workers’ organisations (one in each country), to illustrate how women workers 
construct a collective identity around gender and/or class. The focus will be on the 
meanings that women workers assign to these processes of contestation and 
reproduction of gender identities and on the claims they make as women workers in 
their own groups and in trade unions in general. The Conclusion highlights the 
similarities and differences between Thailand and Indonesia in the ways that women 
workers respond to, recreate, and reproduce identities for sustained collective action. 
Lastly, the Conclusion discusses the implications of these findings for the study of 
women workers as a group, and the prospects for building and extending alliances 
between women workers and other groups of women in the future.
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Chapter 1 - Women workers in social movements: 
Review of approaches
Introduction
To what extent and how do women workers in Thailand and Indonesia organise based on 
collective identity, and how are collective identities constructed and contested? This thesis 
situates these questions within feminist challenges to International Political Economy and 
to social movement theories. During the past three decades, feminist researchers have 
studied women workers and their struggles to address the gender-blind nature of much 
mainstream research in those fields. But in the process, they have also contributed to 
feminist calls to examine the complexities of gender, race, class, and other dimensions of 
power in labour struggles. A study of women workers’ movements in Southeast Asia would 
therefore do well to start by scrutinising the methods and ideologies through which women 
workers have been incorporated in, spoken about and on behalf of in, (mis)represented in, 
as well as frequently left out of, writings that have touched upon aspects of their mobilising 
efforts.
After providing a brief background of contemporary social movement theories, this chapter 
discusses whether these theories should be applied to the labour movement. In other words, 
are trade unions and workers’ organisations social movements? It is argued that, contrary to 
popular perceptions and although in decline in many regions, trade unions have the 
potential to become powerful social movements. Secondly, the chapter reviews writings on 
women workers and their strategies and means for organising worldwide, with particular 
focus on what these writings can tell us about women workers in social movements such as 
trade unions. The chapter concludes that social movement theories provide a useful starting 
point for studying the emergence of collective action by women workers. However, these 
theories raise a number of important questions about identity-defining factors that have not 
yet been put at the centre of analyses of women workers’ mobilising and organising. These 
questions lead to an exploration of feminist politics of identity and conceptualisations of 
women’s interests in the next chapter.
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Social movement theories
Women workers’ attempts at mobilising and collective organising often revolve around 
oppositional action against employers, managers or the state, but this is not always the case. 
Witness the existence of numerous social and recreational groups of women workers that 
aim to provide entertainment and distraction from monotonous work, and the many 
collective help organisations among women workers that establish loan systems and lighten 
the economic burden of household maintenance. How can such activities be distinguished 
from those that may lead to the formation of social movements with a clear agenda and a 
common opponent? Rather than offer an in-depth discussion of social movement theories, 
this chapter will outline the broad principles and characteristics of contemporary social 
movement theories in order to answer this question and to put into perspective their 
usefulness for the study of women workers’ mobilisation in developing countries.
Traditional explanations
We can distinguish three broad tendencies in contemporary explanations for collective 
action. The first has its origins in Marxism and, focusing primarily on labour protest, 
considers collective action to result either directly from workers’ common position in the 
capitalist production process or (in more sophisticated analyses) from the active 
construction of class consciousness and feelings of class solidarity among workers. Such 
views of class coming into being through deliberate processes and lived experiences as 
opposed to being constituted as a natural outcome of class structure and class relations have 
been explored in the works of, for example, Erik Olin Wright and E.P. Thompson, as have 
their consequences for the study of collective struggle by workers.
The second, referred to as collective behaviour or relative deprivation theory, essentially 
locates the emergence of collective protest action in “status inconsistency” or the collective 
experience of grievances (Tarrow 1998; Crossley 2002). The focus here is on concrete and 
acute shortcomings or changes in status, which motivate the gathering of large numbers of 
protestors and the expression of discontent. At times, women workers who unite to protest 
and make claims are indeed motivated by the inequities they observe in society and by the 
exploitation they experience. For example, Koo (2001) vividly describes how Korean 
women found the courage to resist employers and managers because of not only the
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economic oppression but also the cultural discrimination they faced in comparison to other 
groups in Korean society. However, looking towards the existence of unfulfilled 
expectations or status differentials as the source of protest and collective action cannot 
explain why only a fraction of those who have experienced exploitation or oppression join 
movements, and why many of those active in social movements have never personally 
experienced the grievances that motivate them to become active. Additionally, emotional 
expressions of protest fuelled by grievances are relatively easily co-opted or subdued by 
granting some of the demands, thus constituting an unlikely explanation for the sustained 
social movement observed since the 1970s in much of the world. This theory therefore lost 
popularity in the 1960s because its proponents “tended to underspecify the mobilization 
process ... [and] because they started from the assumption that collective behavior was 
outside the routines of everyday life, few of them specified its relationship to the political” 
(Tarrow 1998:14).
On the other hand, protest and activism that emerge out of a demand for needs-fulfilment 
can turn into a sustained challenge to authorities, if organisers can harness public discontent 
even after the direct threat is taken away. To do so, organisers need to prevent co-optation 
by authorities and channel protestors’ emotions into effective repertoires of collective 
action. This requires a greater focus on issues of resources available to a movement to 
increase the scale of the action, maintain its membership, and sustain its collective action. 
This -  together with criticism of the underlying assumption in the grievance perspective of 
movement participants as dysfunctional and irrational actors -  fuelled the rise during the 
1960s of resource mobilisation as a third explanation for the emergence of social 
movements, “emphasizing organizational variables in deliberate efforts to mobilize 
resources in accounting for the growth, development, success and decline of social 
movements” (Stryker, Owens and White 2000:2). Rather than focusing on the ideological 
bases of social movements, resource mobilisation scholars were influenced by 
organisational analysis and examined organisational and institutional dynamics in changing 
political contexts, such as recruitment and participation, inter-organisational relations, 
financial support, political structures and processes, and cycles of protest (Klandermans, 
Staggenborg and Tarrow 2002).
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Social movements and identity
The absence of discussion of values, commitment or ideology caused many theorists to 
infuse the resource mobilisation perspective with alternative models. Under the influence of 
social psychology, processes of identity construction were increasingly highlighted during 
the 1990s (e.g. Taylor and Whittier 1992; Stryker, Owens and White 2000), though often as 
variables independent of power relations in society. Thus, while social psychologists accept 
the possible existence of multiple identities, these are often seen to be competing for 
salience at equal levels of importance. Can identities be considered, however, equal in 
weight and the result of construction by free agents unrestrained by their relative bargaining 
power in society? While avoiding a return to orthodox Marxist theory in which 
consciousness arises out of and reflects class position and mode of production, Zugman for 
example contends that identities are not neutral but instead are an integral part of and are 
marked by the struggle between dominant and subordinated groups: “this ability to create 
and live out multiple identities is a gift that only people in ‘post-industrial’ democracies 
have” (2003:155). Seen from this angle, theories of identity construction based on social 
psychology display a disturbing lack of attention to relations of power that in fact are 
crucial in shaping collective identity, for example, among women workers. This is perhaps 
not surprising, as much of social movement theory has been based on empirical work 
carried out in Western Europe and the United States, the so-called ‘post-industrial’ societies 
(Klandermans, Staggenborg and Tarrow 2002).
Building on these three perspectives, Tarrow proposes that changes in political opportunity 
structure provide actors with the necessary openings to transform discontent (one possible 
motivator of collective action) into an organised movement. At the same time, though, 
political changes can also constrain collective actors by closing off avenues for protest. 
Through the concept of political opportunity structure, Tarrow locates the reasons for 
success or failure of social movements in “consistent -  but not necessarily formal, 
permanent, or national -  signals to social or political actors which either encourage or 
discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements” (Tarrow 
1998:54).
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Distinguishing between collective organising and social movements, Tarrow argues that 
social movements represent particular sequences of contentious politics that “are based on 
underlying social networks and resonant collection action frames, and which develop the 
capacity to maintain sustained challenges against powerful opponents” (Tarrow 1998:2). As 
part of this definition, he identifies four basic properties of social movements: “mounting 
collective challenges, drawing on common purposes, building solidarity and sustaining 
collective action” (1998:4). Collective action is contentious and may result in the formation 
of a social movement when it is used by people who lack regular access to institutions, act 
in the name of new or unaccepted claims, and behave in ways that fundamentally challenge 
others (Tarrow 1998:3). Some collective organising may be short-lived and local, and may 
not result in the formation of a social movement. But when it is contentious in nature and 
based on a common adversary and goal, collective organising can thus be considered as an 
important and necessary step towards building a social movement.
Whether they are an outgrowth of the labour movement or an integral part of women’s 
movements, women workers’ groups have the potential to become (part of) a social 
movement (or social movement organisations). Using Tarrow’s definition, collective action 
by women workers is contentious and can produce a social movement (or contribute to an 
existing one) when it involves planning for protest against employers or initiating a 
campaign for legal reform or any other activity that shows claims made in opposition to a 
common adversary. In such cases, it would be appropriate to use social movement theory to 
analyse the emergence and the functioning of women workers’ groups in developing 
countries. As Chapters Six and Seven will show, many women workers engage in such 
contentious politics, though often combined with concern for issues of daily survival.
Many political scientists apply Tarrow’s framework of social movements in an 
instrumentalist fashion, whereby “the relative openness or closure of the institutionalised 
political system; the stability or otherwise of elite alignments; the presence or otherwise of 
elite allies; and the state’s capacity and propensity for repression” are the parameters that 
enable or limit the success of social movements (Sperling 1998:194). At the basis of the 
resource mobilisation perspective (and Tarrow’s framework in particular) is an analysis of 
the forces at work within a traditional nation-state setting that shape the interaction of a 
social movement with parts of the state. While external influences, transitions or ruptures
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may create openings for effective interaction with the state, they may also close off avenues 
for engagement. Allies within the state structure variously appear or disappear, depending 
on the wider political, economic and social configurations of power that may pressure the 
state to resist or constrain a social movement, or may lead to an embrace of or support to a 
movement (for example see Banaszak, Beckwith and Rucht 2003).
.Although the sociological resource mobilisation perspective has been criticised for 
overemphasising structural and institutional factors and rational actors, and for not 
recognising fields other than the narrowly political (Crossley 2002; Randall 1998; Ray and 
Korteweg 1999), it has had widespread influence on feminist studies of social movements 
and collective action (though more frequently of women’s movements generally than of 
women workers). Using Tarrow’s framework as a starting point, Keck and Sikkink (1998) 
have expanded on the concept of political opportunity structure to address transnational 
collective action and its transformative influence over social movements. Ferree and Martin 
(1995) and Acker (1995) have explored the various types and roles of organisations that 
make up and sustain a movement, as well as the processual element in women’s organising. 
Taylor and Whittier (1992) have written about the important role played by the social 
movement community in sustaining activism, and Taylor (1995, 2000) has called for 
attention to the role of emotions in the creation of collective identity. Kaplan (1997) 
emphasised the organic aspects of women’s organising, the so-called “primary movement 
groups” that are important in sustaining formal forms of collective action over long periods 
of time but are often ignored because their nature is informal:
While recognizing the importance of informal ties such as friendship networks and 
connections among church members, collective action theorists frequently view loose 
associations merely as tendencies guiding potential insurgents toward one organization 
rather than another. Networks then become means to certain organizational ends rather than 
strong webs connecting politically vital local groups. According to this line of thinking, 
leaders and key events directed by highly visible organizations assume greater significance 
than do processes by which large numbers of people resist oppression and develop 
programs for transforming society (Kaplan 1997:181).
Challenges to the resource mobilisation theory have come primarily from those who view 
social movements increasingly as cultural struggles over meaning, rather than purely as 
instruments towards the achievement of certain goals. The so-called new social movements 
no longer revolve around struggles for economic equality or national liberation but rather
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around identity and meaning. At the core of new social movement theory is the “plurality 
of the political subject” (Zugman 2003) which is no longer constituted exclusively by class 
identity but instead may experience a variety of interests at different intersections. Melucci 
argues that “contemporary social movements, more than others in the past, have shifted 
towards non-political terrain: the need for self-realization in everyday life. In this respect 
social movements have a conflictual and antagonistic, but not a political orientation, 
because they challenge the logic of complex systems on cultural grounds” (1989:23). The 
difference that Melucci signals here is that many contemporary social movements are not 
intent on capturing state power but instead have demands that go beyond institutional party 
politics. Crossley captures this when he argues that “new social movement theory has 
abandoned the model of politics developed within Marxism wherein it necessarily centred 
upon parties, revolutions and states, and has sought to explore the broader territories of 
movements and politics” (2002:152).1
New social movements (or at least those social movements centred on identity) can be 
usefully analysed through Gramsci’s insight that civil society is the location of struggles 
over consent to hegemonic power relations (Castells 1997:8). Thus, civil society is the 
realm where political transformation takes place through the shaping of social practices and 
their normalisation in the everyday world. Castells therefore sees as the core of new social 
movements the emergence of “project identity”: “when social actors, on the basis of 
whichever cultural materials are available to them, build a new identity that redefines their 
position in society and, by doing so, seek the transformation of overall social structure” 
(1997:8). This position is similar to that of Escobar who argues that “actors recognize the 
stakes in terms of a cultural project; in other words, what is at stake for social movements is 
historicity [the reproduction of social practices through knowledge, economic and ethical 
models] itself, not merely organizational forms, services, means of production and the like” 
(1992:71).
Yet, exactly how do such processes of identity formation take place in a context where 
political and economic rights are routinely ignored and fulfilment o f material needs is the 
main goal for a majority living in (near) poverty? Although struggles over culture and 
meaning are perhaps increasingly important for women workers, it is difficult to deny the 
continuing centrality of structures of economic and political inequality for women workers
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in developing countries. But rather than returning to class reductionism, “it is both possible 
and necessary to theorize culture, identity, and language alongside the larger structural 
political-economic forces that help to shape these processes” (Zugman 2003:154). In this 
context, relations of both ideological and concrete material domination and subordination 
still carry weight in processes of identity formation and collective action, and can become 
the subject of social movement struggles. Thus, while identity and subjectivity are crucial 
aspects of such struggles, for women workers in developing countries those struggles also 
involve a politics of redistribution, contrary to the characterisation by the authors above of 
new social movements as concerned primarily with meaning.
Trade unions and social movement theory
What do these diverse views of social movements mean for the study of trade unions? 
Before analysing to what extent (and which) trade unions can be called new social 
movements, this section first reviews recent approaches to the study of labour movements.
Trade unions in the global division o f labour
When critics of neo-liberal economic development policies have pointed out the importance 
and human cost of labour repression by the state and large conglomerates as part of a 
corporatist or exclusionary system of labour relations (Hadiz 1997; Koo 2001), many have 
accorded labour a passive role, subjugated to structural forces. For example, Deyo (1987, 
1989) attributes what he sees as a lack of workers’ resistance to labour repression in 
Southeast and East Asia to a combination of political, economic, and socio-cultural 
structures. He therefore claims that “nowhere -  not in their workshops, firms, communities, 
or governments -  have workers been able to influence the political and economic decisions 
that have shaped their lives” (1989:1; see also Rowley and Benson 2000, Frenkel and 
Harrod 1995, Frenkel 1993). With regard to women workers, Deyo observes that:
the attraction of young, low-skilled, often female workers to employment characterized by 
low pay, tedium, minimal job security, and lack of career mobility encourages low job 
commitment, high levels of turnover, and lack of attachment to work groups or firms. These 
circumstances impede independent unionization efforts among workers in light export 
industries (1989:8).
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Similarly, Thomas (1995) points out the weaknesses of trade unions worldwide in the face 
of increasing integration of industrial development, state intervention, and the growth of 
informal work. Hadiz (2002) argues that labour has lost its political space in much of 
Southeast Asia as a result of historical circumstances, such as the defeat of communist 
parties with which labour movements often aligned themselves. These events, compounded 
by suppression of union movements, a prolonged economic crisis and slow recovery in the 
late 1990s, and the international mobility of employers have largely prevented trade unions 
from using the opportunities presented by political transformations such as democratisation 
or international treaties and conventions. Globalisation is posing new challenges to trade 
unionism, since it undermines states’ efforts (or at least promises and obligations) to protect 
increasingly mobile workers -  who work for increasingly global employers -  through 
national legislation. In sum, such analyses effectively reduce labour resistance in its various 
forms in Southeast Asia to short-lived and small-scale protest that is powerless in the face 
of big business and the state.
To be fair, trade unions in many countries in Southeast Asia do indeed lack effective power 
to challenge either state policies and industrial relations systems or employers’ repressive 
practices. Many trade unions suffer fragmentation because of internal power struggles, are 
frequently co-opted by political parties, and are weakened through disadvantageous labour 
practices such as outsourcing, contract work, and informalisation of the workforce (see 
Chapters Three and Four). Because such trends pose a serious threat to their membership 
and thus to their representational capacity and political potential, trade unions have 
frequently been dismissed by observers as anachronistic organisations that are superseded 
by popular social movements such as anti-globalisation movements. Based most often in 
assembly lines rather than in workplaces that use information technology and are firmly 
placed in the “network economy” (Castells 1997), once powerful trade unions have 
generally responded belatedly and insufficiently to the challenges of globalisation. As one 
example of their weakness, they have not offered new or more inclusive notions of 
exploitation that could move them forward in this era of globalised trade and production 
processes:
The labor movement seems to be historically superseded ... [it] does not seem fit to 
generate by itself and from itself a project identity able to reconstruct social control and to 
rebuild social institutions in the Information Age. Labor militants will undoubtedly be a part
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of new, transformative social dynamics. I am less sure that labor unions will (Castells 
1997:360).
In essence, Castells argues that trade unions are no longer dominant agents of social change 
because the trade union movement has become “a political agent integrated into the realm 
of public institutions” (1997:354). As such, they are not positioned adequately to respond to 
the changed circumstances of work in Western countries, namely individualisation of work 
and the importance of networking and internationalisation for firms. Although these 
conditions might not all apply in equal measure to the nature of work in developing 
countries, trade unions here have lost ground due to other weaknesses. For example, in 
direct reference to Indonesia, Ford (2001) argues that Western paradigms about 
employment and work do not necessarily directly apply to developing countries and that an 
identity as worker is not always the most (or even very) meaningful in people’s lives. In 
conclusion, the question why workers would organise in trade unions instead of other social 
movements is a legitimate one, given the inability of most trade unions to take effective 
action against (or to mitigate) the excesses of global capitalism.
Nevertheless, in much of the world, paid labour is increasingly considered a necessity 
rather than a choice (or alternatively as desirable and preferable to unpaid and insecure 
labour), thus exposing growing numbers of people to the workplace and to fellow workers. 
Furthermore, far from being stagnant monolithic institutions, trade unions are making gains 
in some parts of the world. In South Africa and Australia, for example, although overall 
union density has largely remained stagnant, previously unorganised groups of workers 
have begun to unite through already existing trade unions, thereby slowly changing the 
image and even the operational procedures of trade unions. Of particular interest is the 
growing unionisation of women working in the service and health sectors and in the 
informal economy where home-based work and contract work are widespread (Hallock 
1997; McManus 1997). In Canada, the largest increase in unionised workers has been 
among women in the urban service sector, while in the United Kingdom unions have also 
started* to attract members among those who least fit the original Marxian definition of 
worker (Briskin 1999). Thus, there is no reason to assume that trade unions are unable to 
reinvent themselves or to spawn new organisations that can bring concrete improvements 
and become agents of social change in the coming decades.
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Trade unions as social movements?
Several observers of labour movements (Waterman 2001; Munck 2000a, 2000b) 
acknowledge that social movements increasingly emerge around identities rather than 
around concerns for redistribution that are based on objectively determined positions in 
economic and political structures. However, this shift is not limited to so-called ‘new’ or 
‘alternative’ social movements such as anti-globalisation protests or women’s movements, 
but potentially extends to workers who can also organise on the basis of identities other 
than class-based.3 In a practical sense, the global and fragmented (but networked) nature of 
production processes has meant that the very basis of organising workers has had to adapt 
to new realities. Waterman (2001) considers labour’s involvement in the anti-globalisation 
movements of the early twenty-first century as a good example of its attempts to broaden 
its organisational basis as well as its appeal to workers. In defence of trade unions, Munck 
argues that they are helped by the increasing willingness o f social activists to move beyond 
traditional dichotomies of political versus economic and work versus community. While he 
acknowledges the challenges faced by workers worldwide, Munck rejects Castells’ 
prognosis that trade unionism is largely ineffective and trade unions are institutions 
moribund in the face o f globalisation. Instead, he maintains that:
Once the traditional idea of the working class, as a central unifying feature in the socialist 
strategies, is abandoned, the doors are opened on a new radical democratic politics more 
attuned to the needs of [this] century. This, more pluralist, politics clearly entails an 
engagement with the multiple identities and diverse struggles of the new social movements.
... The growing heterogeneity of the labour force and the increasing impact of ‘flexible 
specialization’ can be, and has been, seen as an opportunity for labour even while it is a 
constraint on traditional strategies. As against a homogeneous working class we now have a 
heterogeneous labour force. Union leaders presume less to speak ‘on behalf of a mythical 
working class, instead diverse identities find their own voices and articulate their own 
strategies. Interest representation in a simple one-to-one model gives way to the pluralism 
of identity politics (2000a: 91-92).
Munck clearly realises that, in order to survive and increase their membership, trade unions 
need to engage with new social movements, such as the anti-globalisation, environmental, 
and women’s movements. However, to what extent can and do trade unions deliberately 
organise workers on the basis of identities other than class?
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That workers do not necessarily only unite based on class solidarity is evident from Koo’s 
study (2001) of South Korean workers. In it, he shows that the Korean labour movement -  
far from being unitary in its origins as a class-based movement -  during the 1970s and 
1980s developed extensive linkages with non-governmental organisations (NGOs), church- 
based groups and academics, often as part of larger democracy struggles. Through these 
linkages, trade unions were able to draw on and to some extent pull together the diverse 
aspects of workers’ collective identity as workers. His study highlights the making of a new 
working class, suggesting that “the same cultural and political factors that are often 
assumed to have produced labor subordination, such as traditional culture and state 
oppression, have also worked to facilitate a strong working-class movement in South 
Korea” (2001:8). Trade unions made use of these strong feelings of common cultural and 
gender identity to create the basis of a broadly based union identity:
Korean workers’ grievances and resentment were ... derived from multiple sources of 
oppression rather than simply from low wages and poor working conditions, and this was 
particularly so for women workers. They were not only economically exploited but also 
culturally and symbolically oppressed. Thus, in the Korean factory, class exploitation, 
gender oppression, and status subjugation combined to produce the workers’ intense 
frustration and resentment against the despotic management (2001:16).
Koo’s analysis suggests that workers can and do unite through trade unions when trade 
unions “go beyond” appeals to the traditional Marxian categories of class oppression. By 
highlighting that worker identity is composed of elements that build on but are not limited 
to the economic, Koo shows that the Korean labour movement broadened the conceptual 
bases of its membership as well as its raison d’etre. When social movements recognise that 
common interests -  whether derived from class or other expressions of identity -  are 
necessarily a social construction rather than the unproblematised, presumed outcome of a 
homogeneous and objectively categorised membership, then we can conceive in a much 
broader way the solidarity that brings workers together in networks, organisations, 
demonstrations, and other expressions of collective action.
Thus, workers no longer mobilise -  indeed, may never have mobilised -  only around 
interests as a working class; this is especially clear among women workers. Furthermore, 
they increasingly recognise that such interests are an outcome of negotiations and 
contestations carried out through collective action, rather than the starting point for
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collective action. When labour movements (or elements of them) challenge the meanings 
ascribed to work and to workers’ position in society and construct a more broadly based 
collective identity that includes forces such as gender, citizenship or place (as Gallin (2004) 
suggests some are doing), I argue that they are on par with the so-called ‘new social 
movements’.
Feminist analyses of women workers’ mobilising
The literature on women workers’ collective action owes much to the shift in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s in feminist thinking from women in development to gender and 
development, for it was the latter that questioned the gender-dimensions of the relocation of 
manufacturing industries from the developed to the developing world. The increase in 
labour force participation among young women in regions such as Southeast Asia, the US- 
Mexican border region, and the Caribbean was not merely analysed in terms of women’s 
contributions to the development effort. Starting with Elson and Pearson (1981), feminists 
increasingly pointed out the linkages between this new class of industrial workers and 
global economic and financial changes, and assessed critically women workers’ position in 
the global sexual division of labour, and by extension the gender-dimensions of visions of 
development as a linear drive towards modernisation.
Research in the 1980s and 1990s on women workers and the global assembly line 
frequently went beyond the traditionally exclusive focus in international political economy 
studies on the national and regional levels, instead highlighting the interaction between 
local and global (e.g. Enloe 1990; Nash and Femandez-Kelly 1983; Safa and Leacock 
1986; Ward 1990). In particular, this literature showed how women’s work was usually 
low-paid and ill-protected, precisely because it was done by women. Stereotypes of women 
as a young, docile, and uneducated work force assisted employers and governments alike in 
shaping Third World women as a cheap labour force that could be discarded when the quest 
for profits required the removal of the assembly line to the next frontier of cheap labour.
Feminist analyses of labour have often highlighted unequal power relations at the 
transnational and the local level, recognising the dialectic relationship between gender 
relations at the local level and global economic structures and labour regimes. Mies (1986),
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for example, showed how caste and gender divisions among lace-producing communities in 
India were reinforced by the requirements of global capital. Beneria and Roldan 
significantly contributed to feminists’ understanding of women’s work by showing how 
“the processes of creation and re-creation of class and gender relations take place 
simultaneously and involve both material and ideological dimensions” (1987:165). By 
offering a coherent link between the sexual division of labour and the global political 
economy, feminists demonstrated that women workers are an integral part of the 
international political economy, and set the stage for a focus on women workers as 
autonomous subjects of research.
To assess studies of women workers’ mobilising and organising efforts, it is useful to 
distinguish the different aspects of social movements that have been foregrounded. A 
number of common characteristics can be observed in feminist studies of women workers’ 
organising. To varying degrees, these commonalties correspond to the four properties of 
social movements that Tarrow (1998) has described: “mounting collective challenge, 
drawing on common purposes, building solidarity, and sustaining collective action.” While 
some feminists have addressed women workers’ mobilising from a rather empirical angle 
in which political opportunity structure takes centre-stage, others are more interested in the 
cultural and epistemological aspects. The next sections discuss the insights that feminists 
have added to each of these properties, highlighting the questions that arise when 
discussing women workers’ expressions and forms of collective action in the framework of 
social movement theories. It is important to note that Tarrow’s four properties of social 
movements are used here as a tool to ‘group’ feminist analyses of women workers’ 
mobilising, and that his definition and framework remain subject to challenges by feminists 
and others.
Collective challenge
Feminists have documented the engagement of women workers in collective struggles 
during the past 150 years and the challenges they have posed in the form of disruption of 
the practices or discourses of others (in other words, mounting collective challenges). Their 
analyses have included observations of women in strike action (Beckwith 1996, 1998; 
Fonow 1998; Tilly 1981) and accounts of women workers’ activism in labour organisations
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or lack thereof in developing countries (Chhachhi and Pittin 1996; Rowbotham and Mitter 
1994; Martens and Mitter 1994; Saptari 1995). Especially the last category of analyses 
increasingly draws direct linkages between, on the one hand, the settings of women’s 
labour and the industrial relations systems under which they work, and on the other hand, 
women’s lived experiences and potential for resistance.
A large part of this literature concentrates on case studies recounting best practices of how 
to organise groups of women workers who are often called “difficult to organise”. These 
include Free Trade Zone workers, home-based workers, migrant workers, domestic 
workers, and sex workers (Enloe 1990; Rowbotham and Mitter 1994; Martens and Mitter 
1994; Boris and Pruegl 1996; Ledwith and Colgan 2002; Hensman 1996, 2002; Chhachhi 
and Pittin 1996; Kempadoo and Doezema 1998; Wee and Sim 2003). The negative attitude 
of many trade unions and federations towards integration of (particular) women into their 
membership4 -  as well as the immediate economic necessities of women living in poverty -  
have contributed to this particularly practical focus of the literature. The increasing 
visibility of so-called ‘unusual’ forms of work highlights women’s different experiences in 
the labour market. However, there are too few studies that tell us through what 
organisational forms the millions of women in ‘regular’ kinds of employment, especially in 
rural areas, sustain their collective action.
Furthermore, such analyses have often aimed to explain women’s organising or lack thereof 
largely as a function of their gendered position in the labour force and the production 
process. For example, Diane Wolf (1992) notes that rebellion by young women is 
frequently more successful at home than in the factory. Although consciousness about their 
unequal position as women appears to flow over from home to the factory, Wolf argues that 
the particular shape of capitalist development in Indonesia prevents young women from 
organising collective action in the workplace (see also Saptari 1995).
The Committee for Asian Women (1995), an Asian regional NGO concerned with women 
workers’ rights, reports on the difficulties of unionisation in South Korea, which during the 
1980s was the first Asian country to experience outsourcing. In South Korea, the increasing 
use of subcontracting chains in garments and electronics manufacturing comprised the 
formation of small working groups within the original factory, though these working
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groups were each considered to be individual and independent subcontracting factories. The 
small size of each group (20 women) made it virtually impossible for women to form a 
union or organise collective protest. The ease with which unionised workers could (and still 
can) be fired contributed to the general feeling of uncertainty and fear among workers. 
These conditions resulted in reluctance to undertake labour activism and declining labour 
unity among women workers. Many other industries and countries throughout Asia have 
now also experienced rapid declines in unionisation rates for similar reasons (Gallin 2004; 
Oxfam 2004a).
Economic restructuring has clearly forced women workers in diverse parts of the world to 
search for innovative ways of organising, in order to “interrupt, obstruct, or render 
uncertain” (Tarrow 1998:5) capitalist structures and processes that often make traditional 
trade unionism impossible. Much can be learned from the patterns of globalisation and 
economic restructuring, their impact on women workers, and women workers’ responses, 
as described by Asian Exchange (1995), Beneria and Roldan (1987), Chhachhi and Pittin 
(1996), Enloe (1990), Marchand and Runyan (2000), Rai (2002b), Razavi (1999), 
Rowbotham and Mitter (1994), Theobald (2002), Tjandraningsih (2000), Ward (1990), and 
Wolf (1992). However, women workers’ collective action is frequently more than a means 
to achieve social justice. Its meaning may extend to become an end in itself for the 
empowerment of workers, and organising by women workers may therefore imply more 
than the existence of a struggle over working conditions. It follows that success and failure 
go beyond the immediately visible outcomes of the struggle to encompass what the process 
of struggle has meant for the participants (including its unintended consequences).
Thus, above and beyond instrumental interpretations, collective challenge by women 
workers also implies cultural struggles over meaning, symbols, and naming processes. 
Detailing women’s role in strike action in Virginia in the late 1980s, Beckwith recounts that 
“the construction [by the union] of class as collectivity ... emphasized class identity at the 
expense of a gendered identity of women as women” and was therefore challenged by 
participating women (1998:154). The women workers’ organisations described by Enloe 
(1990), Rowbotham and Mitter (1994), and Pruegl (1999) challenged narrow masculine- 
biased definitions of who is a worker, who can or is allowed to organise collectively, and 
what type of organisation constitutes collective action. Analyses of women’s movements
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also challenge the masculine notion that social movements are confined to the formal, 
public sphere and point out that women’s movements are “groups with a self- 
consciousness or awareness of being a group and with some level of organisation, although 
not all members necessarily participate in those organisations” (Stienstra 1999:263; see also 
Sperling 1998 and Lind 2000). Collective challenges by women workers in new (or newly 
visible) forms of employment have therefore ‘disrupted’ conventional notions of who is a 
worker and what we understand to be work, workplaces, and sites for collective action, 
much in the fashion of ‘new social movements’.
In an era when labour organising increasingly diverges from any traditional model, 
“organising ... is centered on sites of social reproduction rather than on production, the 
home, the school, and public transportation” (Zugman 2003:161). Women workers are 
likely to break down barriers between what are considered the public and private sphere, 
recognising the artificial and often arbitrary nature of this divide. In diverse circumstances 
around the world (but especially in Latin America), this has led women to emphasise their 
identities as mothers and wives as a form of collective protest (Radcliffe 1993). Because of 
women’s frequent responsibility for household and children’s wellbeing, an inability to 
fulfil traditional roles may act as encouragement for collective action. Kaplan (1997) sees 
much participation and leadership by women in collective action as stemming from “female 
consciousness”, which is not biologically based but rather derived from women's gender 
roles as wives and mothers and the protection of life that these roles involve. Women are 
thus inclined to extend issues of family and household survival to questions of morality and 
social justice. This may take the shape of ‘tactical essentialism’, but may alternatively be 
based on deeply felt emotional ties to highly valued or highly symbolic roles and 
responsibilities in society, community and household. Although such action may be 
predicated on what Molyneux (1985) has called practical gender needs (for survival in 
accordance with traditional gender roles), it may nonetheless carry political implications 
beyond its original intentions.
Much collective action by women challenges conservative notions of the public-private 
divide not only through women’s bodily presence in the public arena but also through 
‘framing’, that is, the articulation of movement issues and the process of infusing them with 
meaning for both supporters and adversaries. Tarrow notes that “framing not only relates to
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the generalization of a grievance, but defines the ‘us’ and ‘them’ in a movement’s conflict 
structure”, in other words creates boundaries between members and adversaries (1998:21; 
see also Taylor and Whittier 1992). Radcliffe (1993) and Alvarez (1990) show how women 
activists in Latin America have at times taken advantage of constructions by politicians and 
religious leaders of women as mothers and caretakers of the family and household. Such 
constructions allowed them to mobilise based on their identities as mothers of political 
dissidents, hence locating and politicising unexpected spaces for collective action. Thus, 
framing allows women to define themselves and their issues strategically, using traditional 
gender roles that are given new meanings, or mobilising new and more confrontational 
images and symbols.
Feminist contestations around meanings and definitions of collective challenge are also 
important in a practical sense, given that social movement theorists such as Tarrow (1998) 
and McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) point to the role of a shared historical experience 
in constructing common meanings and creating group solidarity. Feminists have long 
challenged the construction of such shared meanings and experiences on exclusively male 
terms, including in the workplace where trade unionism is still frequently regarded as an 
attribute of masculinity. By uncovering and celebrating women’s union activism in the past 
and present and in both usual and unexpected locations, feminists and the movements they 
describe expand common definitions of what is political action (Tilly 1981; Rowbotham 
and Mitter 1994). They thereby focus attention on everyday forms of politics and 
resistance, a phenomenon given wide circulation by James Scott (1985) and which 
incorporates new ‘repertoires of protest’ practised by women workers. These include theft, 
sabotage, absenteeism, fainting, and hysteria, in contrast to strikes, work stoppage, picket 
lines, and other traditional and more organised expressions of contention (Ong 1987; Lee 
1998; Wolf 1992; Smyth and Grijns 1997; Mills 1999; Tjandraningsih 1995).
However, the question remains to what extent and how such individual, more or less 
spontaneous, and often symbolic forms of resistance are extended or duplicated by women 
workers in collective and more permanent forms of organising. How can they form the 
basis for group solidarity? Kaplan (1997) has described in detail the extensive informal 
networks that link women activists in the United States and South Africa at the local level 
(around issues of the environment, housing, and poverty). Yet, the above studies largely
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omit the mention of what holds together (or has the potential to hold together) women 
workers’ acts of subversion or resistance at or near workplaces. Alternatively, they assume 
a natural progression from individual to collective action, whereas it is important to specify 
the manner in which such expansion of scale occurs and the factors that mediate it.
Common purpose and solidarity
Analyses about women workers’ organising in developing countries frequently describe the 
reasons women hesitate to or are prevented from establishing or joining unions and other 
workers’ organisations, whereas the question that needs to be asked is what drives some 
women workers to claim a voice. They emphasise mostly the system-specific obstacles to 
women’s participation arising from male-dominated trade union leadership and women’s 
particular location in the workforce, as well as gender-specific obstacles such as the 
unequal domestic burden faced by many women (discussed further in Chapters Three and 
Five). However, reviewing previous analyses of women in trade unions in developed 
countries, Lawrence (1994) rightfully notes that the removal of obstacles to women’s 
participation does not guarantee that women will join unions or their activities. It follows 
that women’s diverse reasons for joining unions should be examined carefully in order to 
understand the processes through which women workers recognise or construct a common 
purpose and feelings of solidarity.
Reasons for joining a movement organisation will differ depending on the level at which 
the organisation is active, i.e. at the national, regional, or local level (Kaplan 1997), which 
will in turn have consequences for visions of the movement as a means to an end or as an 
end in itself (Melucci 1989). In the United States, women were variously found to have 
joined unions in order to gain economic independence, because they had less to lose than 
their male colleagues in terms of risk to promotion, because of the influence of feminist 
politics, or because occupational segregation meant that there were no men around to 
represent them (Lawrence 1994:14-20). In Australia, Franzway (2002:56-62) found many 
union women to have been motivated by a sense of social justice, in addition to some who 
spoke about their hopes and expectations in terms of traditional unionism. These findings 
invite an assessment of the rewards women workers expect from trade unionism in each
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instance, their position in the labour market, and their experiences in the organisational 
structure and culture of trade unions.
Taking into account cultural and historical particularities, women in developing countries 
perhaps face different constraints and are motivated by different rewards than were found 
by Lawrence in the United States and Franzway in Australia. Since women’s struggles 
usually occur in relation not (only) to global but (also) to local political or economic 
developments (Basu 1996), considering these struggles in their historical and cultural 
context will expose what may be less generalisable but often more significant elements. For 
example, home-based garment workers in Mexico-City began to organise when their 
employers’ responses to the devastating 1985 earthquake demonstrated the nature and 
extent of worker exploitation (Enloe 1990; Rowbotham and Mitter 1994). Although in 
almost all contexts union women deal with “sexual politics” (Franzway 2002) in 
institutions based on patriarchal norms, the particular forms of patriarchy as evident in 
gender regimes and gender norms will differ in each country (Connell 2002).
Because social movements increasingly revolve around expressions of collective identity, 
participation in them may also be contingent on a movement offering members sufficient 
opportunities for self-identification. In practical terms, the construction and recognition of 
common purpose within and through a trade union “relies upon identifying with the issues 
that the union pursues and the image and symbolism of unionism” (McManus 1997:32). 
Franzway argues that without investigating the sexual politics of trade unions, they remain 
“men’s movements” and gender issues remain “attached to women”:
The fact that the trade union movement has been dominated by men numerically, culturally 
and hierarchically throughout its history is often overlooked, a view that is confirmed by 
assumptions that men are gender-neutral. Men’s gender difference, including their 
sexuality, is denied, and thus what is specific to men, their dominance of the trade union 
movement, can be ignored (2002:93).
Similarly, writing about North American union women, Forrest criticises industrial 
relations thinking for overlooking gender:
The basic assumption that underlies much of the analysis is that, whatever women are 
doing, they are women first and foremost and driven by motivations uniquely female ...
Men are never compared with women: men are assumed to be workers while women are
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not. Indeed, industrial relations constructs men only as workers and never as men” (Forrest 
1993:330-1).
Given that the prevailing image (and leadership) of unions worldwide is still predominantly 
male (Chhachhi and Pittin 1996), some studies of women workers investigate how women 
formulate their common vision, sustain feelings of identification, reach agreement on the 
modalities of action, and manage internal and external differences (Arifin 1988; Pineda- 
Offeneo and Del Rosario 1988; Beckwith 1998; Saltzman 2001). Configurations of power, 
political culture, and the type of arena in which contentious action is located, influence the 
emergence and expression of collective identity, and the choice of that identity. For 
example:
Beyond the specific concerns and circumstances of individual strikes, national contexts ... 
shape the content and expression of the collective identities of women in movements. 
Where class consciousness is strong, gender-based consciousness and solidarity among 
women ‘as women5 will evince a developmental pattem and content different from those 
that emerge in contexts where class consciousness is diffuse or positioned in competition 
with ethnic- or religious-based identities, for example (Beckwith 1998:150).
Zugman’s (2003) study of women workers’ organising on the Mexican-American border in 
the early 1990s provides a good example of the local context. She describes the disjunction 
between the traditional (racialised) workers’ identity put forward by the local union, and 
the identities as mothers and wives that women workers felt were meaningful to their lives 
and their experiences of the workplace. But while the competitive production process 
directly prevented women from organising, Zugman focuses not on these structural 
impediments but rather on the company management’s use of language and discourse of 
family and community to ensure the women’s deference to management. Whereas in this 
case unions saw a lack of class consciousness as the reason for the women’s refusal to 
unionise, the women workers themselves were confronted with a union identity that did not 
recognise their cultural background and the family discourse they faced from the company 
management. It thus becomes clear that for these women the struggle to organise also 
involved a struggle to assign a different meaning to the identity of motherhood against the 
company’s dominant discourse and to challenge the limited sense of common purpose put 
forward by local unions. Thus, it makes sense to analyse “patterns of gender power in many 
institutions and over long historical periods” in order to understand better the workings of 
gender, class and race in trade unions (Cockbum 1994:111).
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Sustaining collective action
When examining what accounts for the continuation of collective action over a longer 
period of time in the face of practical and strategic obstacles, many studies of women 
workers have focused on these women’s propensity to question organisational structure and 
to instigate changes to it. Franzway (2002) describes the efforts of union women to 
question the dual commitment required of women by their unions and by their households, 
thus exposing the importance of broader feminist issues for union women. Ford (2001), on 
the other hand, analyses how the organisational characteristics of women’s NGOs impact 
on the aims and needs of women workers in Indonesia. More generally, studies of women’s 
movements have called attention to the different organisations involved in a movement. For 
example, Ferree and Martin (1995) distinguish between the American women’s movement 
and the organisations that sustain it through their activities, akin to the submerged networks 
described by Melucci (1989). Together these studies show the importance of distinguishing 
the different types of organisations involved in a movement.
In relation to sustaining collective action, it is especially relevant for feminists to examine 
how a social movement based on identity, such as a women’s movement or trade unions, 
relates to other social movements. Several studies have questioned the nature of relations 
between women workers’ organisations, the mainstream trade union movement, and the 
women’s movement, with some drawing attention to global or transnational linkages 
(Cohen and Rai 2000; Enloe 1990; Hensman 2002; Ledwith and Colgan 2002; Ray and 
Korteweg 1999; Rowbotham and Mitter 1994). Successful collaboration beyond 
networking may indeed be rare in practice, with the exception of some Latin American and 
Indian feminist organisations (Gandhi 1996; Alvarez et al. 2003). The Australian women 
trade unionists interviewed by Franzway experienced serious discrimination at the hands of 
their male colleagues, yet did “not regard the women’s movement as a resource or a site 
where they might contest feminist politics” (1997:137).
How much support do the emerging transnational labour movement or women’s 
movements offer to women workers’ organisations in Southeast Asia and what determines 
their attitude? According to some, competing class interests account for the inability or
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unwillingness of women’s movements to problematise women workers’ issues (for 
example Cook 1998 on Thailand). Others, in contrast, put the blame partially on leftist 
movements which “seem incapable of overcoming the ‘natural’ division of labor between 
men and women” (Ray and Korteweg 1999:63) and link the issue back to the question 
whether autonomy or affiliation will best serve the advancement of women’s interests.
When discussing strategies employed by women workers to sustain their collective action, 
union women and union observers have debated the advantages and disadvantages of 
separate organising or autonomy as opposed to integration into unions (Briskin 1999; 
Franzway 2002; Gandhi 1996). Why would (and do) women workers organise separately 
from the labour, women’s, and other movements? Is it because mainstream interest groups 
do not represent them or because their interests do not fit into any one already existing 
group? Addressing a South Asian context of a male-dominated trade union movement and a 
largely unsympathetic or overburdened women’s movement, Hensman (1996) suggests that 
only “a women workers’ movement that is autonomous from the trade union movement” 
can achieve significant improvements in gender equality inside and outside the workplace. 
This would imply that women workers must continue to wage struggles both as 
constituencies within movements such as the trade union movement (for recognition of 
their interests as women) and as members of larger movements (for interests that they share 
with men as workers).
Strategies on how to sustain collective action by women workers (both as an outcome and 
as a prerequisite) are central to this debate. Chapters Six and Seven will analyse in more 
detail how this debate plays out in women workers’ organisations, trade unions, and 
women’s movements in Thailand and Indonesia. What is relevant to note here is that, while 
focusing on organisational strategies, the above-mentioned studies take as a given the 
existence of a common purpose and solidarity on which women workers are expected to 
build their collective action.
However, the diverse strategies to sustain collective action not only reflect concerns over 
the effectiveness of different forms of protest and movement. They also reveal much about 
the cultural struggles being waged by women workers and point to debates about the 
meaning of the collective action and its aims. In the context of Latin America, Alvarez et
41
al. (2003) note that the feminist movement during the past two decades has faced internal 
rifts based on differences of opinion concerning feminist interpretations of equality and 
difference. In other instances, women organise separately to avoid the loss of identity that 
would occur if they became part of mass movements or if they were perceived to be part of 
the state structure (Heilman 1992). Thus, separate or autonomous structures for women (or 
for women workers) do not only refer to spaces where women can build their skills and 
discuss their issues free from male domination and in a supportive environment (until such 
a time when they can be integrated at equal level with men).
For many feminists, such structures are in fact places where an alternative culture is 
allowed to flourish, where hierarchy is challenged, and where power and identity can be 
reappropriated (Lind 1992; Acker 1995). Although radical feminism is not influential in 
Southeast Asia, some cultures in this region have elements of gender-segregated traditions 
based on a belief in women’s difference from men (see Chapters Five to Seven). This may 
increase the appeal of autonomous organising, in addition to the practical necessity of 
providing women with safe spaces to organise. Thus, the emergence of separate or 
integrated women workers’ organisations reflects cultural and political processes in each 
context. As Acker (1995) concludes, organisations are embedded in class, racial, gender, 
and other structures in society, which undermine or support particular ways of organising.
Feminists have also argued that much of the literature on social movements does not 
recognise the gendered nature of sustaining collective action or explain the particular 
organisational forms that mobilising and organising among women workers often takes 
(Stienstra 1994 and 1999; Goetz 1997). For example, women workers’ organisations appear 
to be particularly often engaged in transnational or cross-border advocacy such as the Clean 
Clothes Campaign when compared with traditional, male-dominated trade unions (Kuehl 
2003; Wick 2003). But why women workers’ organisations have such different repertoires 
of contention and strategies remains to be examined. For example, when feminists have 
written about the gender differences involved in collective challenges, they have focused 
primarily on transnational movements rather than local-level movements or networks 
(Stienstra 2000; Cohen and Rai 2000). However, by privileging outside influences they 
leave unanswered the question: how may the political, economic and cultural context (both 
globally and locally) shape women workers’ organisational strategies.
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Similarly, the organisational influence of trade union leadership and its rhetoric is 
sometimes overstated, at the expense of the role played by cultural and ideological factors 
(for example Beckwith 1998). If women’s specific ways of organising exist, do gender 
differences arise out of circumstances or priorities particular to women’s experiences or the 
culture in which they are located, or are they the result of organising according to explicitly 
feminist principles? Or are they the result of deliberate strategies to draw women 
participants into the movement? These questions deserve further research.
Transnational organising
Recent analyses have made clear that women workers in many places are increasingly 
using strategies characteristic of transnational social movement organisations, such as new 
modes of communication, international and cross-border alliances and advocacy, and new 
modalities of organising members at local levels (Zugman 2003; Gallin 2004). It is 
therefore important to review the transnational aspect of women workers’ organising and 
mobilising. The more structure-oriented social movement theories (collective grievances 
and resource mobilisation) until recently assumed the centrality of people’s challenges vis- 
a-vis the nation-state or local employers. However, increasingly globalised modes of 
production and consumption have expanded the nature of common purpose and solidarity 
beyond borders in ways that previously were attempted only by some labour movements.
According to Keck and Sikkink, the resulting new transnational advocacy networks that 
have gained global influence during the past thirty years “must be understood as political 
spaces, in which differently situated actors negotiate -  formally or informally -  the social, 
cultural, and political meanings of their joint enterprise” (1998:3). Keck and Sikkink 
describe several factors that are likely to give rise to transnational advocacy networks: 
nationally based actors seeking contact across borders to put pressure on the state; the 
expectation that networking can strengthen campaigns; and the establishment and 
strengthening of networks through international conferences and other cross-border arenas 
(1998:12).
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What significance does analysis of transnational advocacy networks hold for studies of 
women workers’ organising? Although the primary subject of this thesis is mobilisation 
and organisation at the local level rather than transnational activism, each of the above 
factors is of importance in shaping national or local women workers’ organisations. 
Although bom out of the particular circumstances of their individual location, women 
workers’ organisations have been influenced to a great extent by international or global 
circumstances: through the international conferences of the United Nations and global 
NGOs; the circulation of the language of human rights and women’s rights; and the rapid 
spread of information and discourse beyond borders. Chapters Six and Seven show that 
women workers’ groups also mobilise powerful symbols that circulate globally and use 
global and regional alliances for leverage politics (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Stienstra adds 
that “given the nature of transnational women’s movements, we can assume that women 
will organize in diffuse rather than unitary ways, with flexible structures [and] many 
alliances” (2000:212). As such, the characteristics of transnational advocacy movements 
provide useful starting points for the study of local movements.
Yet, the transnational framework as proposed by Keck and Sikkink applies most effectively 
to networks that oppose the state, given its focus on strategies to hold states accountable 
and to push for policy change at the national level. More research is needed to determine its 
usefulness and its limitations when applied to less unitary actors such as networked 
companies, employers, and investors, who often are the target of workers’ organising 
(though see Enloe 1990 and Zugman 2003 for examples of the difficulties of transnational 
alliances). The emerging literature on codes of conduct and similar alternative tools to hold 
companies accountable for workers’ rights offers interesting clues in this regard, but has 
not focused sufficiently on either gender issues or social movements (Wick 2003).
Symbols and values circulate globally through media, legal and popular discourses -  
discourses to which women workers have unequal access due to poverty, exclusion or 
disempowerment. There is therefore an urgent need for focus on transnational organising 
‘from below’ as it occurs and is experienced at local levels and among marginalised groups 
(Marchand and Runyan 2000:158). Research on well-educated women in urban, often 
large-scale and transnational organisations or networks (Tinker 1999; Stienstra 2000) 
shows the importance of a global identity as activist which women frequently use in order
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to legitimise what might otherwise be seen as overstepping traditional gender boundaries. 
However, women living in poverty who frequently mobilise in unofficial, marginalised 
groupings at grassroots level (Kaplan 1997) may well have significantly different 
experiences in relation to public activism. Therefore, the experiences of Northern-based 
and/or elite women’s organisations and activists cannot be assumed to be the same in low- 
income countries and communities.
Lastly, by linking local forms of gender inequalities directly with transnational activism, 
feminists such as Chandra Mohanty (1997) omit the crucial stage of the formation of local 
collective action. Mohanty writes of “her belief that ‘common differences’ can form the 
basis of deep solidarity” (2003:3) and focuses on “an anticapitalist transnational feminist 
practice -  and on the possibilities, indeed on the necessities, of cross-national feminist 
solidarity and organizing against capitalism” (2003:5). However, while transnational 
networks feed on and support local organising by women workers, global or cross-border 
labour or women’s activism cannot be assumed to bring forth automatically large-scale 
local movements. These limitations point to areas where further research is needed, and 
where social movement theories might be usefully applied in conjunction with a gender and 
transnational perspective.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that applying social movement theories to the study of women 
workers’ mobilising and organising efforts (whether within trade unions or autonomously) 
brings to the fore both the factors specific to particular political and economic regimes that 
influence the outcomes of these efforts and the meanings inherent in these efforts or 
expressed through them by women workers. Resource mobilisation perspectives provide 
insights about the concrete constraints and possibilities facing women workers due to the 
political and economic context in which they operate and in which they formulate their 
goals and strategies. On the other hand, by examining women workers’ organisations from 
a cultural viewpoint, it becomes clear that these organisations may be part of a network of 
organisations and movements that challenges political practices and discourses that 
reproduce unequal relations of power. Although some analyses of women workers have 
tended to view mobilising and organising from a purely institutional angle, others have
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grappled with the complexities of collective identity formation and its consequences for 
building and sustaining collective action. It is the latter category that has located in women 
workers’ mobilisation and organisation the potential for a broader struggle over access to 
power, and in particular over gendered mechanisms of power. These conclusions provide a 
basis for explorations in Chapter Two of the collective interests and identities that form the 
foundation of women workers’ groups in Thailand and Indonesia.
With respect to the meanings that women workers themselves ascribe to their collective 
action, this chapter has argued for the importance of understanding the processes through 
which women workers constitute and contest a collective identity that allows them to voice 
their interests. Because these processes are unstable and contingent on political, cultural 
and economic contexts, the next chapter attempts to shed light on how women workers 
address and resolve the tensions between the different identities (and identity-defining 
factors) that may flow from (or are allowed to be expressed by) these contexts. How and 
around what politics do they mobilise, and how do their strategies shape possibilities for 
alliances with other social movements or movement organisations? More broadly, when 
women workers organise in groups that could be identified by outsiders as women’s or 
workers’ groups, are they making any claims in relation to womanhood and dominant 
gender identities? Chapter Two will present a theoretical investigation into the role of 
identity in women’s movements and their organisations, using feminist theories of women 
as a collectivity and of the politics of difference and representation as its starting points.
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1 Others disagree with the differentiation between ‘old’ and ‘new’ social movements, calling the gap 
“overblown” (Hobson 2003:1).
2 Zugman objects to the often-used distinction between old and new social movements: “the distinction 
between the ‘new’ (environmentalism, identity politics) and the ‘old’ (social justice movements, unions) 
does not allow us to understand movements like Fuerza Unida [a Mexican-American women workers’ 
organisation] that straddle these definitions. Sociology ought to move beyond this dichotomy, with 
sociologists viewing activism as emerging in response to regional economic integration. To theorize these 
movements effectively, white middle-class individuals can no longer be the starting point for understanding 
subjectivity -  the center of social movement theory. Workforces in the United States and the world are 
becoming increasingly racially diverse. If sociologists wish to comprehend the dynamics of social change 
and consciousness, we must understand that sexism, colonialism, and racism are historical forces that shape 
the consciousness of the workforce of the new millennium, as well as our own consciousness” (Zugman 
2003:162).
3 My focus here on class and gender should by no means be interpreted to mean that these are the only 
dimensions of identity that have the power to mobilise people into collective action (this issue will be 
revisited in Chapters Five to Seven). For example, Perry illustrates the relative insignificance of class by 
pointing out that many workers in China “have been more consumed with the politics of ‘place’ -  a quest 
for social and cultural status entailing a desire to elude, rather than to embrace, the ranks of the proletariat -  
than with a ‘class’ struggle to further their interests qua workers” (1996:3).
4 Although many federations in Europe and the United States clearly recognise the importance of women 
for the revitalisation of unions and have publicly declared their commitment to gender equality in unions 
(e.g. the 1994 statement made by the two main Dutch trade union federations FNV and CNV before the 
Beijing Fourth Conference on Women), this has had little impact beyond state-borders. From time to time, 
federations in developing countries sound similar calls but these have yet to be acted upon with adequate 
resources necessary to realise gender equality (with South African unions being a notable exception). This 
leads me to conclude that a majority of trade unions in developing countries remain hostile to the 
promotion of gender equality, or at best reluctant to take significant steps in that direction.
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Chapter 2 - Social movements, recognition and the politics of
Identity
Introduction
Chapter One noted that social movement theory increasingly takes account not only of 
system-specific constraints and opportunities to women workers’ mobilising and organising 
but also of the cultural struggles around identity and meaning in which women workers 
engage in developing and developed countries. Studies of women’s collective action in 
general and women workers in particular show that the modes and forms of such organising 
are intimately related to challenges to processes of knowledge-making and participation in 
particular contexts of gender, class, race, age, and ethnicity. But notwithstanding feminists’ 
recognition that women workers are active agents in resisting global capitalism, so far few 
accounts have examined the specific identity-constituting processes through which women 
workers come to formulate, consolidate, and express their collective interests as a group. 
What motivates women workers to act collectively and to see themselves as a group? How 
are the claims they make related to the identities through which they organise? For 
example, groups of women workers in Thailand have formed organisations (self-described 
as ‘women workers’ though not as feminist) that manifestly are concerned with particular 
women workers’ issues and general labour issues, but hardly with general women’s issues 
that do not directly impact on the workplace. What political, economic, and cultural 
processes do such groups reflect through their collective identities and through their 
common interests? In trying to answer these questions, this chapter employs critical 
feminist theory to analyse the modalities and meanings of women workers organising in 
developing countries.
This chapter has three main aims: to show that identities are at the basis of women’s 
mobilisation and are constitutive of the interests expressed by their collective action; to link 
identities with post-modern questions about women as a group; and to explore how gender 
difference may be used in women workers’ struggles for recognition and redistribution. 
After exploring the concept of interest in the first section, the chapter discusses feminist
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perspectives on the politics of identity and their relationship to social movement theories 
discussed in Chapter One. It is argued that identity alone does not define interest because 
not all identities will be politically meaningful; identity requires self-conscious acting upon 
relevant conditions encountered in life to lead to formulation of interests. Yet, group 
interest is deliberated and formulated through groups that are an expression of collective 
identity and that thus reflect common responses to those diverse conditions. Hence it is 
important to consider the processes through which groups or organisations come to reflect 
and convey group interests and construct a common identity.
For post-modem (and other) feminists, the social construction of groups raises questions 
about the types of identities that are validated when women are seen to form a group. Here 
the chapter will draw on the work of Iris Young (1995) to differentiate between ‘serial 
collectivity’ and groups with politicised identity, in order to overcome problems of 
exclusion and universalism. The remainder of the chapter deals with the recognition aspect 
of women’s movements or organisations, in other words women’s struggles for political 
voice and inclusion (as analytically distinct from struggles for redistribution). Here it will 
be argued that women’s activism is shaped by cultural, political, and especially gendered 
norms of public participation and representation. Based on feminist theories of the politics 
of presence, in particular the arguments put forward by Anna Jonasdottir and Anne Phillips, 
the last sections of the chapter argue that gender difference may be used strategically in 
struggles for recognition but that this use may be in tension with women’s struggles to form 
coalitions and alliances around issues of redistribution. The conclusion of the chapter 
highlights possibilities for women workers to build local and transnational alliances in their 
struggles for political inclusion and voice.
From interests to politics of identity
While many feminists have written about demands that follow from women’s interests (e.g. 
the struggle to end violence against women, the fight for equal wages, or the right to inherit 
property), few have tried to construct theoretical frameworks to study women’s interests. 
One approach would be to label all interests that are experienced and expressed by women 
as gender interests. Another would be to label only those needs and desires related to 
women’s distinct social and economic role as gender interests, explicitly differentiating
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women from men. Molyneux (1985, 1998) provided some clarity to the debate by 
proposing a conceptual distinction between those interests that arise in response to 
women’s attempts to fulfil daily needs in keeping with their gender roles (practical gender 
interests), and those that derive from the aim to challenge those gender roles (strategic 
gender interests). She writes: “In the formulation o f practical interests there is the 
assumption that there is compliance with the existing gender order, while in the case of 
strategic interests there is an explicit questioning of that order and of the compliance of 
some women with it” (1985:235). Strategic interests can therefore usually be described as 
feminist interests, insofar as they challenge the status quo and implicitly foresee a 
redistribution of resources, tasks, and power relations affecting women.
Because researchers and practitioners in Gender and Development have frequently used the 
practical-strategic gender needs terminology, they have also refined it (for example Moser 
1989). With reference to poor women’s movements in Ecuador, Lind warns against a focus 
on practical interests alone:
It is too often assumed that most poor women are only concerned with their daily survival 
and therefore do not have a strategic agenda beyond their economic welfare. Hence, such 
women are not really challenging the sexual division of labor. Again, the plight of 
organized poor women is based on a notion of gender/class struggle, in which women fight 
on behalf of their households because of their particular reproductive roles. This type of 
analysis overlooks the critical contributions and challenges that organized poor women 
conceivably represent to the social order. Rarely, if ever, is discussion focused, for 
example, on how poor women negotiate power, construct collective identities, and develop 
critical perspectives on the world in which they live -  all factors that challenge dominant 
gender representations (1992:137; emphasis in original).
Similarly, writing about women’s movements in Brazil, Alvarez points out that women’s 
interests are too diverse to be able to divide them meaningfully into categories, as their 
articulation depends on both organisational and ideological resources, as well as political 
context:
The formulation and articulation of gender interests does not flow ‘naturally’ from 
women’s class position, race, or ethnicity, nor is it directly derivative of women’s insertion 
into dependent capitalist relations of production and reproduction. If class, race, or 
dependency are constitutive of strategic and practical gender interests ... they do not 
determine how such interests are ideologically framed or politically advanced (1990:265; 
emphasis in original).
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Thus, a focus on interests as either practical or strategic obscures the ways in which women 
may use seemingly practical interests to challenge their marginalised collective identity and 
politicise their needs. Although some analyses of women workers’ organising discount the 
importance of women’s participation in traditional protest over wages or overlook it 
entirely (because it does not explicitly concern gender issues), it is entirely possible that 
through such collective action women challenge the norms of public versus private and 
shift the boundaries of what is acceptable behaviour for women. Thus, struggles for 
redistribution cannot and should not be divorced from struggles for recognition of a 
particular group (Fraser 1995, 2003; Phillips 2003). The issue is not so much how to 
characterise interests, but how some women may use the expression of these interests to 
challenge their marginalised identity or construct a new collective identity as a group. Rai 
concludes that “both needs and interests are formulated in particular contexts that frame the 
processes of making choices. Because of this situatedness of interests, we also cannot take 
‘women’s interests’ as an acceptable convergence, except in a minimalist sense” 
(2002b: 165).
It therefore seems unlikely that interests derive directly from one’s position in political and 
economic structures as observed by outsiders. Rather, while they cannot be imputed 
directly from presumed identity, interests are surely constituted by the subjective 
experience of identities. Tarrow acknowledges that interest may be “no more than an 
objective category imposed by the observer” (Tarrow 1998:5). Similarly, Ray and 
Korteweg argue that “rather than imputing identity from articulated interests, and asking 
whether meeting these interests would change subjectively held identity, [social movement] 
scholars now centre identity, asking what subjectively held sense of self motivates women 
to act collectively” (1999:50; see also Lee 1998). The centrality of identity rather than 
interests in social movements is evident from the literature on new social movements, as 
described in Chapter One.
This raises the fundamental question how we are to conceptualise (let alone expect) 
solidarity between women workers -  or in any social movement -  when we run the risk of 
assuming interest on the basis of an objectively determined position in political or 
economic structures. As Molyneux warns, “claims about women’s objective interests need 
to be framed within specific historical contexts since processes of interest formation and
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articulation are clearly subject to cultural, historical and political variation and cannot be 
known in advance” (1998:77). In later sections, this chapter returns to the role of women’s 
interests in the construction of groups or social movements, but first it explores the question 
how feminists and new social movement theory have related identities and subject positions 
to mobilisation in collective action.
Various writers have described the declining influence of class-based identities in politics 
and their displacement by identity markers such as gender, race, ethnicity, and sexuality 
(Fraser 1995; Melucci 1989; Moghadam 1994; Phillips 1995). Fraser (1995) noted that 
recognition struggles based on identity were replacing class struggles around interests, 
exploitation, and redistribution. Indeed, throughout the world, social movements have 
increasingly formed around identities other than class. This may be because politics or 
movements based on class identity in recent years proved to be incapable of radically 
transforming the economic landscape and challenging the exclusion of the poor at anything 
more than a very slow pace.
Alternatively, class turned out to be more transient than other identities, as many blue- 
collar workers aimed to change their -  and their families’ -  fortunes for the better and thus 
at times sought to minimise class differences. Identities can be transitory such as class 
(though class markers may also become permanent in some cases), or based on more 
permanent components such as race, gender, and ethnicity (though these are still 
contingent) (Yuval-Davis 1994). As advocates of the women’s and racial rights movements 
pointed out, even if it were possible, few women or blacks would be satisfied with either 
the erasure or the complete elimination of their difference, as had been the goal for many 
radical activists in regard to class difference (Phillips 1995). Hence the emergence of so- 
called new social movements that have sought to carve out a political identity that would 
lead to political and cultural transformations. Activists and critical theorists increasingly 
recognise that such identities (and the interests expressed by them) are inherently unstable 
and contingent (Escobar and Alvarez 1992).
Such a politics of identity is inextricably linked to the rise of the subject in feminist theory. 
Post-modern and post-structuralist theories have generated a shift from contestations over 
boundaries of structures and material realities to include contestations over meanings and
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identities (White 1999; Whitworth 1994). Feminist theory approaches “identities [as] 
socially constructed as processes: they are embedded in and interact with historically 
specific social contexts composed of inter-subjective meaning systems, practices, 
institutional structures and material conditions” (Peterson 2003:112). As Moghadam 
asserts, “in a rejection of Marxian emphasis on economic determinants of identity 
formation, the new cultural analysis sees identities as historically and discursively 
constructed ... identities are seen as fluid and not primordial” (1994:5).
The implications of this shift are evident in the rejection among a growing number of 
feminists of uni versah sing meta-narratives in favour of specificity and historical context, 
and greater attention to subjectivities and identity though not neglecting the influence of 
institutions and systems (Lim 1990; Marchand and Runyan 2000; Ong 1987, 1991; Pearson 
and Theobald 1998;Sylvester 1995, 2000). Peterson concludes that “the study of identities 
must be historical, contextual and dynamic: asking not only how identities are located in 
time and space but also how they are (re)produced, resisted and reconfigured” (2003:112). 
In short, feminism itself has during the past twenty years become increasingly focused on 
identity as constructed, contested, and contingent.
Hanna Papanek has argued that identity is determined “by a lifetime of experience”, is the 
“product of individual learning”, but also is “shaped and reshaped ... by external forces 
bent on their own agendas of building new solidarities, new group boundaries, and new 
political alliances” (1994:44). If we accept this characterisation, it becomes clear that not 
only is individual identity not stable but it is also not automatically the same as collective 
identities. Identity cannot be assumed to derive without deviation from a larger common 
notion of collectivity (Stryker 2000; Snow and McAdam 2000). Nor is the opposite the 
case: since identities vary in their salience and in their relevance to particular situations, 
construction and contestation of collective identity involve appeals to particular aspects of 
the individual identities of potential and actual members of a social movement (or any 
collective grouping for that matter).
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Identity: Post-modern challenges
Collective identity is not always democratically determined or freely chosen and 
experienced. Rather, “the interests of the entire group in achieving conformity [of identity] 
will ... be invoked [to present a united front to others] to increase control over weaker or 
less ‘obedient’ members, decreasing the range of choices for individuals” (Papanek 
1994:45). This means in practice that those who form part of a minority or of multiple 
minority groups may feel the need to make difficult decisions about which identity/ies they 
prioritise and act upon, since “differences are always contextual and relational” (Moore 
2000:1130). Management of the plurality of (differently felt) identities within a group or 
movement has repercussions for women, as differences are never singularly defined.
Indonesian history also reminds us that identity is not always freely chosen or acted upon, 
but instead can be legitimised or de-legitimised by dominant discourses in society (see also 
Zugman 2003). As will be discussed in Chapters Three and Seven, the New Order regime 
in Indonesia employed the power of hegemonic discourse in its attempts to gain full control 
over the labour movement after the late 1960s. In all political references, it gradually 
replaced the term buruh, which translates as ‘worker’ but with the connotation of blue- 
collar working class, with the more neutral term pekerja which encompasses blue- as well 
as white-collar workers. Since the mid-1990s, however, Indonesian workers have started to 
reclaim the term buruh and invest it with positive meanings more closely related to trade 
unionism (Ford 2000; Bourchier 1994). This example shows once more how collective 
identities are constructed and continually contested, in this case between workers, 
employers, and the state.
The recognition that collective identity is not always freely chosen also points to a 
theoretical obstacle exposed by post-modernist feminists. Feminists have clearly shown the 
workings of gender regimes, in other words, the ways in which discourses, institutions, and 
structures attempt to construct “women” in line with dominant visions of femininity and 
1 masculinity (Stivens and Sen 1998; Sylvester 1995, 2000; Frith 1999). Such contestations 
over definitions and over gender regimes have real consequences since regimes of 
accumulation involve “proper definitions of womanhood and manhood that distribute 
privilege” and power (Pruegl 1999:198). But through what processes are women workers
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constructed as a group by others such as employers, government, male workers, and 
researchers, or do women workers construct themselves as a group? Munck (2000b) warns 
us that increasingly globalised circumstances of workers do not guarantee the emergence of 
similarly disposed classes of workers. In the same way, the fact that millions of women 
workers around the world share exploitative working conditions does not automatically 
lead them to establish groups or organisations, whether as women or as workers.
Post-modern feminists have argued that women do not necessarily form a predetermined 
and natural constituency and that highlighting gender differences (taken as male-female 
differences) may obscure differences between women (Goetz 1991; Hirshman 1995; 
Marchand and Parpart 1995; Mohanty 1988, 1991; Ong 1991; Pearson and Jackson 1998; 
Sylvester 1995, 2000; White 1999). Social movement theory has similarly encountered this 
problem of defining what is collective action and who is involved in it. As Jelin writes:
It is the researcher who proposes the reading of a set of practices as a social movement ... 
Social movements are objects constructed by the researcher which do not necessarily 
coincide with the empirical form of collective action. Seen from the outside, they may 
present a certain degree of unity, but internally they are always heterogeneous, diverse 
(1986:22) (quoted in Escobar and Alvarez 1992:6).
While outsiders might easily regard such entities as women’s groups, what do these people 
call themselves and their groups? Differences among women are arguably as large as 
differences between men and women: “just as ‘Western women’ or ‘white women’ cannot 
be defined as coherent interest groups, ‘third world women’ also do not constitute any 
automatic unitary group” (Mohanty 1991:6-7). Sylvester remarks that “‘women’ is an 
indeterminate subject status and a continually ‘becoming’ identity rather than the realm of 
the given and fixed that many of us, including some feminists, think it is” (2000:24). Her 
reading of ‘women’ as an uncertain subject status that is ‘filled’ by various regimes of truth 
operating simultaneously suggests that gender identities can have many different meanings 
that defy easy and singular categorisation. Sylvester argues that “if gender is a regime­
shaped construction, then it is sensible to view ... women as ‘women’, that is, as bearers of 
an unsettled, unfixed and indeterminate subject status that the people thus labelled may or 
may not embrace” (1995:184). The question therefore is not only why and how are women 
workers motivated to form groups to undertake collective action, but also how can we
56
speak about groups of women workers without validating essentialist and universalising 
identities.
Rai illustrates the indeterminate nature of women as a group in her discussion of quota 
politics in India. She quotes opponents of the passage of a Bill for quotas for women in 
Parliament as saying that the Bill would represent “the creation of a new constituency 
which is not defined by social or economic criteria, strictly speaking, and whose 
characteristics are, in fact, totally unknown -  even the representatives of this [reserved] 
constituency would be unable to say which it is that women stand for and men don’t” (Rai 
2002a: 172).1 Indeed, women are not a unitary or static category but in reality experience 
fragmentation and tensions as a group, and gender differences are by definition culturally 
determined and variable.
It is not the intention of this chapter to reiterate or attempt to resolve feminist dilemmas of 
how to talk of women as a group while avoiding totalising assumptions and the pitfalls of 
essentialism, as such questions of epistemology have been discussed in detail elsewhere 
(for example Baden and Goetz 1998; Goetz 1991; Young 1995; Mohanty 1988, 1991). 
What is of concern here is that debates about the category of ‘women’ have left many 
feminists uncertain under what circumstances there can be a collective entity of women, 
and with what meanings and potential is it invested? Feminist activists question how they 
can make any general claims about women’s groups or movements on the basis of some 
women’s experiences of oppression or gender inequalities, if women as a category are at 
least in part constructed socially rather than naturally constituted. In the context of this 
thesis, if women workers base their collective action on politicised collective identity, how 
can they avoid the essentialism implied in claiming group difference?
Discussing this feminist dilemma, Iris Young proposes thinking of gender as “seriality” and 
of women “as a social collective” (1995:99). She defines a series as “a social collective 
whose members are unified passively by the objects around which their actions are oriented 
or by the objectified results of the material effects of the actions of the others” (1995:110). 
She considers gender as seriality in the sense that:
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In everyday life we often experience ourselves and others impersonally, as participating in 
amorphous collectives defined by routine practices and habits. The unity of the series 
derives from the way that individuals pursue their own individual ends with respect to the 
same objects conditioned by a continuous material environment, in response to structures 
that have been created by the unintended collective result of past actions (1995:110).
Young concludes that individuals are agents but that they act in the context of being part of 
a social collective “whose structure constitutes them with certain limits and constraints” 
(1995:111) but does not define their identity “in the sense of forming his or her individual 
purposes, projects and sense of self in relation to others” (1995:113). Thus, the series 
‘women’ “is a passive unity, one that does not arise from the individuals called women but 
rather positions them through the material organization of social relations as enabled and 
constrained by the structural relations of enforced heterosexuality and the sexual division of 
labor” (1995:119).
In this conceptualisation, seriality is different from being part of a group, as seriality offers 
a passive unity in a collective that does not imply shared attributes or intentions. Group 
membership, in contrast, refers to an internalised identity that is expressed through “self- 
conscious bonds of solidarity” (Young 1995:113). A simplistic interpretation of this 
distinction between seriality and group would imply that some women may experience 
their gender as a (background) constraint they have in common with other women but 
without involving common attributes. Other women, however, may feel that common 
gender attributes are constitutive of their identity, resulting in feelings of recognition of 
membership in a collective and identification with it. Through this distinction, Young 
attempts to overcome the problems of ascribing essentialist attributes to the category 
‘women’ without speaking of oppression and therefore perpetuating exclusions, or of not 
being able to say anything about women’s attributes because of the diversity of women’s 
lived experiences.
Multiple and contingent identities
What do post-modern feminist dissections of women as a group mean for the study of 
women workers mobilising in developing economies? How can Young’s analysis of gender 
as seriality help us understand collective mobilising efforts by women workers? Women’s 
location in society and the household, as well as in the economic and political environment,
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deeply influences their individual experiences of work, but it is increasingly clear that this 
location is in turn also shaped by women themselves (Lim 1990; Pearson 1998; Razavi 
1999). Razavi criticises “structuralist accounts ... [that] rendered women workers ‘faceless 
and voiceless’ and attributed much more personality and animation to capital than to the 
women it exploits” (1999:676).
Spivak’s (1988) characterisation of the exploited Asian factory woman worker as the 
“paradigmatic subject” of the international division of labour, has gradually been replaced 
with a more nuanced and balanced portrayal of women as being at times victims and at 
other times agents: “Without women’s own needs, values and worries, the global assembly 
line would grind to a halt” (Enloe 1990:16-7). If feminists formerly debated whether 
women’s inclusion into the industrial workforce led to exploitation or liberation, now many 
pose the question, which women benefit from what type of employment and under what 
conditions. A wide variety of identity-defining factors and processes come into play in 
answering this question, as they do similarly in understanding women workers’ collective 
action. As Young argues, “no individual woman’s identity ... will escape the markings of 
gender, but how gender marks her life is her own” (1995:120).
Feminist analyses have made abundantly clear that women are resisting domination and 
exploitation on multiple fronts simultaneously, rather than concentrating exclusively on 
particular domains such as the state or the market. The “multiplicity of subject positions 
that women are occupying as they negotiate within and resist [global and local] 
restructuring” (Runyan and Marchand 2000:228) may lead them to invoke a variety of 
(shifting) identities in their collective action (see also Chhachhi and Pittin 1996 and Enloe 
1990). The diversity and continuum of women’s multiple identities indeed allow for a great 
variety in forms of organising and in group membership among women. Although men too 
have multiple subject positions that may generate diverse identities, they have generally 
found it easier to keep their identities separate due to the greater contrasts between their 
public roles as workers/citizens and their private roles as family members. The 
overwhelmingly male-oriented definition of formal work, the workplace, and the paid 
worker largely account for this difference.
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But while feminists emphasise that identity is constituted by and at the same time 
constitutive of culturally and historically specific gender regimes, gender does not operate 
independently of other cleavages of power in society. As Zugman asserts with reference to 
women workers in Mexican-American border towns, “although the notion of multiple 
identities is useful for examining [women workers’] consciousness, it does not explain 
differences stemming from structural inequality ... in the subject formation of the women” 
(2003:160). Alvarez in her study of women’s movements in Brazil calls attention to the 
need to examine political systems, organisational dynamics as well as cultural context at 
specific historical moments, to understand how social movements articulate and represent 
women’s interests, and with what outcomes. She argues that “the competing class and 
gender ideologies and discursive practices prevailing at specific historical conjunctures 
have been shown to be the key to how gender-based claims are couched and to whether, 
when, where, and how they are channelled into the political system” (1990:265).
For many women workers, gender is intimately linked to production processes and relations 
in workplaces: ‘Svomen’s strategies as workers are a response not only to forms of labor 
control but also to gender-related domination” (Smyth and Grijns 1997:16). Writing on 
women workers in southern China, Ching Kwan Lee (1998) shows how women workers 
negotiate and thus help shape their conditions of work. At times, they may reproduce and 
manipulate gender inequality and stereotypes for their own benefit. Because they were 
social constructions that were contested and invested with different meanings by workers 
and managers, production processes in Lee’s research entrenched existing gender 
inequalities but at the same time offered opportunities for women to contest and participate 
in the restructuring of gender relations and gender identity at local level. Thus, identity 
construction is a reflexive process that, in the case of women workers, does not revolve 
exclusively around gender regimes but also incorporates the processes by which people are 
made into workers and included or excluded as citizens.
Freeman’s study of women in the off-shore informatics industry in Barbados (1998) 
provides another useful example of this reflexive process of identity construction. Recent 
attempts by women in this occupation to redefine their personal and collective identity as 
middle-class, pink-collar workers have specifically precluded unionisation or any other 
form of organising around a worker identity. Freeman asserts that trade unions in Barbados
60
are still strongly linked -  both conceptually and physically -  to a subjectively defined, 
masculine working class identity (see also Lawrence 1994; Rowbotham and Mitter 1994). 
Rather than assuming that women workers automatically form part of a labour movement 
based on a rigidly defined membership in working class structures, her study emphasises 
the fluid nature of women’s identities and affiliations and their partial constitution through 
processes of labour regulation and labour control. It is therefore essential to map the place 
and role of identity in mobilising efforts by women workers.
Whether women experience gender as seriality or perceive a common group identity with 
other women is contingent rather than pre-determined. This has consequences as well for 
women’s movements: “Increasingly, the feminist movement is being fragmented in a 
multiplicity o f feminist identities that constitute the primary definition for many feminists” 
(Castells 1997:19; emphasis in original). As discussed in Chapter One, at times these 
multiple (and perhaps competing) identities hinder collective action among women through 
the absence of a common identity, necessitating efforts to build bridges between different 
backgrounds and different work experiences, and to construct common histories and 
purpose. Wieringa similarly points out:
[Women’s movements] are composed of social actors who ... assert their agency in 
reflecting upon their experiences of oppression and constructing their identities. Not all 
aspects of their identities will be constituted by elements of the movement; other power 
relations will intersect with the collective will, sometimes causing ambiguities and 
contradictions, at other times strengthening each other (1995:7).
Castells argues with respect to feminist movements that “the self-construction o f identity is 
not the expression of an essence, but a power stake through which women as they are 
mobilize for women as they want to be” (1997:200). In other words, collective identity is 
constructed, as social movement theorists have argued, through feelings of common 
purpose and at the intersections of competing and contradictory identities whose common 
attributes are politicised. Castells makes the useful distinction between three forms of 
identity building:
Legitimizing identity: introduced by the dominant institutions of society to extend and 
rationalize their domination [...]; resistance identity: generated by those actors that are in 
positions/conditions devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of domination, thus building 
trenches of resistance and survival ... [and] project identity: when social actors [...] build a
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new identity that redefines their position in society and, by so doing, seek the 
transformation of overall social structure (1997:8).
The women workers studied in this thesis are mostly involved in constructing a resistance 
identity, though a small minority of union women (what Young (1995) calls a “proto­
group”) have started to contest dominant identities and construct alternative or project 
identities. The process of construction of such alternative identities through collective 
struggle requires the creation and cultivation of feelings of solidarity and common purpose 
and meaning. Insofar as groups are socially constructed based on deliberate appeals to 
particular common identities, social movement theory is helpful in understanding the role 
of identity in collective action.
Identities, recognition, and representation
So far, this chapter has argued that women workers mobilise collectively on the basis of 
multiple and sometimes competing identities. These identities are to varying degrees 
shaped by gender relations and regimes. Gender identity may not always be sufficiently felt 
to become the (primary) basis for collective action. Following Young’s conceptualisation 
of gender as seriality, mobilisation by women workers can be recognised as constituting a 
group of women if these women workers have deliberately formed bonds of solidarity with 
other women by politicising their common gender attributes. Women may use common 
experiences with women as a starting point in order to stimulate solidarity and feelings of 
common identification. By so doing they invoke women as a group characterised by chosen 
membership. Such politicisation of gender attributes does, however, not necessarily involve 
explicit challenges to dominant/hegemonic gender identity. Other women, in contrast, may 
refuse to valorise gender identity as the primary means of mobilisation, either because 
gender identity is not meaningful for their movement members or because they want to 
distance themselves from a hegemonic gender identity that they feel unable to challenge.
Whether they invoke women as a group with common attributes or mobilise through other 
identities (considering gender as seriality), women forming collective movements with 
other women will often struggle not only for redistribution of resources and power but also 
for recognition “as a distinct and legitimate social group” and “for citizen inclusion and 
political voice” (Phillips 2003:264). Those involved in collective mobilising and organising
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may have short-term objectives but indirectly they often make claims for political agency 
and the right to participate as equals in society. Phillips argues that:
Self-organisation emerges as a central theme -  people shaking off external perceptions of 
what they are or ought to be and establishing their right to define themselves -  and the 
major claim throughout is that neither the injustices they experience nor their most likely 
solutions can be adequately grasped without the group’s full involvement (2003:265).
While this clearly does not hold for all collective action by women workers, both Phillips 
and Fraser (2003) contend that it is difficult to separate struggles over political voice from 
those that “challenge injustices in the distribution of resources and power” (Phillips 
2003:270) given that the former often result in the latter whether intentionally or not. For 
each movement made up of women, the question therefore may be asked, why do they 
value or how do they justify recognition as a group?
Some feminists have argued that women have special interests, distinct from men, due to 
women’s essentially different nature and the characteristics that they share as a group 
(Diamond and Hartsock 1981; Sapiro 1981; Gilligan 1982; Daly 1978). Insofar as such 
characteristics arise out of women’s different positions and responsibilities in society, say, 
as mothers and the majority of those responsible for reproductive work, many feminists 
agree that women do have special interests (Sapiro 1981; Jonasdottir 1988). Sapiro supports 
the view that “regardless of their relative concern with [women’s] issues, women have a 
‘special’ interest, or a particular (potential) viewpoint from which their positions or 
preferences might be derived” (1981:165). It is not the aim of this section to argue whether 
or not women have ‘special’ (whether innate or derived) interests. Rather, it is concerned 
with the reasoning used by these and other feminists to argue for the existence o f women’s 
interests and with what this reasoning might mean for Third World women workers in their 
quest for recognition and representation.
In order to sidestep the question whether and how interests can be known objectively, and 
what such interests might be for women, Jonasdottir approaches women’s interests from a 
different entry-point. She questions whether all women can be said to have common 
interests, regardless of their different subject positions in society. Are women’s interests 
based on their roles and responsibilities in society or on the fact of differences between
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women and men? Jonasdottir proposes recognising the double meaning of representation of 
interests. On the one hand, she identifies the “form aspect” of interests, in the sense of 
demanding to ‘be among’ those who make decisions on public policy and participate in 
such debates. On the other hand, this representational aspect is complemented by the 
“content or result aspect” which refers to the satisfaction of ever-changing desires and 
needs of a particular group of people who want to give active meaning to their ‘being 
among’ decision-makers. This latter concept remains an open question in the sense that 
desires and needs are multifaceted and linked to multiple subject positions in society 
(Jonasdottir 1988:41). Such needs may be easily recognised as feminist issues but may 
equally refer to the fulfilment of traditional roles or be related to right-wing movements.
Jonasdottir acknowledges that public policy making is not necessarily fully democratic in 
practice even if all citizens participate through voting: “the fact that women vote in 
elections as much as men do does not guarantee representation for women as women -  that 
is, as gendered persons ... the active presence and positions within the ‘factory’ of politics 
should be what counts as representation” (1988:41; see also Phillips 1995 on formal versus 
substantive equality). Aside from the imperfections of democratic systems, however, there 
is a second issue embedded in this framework on which the remainder of this section will 
focus in the context of developing countries. If Jonasdottir’s reasoning is followed through, 
it becomes clear that women have interests in the sense of wanting to claim a presence in 
the political sphere.
Ideally speaking, all women can claim a voice and active participation in a democratic 
political system on the basis of their citizenship which implies their legal individual right to 
equality and equal treatment. This is the Western European context in which Jonasdottir 
situates her discussion of interests . At the same time, however, Jonasdottir holds that 
women’s interests -  in the sense of giving expression to values -  emerge from their 
different positions, different responsibilities, and different activities in life. Then women 
could potentially also claim to represent their interests or have their interests represented 
for them on the basis of sexual difference. Thus, there are two grounds on which women 
can give meaning to their demand to ‘be among’ those who discuss and control public 
affairs: a justice argument and an argument that calls for women’s potentially different 
perspectives and needs to be heard.
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Jonasdottir’s theory of interests has been restated and further developed by Anne Phillips in 
her work on ‘politics of presence’ (1995). While this chapter cannot do full justice to the 
comprehensive scope of her ideas, it will focus on her discussion of representation based on 
gender, race, or ethnicity. In brief, Phillips makes the case for a politics of presence rather 
than a politics based on the particular ideas that individuals bring to politics. Of the four 
possible arguments she presents, the role model function or the “importance of symbolic 
representation” (1995:25) of a woman or person of colour counts least for her, as this has 
no implications for our thinking about representative democracy. She puts more emphasis 
on the justice argument (referred to as the “normative” argument by Lovenduski (2000)) 
which would see representative bodies better reflect the people they are meant to represent 
and serve, thus leading to calls for 50 percent women in parliament and proportional 
representation of ethnic and racial minorities. However, without a strong case for structural 
exclusion of these groups, this argument would be open to objections that the current 
under-representation of these groups is due to ‘natural’ circumstances such as the sexual 
division of labour, or that representation should be extended to a potentially endless variety 
of groups (as noted by Rai (2002a) in relation to the quota debate in Indian parliament).
Phillips’ third argument (“pragmatic” according to Lovenduski), that is “the need for more 
vigorous advocacy on behalf of disadvantaged groups” (1995:25), can potentially be taken 
care of by “measures to ensure the proportional representation of political ideals” 
(1995:48). This leaves the fourth argument, based on difference: that the continued 
exclusion of particular groups from representation results in issues and perspectives 
remaining unaddressed and concerns denied:
If we take the preferences that are expressed through the mechanism of the vote as the final 
word on what governments should or should not do, we may be condemning large sections 
of the community to persistently unjust conditions. It is no real justification for this to say 
that it is what people said they wanted (1995:44-5).
Phillips concludes that even though women’s interests cannot be known in advance and in 
many cases their interests will overlap with those of other groups, it is precisely because 
interests are not equal to political ideas but instead attached to particular experiences that 
women need to represent their own interests. Phillips does not assume that women’s
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experiences will be different from men’s in particular ways or that they led to changes in 
political processes or policy outcomes.4 But because interests are gendered and because 
women’s interests are not transparent or can be known objectively, they must be 
represented by women (1995:66-71).
As pointed out earlier in this chapter, group interests are deliberated and articulated by 
groups that are an expression of collective identity. Thus, in representing their interests 
women engage in relational politics in which the identity around which they mobilise 
collectively enables an expression of their interests and claims. When women actively unite 
as women with shared gender attributes, they may base their claims for representation on 
the gendered condition they share, that is, on the different needs they put forward as women 
(in relation to other women, to men, or to other groups). But even when women do not 
activate their gender identity in collective action and instead experience gender as seriality 
(identifying for example as workers), they may still claim recognition and representation, 
based on their right “to be among” in decision-making. The identities around which women 
mobilise and organise collectively may thus be indicative of the particular politics through 
which they claim representation.
According to Phillips (2003), however, the key to avoiding the validation of essentialist 
identities as an unintended side-effect of such efforts towards recognition is to understand 
the motivation of group members for recognition. Phillips therefore warns that “the object 
is not so much the recognition of the group as of equal worth, but the recognition of group 
specificity in order ... to challenge [an injustice]” (2003:266). Rather than the validity of 
the group identity, it is the injustices to which the group is subjected because of the values 
attached to their difference that is to become the focus of the collective action. In this way, 
collective action does not need to revolve around differences that are naturalised or 
uni versah sed, and “recognition then appears as a means to further ends rather than an end 
in itself’ (Phillips 2003:266).
Recognition struggles by women workers
Phillips argues that political representation is substantially different from participation in 
employment or entry into educational institutions where similar arguments for women’s
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inclusion have been made: “while men have no ‘right’ to monopolize political office, there 
is something rather unsatisfying in basing women’s claim to political equality on an equal 
right to an interesting job” (1995:65). But while not all reasons for women’s inclusion in 
employment or education are equally strong or convincing when it comes to political 
representation, Phillips’ justifications for women’s representation as women in politics are 
equally valid in other areas where members of a collective group elect representatives who 
are expected to take decisions and formulate policies based on the presumed interests of all 
members. Whether this collective group is a nation-state or a trade union or a women 
workers’ organisation does not make a difference: in each case, rather than “an objectively 
defined set of interests (which just needed more vigorous pursuit)” what counts is “a more 
exploratory notion of possibilities so far silenced and ideas one had to struggle to express” 
(Phillips 1995:70).
Phillips’ fourth argument of the transformative potential of opening up political spaces to 
previously unrepresented groups is similar to Jonasdottir’s argument of ‘content’, and is of 
particular importance for women in labour movements in developing countries. In many 
societies, there is little basis of participatory democratic governance or guarantees of 
substantive equality on which to claim active political participation (the so-called ‘form 
aspect’). In the formal sense of the word Indonesia and Thailand are both democracies 
which guarantee (formal) equality before the law through their constitutions, while 
Indonesia has instituted a voluntary quota for women in political parties (see Chapter 
Seven). Nevertheless, most observers agree that inequality -  both in law and in practice -  
continues to affect large and diverse groups such as most women, ethnic minorities, sexual 
minorities, or people living in poverty (Hewison 1997; Pasuk and Baker 2000; Lambert 
1997; Robinson and Bessell 2002; see also Chapters Three and Four). Electoral systems 
have long benefited a small minority of rich and powerful, who are mostly men (Bessell 
2004 on Indonesia).5 Manifestations of inequality -  or conversely the inability to claim 
substantive equality -  cause many groups of women to suffer inadequate participation and 
representation in formal politics as well as other political arenas. Women not only 
experience numerical under-representation in most forms of politics but also find that their 
needs and desires are poorly reflected in public affairs, leading some to join struggles for 
recognition as (part of) distinct groups.
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This thesis suggests that, in some cases where women find it difficult to employ arguments 
of formal legal equality (as is common in developing countries), they may instead find it 
expedient to justify their demands for representation on the basis of the ‘content aspect’. 
This in practice would mean that women claim a voice using their potentially different 
gender interests and needs as their starting points. Jonasdottir alludes to this possibility 
when she states that women’s right to vote is justified on the basis of the “continual 
possibility” of women’s needs and attitudes differing from men’s (1988:53). This interplay 
between difference and equality is reminiscent of the “paradox” of feminism, according to 
Joan Scott:
Feminism was a protest against women’s political exclusion: its goal was to eliminate 
“sexual difference” in politics, but it had to make its claims on behalf of “women” (who 
were discursively produced through “sexual difference”). To the extent that it acted for 
“women,” feminism produced the “sexual difference” it sought to eliminate. This paradox -  
the need to both accept and to refuse “sexual difference” -  was the constitutive condition of 
feminism as a political movement through its long history (1996:3-4).
This paradox potentially gives rise to two different types of women’s movements: “[those] 
which premise their strategic visions on the minimisation of difference between the sexes, 
and those which argue for the enhancement of women’s place in society through an 
appreciation of the differences between the sexes” (Molyneux 1998:80). Phillips also 
acknowledges this possibility, stating that “denial of difference can make it difficult to 
argue for special treatment for groups who are unequally positioned in the social hierarchy” 
(1995:9; see also Young 1990). In practice, women (workers) usually do not rigidly decide 
to claim either equality or difference as if these are fixed polarities, but rather deal 
creatively with the tensions between these two choices by strategically adjusting their 
arguments depending on the audience.
Examining identity from the angle of recognition and representation can help to explain 
why women at times publicly proclaim interests that may appear to outsiders to be at odds 
with their attempts at equal treatment. For example, Chapter Six will recount how many 
Thai women union leaders mobilise collectively for women’s inclusion into trade union 
leadership on the basis of their unique and different abilities from men which can serve as 
an example for other women and men. In Indonesia, women union activists have clamoured 
for rights such as maternity and menstruation leave, as entry-points in order to call attention
68
to women workers’ rights more generally. Rather than claiming to ‘be among’ because they 
are citizens (formal equality or justice arguments), these women workers take a different 
approach; they emphasise their sexual difference from men in the hope that this will gain 
them a voice in politics where they can then promote gender equality (though not 
sameness). In Phillips’ (1995) terms, they claim a politics of presence (as women who are 
different from men) over a politics of ideas (the content of their interests which is as yet 
unknown). The arguments made in such struggles for recognition will impact also on the 
struggles for redistribution that often result from them.
A politics of presence does not exclude a politics of ideas, and women frequently use the 
former as a means to reach and legitimise the latter. The importance of using one as a 
bridge to the other is implied in the risks attached to using a politics of presence 
exclusively. With regard to women politicians in Norway, Skjeie writes:
A mandate of ‘difference’ is now attached to women politicians. It has been used by women 
themselves to get inside the power institutions. It is recognized by party leaderships, both 
men and women, as a relevant political mandate. It is the basis for new expectations as 
presently stated from outside the power institutions. Their aim being persuasion, arguments 
on the political relevance of difference, however, remain largely unspecified. They do not 
clarify exactly which values or priorities will form the basis for a transformation of public 
policies. Neither do they outline how such a transformation will proceed. They have been 
powerful tools of inclusion but have also blurred distinctions among women in government.
First arguments of difference undercommunicate the impact of primary political 
identifications ... Second they do not acknowledge individual variations in the degree to 
which women politicians themselves agree that they have a women’s mandate to fulfill 
(1991:134).
Similarly, as Chapters Six and Seven will show, when Indonesian and Thai union women 
have used a mandate o f difference to gain positions of influence, there has been little talk 
about its practical ramifications and the differences between women that it obscures. This 
implies that recognition o f group differences can in certain instances become an end in 
itself rather than a means to eradicate injustices experienced by the group as a whole.
Furthermore, in relation to union women, a politics of presence premised on difference as 
‘otherness’ frequently implies the notion that it is women workers who have to assimilate, 
rather than trade unions that have to broaden their membership and acknowledge women 
workers’ particular demands and needs as women (cf. Rai 2002b: 163). As Franzway writes,
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ltthe organisation of unionism is designed to defend workers against employers and resists 
the inclusion of women qua women. The question which follows is, how women engage in 
class conflict, as women, if their difference as women is denied through a gender-blind 
discourse of worker solidarity?” (1997:132). Women workers may thus have to privilege 
their identity as workers in order to be included into the labour movement, but at the same 
time may have to base claims to political participation on being recognised as women in 
order to make any particularistic demands heard.6
Thus, diverse interpretations are possible when women workers’ groups argue for inclusion 
and representation based on claims that women workers’ gender identity is relevant to the 
operations of the group and its representation of members. Such arguments may indicate 
feminist consciousness but may also show a ‘tactical essentialism’ that makes use of the 
ever-changing societal perceptions of women's identities to challenge hegemonic identities 
of workers, mothers, or women. This implies the necessity of understanding seemingly 
contradictory demands and struggles by women workers as diverse strategies to challenge 
mechanisms of exclusion and as fluid expressions of a variety of visions and constructions 
of women workers’ identities.
Thus, we can distinguish between identities that lead women workers to struggle on the 
basis of their formal right to have a voice and be represented by women, and those 
identities that encourage collective mobilisation and demands for representation (and 
implicitly for implementation of their demands) based on difference (gender and 
otherwise). This distinction allows us to understand more clearly how union women use, 
conform to, or challenge dominant identities to construct and sustain feelings of a common 
purpose and solidarity in pursuit of collective action.
To sum up, where substantial gender inequalities persist, the ‘content aspect’ identified by 
Jonasdottir (1988) may at times be the most effective justification for women’s 
representation. Where this occurs, this thesis argues that union women construct a common 
identity around which to mobilise women workers, an identity as women based on what 
may appear to be essentialist conceptions of women’s (subjective) interests. In other cases, 
gender identity may not be experienced as meaningful by women workers. When union 
women then mobilise around workers’ identities, they may nevertheless employ gender
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interests in their efforts to build a common goal and purpose for their collective action. 
Thus, this thesis aims to demonstrate some of the different (and sometimes hybrid) 
strategies among union women in Thailand and Indonesia to try to represent women 
workers’ interests in and through labour movements.
Collective identity and alliances for transformation
If women workers’ struggles for recognition and redistribution are constructed around and 
bound up in local and global gender regimes -  and how these regimes construct and 
reproduce gender identities -  this has important implications for the cohesion of collective 
identity in women workers’ organisations. How much weight is attached to gender identity; 
how much it is privileged over other identities in mobilising efforts; and exactly whose 
interests are represented is dependent on the participants in a social movement 
(organisation) and the context in which they are operating. Because “group interests do not 
pre-exist, fully formed ... [but] have to be continuously constructed and reproduced” in 
particular contexts (Pringle and Watson 1992:229-30), differences must be negotiated by 
women from different backgrounds each time they come together in a social movement or a 
movement organisation.
Women construct an image of women’s interests that may owe more to the needs and
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desires of some groups of women than to those of others. For example, maternity leave is 
not an inherent interest for all women workers since not all women will want to become 
mothers or to return to their workplace after childbirth. Nor do demands for menstruation 
leave by women workers in Indonesia represent the interest of all women who work. In 
other words, when union women demand recognition of their potentially different interests 
as women, they construct a collective identity of women workers based on what are 
necessarily subjectively defined interests. This collective identity therefore includes some 
women and excludes others.
The consequences of such exclusions and the risks of validating essentialist identities are 
particularly evident in women workers’ efforts to build solidarity through coalitions and 
networks.8 In order to result in concrete changes to power relations in society, recognition 
and representation of a particular group’s collective identity -  “the politics of affirmation”
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(Fraser 1995) -  needs to be followed by redistribution in order to transcend the status quo. 
Such a redistribution of resources (both material and immaterial) is the aim of those women 
workers who through their organisations express demands that go beyond recognition of 
their shared disadvantages. Redistribution, however, requires a large-scale movement that 
can mobilise large numbers of supporters, necessitating coalitions and networking.
Some feminists locate the possibility for coalitions and other forms of cooperation among 
women in their potential for common opposition to oppression. Jill Krause, for example, 
argues that ‘Svhat all feminists share is a conviction that women can become a strategic 
group when they enter into a common struggle against class, race and gender hierarchies” 
(1996:234). Given the plurality within women’s movements as well as within feminism, 
however, it may not be the differences between men and women, but those among women 
that make such a common struggle difficult to locate (Molyneux 1998:83). In 
acknowledging the diversity among women, women workers may as a result find 
insufficient common ground to organise collectively with other women (see also Franzway 
1997; Perry 1996). For example, the recognition of their exclusion as women workers may 
in some instances take precedence over the urgency of redistribution of resources and 
power to all women. In other words, in some situations women’s position in a sub-group 
(workers) may have greater or lesser bearing on their struggles for empowerment than the 
general position of women in social and economic systems (see also Yuval-Davis 1994 and 
Rai 2002b). Therefore the experiences or strategies that will lead to the development of 
solidarity and the pursuit of coalitions and networks should be treated as historically and 
geographically specific and shaped by differences between women.
In response to these questions of strategy and prioritisation, Goetz suggests that “successful 
coalitions are built upon both the strength of numbers -  where one of the potential strengths 
of women has always resided -  and on the fact that members always have some home 
beyond the coalition from which to draw self-affirming sustenance” (1991:150). The 
importance of identity for mobilisation lies in the local and transnational alliances that 
particular identities facilitate among different groups. As Theobald has argued with respect 
to women workers in northern Thailand, “in order to meet the challenge of better working 
conditions in the electronics industry, there is a need to have a greater understanding of 
workers’ identities, experiences and responsibilities; [and] develop structures that facilitate
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the growth of participatory alliances between different groups at national and international 
levels” (2002:150).
Alliances between women’s or feminist groups and other social movements are all the more 
important, given the changing role of the state in the context of globalisation: “Increasingly, 
feminists are concerned that in succeeding in the battle for recognition of gender 
inequalities, feminist social movements are losing the struggle for redistribution of power 
relations” (Rai 2002b: 119). Thus, identity not only counts in the mobilisation of women 
workers but also in the degree of compatibility and commonality in experience that they 
may find with other women, and the likelihood of building alliances with those women.
Such alliances would most likely revolve around particular, short-term struggles for 
recognition (as women or otherwise) and/or redistribution, in which genuine dialogue can 
lead groups of women to bridge or put aside temporarily differences between women in the 
interest of constructing solidarity and a shared purpose. Chapters Six and Seven will 
explore whether and under what circumstances such coalitions have emerged in Thailand 
and Indonesia. With reference to women workers, Mohanty suggests that the basis for such 
dialogue can be laid by looking towards the “social location of particular women as 
workers” and finding in it “the basis for common interests and potential solidarities across 
national borders” (1997:5). She argues “for a notion of political solidarity and common 
interests, defined as a community or collectivity among women workers across class, race, 
and national boundaries which is based on shared material interests and identity and 
common ways of reading the world” (1997:8). She thus refers to an interconnectedness of 
women workers on the basis of the gendered ideological construction of women’s work as 
seen through the viewpoint of history and social location.
What may be most important (in a practical sense) in Mohanty’s argument is the process of 
uncovering such interconnectedness. In the process of deliberating their commonalities, 
women workers and other groups (of women and others) may become aware of both their 
mutual need for recognition as political actors, and their need for a redistribution of 
resources that enables them to participate in politics in meaningful and potentially 
transformative ways (Rai 2002:193-5). Such deliberation may enable women workers and 
other marginalised groups to see the interlinked nature of their struggles. Where it is based
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on respect for multiple differences, it can open up space for women workers to mobilise 
other women workers through reference to identity but also to form alliances without 
claiming or validating an essentialised identity.
Conclusion
The main question addressed throughout this chapter has been how identity and interest 
relate to efforts by women workers in developing countries to mobilise for collective 
action. First, it has been argued in line with much feminist theory that interests are not 
easily read as indicators of how and why women workers mobilise, as interests are not pre­
determined and do not derive automatically and unproblematically from identities and 
experiences. When instead looking towards identity as the motivating factor for women 
workers’ engagement in struggles for recognition and redistribution, this chapter has 
addressed post-modern (and other) feminist doubts about speaking about women as a group 
without validating essentialist identities. Young’s concept of gender as seriality was found 
to be useful in distinguishing between gender as passive experience of constraints and 
gender as politicised identity through which collective movement (such as feminist action) 
occurs. Thus, collective action may entail conforming to and/or contesting hegemonic or 
dominant gender identities.
More specifically, this chapter argued that the discursive practices of gender and class in 
particular geographical and historical contexts constitute gender and economic regimes that 
shape the identities through which women workers organise in recognition struggles. 
Women workers take part in shaping these regimes through their participation in them and 
their resistance, but simultaneously experience the constraints and possibilities that flow 
from them. In response, the identities on which women workers build their collective action 
at times use hegemonic (and perhaps essentialised) identities, but at other times contest and 
reinvent them.
Jonasdottir’s distinction between the form and content aspects o f arguments for 
representation allowed for greater clarity with regard to the strategic use of sexual 
difference in recognition struggles. Where arguments of formal legal equality are lacking, 
women workers may mobilise around a common gender identity based on gender
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differences. In doing so, they recognise that common attributes as women can be activated 
and politicised to make claims for recognition and representation. Yet, where social, racial, 
economic, or other differences between women cannot be bridged through reference to a 
common gender identity, women workers may find that their identity as workers is more 
meaningful and more effectively articulated as the basis for collective action. Because 
collective action involves the deliberate construction of common identities among members 
of a collective, women workers may thus not valorise gender identity as the most effective 
common attribute leading to solidarity.
This implies that the study of women workers’ groups must pay particular attention to the 
use of gender identity to understand and interpret seemingly contradictory claims and 
demands by such groups. Because arguments for recognition of gender difference (in 
Phillips’ words ‘a politics of presence’) cany the risk of validating essentialist identities, 
this chapter also argues for the necessity of coalitions and alliances with other groups and 
movements. Through deliberation of commonalities and respect for multiple differences, 
such alliances can transcend essentialist implications in the strategic use of gender (and 
other) differences.
Chapters Six and Seven put these arguments to the test by examining in detail to what 
extent and how women workers in Thailand and Indonesia have invoked identities as 
women, as workers, as women workers, or any other variations to mobilise for collective 
action. Those chapters will examine how gender and worker identities shape the ways in 
which union women construct and name interests in collective terms. Given the contingent 
nature of such efforts at collective action, the next two chapters will sketch a brief 
background of Thailand and Indonesia, focusing on economic and political developments 
of the past twenty-five years and their impact on women workers’ ability to mobilise and 
organise collectively. Chapter Five in turn will discuss how these developments have 
shaped the participation and roles of women in trade unions.
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1 The question of a quota for women’s representation will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven in 
relation to Indonesian women workers.
2 Castells cautions that identity must be distinguished from roles and role-sets. Roles “are defined by norms 
structured by the institutions and organizations of society” whereas identities “are sources of meaning for the 
actors themselves, and by themselves, constructed through a process of individuation” (Castells 1997:7). In 
other words, “identities organize the meaning while roles organize the functions” (Castells 1997:7).
3 In this respect, Jonasdottir says that “in Western capitalist societies with their liberal democratic states, 
neither sex/gender groups nor sexuality, as a field of activities, is openly acknowledged as a politically 
relevant social basis for competing interests. Even many women’s organizations are hesitant or unwilling to 
see society in these terms, and mainstream political science reflects this situation by being silent” (1988:44). 
Thus, she questions the exclusive reliance on the democratic ideal of equality and equal representation as a 
justification for women’s participation.
4 For Scott (1992), experience must be located in subject positioning that is constituted discursively at 
particular historical moments. While this thesis does not pursue the meaning of experience through discourse 
analysis, it does heed Scott’s call for “a way of changing the focus and philosophy of our history, from one 
bent on naturalizing ‘experience’ through a belief in the unmediated relationship between words and things, to 
one that takes all categories of analysis as contextual, contested, and contingent” (1992:36). Scott’s assertion 
that “what counts as experience is neither self-evident nor straight-forward; it is always contested, always 
therefore political” (1992:36-7), strengthens the call for women to represent their own diverse interests, given 
that women’s experiences have historically been discounted and interpreted by men.
5 Hewison (2001) suggests that although the capitalist class in Thailand is not united and is instead made up of 
different sections, it is supported by (and in many instances forms part of) the ruling class.
6 Phillips warns that “focusing on the differences between women and men can lend itself to a sentimentalized 
vision of women's place or role -  and in the sentimentalized vision, women are usually subordinated” 
(1995:11). The discursive emphasis on difference or equality also allows men to remain the standard against 
which women can be judged. Thus, as White warns, “the repeated emphasis on the differences of women to 
men ... fails to question how ideas of the ‘general’ interest by class or ethnicity may be implicitly male 
gendered or the way in which these interests are interrelated” (1999:131). However, given the importance of 
acknowledging and addressing points of vulnerability or special interests, Rhode (1992) advises assessing in 
each context how sex-linked attributes are interpreted and what gender-specific advantages and disadvantages 
result from such attributes.
7 Both Jonasdottir and Molyneux treat needs as distinct from interests, in that needs can be met without the 
people or groups concerned participating in public policy (which for Jonasdottir is an essential aspect of 
interests). Also, needs can be met ‘from above’ whereas the participatory aspect of interests requires a view 
‘from below’. Molyneux adds that “interests are conceptually different from needs, in that the former are 
more clearly intentional, belong within a political vocabulary, and are the product of a process of reasoning 
which assumes instrumental agency” (1998:79).
8 For a critical discussion regarding engagement by women’s movements and groups with state institutions 
and global economic institutions, and on the costs and risks of such engagement, see Rai (2002b).
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Chapter 3 - Labour markets and labour regulation in Thailand
and Indonesia
Introduction
Any examination of the role of identity in women workers’ efforts to mobilise and organise 
collectively requires analysis of the context in which they live and work, in particular the 
local structures of and attitudes to trade unions and work, especially women’s work (Hess 
1986; Beckwith 1998). Accounts of workers’ organising in Southeast Asia can be divided 
into three broad areas that to some extent overlap with explanations sought for women’s 
presumed lack of organising. One stream highlights economic and structural factors such as 
economic restructuring, globalisation and the uneven growth of capitalism in Southeast 
Asia (Frenkel 1993; Frenkel and Harrod 1995). Closely related is the second stream, which 
emphasises the role of the state and military, focusing on state structures and power 
struggles in and around the state (Hadiz 1997; Brown 2004; Kämmen 1997). This literature 
largely corresponds to the political science school which focuses on political opportunities 
and the changing constellations of political and economic power within the state and its 
institutions. Lastly, religion, language, and culture have played an important role, according 
to Deyo (1989) and Koo (2001), whom in stressing these factors approach the grievance 
theory of social movement analysis.
Following the first of these approaches, this chapter aims to provide an analysis of labour 
markets and labour regulation in Thailand and Indonesia, with specific focus on economic 
factors influencing women workers’ ability to mobilise and organise collectively. As 
patterns of economic development and industrial relations in Thailand and Indonesia have 
been described in great detail elsewhere (Brown 2004; Deyo 1989, 1997; Ford 1999, 2000; 
Hadiz 1997, 2000; Manning 1998), this chapter will limit itself to key features and events 
of the past twenty-five years and their effect on women workers’ potential for collective 
organising. It will examine from a gender perspective several relevant political and 
economic aspects of labour regulation and will argue that these have constrained the ability
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of workers in general and especially of women workers to build strong and effective 
workers’ organisations.
Chapter Four will compare political structures and social movements in the two countries, 
with gender relations and regimes analysed in Chapter Five. Chapters Three to Five 
highlight from a gender perspective the similarities and differences between Thailand and 
Indonesia while stressing the different contexts in which women workers began to organise. 
This chapter starts with an introduction to political systems and their impact on labour 
regulation in the two countries. Following this is a comparison of economic developments 
in each country, highlighting recent changes to the industrial relations system as well as the 
effect of labour market dynamics on women workers. Finally, the chapter presents a 
comparative analysis of women’s position in labour markets in Thailand and Indonesia. 
Each section discusses the two countries separately and is followed by a brief comparison 
and conclusion.
Political systems
What impact do political systems have on workers’ ability to mobilise and organise 
collectively? Thailand and Indonesia have both experienced authoritarian regimes that 
through their repressive labour legislation have weakened trade unions. Both countries have 
also witnessed regime change to more democratic forms of governance, in Indonesia more 
recently than in Thailand. The following sections argue that political systems negatively 
affect workers’ ability to form and join trade unions and other workers’ organisations 
because of the nature of labour legislation and industrial relations, as well as the struggles 
in which the state has collaborated with employers to prevent workers from exercising their 
formal rights.
Thailand
Workers’ freedom to organise and enjoy labour rights has frequently been limited 
throughout Thai history, usually in conjunction with military dictatorships concerned with 
political stability and economic growth. Most civilian regimes have also sought to 
downplay the political and popular influence of labour activists or to use it for their own
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purposes. Although labour groups were actively involved in the 1932 popular uprising that 
would lead to the establishment of constitutional democracy in Thailand, labour was 
alternately repressed by military regimes or given limited political space by civilian rulers 
in the four decades after this important event in Thai history. The immediate post-war 
years, the late 1950s, and the mid-1970s were periods during which heavy-handed 
strategies of containment by authoritarian or military regimes were replaced by legal 
reforms by democratic regimes allowing some degree of freedom of association and 
collective bargaining. Subsequent authoritarian regimes (1976-1988 and 1991-1992) 
generally repealed or amended such legislation and reverted to interference in labour 
organisations by fostering rivalries, outlawing labour unions, intimidation, and murdering 
union activists (Brown 2004; Bundit 2004).
Yet, the changing fortunes of Thai labour are more complex than simple antagonism or 
variation between democratic and military rule with regards to freedom of association and 
the right to bargain collectively. Labour has at times acted as the scapegoat of conflicts 
between conservative bureaucratic and military interests on the one hand and progressive or 
liberal business elites on the other. For example, during and especially after the transition 
period towards parliamentary democracy (1988-1991) new politicians courted labour’s 
votes while conservative elites sought to turn back the clock to an exclusionary labour 
regime (Brown 2004). This created opportunities for labour to utilise elite divisions and to 
push successfully for the introduction of social security and paid maternity leave.
More recently, the rise in 2001 of the business-centric Thaksin Shinawatra government 
appears to have led to a gradual but perceptible closing off of political space for civil 
society. The April 2004 report by the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights presented 
to the Human Rights Commission criticised the government for increasing harassment of 
and the use of force against human rights defenders in areas such as the environment, 
minority rights, and migrant labour. According to the report, “officials tried to control 
NGOs’ funding support, their freedom of association and used state security mechanisms to 
place them under surveillance and harass some of them” (Bangkok Post 14 April 2004). In 
addition, the spate of killings of local activists in 2003-2004 (detailed by the Thai National 
Human Rights Commission) and the subsequent lack of punishment of the perpetrators 
reflect a culture of intimidation by the government and/or its intermediaries towards their
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critics. It is likely that such a culture of impunity constitutes a strong disincentive for 
workers to mobilise and organise. Given their vulnerability to sexual violence and law- 
enforcers’ reluctance to respond to this, women workers might well experience these 
disincentives more strongly than men do.
As the state is not a unitary actor with fixed interests, the particular intersections of 
interests within it and between the urban elite, bureaucracy, business, military and other 
interest groups impact on labour’s position in society and their ability to mobilise. 
Although workers in theory enjoy protection under the labour law, in practice the state 
colludes with employers and investors to make it difficult for workers to exercise their 
rights. Brown (2001) observes several weaknesses of the Thai trade union movement which 
he attributes in part to employers’ strategies such as labour flexibilisation (especially short­
term contracts), dismissal of those initiating trade unions, and avoiding unionisation by 
closing or moving the company and opening up elsewhere under a new name.
Various elements within the state share responsibility for such indirect repression through 
their “failure to close the many loopholes in the law, not enforcing employer compliance 
and a continuing refusal to ratify ILO [International Labour Organisation] conventions that 
cover workers’ basic rights” (Brown 2001:129), while military interference through a 
‘divide and rule’ attitude has further limited the possibilities for trade unions to take 
effective action (see also Napapom 2002). Clearly, combined with growing unemployment 
since the late 1990s and the decline of traditional labour-intensive industries, these 
developments have made many workers -  both men and women -  fearful of losing their 
jobs and therefore reluctant to engage in trade unionism. Thus, the impact of political 
systems is best analysed in conjunction with economic-structural factors and in the context 
of defence of particular business interests.
In sum, the political space available to labour to organise and to formulate and project its 
demands, and workers’ relationship with political elites -  or perhaps rather their ability to 
manipulate this relationship -  can at least partially explain past successes. It is important to 
keep in mind that both democratically elected administrations and military regimes may 
represent interests that are antagonistic to trade unions and other workers’ organisations. 
Both have at various times constrained the ability of Thai workers to mobilise, through
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repressive labour legislation, labour practices that primarily benefit employers, and/or 
political interference in trade unions. Nevertheless, the existence of legislation guaranteeing 
freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively, in contrast to other countries in 
the region, has at the same time given support to labour activists. In addition, in the context 
of democratisation, the passage of a new constitution in 1997 and the global and local 
spread of human rights vocabulary, (women) workers increasingly perceive the above- 
mentioned obstacles as social injustice. Hence, these constraints also provide powerful 
incentives for some (women) workers to defy the power of state officials, politicians, and 
employers through collective action. Thus, the political interests of the state have both 
positive and negative effects on women workers’ propensity to organise collectively.
Indonesia
Unlike the messy chronology which characterises Thai political developments, Indonesia’s 
political system was until 1998 defined by the relative stability resulting from the 
dominance for more than thirty years of Suharto, his powerful political party GOLKAR, 
and the military. During the Suharto era, independent labour organising was virtually 
impossible due to the existence of a single trade union federation with which all enterprise- 
based unions were forced to affiliate. As a consequence of this system and the domination 
of the union structure by GOLKAR personnel and supporters, political space for labour was 
extremely limited. The Indonesian regime at times acted according to political motives and 
at other times was pressed by economic imperatives to deny labour the chance to act 
collectively (Hadiz 1997). But the result in either case was to force labour activists to 
comply with the regime’s policies and limiting ideology or take their operations overseas or 
underground.
As has been documented elsewhere (Hadiz 2001; Ford 2000, 2001; Quinn 2003), the 
changes in governance since 1998 have led to the ratification of the ILO Conventions on 
Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining, and subsequent 
adjustments to national labour legislation. However, while it allowed the nascent labour 
movement greater freedom through the loosening of regulations, the Indonesian state at the 
same time has not shown great interest in protecting labour through new regulations. For 
example, the Megawati administration (2001-2004) has responded to calls from business
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elites for a tougher stance on workers’ demands for minimum wage increases, mainly by 
providing exemptions and by frequently failing to enforce the minimum wage.1 With a 
relatively weak system of law enforcement and the current prioritisation of national 
security and political stability over labour issues, the disregard by the state for labour 
appears likely to continue. For workers, this effectively implies the continuation of serious 
practical obstacles to collective organising such as the biased implementation of labour 
legislation (favouring employers), a shortage of funds and other support, and physical 
threats from thugs working for their employers.
Other legacies of the Suharto regime also continue to constrain workers in their attempts to 
defend their rights. The New Order regime not only did not countenance the emergence of a 
labour movement, but also was averse to opening up the political sphere to women and men 
outside the military, business, or religious elites. This sense of exclusion was heightened 
for middle-class and other working women. Saptari asserted that the New Order regime 
had, since the late 1980s, brought about for women a form of dependency “in formal 
political representation due to direct processes of exclusion or to the social and ideological 
constraints imposed on women’s participation” (1995:169).
Only during the last ten years of the New Order regime did women enjoy increasing 
opportunities to engage in political life as a result of “a growing level of civilianisation, an 
increasingly politicised and divided elite, and the declining popularity of the regime” 
(McCormick 2003:1). Although a small number of female leaders emerged in the fields of 
politics and social activism, non-elite women stood very little any chance of becoming 
significant political actors at the regional or national level. Robison noted that “the middle 
classes have gained a political place but one within the structures of authoritarian 
corporatism, not liberal democracy, and to suit the agendas of capitalist oligarchies” 
(1998:74). This has limited men and women in their ability to gain experience in social 
activism.
With greater political freedoms as well as continuing contestations for power between 
military, business, and religious factions behind the scenes, Robison’s characterisation of 
Indonesian political life now appears to some extent to be valid for most Indonesians, 
including workers. In terms of participation, only Indonesian men have progressed far
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beyond the exclusionary tactics of the New Order regime. The 2004 elections in Indonesia 
showed that, even though voters now directly elect both the nation’s president and 
representatives for local and national parliaments, much remains the same in terms of elite 
and patriarchal domination of formal political processes, especially in determining party 
candidate lists. This is particularly true for women whose representation in both local and 
national political structures remains very low (see Chapter Four). Thus, there have been 
very few women within the political establishment to whom women workers could turn for 
encouragement, influence, or information (with the exception of a handful of women 
activists in politics).
Greater political freedoms have not led to the expansion of the role of labour in politics 
either. Citing large-scale rural-to-urban migration and growth of employment in labour- 
intensive industries as factors stimulating union organising, Hadiz (1997) initially pointed 
to the emergence of a proletariat in Indonesia. He posited that this new labour force could 
expect long-term employment, has common experiences under structures of labour control 
and therefore would have an incentive to organise collectively. That this proletariat has not 
gained much political influence since the political reforms era is mainly the result of union 
fragmentation, unions’ lack of experience in advocacy and lobbying, and the consequent 
lack of interest from political parties (which do not regard labour as a constituency worthy 
of attention) (Hadiz 2002). Parties claiming to represent workers performed poorly in both 
the 1999 and 2004 national parliamentary elections. This suggests that workers may not 
regard their status as workers as the most important consideration in their voting 
preferences, that workers’ parties may not have sufficient experience and resources, or that 
workers do not trust political parties to represent their interests.
In sum, although the political and particularly the industrial relations systems in Indonesia 
have witnessed substantial changes since the start of Reformasi in 1998, at a practical level 
many of the obstacles to (women) workers’ mobilisation and organisation remain the same. 
On a more positive note, the new freedom to organise through trade unions has led to 
renewed enthusiasm in trade unionism among some workers, while political reforms have 
brought about greater access to information and foreign funding for trade unions and other 
labour organisations. In conclusion, the legacy of the Suharto years continues to impact
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negatively on collective activism by workers and by women in particular, but recent 
political reforms have given a new impetus to efforts to organise workers.
Comparison
Although both countries have experienced authoritarian regimes, the impact of these 
regimes on labour organising is not clear-cut. Repressive labour legislation, political 
interference and backing for employers (and the growing domestic capitalist class) 
characterise both the Suharto and successive Thai authoritarian regimes. In both countries, 
labour leaders have been intimidated, attacked and even murdered by shadowy forces 
working most likely for the government and/or employers. Equally, such repressive 
circumstances might give rise to resistance by workers and their organisations, albeit 
covertly.
Both Thailand and Indonesia currently recognise the rights to freedom of association and 
collective bargaining (though not for public sector workers in Thailand), and legislation 
passed in recent years to strengthen these rights provides important opportunities for 
workers to mobilise and organise collectively. However, civilian regimes have also created 
serious obstacles to unionisation. While the political space for workers to put forward their 
demands has increased in recent years (especially in Indonesia since 1998), workers 
continue to have little access to formal politics, such as electoral and party politics. Union 
activists continue to be insufficiently protected from their employers, and practical 
obstacles to unionisation remain in many workplaces. The next section analyses in detail 
these barriers in relation to the formal rights offered to workers through labour legislation. 
At this point, it can be concluded that despite recent improvements, both countries still 
have a political environment that does not give both male and female workers the ability to 
mobilise and organise fully in movements and organisations. As Aspinall concludes, 
“Indonesia has entered a phase typical of ‘third wave’ democratisation processes, where an 
early middle class democratic breakthrough is followed by struggles to extend and apply 
the benefits to subaltern groups” (1999:2). This conclusion is equally valid for Thailand. 
The legacy of political systems is therefore best considered in light of social and economic 
developments both nationally and globally that constitute most workers in the industrial 
and service sectors as subaltern and marginalised groups.
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Labour regulation in theory and practice
What can labour regulation through legislation and state practices tell us about the potential 
for women workers to organise collectively? As discussed in Chapter One, an extensive 
body of research has analysed women’s resistance to labour exploitation in relation to 
labour legislation and control by employers. To what extent does labour regulation and 
control in Thailand and Indonesia obstruct or encourage women’s mobilisation and 
organisation? Are there significant differences between these countries?
Thailand
Thai labour regulation has seen many changes over time, often in conjunction with regime 
change and in line with the economic priorities of ruling elites. Current Thai labour 
legislation -  as established by the 1975 Labour Relations Act -  recognises four types of 
workers’ organisations: labour union councils, labour union federations, (state) enterprise 
labour unions, and (private) industrial labour unions. According to the law, a labour union 
can be formed by a minimum of ten employees and a labour federation must consist of a 
minimum of two labour unions in the same industry. At least fifteen labour unions or 
federations can form a labour union council (Voravidh et al. n.d.:10).
Once again in force after being temporarily repealed during the 1991-1992 military regime, 
the 1975 Labour Relations Act has guaranteed workers in the private sector the right to 
organise, to bargain collectively with employers, and to strike. In reality, conservative or 
militaiy-controlled administrations have not protected these rights, instead enabling 
employers to use loopholes in the law to fire those initiating a trade union (as workers are 
only protected from dismissal once their union has been formally registered). The Act has 
also introduced a system of tripartite, management-controlled labour relations (or labour 
management) committees that in many workplaces have replaced independent trade unions. 
Jaded Chaowilai from the NGO Friends of Women asserts that ‘these committees do not 
reflect workers’ true interests. They have served instead as an effective tool by the state to 
control, restrict, and decrease the bargaining power of the trade unions” (n.d.:3).2 Where
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tripartite committees have been established at the behest of management and employers, 
trade unions have stood little chance of organising and gaining bargaining power.
The 1975 Labour Relations Act ostensibly set out to strengthen trade unions by 
guaranteeing freedom of association and facilitating the process of establishing unions. In 
effect, however, by allowing a minimum of ten people to form a union it led to a rapid 
increase in the number of small trade unions during the 1980s (see Chapter Four for 
statistics). The immediate results were not only the fragmentation of the labour movement 
but also fear among employers that the process of collective bargaining would become 
unmanageable due to the many competing groups of workers (Brown and Frenkel 1993). 
Through their internal policies, employers have also been able to obstruct the collection of 
dues by unions from their members; this in turn affects the financial stability of unions and 
their ability to carry out activities.
If private sector workers at least had the right to organise and bargain collectively, the 
fortunes of public-sector workers changed drastically after the 1991 coup d’etat which 
temporarily brought to power a military junta. It introduced the 1991 State Enterprises 
Labour Relations Act which severely curtailed trade union rights. The Act barred state- 
owned enterprises from having trade unions, allowed striking workers to be replaced, and 
banned industry-wide bargaining (Bundit 2004). This has had far-reaching negative effects 
on union activism in Thailand where public-sector unions, the vanguard of the labour 
movement, had set the pace for private-sector wage increases.
International organisations have long demanded the withdrawal of this legislation, and the 
2000 State Enterprises Labour Relations Act went some way to improve this situation by 
restoring the right to organise and register. Nevertheless, this new Act continues to prohibit 
the right to strike for state enterprise employees (Voravidh et al.: n.d.; Brown 2004; Bundit 
2004; Jaded n.d.). The ILO has repeatedly criticised Thailand for the lack of legal 
protection for workers in the public sector. Thailand has also been under pressure to ratify 
the core International Labour Standards Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise (1948), Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organise 
and Collective Bargaining (1949) and Convention No. 100 on Equal Remuneration (1951). 
According to the ILO’s specialist on labour standards in Bangkok, the lack of ratification of
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Conventions 87 and 98 is “partly due to a tendency to regard labour unions as economically 
disruptive rather than a force for social improvement” (paraphrased in Bangkok Post 4 June 
2004).
In theory, women workers are protected against discrimination and unequal treatment under 
Thai labour legislation and the 1997 Constitution. As a result of a 1993 ruling by the 
Ministry of Interior (before the establishment of the Ministry of Labour), women 
employees are entitled to ninety days maternity, half of which is at normal pay rate (paid by 
the employer).4 However, in recent years, the outsourcing and subcontracting of work has 
resulted in the creation of large new groups of vulnerable workers who are not able to 
organise collectively under current labour laws. Workers on short-term contracts and 
subcontractors are prohibited by their employers from joining trade unions even if they 
work alongside permanent unionised employees. The short-term nature of their contracts 
means that they have little job security and therefore are unlikely to organise in unions. 
Though no exact figures are known, many if not most of these workers are likely to be 
women. Oxfam and Thai Labour Campaign (a Bangkok-based NGO) estimate that 90 per 
cent of subcontracted workers in the Thai garment industry are women (Oxfam 2004b). As 
is often reported, this is because of women in manufacturing industries frequently being 
dismissed due to cost-cutting measures, only to be rehired shortly afterwards as piece-rate 
workers or on lower-paid and temporary contracts that give them few, if  any, rights in the 
workplace. Older women also generally have lower skill and education levels and often 
have family responsibilities which compel them to take on home-based work or insecure 
contracts.
Labour activists have repeatedly called on the government to extend to workers in 
contracting or outsourcing arrangements the right to join trade unions and the right to strike 
and bargain collectively (Bundit 2004). However, many trade unions appear ambivalent 
about the (unlikely) prospect of these workers joining them. They fear the competition from 
cheaper workers will weaken union structures and their membership in unions would imply 
acceptance by unions of the practice of labour flexibilisation. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that several trade union federations have tried to limit the percentage of work done by 
contract or outsourced labour (Bundit 2004). Opportunities for organising have also been 
limited for workers in free-trade zones or export-processing zones, where the Thai
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government has implicitly banned unionising in the name of attracting foreign investment 
(AMRC 1998; Theobald 2002:134).
Workers in the informal economy have found organising especially difficult, due to the 
dispersed and sometimes illegal nature of workplaces and workers’ low bargaining power 
vis-ä-vis employers and government. Especially in the case of home-based work, 
unionisation is almost impossible because of the absence of a clear employer-employee 
relationship, extreme family dependence on this source of income, and a shortage of 
alternative income-generating possibilities. With the exception of the new Ministerial Order 
on Homeworkers (of June 2004), workers in the informal economy are completely without 
protection under the labour law. They have little access to social security or welfare 
benefits designed for permanent employees in the modem sector, although the gradual 
introduction of social security for laid-off workers in 2004 may go some way to 
overcoming this problem.
Intimidation is frequently a part of the work culture. Women workers are cheated and 
intimidated by employers and security forces more frequently than men because of their 
perceived passivity and lack of knowledge about labour laws (though intimidation happens 
even to those who possess detailed knowledge of the labour law) (CAW 1995; Asian 
Exchange 1995; Brown and Frenkel 1993; Oxfam 2004a). Clearly, a political system that 
fails to punish violations of labour laws gives only few of the legal assurances needed for 
effective unionisation. Brown also asserts that “although the scale of [state] repression has 
eased over the last two decades, the continuing importance of the phenomenon in 
understanding contemporary labour relations should not be underestimated ... Even those 
who have been prepared to stay within the rules of the game must continually struggle to 
exercise their rights” (1997:172-3). Thus, both physical and psychological threats pose 
powerful constraints to mobilising and organising among Thai women workers.
This is substantiated through my interviews with union women in Thailand who had 
experienced a wide range of threats and coercion by their employers or hired security 
personnel. When asked to describe constraints to unionisation, one union secretary in 
Bangkok recounted how her union faced difficulties in attracting candidates for its 
upcoming elections because the human resources department of her factory had pointedly
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asked each worker if they were candidates and if they were going to vote: “It is difficult to 
get long-term commitment as a group... Some are afraid to lose their jobs.”5 Employers are 
also known to bribe potential union activists or promote them to jobs where their activism 
is much harder to sustain than on the shop floor.6 Given that almost half of all dismissals in 
2002 in the industrial sector concerned women7 (whereas women constitute around one- 
third of this labour force and the industrial sector as a whole experienced positive growth 
rates in 2002) and workers have little chance of successfully challenging employers in 
court, women workers often have no choice but to give in to such threats from employers 
and managers.
In conclusion, legal restrictions on trade unionism, insufficient legal protection for union 
organisers, intimidation by employers, and the use of flexible employment arrangements 
are important obstacles to the effective operation of trade unions in Thailand. The Thai 
state has shown little willingness to protect union activists from repression by employers. 
These problems are compounded by the growing trend towards subcontracting and 
outsourcing which, by creating insecure jobs, further decrease the likelihood of workers 
organising. Workers in the informal economy have even fewer possibilities for organising 
collectively, as their bargaining power vis-ä-vis employers is extremely low. All these 
factors apply to men as well as women, though women are likely to feel their impact more 
strongly due to their predominance in vulnerable kinds of employment.
Indonesia
Having served as an instrument of suppression of the labour movement for more than thirty 
years, Indonesia’s industrial relations system is by turns called exclusionary (Hadiz 1997) 
or repressive (Saptari 1995:58). The former term refers to the absence of workers from 
structures and institutions established by the Suharto regime to deal with labour issues (in 
contrast to corporatist or populist models of labour control), while the latter takes its cue 
from the attempts by the government and security apparatus to silence workers claiming a 
voice in decision-making. Whereas Thailand at times saw civilian administrations accord 
limited political freedoms to labour, the Suharto regime set out during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s to exercise full control over all labour groups by unifying existing trade unions 
into one peak body. Previously named the All Indonesian Workers’ Federation, the
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Federation of All Indonesian Labour Unions (F-SPSI) was nominally independent but 
clearly controlled by the regime through the appointment of a Suharto ally as its head, the 
election of retired military personnel as local union leaders, and the infiltration of security 
officers into its ranks (Hadiz 1997).
Under the influence of the national Pancasila ideology propagated by the New Order 
government, the cornerstone of the Indonesian industrial relations system came to be
o
solving industrial disputes through consensus and agreement (Musyawarah Mufakat). 
However, in reality, “the (internationally-promoted) ideology of Development, with its 
emphasis on economic growth, a powerful elite and the oppression of the rakyat jelata, or 
ordinary people -  and not Pancasila, with its emphasis on social justice -  was the 
overarching ideological imperative of the New Order state” (Ford 2000:3). National 
economic development required harmonious relations between employers and workers in 
which the latter were encouraged to see their interests as closely entwined with those of 
their employers (Ford 1999, 2000; Manning 1998; Lambert 1997).
An integral part of these efforts to silence the voice of workers was the shift in semantics, 
similar to changes in Thailand in the 1960s. In order to erase references to communist 
ideology, in the Pancasila Industrial Relations system workers were called pekerja or 
karyawan (employee) rather than buruh (labour); pemecatan (dismissal) became pemutusan 
hubungan kerja (termination of work relations); and mogok (strike) was replaced by unjuk 
rasa (expressing feelings). “Since the emphasis in the industrial relations system was on 
family spirit and mutual cooperation, anything connoting a one-sided action or non- 
cooperative tone should be erased from the vocabulary. Workers were portrayed as ‘black 
ants’ (semut hitarri) symbolising the hard work they were meant to do” (Saptari 1995:53). It 
was particularly after the mid-1980s that these changes to vocabulary began to be felt.
Despite the ability of the F-SPSI to suppress independent unionisation, genuine alternatives 
sprung up from time to time. Firstly, because registration requirements and threats from 
employers made it impossible for workers to establish rival unions to the F-SPSI in their 
workplaces, NGOs filled the void by organising support groups and workers’ education 
activities outside the workplace (Ford 2000, 2001). Few of these awareness-raising efforts 
made a deep impact on the oppressive conditions under which most workers operated.
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Nevertheless, it is fair to say that NGO activities contributed to the expansion of workers’ 
repertoires of contention in the early 1990s, when the number of industrial disputes 
suddenly rose dramatically in the greater Jakarta area in protest against working conditions 
and increasingly glaring disparities in income and social welfare (Kämmen 1997; Quinn 
2003:7-8). Secondly, Hadiz (1997, 2001) also reports the emergence of community-based 
organising vehicles, initiated by both labour NGOs and workers themselves and operating 
under the pretext of welfare, educational, cultural, or religious activities (discussed in 
Chapter Four). These groups were quickly suppressed by security personnel and their 
leaders imprisoned.
After the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, Indonesia under Habibie became the first 
country to ratify all core conventions of the ILO, regarding freedom of organisation and the 
right to collective bargaining; forced labour; non-discrimination and equality; minimum 
age; and the abolition of the worst forms of child labour.9 Since then, the Indonesian 
government has also passed three new laws on labour issues: the 2000 Trade Union/Labour 
Union Act; the 2003 Manpower Act; and the 2004 Industrial Relations Dispute Settlement 
A ct.10
The Trade Union Act significantly widened the conditions under which workers were 
allowed to organise and practise collective bargaining. Specifically, it gave them the right 
to form and become members of trade unions, federations of trade unions and 
confederations of trade unions which the Act stipulates must be “free, open, independent, 
democratic and responsible.” In an important break with the previous centralised and state- 
controlled industrial relations system, managers were not allowed to become trade union 
members. Similar to Thai legislation, the Act ostensibly set out to strengthen trade unions 
by guaranteeing freedom of association and facilitating the process of establishing unions. 
By allowing only ten workers to set up a trade union and more than one union to participate 
in collective bargaining (if no union represents more than 50 per cent of the workers), the 
Act has contributed to the rapid increase in the number of trade unions. This has resulted in 
fragmentation, internal rivalries in the labour movement, and competition for scarce foreign 
funding (Quinn 2003:17).
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While both the Trade Union and the Dispute Settlement Acts elicited critique from workers 
and employers alike, the 2003 Manpower Act was and continues to be the main subject of 
controversy among the Indonesian labour movement and its international supporters. The 
Act was passed only after lengthy negotiations between government, workers and 
employers, and some large-scale union protests. Although it includes provisions of 
importance to women workers (e.g. menstruation and maternity leave, family benefits and 
insurance, working hours), women’s participation in the negotiations was minimal (the 
small team of six union leaders selected to negotiate with the Ministry of Manpower and 
employers contained only one woman). As a result of this silencing and pressure by 
employers, the new Act has minimised women’s right to menstruation leave, although 
provisions on maternity leave, equal pay for equal work, underground work, and night work 
were left untouched. Several major union federations continue to reject the Act.
In discussions among labour groups and employers about the new Manpower Act, 
subcontracting clearly emerged as the most contentious item. Previously unregulated, 
subcontracting has now come under the purview of the Act, which stipulates that employers 
may subcontract non-core work but that such work must be done under conditions that are 
of the same standard (i.e. concerning wages, hours, safety etc) as that enjoyed by regular 
employees. Seen from this perspective, the Act is a positive development insofar as it 
regulates an increasingly common practice. Objections from trade unions focus on the 
practical obstacle that workers will not organise in unions and demand their rights if they 
fear that their contract will not be renewed because of such actions. Furthermore, the Act 
does not clearly specify the grounds on which core activities are distinguished from non­
core activities, thus necessitating further ministerial decisions and other government 
regulations to clarify the law. Because of the prevalence of corruption, trade union activists 
fear that the Act will permit employers to test the boundaries of the already overworked and 
inefficient justice system. Although subcontracting affects both men and women, women 
workers are often more vulnerable due to their frequent classification as low-skilled or 
unskilled labour (which can easily be outsourced), the difficulties they experience in 
entering an already crowded labour market, and their predominance in industrial sectors 
that are prone to cost-cutting measures.
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In recent years, discussion of alternative forms of regulation, such as social clauses, codes 
of conduct and framework agreements, has become widespread, although implementation 
in Indonesia is so far limited to a small number of multinational companies (Wick 2003; 
Kuehl 2003). However, the overwhelming majority of workers continue to rely on national 
labour legislation and enforcement agencies located in the Indonesian government. The 
above discussion shows that compliance with and enforcement of labour laws leave much 
to be desired while many workers have expressed their dissatisfaction with the new 
Manpower Act, specifically with its provisions on menstruation leave and subcontracting.
Comparison
Many significant similarities in labour legislation and its impact on workers’ abilities to 
mobilise and organise collectively exist between the two countries. In both, legislation 
permitting the establishment of trade unions by a minimal number of workers resulted in 
the mushrooming of trade unions. This has at times encouraged employers to establish 
unions through their supporters or to manipulate union elections or leadership contests. 
Such legislation has contributed to the fragmentation of the national labour movement and 
undermined the legitimacy of trade unions in the eyes of the larger public. In both 
countries, workers also face the consequences of extensive subcontracting and outsourcing 
of work once done by members of trade unions. As legislation forbids unionisation of such 
workers or does not offer them sufficient protection from reprisals by employers, trade 
union activism and membership have declined in several sectors and is likely to continue to 
do so in both countries. These similarities indicate that Thailand and Indonesia are both 
subject to pressures brought about by globalisation and economic restructuring and that 
both states have responded similarly to such pressures by passing legislation that restricts or 
obstructs trade unionism.
However, the industrial relations systems in the two countries have in the past had distinct 
and different impacts on workers’ ability to organise collectively. Whereas the labour force 
in Indonesia until the late 1990s operated under an exclusionary system of industrial 
relations that did not give workers a free and democratic voice in policy-making, civilian 
regimes in Thailand at times applied a system combining co-optation and repression in an 
interactive relationship with labour (though at other times military regimes employed
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primarily repressive strategies) (Brown 2004T3). Though the effect of exclusion of 
workers from formal political processes of decision-making was probably the same in both 
countries, this difference is significant in that the direct labour repression by the New Order 
regime in Indonesia radicalised parts of the labour movement that were able to sustain their 
activities in the face of state-sanctioned violence.
Meanwhile, the Thai system at times posed more subtle, though no less serious, obstacles 
for the labour movement in that country, thereby perhaps leading workers to believe that 
they could challenge and change the industrial relations system in a gradual fashion. The 
Thai labour movement during the 1980s and 1990s could probably count larger numbers of 
active members and committed local supporters relative to the size of the workforce than in 
Indonesia, due to its relatively free and open nature (at least in the private sector). 
Therefore, the particular institutional arrangement in Thailand is likely to have helped 
women workers gain some measure of influence and experience in trade unions through 
their participation in a variety of protest actions (though not always in positions equal to 
men, as Chapters Five and Six will show).
The New Order government in Indonesia certainly attempted to institutionalise and 
neutralise workers’ contention against employers and the state. It did so by restricting all 
labour protests to ritualised expressions of discontent by the F-SPSI, by limiting workers’ 
expressions of grievance to inconsequential bargaining agreements that remained 
unimplemented, and by employing intimidation and violence against those who challenged 
the industrial relations system. However, through these actions the Indonesian state 
arguably sided with business interests so blatantly that few workers trusted the state- 
sanctioned trade union federation as an institution that would defend their rights at work.
Although the Thai state also colluded with business interests and, especially under military 
regimes, employed violence to subdue labour protest, its attempts to institutionalise 
workers’ protest actions were perhaps more indirectly intended to neutralise trade unions. 
For example, workers in the private sector were allowed to participate in workers’ councils 
that directly competed with trade unions. Furthermore, throughout the 1990s the 
Department (later Ministry) of Labour established numerous committees to examine 
workers’ grievances in order to call a halt to often disruptive and sometimes violent forms
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of workers’ protest. Although workers in both countries were in effect largely excluded 
from policy-making and politics, it is likely that such indirect measures as described above 
allowed Thai (women) workers greater participation in trade union affairs than if  there was 
direct repression of workers’ activism. The different impacts of the industrial relations 
systems on women workers in the two countries also are a function of women’s position in 
the labour market, which will be analysed in the next section.
Women’s labour market position
The nature of local and national labour markets may also exert significant influence on 
workers’ decisions to pursue union activism. The sectors and jobs in which women find 
themselves impact greatly on their ability to exercise their rights at work. This section will 
analyse the labour market position of women in the countries under discussion, arguing that 
labour surplusses have negatively influenced their potential for collective organising. 
Labour market position will be considered in terms of both quality and quantity of jobs, 
that is both the availability of jobs and the particular sectors and kinds of jobs in which 
women are often concentrated. Although this section focuses particularly on women 
workers, it will be emphasised that in some cases male workers share characteristics with 
their female counterparts, such as vulnerability to economic restructuring, low wages, and 
lack of protection under national labour laws.
Thailand
As mentioned previously, Thai workers have experienced several long periods during 
which the state banned collective organising and bargaining. These measures benefited the 
political objectives of the groups and interests that controlled the Thai state at various times 
by guaranteeing a stable economic climate which would encourage high returns to foreign 
and domestic investment. Thailand’s industrial development first took off in the late 1950s 
with state policies geared to promote import-substitution in which both foreign and 
domestic investment played important roles. While the focus of industrialisation shifted to 
export-orientation in the 1980s, foreign investors and the increasingly powerful domestic 
capitalist class remain the main actors in the state’s efforts to stimulate economic growth 
and job creation. As Table 3.1 below shows, agriculture has declined in importance to the
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Thai economy, while manufacturing has grown consistently over the past twenty-five years. 
By mid-2003, manufacturing accounted for 39 per cent of Thailand’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) (World Bank n.d.). To this end, both export-processing zones and general 
industrial zones or estates have been established where investors receive favourable 
treatment in the form of lower taxes and cheap utilities in the midst of relatively abundant 
supplies of unskilled or low-skilled labour (Jaded n.d.). The resulting rapid economic 
development contributed to the expansion of women’s participation as formal employees in 
labour-intensive industries in the modem sector (Mathana 1996) and their predominance in 
vulnerable informal positions due to their temporary migration and the demand for docile 
and cheap labour by the export-oriented sector (Kurian 1999).
According to the 2003 Labour Force Survey, Thailand counts a labour force of 35.09 
million people (or 54.7 per cent of the total population of 64.11 million), of whom 34.33 
million are working, 630,000 are unemployed, and 130,000 are seasonal workers (semi­
unemployed) (NSO 2003a). The unemployment rate in the greater Bangkok area is 
estimated at 2.5 per cent, whereas the nation-wide average is 1.8 per cent (accounting for 
seasonal differences; compared with 3.3 per cent in 2001) (see Table 3.2 below). Of the 
officially unemployed, slightly less than half (300,000) are women; yet, this proportion can 
partially be explained by women’s tendency to take up any job available to fulfill their 
family’s basic needs.
Though the highest proportion of workers is still employed in agriculture, the Thai 
economy has seen a gradual shift of jobs throughout the 1980s and early 1990s from 
agriculture to industry and service (see Table 3.3 below). The weak position of women in 
the labour market can be seen clearly from their employment status. While the percentage 
of women and men in waged or salaried employment is nearly equal, 39.8 per cent of 
women but only 16.4 per cent of men were contributing family workers. Meanwhile, the 
percentage of self-employed women is less than half that of men workers (see Table 3.3 
below). The predominance of women working as contributing family workers means that 
many women workers lack formal protection under labour legislation and have limited 
independent opportunities for wage-earning and upward mobility as workers.
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Table 3.1: Sectoral growth in Thailand
Annual average growth (%) % o f  GDP
1982-92 1992-02 2001 1982 1992 2001
Agriculture 4.0 1.1 -10.1 18.5 12.3 8.5
Industry 11.8 3.5 4.5 29.5 38.1 42.0
- manufacturing 11.8 4.8 5.0 21.3 27.5 33.3
Services 8.4 2.0 2.5 51.9 49.6 49.5
Source: World 03 1 P' s
Table 3.2: Key labour market indicators in Thailand disaggregated by sex
1990 1995 2000 2001 2002
Population (millions) 
Unemployment rate (%)
55.84 59.40 62.41 63.31
Quarter 1 (total) 3.5 2.0 4.2 2.8 2.9
Quarter 3 (total) 2.2 1.1 2.4 2.1 1.8
Quarter 1 Male 3.0 1.8 4.1 2.9
Quarter 3 Male 2.0 0.9 2.4 2.3
Quarter 1 Female 4.1 2.3 4.4 2.7
Quarter 3 Female
Labour Force Participation (Q3) (%)
2.1 1.3 2.3 1.9
Male 87.7 83.5 80.6 81.8 81.5
Female 76.3 68.9 64.9 66.6 65.6
Sources: World Bank (n.d.), National Statistical Office (2003b) and United Nations 
Development Program (2004).
Since embarking on export-oriented, labour-intensive industrialisation, Thailand has 
witnessed the phenomenon of large-scale domestic and cross-border labour migration to 
urban centres. Industrial estates and free-trade zones first started emerging around Bangkok 
and nearby ports, and gradually extended to semi-urban areas, providing job opportunities 
close to the homes of surplus rural labour (Mills 1998; Yoddumnem-Attig et al. 1992; 
Theobald 2002). These new employment opportunities have drawn thousands of young 
women in particular to the factories, sharply increasing women’s participation in the formal 
labour force. Women have also rapidly become absorbed in the urban labour force through 
domestic service and home-based work. These changes in employment status from unpaid 
family worker to waged or subcontracted worker stem largely from rural poverty which 
forces young women (as well as men) to seek urban jobs to support their families in the
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villages.11 The decline in the fertility rate (number of births per woman) from 3.5 in 1980 to 
1.8 in 2000 (World Bank n.d.) has significantly contributed to, and at the same time 
reflects, the growth of women’s labour force participation. Taken together, these 
demographic changes have had far-reaching consequences for women’s labour force 
participation.
Table 3.3: Sectoral composition of the Thai labour market disaggregated by sex
1990 1995 2000
Share of waged and employed workers
Male (% of male labour force) 31 38 40
Female (% of female labour force) 26 32 39
Share of self-employed
Male 42 43 43
Female 18 21 21
Share of contributing family workers
Male 26.9 18.5 16.4
Female 56.1 46.5 39.8
Sector of employment 
Agriculture
Male (% of male labour force) 63 51 50
Female (% of female labour force) 65 53 48
Industry
Male 16 22 20
Female 12 17 17
Services
Male 21 27 30
Female 23 29 35
Sources: World Bank (n.d.), National Statistical Office (2003b) and United Nations 
Development Program (2004).
To the extent that increased labour force participation allowed Thai women greater contact 
with other working women and more exposure to formal structures of labour control (e.g. in 
a factory setting), these changes are likely to have increased the potential for women 
workers’ collective organising. On the other hand, the insecure nature of many women’s 
jobs and the pressures on young women to contribute to the household income have 
provided disincentives for collective organising. Moreover, the high concentration of 
employees in small (though very often formal) industrial workplaces with fewer than ten 
workers obstructs access to information about labour rights and constitutes a serious 
obstacle to organising in the manufacturing sector in Thailand (Brown and Frenkel 1993).
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The impact of these factors depends on how easily women workers can find new jobs. If 
jobs are scarce, it is likely that few women would be willing to risk dismissal by joining 
workers’ organisations, whereas a growing labour demand may lower the risk of workers’ 
agitation. In the early 1990s, the almost continual expansion of industrial employment in 
the greater Bangkok area perhaps allowed women workers greater flexibility in organising 
collectively, whereas strikes and other protest action decreased when the job market 
contracted due to the financial crisis of the late 1990s.
Statistical evidence suggests that women workers were over-represented among those laid- 
off during the early part of the financial crisis that hit Thailand in 1997 (ILO 1998). By 
contributing to dismissals and job insecurity and prompting both Thai and foreign 
enterprises to implement flexible labour policies, the financial crisis in Thailand also led to 
a sharp decrease in the number of strike actions. In 1997, there were 15 strikes involving 
8,850 workers with a duration of 248 days, dropping to 3 involving 909 workers with a 
duration of 25 days in 1999 (Voravidh et al. n.d.:13). The numbers of labour disputes and 
workers involved in them fluctuated during the peak years of dismissals but returned to pre­
crisis levels in 2001. More than 70 per cent of all cases before the labour court during 2001 
were brought by workers against employers regarding unfair dismissal and outstanding 
benefits (Brown, Bundit and Hewison 2002:13). Thus, while job insecurity constitutes a 
disincentive to collective organising, at the same time it may also remind workers of the 
necessity of trade unionism to defend their rights in the workplace.
More generally, new global economic pressures affect women’s ability to mobilise and 
organise. As mentioned earlier, global processes of economic restructuring have created 
radically different methods and relations of production, many of which cause unionisation 
rates to decrease or stagnate. While initially this transformation led to an increase in 
women’s access to light manufacturing jobs in developing countries including Thailand, 
more recently a large proportion of these women have been compelled to take on casualised 
and flexible work, in both the formal and informal sectors (Oxfam 2004a). Contract or 
casual work status, long probation periods, and other forms of insecure employment are 
additional and powerful deterrents to protest of any kind, since in the current economic 
climate of declining investment in labour-intensive industries, such as textiles and 
footwear, workers cannot immediately find new jobs and at the same time cannot afford to
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be unemployed for long. In conclusion, in Thailand the impact of the labour market on 
women’s ability to mobilise and organise collectively is likely to be mostly negative. 
Although women have entered the formal labour market in considerable numbers during 
the past two decades, their jobs are largely insecure and are in sectors where workers are 
vulnerable to subcontracting and outsourcing as well as large-scale dismissals during an 
economic down-turn or crisis.
1
Indonesia
Recent Indonesian history has seen major shifts in labour market dynamics, and especially 
in women’s participation and locations in the labour market. With the growing shift 
between 1970 and 1985 from traditional labour-intensive (mostly food and tobacco) and 
import-substituting (chemical, rubber, transport equipment) industries to new export- 
oriented industries, large numbers of young urban women entered formal wage labour for 
the first time. The Indonesian government’s deregulation policies of the 1980s and its 
active support for foreign investment stimulated the growth of labour-intensive 
manufacturing industries such as garment and textiles, footwear, furniture, plastics, 
electronics, and food and beverages production (Ford 2003; Saptari 1995; Manning 1998). 
Formal sector employment increased from 28 to 35.2 per cent of total employment between 
1990 and 1996 (Sulistyaningsih 2003). These industries provided jobs for thousands of 
young women and men, initially in industrial areas near Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya, 
Semarang and Medan, but in more recent years also in smaller urban areas.14
While in terms of output and value-added the manufacturing sector is dominated by a small 
number of large firms, employment remains largely concentrated in small firms and cottage 
industries (Smyth and Grijns 1997:16). This and the resulting isolation of workplaces 
constitute a serious obstacle to efforts to organise manufacturing workers. The following 
table gives an overview of labour market indicators.
100
Table 3.4: Key labour market indicators for Indonesia
1990 1995 1998 1999 2000 2002
Unemployment rate (%) 2.6 4.7 5.4 6.3 6.1
Urban 9.3 10.5 6.1
Rural 3.2 3.7 4.1
Underemployment rate (%) 30.5 31.6 35.1 33.4 31.5
Urban 8.3 8.4 7.4
Rural 26.4 30.2 24.0
Labour force participation rate (%) 53.1 65.4 66.9 67.2 67.8
Male 82.8 84.5 83.2 83.6 84.2 85.6
Female 44.2 46.9 51.2 51.2 51.7 50.1
Share of employment (%) 
Male 64.8 64.6 61.5 61.8 61.7
Female 35.2 35.4 38.5 38.2 38.3
Urban 24.5 31.8 34.5 36.4 37.9
Rural 75.5 61.2 65.5 63.6 62.0
Source: Van Zorge 2002, based on data from Ministry of Manpower and Central Bureau of 
Statistics (BPS).
Results of the 2002 National Labour Force Survey showed that 67.8 per cent (or 100.9 
million people) of the population were part of the work force (based on reporting of the 
previous week’s activities), of which 61.6 per cent worked (paid workers, employers and 
unpaid family workers) and 6.2 per cent actively sought work. Women’s labour force 
participation rate was significantly lower than men’s for all age groups (50.1 versus 85.6 
per cent) as 37.8 per cent of all female respondents reported being housewives. Rural areas 
experienced higher female labour force participation than urban areas. Young women’s 
responsibility for child care and household tasks was reflected in the finding that women’s 
participation is highest among the 45-49 age group (60.6 per cent) whose children have 
already grown up and moved out or could help to take of the household. While the formal 
economy counts 27.3 million workers according to government estimates, the informal 
economy absorbs the remainder of those who are employed, estimated at 52 million 
workers (Van Zorge 2002).
As a result of the 1998 Indonesian economic crisis, the deteriorating security situation in 
parts of the country, rampant corruption and continuing inefficiencies, investor confidence 
in Indonesia has decreased. This has contributed to the withdrawal of foreign direct 
investment that would have provided thousands of jobs (most prominently in the mining
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and gas sector and in labour-intensive manufacturing). Macro-economic trends such as 
exchange rate fluctuations, ineffective government policies, and regional competition have 
resulted in low export growth rates (between 4 and 5 per cent in early 2004). Although the 
financial sector has stabilised remarkably since the days of the economic crisis, the 
recovery has been largely ‘jobless’ because of the nature of capital flows into the country 
(Ramli 2004; Van Zorge 2002).15
As a clear indication of the resulting problems, between 1997 and 2003 measured 
unemployment rates increased from 4.7 to 9.3 per cent, while underemployment (those 
above 15 years old working 35 hours per week or less) rose to 39.3 per cent (or 41.5 million 
people) (Ramli 2004:28). This amounted to 9.1 million openly unemployed and an 
additional 28.9 million underemployed in 2002 (BPS 2003). Among the female population, 
open unemployment (including discouraged job-seekers and those waiting for work) stood 
at 11.8 per cent in 2002, compared to 7.5 per cent of men. The highest figures were 
recorded for the 15-19 age group where 40 per cent of women and 30.7 per cent of men 
were unemployed. In total, open unemployment among the 15-24 age group amounted for 
more than half the total unemployed (BPS 2003). Dismissals in the manufacturing sector 
have frequently been reported in the local press and are widely expected to continue during 
the remainder of 2004. Especially the garment, textile and leather sector is set to feel the 
impact of the abolition of the Multi-Fibre Agreement and its preferential export quota 
system in January 2005. Similar to the situation in Thailand, these economic difficulties 
could lead either to greater mobilisation and organisation to defend existing workers’ rights 
or to a decrease in activism in order to safeguard jobs.
Aside from higher unemployment rates, significant gender differences are also evident in 
employment status and wages. Whereas almost half of both women and men in urban areas 
are paid employees or labourers, 17.9 per cent of urban women are unpaid workers 
(compared to only 3.2 per cent of urban men).16 In rural areas, these differences are even 
more pronounced with 47.5 per cent of women being unpaid workers compared to 9.8 per 
cent of men. Unpaid work impinges on people’s ability to protect their rights in the 
workplace, as they are mostly found in irregular and informal jobs in small workplaces 
where they have little bargaining power with their employer.17
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Labour force survey statistics show that women’s earnings are consistently lower than 
men’s when disaggregated by educational attainment (BPS 2003; Manning 1998:258).18 
Except for the transport sector, women’s average wages are lower than men’s in all main 
occupations and industries, with women earning as little as 52 per cent of men’s wages in 
agriculture and forestry. The highest percentage of permanent workers earning less than the 
minimum wage in 1995 was found in small and medium-sized enterprises and in the 
footwear sector (Pangestu and Hendytio 1997), indicating a high risk of poverty.19 A 
second indicator, working hours, shows that 47.3 per cent of women worked 35 hours per 
week or less, compared to 26.9 per cent of men (BPS 2003). Although reduced working 
hours are sometimes a sign of women’s preference to be able to combine their work with 
family responsibilities, the wages they receive are most likely insufficient to provide for 
their household, thereby increasing their reliance on other wage-earners or forcing them to 
take on a second job. While this situation may encourage women workers to mobilise and 
organise in trade unions to demand better wages, poverty and the fear of job loss may 
equally prevent women from initiating or participating in collective action.
In terms of legislation, Indonesian workers fare well in theory, as a result of government 
intervention regulating dismissals and separation payment, setting minimum wage levels, 
and recognising collective labour agreements (Manning 1998). Women workers in 
particular are well protected by law, as the Manpower Act (13/2003) grants several special 
rights related to women’s reproductive functions. The current provision allows for women 
in all workplaces to take leave during the first and second day of their menstruation, on the 
condition that they can show a relevant medical certificate.
Although menstruation leave is a controversial issue because it increases the cost of 
employing women, many union women see it as necessary because of low nutritional 
standards among women workers and unhygienic conditions in most workplaces. In 
practice, however, this provision and others have little impact in the majority of 
workplaces, aside from providing a disincentive for some employers to recruit women. Not 
only do many women fear dismissal or demotion if they take menstruation leave, but many 
also refuse examination by a doctor appointed by management, who is usually a man 
(Suryomenggolo 2002). Furthermore, many women lose their incentive payments or 
attendance bonus if they take menstruation leave, which in the context of very low monthly
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wages is tantamount to limiting women’s free choice. Where women predominate in small 
enterprises (as older women do in Indonesia), they may be especially vulnerable to 
paternalistic labour relations that prohibit organising collectively and make implementation 
of labour legislation unlikely (Smyth and Grijns 1997:17).
Similar practical obstacles also limit the implementation of provisions on maternity 
protection. Women workers have the right to paid maternity leave 1.5 months before and 
1.5 months after giving birth or suffering a miscarriage. Afterwards their employer must re­
employ them in the same position and in the same place. Pregnant and breastfeeding 
women may not be forced to undertake work that endangers their health or that of their 
child. However, in the absence of government funding for maternity benefits, employers 
prefer to reduce costs by hiring single workers or dismissing pregnant workers (World 
Bank et al. 1999; Singarimbun and Sairin 1995). Legislation passed in 1989 has made 
termination of employment on the basis of marriage, pregnancy, or giving birth illegal 
(PER-03/MEN/1989). Nevertheless, violations of this law occur from time to time, 
according to surveys, informal reports and personal interviews.
A 1995 World Bank survey of 300 workers in the textile, garment, and footwear sectors 
(with 85 per cent o f the sample employed in large firms) found that 96 per cent of firms 
complied with maternity leave provisions, 91 per cent with working hours provisions, and 
89 per cent with maternity leave compensation (Pangestu and Hendytio 1997). However, 
the survey found low compliance with provisions calling for breastfeeding facilities, 
overtime compensation, and menstruation leave. However, legal experts working with 
labour-related and women’s NGOs routinely receive complaints and calls for help from 
women workers concerning illegal dismissal related to pregnancy or motherhood, unpaid 
wages, dubious factory closures (with the factory opening up a short while later under a 
different name and with new workers), and forced overtime without appropriate benefits 
(see also World Bank et al. 1999).
While these complaints cannot be taken as an indication of the size of the overall problem, 
it is highly likely that such violations are especially common in smaller enterprises where 
enforcement of labour legislation is often low due to the absence of international pressure, 
the lack of internal enterprise standards, and the pressures of subcontracting. This suspicion
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was confirmed by a 1997 World Bank survey of managers and supervisors that showed a 
worker’s sex to be the third most frequently cited factor in recruitment decisions among a 
range of occupational sectors (see Table 3.5 below).
Table 3.5: Factors affecting recruitment in different occupations in Indonesia
M a n a g e r s T e c h n ic ia n s B o o k k e e p e r s S e c r e ta r ia l S u p e r v is o r S k il le d U n sk il le d
Age 90 83 83 100 100 91 82
Educatio 90 83 87 89 94 64 4
n
Sex 80 91 60 79 78 93 93
Marital 70 35 50 56 56 38 51
status
Training 50 48 43 17 17 5 3
Note: Percentage of firms agreeing that a factor is important. 
Source: World Bank (1997:92).
Further protective legislation is still on the books in Indonesia, in the form of a Ministerial 
Decision (Per-04/MEN/1989) which prohibits women employees from working at night, 
and the provision in the 2000 Manpower Act which prohibits women from working in 
mines. Although both of these provisions state some exceptions (notably for work that must 
be done by women and for workplaces that receive special permission for night work by 
their women employees), they effectively restrict women’s access to employment 
opportunities which are at times lucrative and always much needed. Jafar Suryomenggolo 
(2002) from the Trade Union Rights Centre notes that legal safeguards in the Ministerial 
Decision on night work often do not work in practice.20 Thus, women workers enjoy little 
protection from the dangers of night work but are at the same time unable to take advantage 
of it even when it is well paid. The same situation is found with regard to underground 
work.
How women workers have experienced the Indonesian industrial relations system and in 
particular how they have made use of existing structures and initiated new organisations 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter Seven. However, at this point it can be concluded that 
the legal system has offered women workers little protection from exploitation and 
discrimination in the workplace. The above analysis indicates that workers have ample 
reason to doubt the adequacy of existing legal protection, both in general and in particular 
with regard to collective action. Among the recurrent features of women workers’ lives are
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low wages, long hours, and segregation into low-skilled manufacturing jobs (often contract- 
based), while high unemployment rates have created a large reserve labour force eager to 
take up formal employment. These conditions are far from conducive to unionisation or 
even ad-hoc collective action in the workplace. In conclusion, since the economic crisis, 
downsizing, restructuring, and women’s predominance in vulnerable employment keep 
them from joining trade unions and decrease the effectiveness of the unions.
Comparison
In both countries, the rising labour force participation of women in the formal (modem) 
economy since the late 1970s has been a significant development at the national level, 
though Indonesia experienced a slightly later start than Thailand. In both cases, this was a 
result of the switch away from import-substitution to export-oriented industrialisation that 
involved large-scale domestic and foreign investment in labour-intensive industries. Where 
women workers are concerned, Thailand and Indonesia have experienced similar paths of 
economic development that have largely incorporated women into the labour force as 
secondary, cheap workers. Sizable groups of women work in labour-intensive 
manufacturing and home-based enterprises in both countries. Those in formal employment 
such as manufacturing are subject to varying degrees of labour control at their workplace 
through the prevailing industrial relations system, which in both countries allows 
subcontracting and frequently does not take serious action against employers who violate 
labour legislation by paying below the minimum wage, enforcing excessive overtime, or 
closing workplaces without proper compensation. Meanwhile, those in domestic work or 
home-based work have been excluded from the industrial relations system and cannot claim 
any labour protection.
While labour legislation in Indonesia contains more protective provisions than in Thailand, 
particularly with regard to maternity and menstruation leave, this difference is not likely to 
have a great impact on women workers’ ability to mobilise and organise collectively. The 
reality for many women workers in manufacturing, service, and home-based industries is 
that they are often employed because they are cheaper than men and easy to replace due to 
their relatively low (classification of) skill levels. In both countries, these factors may 
prevent them from mobilising and organising collectively, although they may equally
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motivate women to do so, provided that feelings of dissatisfaction, political awareness, and 
common identification are sufficiently strong.
Many observers of women’s work have noted the negative impact of structures of labour 
control on workers’ willingness to organise collectively in both countries. Production 
quotas for groups of workers that are tied to bonuses encourage workers to exploit 
themselves in search of a decent income, while increases in the speed of automated 
production on the shop floor constitute a disincentive for talking with fellow workers 
(Saptari 1995; Wolf 1992; Lee 1998; Tjandraningsih 1995; Mather 1988; Oxfam 2004a, 
2004b). Long working hours and restrictions on talking on the shop floor further minimise 
the possibility of solidarity arising among women workers (Tjandraningsih 1995:51; 
Oxfam 2004a). In addition, new systems of labour control have emerged as part of the shift 
towards subcontracting, outsourcing and home-based work. In sum, the slow recovery from 
economic crisis -  as evidenced in lagging employment growth rates -  together with the 
vulnerable position of women in the global gender division of labour and the gap between 
the theory and reality of labour protection make it unlikely that many women will mount 
collective challenges vis-ä-vis their employers.
Although this discussion has focused on women at the lower end of the labour market, it is 
important to keep in mind the differences between Thailand and Indonesia in terms of the 
proportion of more highly skilled women in the workforce. While women make up 52.4 per 
cent of all professional and technical workers in Thailand, they account for 40.8 per cent in 
Indonesia. The contrast is greater for the category administrators and managers, where Thai 
women account for 21.8 per cent but Indonesian women for 6.6 per cent (UNDP 1998). 
Higher educational achievement and a tradition of women in business and trading in 
Thailand may account for this. While these factors may not necessarily have a direct impact 
on women’s ability to organise collectively at the lower end of the labour market, they 
indicate the large gaps between various groups of women in the workforce in Thailand. 
Whether these different groups have the potential to learn from each other’s experiences 
will be analysed in greater detail in Chapters Six and Seven.
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Conclusion
This chapter has argued that in both Indonesia and Thailand restrictive labour legislation 
and other strategies by governments and employers have effectively excluded labour from 
decision-making and have created formidable obstacles to unionisation. Labour legislation 
allowing small groups of workers to establish a union has resulted in fragmentation of the 
labour movement, while successive governments in both countries have done little to 
enforce labour legislation protecting workers and to close loopholes allowing employers to 
suppress labour protest. Even when workers are willing or eager to associate themselves 
with the union movement, they face a number of direct and indirect obstacles, compounded 
by their weak position in the labour market. This is especially the case for women workers 
who in both countries are often found in vulnerable and insecure types of employment 
where labour organising is extremely difficult.
But while the exclusionary effect of industrial relations systems has been the same in both 
countries, the means have differed substantially. Workers in Thailand are likely to have 
benefited from the periods of relative freedom and democracy under civilian regimes that 
permitted union organising and collective bargaining. This may have enabled them to gain 
experience in unionisation, to engage in alliances with other social movements, and to 
expand their repertoires of protest vis-ä-vis employers and the state. In Indonesia, in 
contrast, workers’ organisations were for some three decades severely restricted in their 
efforts to educate and organise workers, and this role was largely taken over by new, 
independent NGOs. The absence of credible trade unions and the lack of access to reliable 
information about trade unions suggest that many workers are not familiar with the concept 
of trade unionism or are unwilling to put their trust in such organisations. For these general 
reasons, the ability and willingness of women workers to mobilise and organise collectively 
is likely to be higher in Thailand than in Indonesia. The earlier large-scale entry of women 
into the formal urban labour market in Thailand will probably strengthen this supposition.
However, ability and willingness to mobilise and organise are not only a result of labour 
regulation and position in the labour market. Whether or not women workers will form and 
join organisations to articulate their struggles -  and how they respond to political 
developments -  depends also on the nature of available organisations and the environment
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in which they (can) operate and form alliances. The gender relations and regimes which 
women workers experience and in which their organisations operate furthermore shape the 
diverse grounds on which they might organise and the specific ways in which they try to do 
so. The next two chapters therefore address the political and gender environment of women 
workers in Thailand and Indonesia.
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1 A useful recent example is the controversy over the minimum wage during July-August 2004 (for a history 
of this issue see Manning 1998). The debate saw workers’ coalitions such as the Jakarta-based Committee 
Against Workers’ Oppression (KAPB) call for use of a “reasonable life necessities” index which would 
increase the minimum wage substantially, whereas the national employers’ federation APINDO insisted on 
continued use of the “minimum life necessities” index. APINDO and the National Planning Agency proposed 
that the increase in the minimum wage as desired by workers’ groups would lead to increased unemployment, 
and called on the Ministry of Labour and Transmigration to let employers and workers determine the 
minimum wage through bipartite negotiations. Workers’ organisations throughout the country objected to this 
proposal, arguing that government intervention was necessary in the face of the weak legal and practical 
position of enterprise-based trade unions. In the end, the Minister of Labour and Transmigration chose to 
uphold the status quo with regard to the basis for determining the minimum wage (Kompas 29 July 2004; 
Kompas 10 August 2004).
2 Jaded’s view is shared by observers from other labour-related NGOs in Thailand. For example, the head of 
the Thai Labor Campaign (a Bangkok-based advocacy and research NGO) insists that workers who 
participate on labour-management committees are merely “brainwashed about the importance of attaining 
SA8000 status” even though this is only in the interest of the employers (in order to get more orders) rather 
than beneficial to the workers (presentation at Seminar on Codes of Conduct in the Textile Industry, 27 
November 2001, Bangkok).
3 This situation frequently occurs when management restricts the automatic deduction of union dues from 
workers' salaries, instead forcing union activists to conduct periodic visits to individual members in order to 
collect dues.
4 As of late 2004, Thailand had not ratified ELO Conventions 103 or 183 on Maternity Protection.
5 Personal interview Wannipa Paonoy, Bangkok, 24 January 2002.
6 Personal interviews Tew, Bangkok 25 January 2002 and Arunee Srito, Bangkok 29 October 2001.
; According to a Labour Protection and Welfare Department report, 21,151 out of 44,783 dismissals were of 
women. The report did not specify what proportion of these dismissals were on grounds of union activism or 
were discriminatory in nature {Bangkok Post 28 February 2004).
8 For a detailed description of Pancasila and its influence on the Indonesian Industrial Relations system, see 
Ford (1999, 2000) and Manning (1998).
9 Observers note that it is likely President Habibie signed the ELO Conventions because it presented a 
relatively quick and easy way of appeasing labour in the aftermath of the riots of May 1998. However, he may 
not have intended to grant labour far-reaching legal rights (Ford 2000:14). Although subsequent 
administrations have passed the Trade Union and Manpower Acts of 2000 and 2003 respectively, the 
continuing unwillingness and/or inability of the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration to enforce these 
and other labour-related laws across the board raises doubts about any fundamental reform of the industrial 
relations system in Indonesia.
10 The Industrial Relations Dispute Settlement Act of 2004 -  which has less direct relevance to this discussion 
-  represents an overhaul of the relevant institutions and clarifies the rights of each party to bring a case 
forward, to request mediation, and to appeal against decisions.
11 Revised poverty line measurements indicate that some 15 per cent of the Thai population of 64 million (or 
around nine million people) are living in poverty, around half of them in the northeastern provinces which for 
decades have been a source of migrant labour {Bangkok Post 16 September 2004).
13 Vicky Crinis, however, argues in her research on labour in Malaysia that the financial and economic crisis 
that hit Southeast and East Asia in 1997 brought unexpected benefits for trade unions in Malaysia: “The crisis 
caused a considerable change in the way workers view their job security and welfare benefits. A post-crisis 
backlash through restructuring has made workers more aware of the advantages of trade union membership. 
The Malaysian Trades Union Congress (MTUC) is seen to be making advances for workers and the 
government has had to relent on some work-related policies” (2002:165).
14 See Manning (1998) for a detailed assessment of variations in women’s labour force participation over time 
in Java and the Outer Islands, in rural and urban areas and in various sectors of the economy.
15 See Manning (2003) for a different interpretation according to which the Indonesian government’s wage 
and termination policies for the modem sector “have an adverse effect on productivity, and could slow the 
creation of ‘better’ jobs and higher living standards” (2003:20).
16 Manning, however, cautions that women may be more frequently described as unpaid family workers than 
men due to gender bias and given that ownership of a family company may be “im ested in male hands” 
(1998:242).
110
17 The absence of viable employment opportunities for women in rural areas stands in contrast to the large 
percentage of urban women who are paid workers. This reflects the availability in Indonesian cities of work in 
the service and industrial sectors which account for 22.4 and 65.5 per cent of women’s jobs respectively. In 
rural areas, the primary sector still provides 66.4 per cent of all jobs for women (BPS 2003).
18 See Chapter Five for details on gender and education in Thailand and Indonesia. As in other countries in the 
region, the significant differences in earnings by sex are most likely due to a combination of lower levels of 
experience; sex segregation and undervaluation of women’s traditional occupations and of newly feminised 
occupations; women’s frequently interrupted work life (due to family responsibilities); and direct 
discrimination on the basis of sex.
19 After decades of increasing prosperity, the relative incidence of poverty has been on the rise again since the 
economic crisis of the late 1990s. Though estimates vary as a result of the variety of measurements used, it is 
safe to state that women are particularly at risk due to their lower educational attainment, their lower access to 
employment and social safety nets, and their greater social vulnerability. The Central Bureau of Statistics 
(BPS) reports that between 1996 and 1999 the number of people living in poverty increased from 34 million 
to 48 million. In particular, the number of poor households headed by women grew from 710,000 to 1.03 
million, which represents an increase of 45 per cent. This meant that of each 100 households headed by 
women, 15 were living in poverty in 1999, of which most were headed by women with very low levels of 
education (elementary level or less) (BPS 2000).
20 For example, Suryomenggolo (2002) observes that permits from the Department of Labour can be ‘bought’ 
with relative ease; many companies fail to send the required monthly report about the implementation of their 
permit; and although the ordinance on night work must be displayed to and read by the workers, few workers 
effectively know their legal rights and dare to protest against violations.
I l l
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Chapter 4 - Trade unions and social movements in Thailand and
Indonesia
Introduction
The previous chapter analysed and compared labour regulation and labour legislation in 
Thailand and Indonesia, highlighting the different means employed by the state and 
employers to achieve exclusion of labour from decision-making processes. It argued that 
Thai workers may have had somewhat greater opportunities to experience collective 
mobilisation and organisation than Indonesia workers, since Thailand had known several 
periods of democratic governance during which labour rights were generally respected. 
That chapter also demonstrated the similarities between the two countries in terms of 
women’s large-scale entry into urban formal employment, their position in vulnerable types 
of employment, and the common lack of enforcement of labour legislation where workers’ 
protection is concerned. The latter two of these characteristics are important obstacles to 
effective mobilisation and organisation of women workers.
But the question of how important identities are to collective mobilising and organising by 
women workers in these two countries cannot be answered by considering only economic 
developments. Freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively have historically 
been closely linked not only to economic developments and factory organisation but also to 
prevailing local, national, and regional political arrangements and formations. The 
configuration and relative strength of the labour movement -  while the result of a large 
array of forces -  have been the subject of struggles both within the state and between the 
state and civil society, the military and business circles. As Andrew Brown concludes from 
his extensive analysis of secondary sources in both Thai and English, “the capacity of 
workers to emerge and re-emerge as political actors ... can only be understood in relation 
to the character of the state, regime and political space in particular historical conjunctures” 
(2004:133).
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Moreover, the political space available for the development and expression of particular 
identities is uneven and subject to political developments such as regime change, 
democratisation processes, cross-border ties, and political alignments between social 
movements and communities. This chapter argues that as a result of maneuvering by 
political parties and economic elites but also due to their own weaknesses, trade unions in 
Thailand and Indonesia until the 1990s were incapable of linking with other social or 
oppositional movements. This has significantly weakened their ability to appeal to groups 
other than labour and to address cross-cutting issues such as gender inequality.
This chapter starts with an analysis of social movements in Thailand and Indonesia which 
explores and compares in particular the linkages and alliances between trade unions and 
other social movements. The next section highlights one particular social movement, the 
women’s movement, and questions to what extent women’s movements or organisations 
have addressed (or have the potential to address) labour issues. This is followed by a brief 
exploration of the role of women in politics. The remainder of the chapter is concerned 
with a comparison between Thailand and Indonesia regarding the nature and extent of trade 
unionism.
Social movements
Chapter Two noted the emergence throughout the world of new social movements that are 
based primarily on fluid identities rather than material interests. It also noted that opinions 
are divided as to whether trade unions can be called new social movements that work 
towards the shaping of social practices. Have trade unions in Thailand and Indonesia 
become integrated into public institutions, as Castells (1997) argued, and absorbed into 
anti-globalisation movements? Or are trade unions increasingly engaged in struggles over 
meaning and do they “build a new identity that redefines their position in society” (Castells 
1997:8)? This section explores the connections between trade unions and other social 
movements in Thailand and Indonesia.
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Thailand
While civil society organisations have been active for decades in Thailand (e.g. trade 
unions, women’s professional organisations, religious associations, etc) the networks that 
some of these organisations establish in the form of social movements are of relatively 
recent origin. The appearance and spectacular rise of social movements observed during the 
1990s has been due in part to rising economic inequalities and the inadequacies of Thai 
parliamentary democracy: “The failure of representative democracy to provide any 
meaningful representation for poor and marginal groups has prompted many agitational 
campaigns” (Pasuk 2002:15). It can thus be argued that it was precisely those groups that 
felt most excluded from the workings of parliamentary democracy that engaged in social 
movements, such as farmers, ethnic minorities, and women workers from lower income- 
groups. With respect to these movements, Pasuk notes that they “mobilise concepts of 
culture and identity to build solidarity and inspire action” (2002:16) but with reference to 
“universally acceptable concepts” rather than exclusive markers of identity, thereby 
facilitating alliances with other groups and support from the general public.
Pasuk’s observation applies perhaps more to environmental, women’s, and so-called 
people’s movements than to trade unions. Most Thai trade unions have not tried to align 
themselves with increasingly active social movements during the 1990s and have in fact 
been slow to recognise and learn from the shift from occasional popular protest against the 
state to sustained networks agitating around multiple issues. This stands in sharp contrast to 
trade unions’ earlier periods of radical activism, in particular the democratic interlude of 
1973-1976. This period witnessed a successful challenge by students and other civil society 
groups against the military government and a subsequent short-lived explosion of political 
activism by a large variety of groups and individuals. According to Napapom:
Social movement unionism developed as the dominant form of the trade union movement 
from October 1973 to October 1976, with three components: defence of the common 
interests of the working class, class collective action, and participation in the movements 
for broad social objectives. Economic unionism developed to replace social movement 
unionism in the post-1976 period. Trade unions turned to emphasize only the defence of the 
workers’ common interests and distanced themselves from movements for broad social 
objectives (2002:80).
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For example, the democratic interlude saw one strike in early 1976 in which unions won 
widespread popular support because their demand for lower food prices moved beyond 
(though included) the traditional interests of the working class (Napapom 2002:85).
Harsh authoritarian rule in the late 1970s and the slow return to democracy during the 
1980s meant that the trade union movement was forced to regroup its strength and its 
membership base. The “labourist wing” concerned with expanding labour’s influence in a 
stable, capitalist system gained the upper hand (with encouragement from the state and 
capital), whereas the “more radical stream” which criticised the capitalist system and 
sought to overthrow it, was gradually weeded out through repressive measures by the 
military (Brown 2004:83). Simultaneously, the rapid increase in manufacturing 
employment spawned new, area-based trade union groups that challenged the legitimacy 
and efficiency of the increasingly fractured national trade union congresses. Legislation 
limiting trade unions to discussion of and struggle around economic issues and granting 
workers only limited rights to discuss political issues through the nascent parliamentary 
democracy in turn contributed to the isolation of trade unions from most other oppositional 
movements in Thai society. Thus, the contrast between alliances in the mid-1970s and the 
relative isolation of trade unions in the 1980s can be attributed to economic and political 
strategies by the state aimed at containment and depoliticisation of labour movements. The 
weak position of the labour movement and its focus on basic worker rights (as opposed to 
broader political rights) were a result of the exclusionary system of labour control that 
developed after 1976.1
In the 1990s, in contrast, a younger generation of trade union leaders started to explore new 
avenues of organising in response to a perceived sense of crisis in the labour movement 
(Brown 2004:113-4). One of the clearest manifestations of their resolve was their taking up 
of occupational safety and health (OSH) as a union priority in response to a string of large 
industrial accidents. In particular, the Kader toy factory fire in 1993 that claimed 188 lives, 
including 159 women workers, caused by negligence on the part of employers and 
managers and the absence of safety equipment and training, galvanised trade unionists into 
action. The resulting collective action around safety and health issues is notable for two 
reasons. First, as Brown argues, “the health and safety crisis has been seen to be partly the 
result of the ineffectiveness and weakness of existing labour organisations” (2001:133).
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Even when enterprise-based unions were fully aware of health and safety shortcomings in 
their workplace, they were generally unable to push for changes. Secondly, the Kader 
accident “furthered the resolve of some and convinced them of the utmost importance of 
regrouping and rebuilding organisations that would have a greater capacity” amongst other 
things to defend workers’ class interests (Brown 2001:134). Yet, more relevant for this 
analysis is the related fact that the Kader fire generated new alliances that went beyond 
traditional class interests and were at times “outside the officially sanctioned parameters of 
labour organisation” (2001:138).
Integral to these new alliances is the launch of a campaign to assist Kader fire victims in the 
immediate aftermath of the disaster. This led to the establishment later the same year of a 
Committee for Assisting Kader Employees, a Health and Safety Campaign Committee, and 
a Council of Work and Environment Related Patients’ Network of Thailand (WEPT). 
Whereas Brown emphasises these committees’ demands for workers’ participation in 
decision-making around issues of health and safety and the challenge to centralised 
bureaucracy that this constituted, Napapom (2002) calls attention to the new alliances 
formed in the process between workers, academics, medical professionals, and networks of 
rural poor. Central to these alliances was a new degree of cooperation and collaboration 
between workers and other social groups and a focus on issues other than wage demands 
that had during most of the 1980s been the main preoccupation of trade unions in the 
industrialised sectors.
Especially noteworthy in this respect is WEPT joining the Assembly of the Poor in 1996. 
Formally established in 1995, the Assembly of the Poor is a country-wide network of poor 
peoples’ organisations and action groups whose aim is to challenge the government’s 
development policies and projects (Missingham 2003). Although the Assembly’s most 
well-known campaigns are in the fields of forestry and rural environmental damage, it also 
includes as its allies groups of urban poor and fishing people, aside from sufferers of 
occupational diseases. The importance of these developments is captured by Napapom who 
argues that:
The formation of a broad-based coalition highlighted the limitations of the trade unions’ 
role in the OSH campaign. Trade unions in the 1990s are organizations of the relatively 
powerless. They cannot derive significant power from their members. They achieve success
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as campaigning organizations only when they cultivate alliances with other social 
movements whose aims overlap with the unions’ demands (2002:99).
Thus, while in the days of democracy in the 1970s workers had actively supported the 
struggles of students’ and peasants’ movements, in the 1990s OSH concerns compelled 
trade union activists to seek support from other movements. This, in turn, required them to 
re-examine their agenda, strategies, membership, and ultimately their position as a 
movement. The involvement of workers’ groups in the Assembly of the Poor is not the only 
example of workers and trade union activists venturing again into broader activism and 
discovering the strength of alliances. Chapter Five discusses the ninety-days maternity 
leave campaign by union women in the early 1990s, and the ways in which they drew on 
new alliances in order to press for protection of pregnant women in the workforce in 
general. Similar to the OSH campaign, this campaign sought a broader support base and 
covered issues on which alliances across and beyond economic sectors were possible 
(Brown 2004).3
Cross-sectoral or cross-class alliances raise the question of the role of NGOs. Whether as 
principle actors or supporting organisations, NGOs are an important aspect of social 
movements. With regard to the campaigns on maternity leave and OSH, as well as the 1990 
campaign on social security, it is important to note that both international and local NGOs 
offered a wide range of support. One consequence of their financial and technical 
involvement was the increased standing of informal and unofficial labour organisations that 
proved to be more effective in addressing workers’ concerns than the formal labour 
councils or federations. As Voravidh et al. write, “it is a positive development to see that 
some international organisations, in particular ACILS [the American Center for Labour 
Solidarity] and FES [the German Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung], changed their methods of 
solidarity support from emphasising only the formal organisations to focusing more 
attention on the organisations that have real power bases and could mobilize workers’ 
collective actions” (n.d.:15). Nevertheless, according to Missingham (2003) and my own 
interviews with women workers, many Thai activists in diverse social movements remain 
concerned about the inequalities between social movement members and NGO supporters 
in terms of access to media and information.
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In sum, political changes in Thailand during the past thirty years first encouraged radical 
trade unionism during the mid-1970s, then limited the labour movement to a focus on 
economic issues during much of the 1980s, and encouraged trade unions to engage in 
alliances with other social and oppositional movements during the 1990s. Napapom (2002) 
has argued that trade unions have vacillated between social movement unionism and 
economic unionism depending on their responses to the external political environment in 
Thailand and internationally. However, it is worthwhile remembering that such responses 
are also shaped by the presence or absence of effective social movements and NGOs with 
similar goals, and by the legitimisation of the discourses of these diverse actors by the state 
and the media. The emergence during the 1990s of alliances between trade unions and other 
social movements can therefore be regarded as the combined effect of political 
opportunities and economic restructuring: that is, the opportunity for trade unions to remain 
relevant and overcome internal weaknesses by forming strategic alliances across sectors 
and type of employment.
Indonesia
Similar to Thailand, Indonesian workers have also explored alliances outside the workplace 
during the 1990s, though continuous labour repression until recently made this process 
more difficult and less obvious than in Thailand. The trajectory of social movement 
development in Indonesia reads like a constant contestation over the amount and the nature 
of political space granted by the authoritarian Suharto regime, though Ganie-Rochman 
(2002) emphasises the influence exerted by NGOs in the political process during the 1990s 
despite being constrained by governing mechanisms. Since the start in 1998 of efforts 
towards political reform, coalitions of NGOs and other civil society organisations such as 
church organisations, student groups, consumer protection groups, legal rights bodies, and 
professional interest associations have made their presence felt in media, decision-making 
processes, and the public sphere in general.
However, unlike Pasuk’s (2002) assertion of Thai poor and marginal people organising 
because of their under-representation in politics, Indonesia has yet to witness large-scale, 
sustained campaigns by marginalised people at a national or regional level, despite the 
exclusion of large sections of its population from local and national decision-making.
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According to popular opinion, many Indonesians are apolitical or are not yet used to (and 
fearful of) challenging political figures held in high esteem. However, it is equally likely 
that the lack of political education during the New Order years, the relatively recent 
emergence of lobby organisations, and the recent changes towards regional autonomy have 
left many people -  including workers -  unsure of how and where to start influencing the 
political system.
The particular trajectory of trade union development in Indonesia and the changing nature 
of trade union-NGO relationships also account for the relative absence of workers from 
emerging social movements since the start of Reformasi. By necessity, most genuine efforts 
at organising workers and defending their rights during the 1980s and 1990s were carried 
out in secrecy and outside of the state-controlled (F)SPSI. As a result, workers in labour- 
intensive industries often sought help from or were approached by local NGOs and 
informal study or solidarity groups which offered legal education, literacy classes, legal 
assistance, and general solidarity.
In the arena of industrialised labour, low wages and generally appalling working conditions 
gave rise to a sharp increase in strike action (Kämmen 1997) and gradually encouraged 
community-based organising (Hadiz 1997, 2001). The best known among the new 
groupings and networks established during the 1990s were the Solidarity Independent 
Workers’ Union (Serikat Buruh Merdeka Setiakawan or SBM Setiakawan) formed in 1990 
and involved in a range of activities such as workers’ education, training programmes and 
discussion groups; the Indonesian Prosperity Trade Union (Serikat Buruh Sejahtera 
Indonesia or SBSI) formed in 1992 by well-known labour lawyer Mochtar Pakpahan and 
other intellectuals, many of whom were arrested in due course; and the Centre for the 
Struggle of Indonesian Workers (Pusat Peijuangan Buruh Indonesia or PPBI) formed in 
1994 through the initiative of militant students and activists, whose leader Dita Indah Sari 
would later be imprisoned by the Suharto regime.
During the 1990s, the relationship between these pioneer, independent trade unions and 
labour NGOs was at times tense, given their difference in objectives and strategies.4 The 
labour NGOs that constituted the independent labour movement were themselves 
characterised by divergent strategies, with some focusing on policy advocacy and others
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concentrating on “legal advocacy, workers’ education and associated activities” (Ford 
2000:12). Despite these divides, many workers’ organisations benefited from financial and 
technical assistance from NGOs and progressive student organisations. They acted either to 
challenge the political and social exclusion of the poor in a broad sense (such as the PPBI), 
or to push the boundaries of political space for workers to express their demands 
collectively (for example the SBM and SBSI) (Hadiz 2001:120). In both scenarios, 
workers’ organisations went beyond narrowly defined class interests to seek support among 
other communities such as home-based workers, students and academics, and a variety of 
domestic and international NGOs. Thus, some seeds for social movement unionism were 
sown during the 1990s when formal organising through independent trade unions was 
nearly impossible because of state repression.
In contrast, the post-Suharto era has seen linkages between workers and other social groups 
weakened, in part due to the resurgence of official unionism. With the new ability to 
register officially and to receive overseas funding, trade unions (and federations) appear to 
have less incentive to seek support from NGOs, while Ford also points out that several 
high-profile labour NGOs and activists shifted to other issues:
[P]olicy-oriented labour NGOs, which had been part of a privileged domain of semi- 
tolerated opposition in the late New Order, experienced a crisis in membership and 
direction as a result of the expansion of political space and the disintegration of the 
government machine. During Reformasi, middle-class activists who had used labour issues 
to voice their more generalised feelings of dissent were able to express that dissent directly 
(2000:20).
In addition to the wave of new political issues put forward by reform-minded activists, Ford 
also reports reduced general interest in labour issues and the weakening of policy and 
advocacy NGOs due to uncertainty about their modus operandi in these new political 
circumstances (2000:21). The same may be said about the student groups that in the years 
before 1998 actively supported workers’ education and organising activities. With 
Reformasi opening up old and new issues for activism (ranging from corruption to military 
influence in politics to the environment), student groups have shown relatively little interest 
in labour issues in recent years. On the other hand, it should be noted that activists and 
leaders associated with mainstream, large trade unions during the past six years have 
seldom reached out to or supported social movements such as the environment, anti-
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corruption, women’s, or pro-poor movements. Thus, it can be concluded that the seeds 
were sown for social movement unionism in Indonesia but that political developments -  
especially the nature of state-imposed constraints during the 1990s and the shifting 
advocacy and policy priorities of the early 2000s -  have, perhaps temporarily, halted any 
deepening of alliances beyond class-based (or single-issue) groupings.
Comparison
During the 1990s, both countries saw an increase in social movements and social 
movement organisations, as well as in collaboration between workers’ organisations and 
social movements. The latter ranged from farmers and students to popular and political 
protest movements mobilising against authoritarianism. In both countries, workers’ 
organisations explored new alliances, albeit for different reasons. Thai unionists seeking 
alliances with occupational health and safety and anti-poverty groups were concerned with 
the need to revitalise the labour movement and maintain its relevance. In contrast, some of 
the fledgling, semi-legal workers’ organisations in Indonesia broadened their protest on 
labour issues in an effort to call attention to the general political and social exclusion of the 
poor. Hence, both countries have witnessed examples of social movement unionism, based 
on cross-movement alliances that went beyond class interests.
Yet, in Thailand such alliances appear to have been easier to maintain than in Indonesia. 
Thai workers’ organisations continue to advocate on behalf of unemployed workers, people 
infected with HIV-AIDS, and workers with occupational diseases. In Indonesia, on the 
other hand, attention shifted away from labour issues in the aftermath of Reformasi and few 
trade unions are engaged in alliances with social movements. This is surprising, since trade 
unions in both countries are threatened by lack of unity, economic restructuring, and 
ineffective enforcement of labour laws. Social movement theories suggest that, aside from 
political opportunities, the emergence of alliances between movements depend on the 
compatibility of the identities on which they are based. Thus, it is possible that the Thai 
workers’ movement emerged from identities that are more easily aligned with those 
activated by other social movements, whereas in Indonesia there is a divergence of 
identities between the trade union movement and other current social movements. This 
possible explanation will be examined in more detail throughout the following chapters.
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Women’s movements
Analysing and comparing the position of women in workers’ organisations raises the 
question of women’s movements in Thailand and Indonesia. Are these movements largely 
formal or informal? Are they political and/or social movements? To what extent and on 
what issues do women’s organisations form alliances? With which individuals or 
organisations do they do so and how? Do these actors politicise the same issues and do they 
do so in similar language? The following section will offer a brief analysis of women’s 
movements in Thailand and Indonesia, with particular attention to their areas of focus and 
their strategies in recent years.
Thailand
Although women’s issues had already been on the agenda of urban, educated elites since 
the late nineteenth century (Barme 1999), the Thai women’s movement first emerged in the 
1930s when a small group of urban, upper-class women lobbied for better protection and 
rights in marriage and for the extension of educational opportunities for women and girls. 
Such agitation on the part of educated and well-established women involved the 
establishment of women’s clubs, newspapers, and magazines, and continued in the 1950s 
and 1960s. According to gender and law expert Virada Somswasdi, this activism “did not 
touch upon any societal patriarchal structural problems or gender equality” and was thus 
divorced from the realities faced by most low-income women in Thailand (2003:4). Jeffrey 
(2002) relates such elite sentiments about women’s equality throughout modem Thai 
history to the class divisions in Thai society:
Various women sought to engage in the political process, in interpreting and reinterpreting 
political reality to further women’s interests and to promote women’s equality. Elite 
women, in particular, were able to draw upon their position as guarantors of national 
identity in order to make claims for women’s equality. In doing so, however, they 
strengthened the disciplinary hold of national identity over other women, particularly 
prostitute women. Elite women gained political voice through their role in disciplining 
other women ... into the “correct cultural role” (2002:147-8).
Jeffrey in her detailed study of prostitution policy in Thailand points out that gender has 
been central to the state’s project of building a national identity since the early days of the
123
Siamese (and later Thai) state: “Female identity has been viewed in terms of cultural and 
national identity” (2002:153). The Thai women’s movement and Thai women’s 
organisations have in various ways been implicated in this project of constructing 
acceptable female behaviour, most notably in debates around prostitution but equally so in 
their various campaigns, which have legitimised certain gender identities while silencing 
others.
The 1973 popular uprising and the influence of leftist activists resulted in the emergence of 
a more progressive women’s movement that prioritised gender-oriented struggles around 
issues such as abortion, divorce, education, and bodily integrity. The confrontational 
politics of this period produced growing radicalism and political polarisation within and 
between movement organisations (Prudhisan and Mitprasat 1997). Although this women’s 
movement died down in the aftermath of the 1976 coup d’etat, the 1980s and 1990s saw 
relaxation of government controls over civil society, resulting in the establishment of a 
number of feminist women’s organisations concerned with the participation and rights of 
grassroots women, including prostitute women (Jeffrey 2002:80-3, 119-24).
Democratisation processes during the 1990s enabled these and more recently established 
organisations to pursue further reforms such as the extension of maternity leave and 
legislation on prostitution and trafficking of women and children. This focus on legal rights 
for women regardless of class position culminated in the lobbying efforts of the Women 
and Constitution Network to ensure gender sensitivity in the 1997 Constitution (Virada 
2003:5-8). Prudhisan and Mitprasat note that environmental and anti-poverty movements 
face increasing challenges to balance demands for political advocacy with direct action for 
grassroots constituents, yet little is known about whether and how women’s groups and 
movements are dealing with such challenges.
Gender equality and women’s empowerment remain contested terms for much of the 
mainstream women’s movement. A great deal of popular discussion about gender equality 
as reported in the print media remains couched in terms of protection of the rights of 
women and children, and many elite women activists and female politicians express 
continued concern for women’s protection from vice and crime rather than promotion of 
women’s political and economic empowerment. They thus perpetuate the distinction 
between good women/bad women, which has left parts of the Thai women’s movement
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unable or unwilling to link economic and sexual exploitation while respecting women’s 
agency in their search for work. In sum, the mainstream Thai women’s movement has at 
many times in its history been dominated by elite concerns for legal reform and the defence 
of traditional ideals of Thai womanhood rather than guided by the priorities expressed by 
rural and low-income women, be they material, legal, or discursive.
Indonesia
The Indonesian women’s movement dates back to the early part of the twentieth century 
when women’s organisations first appeared with the goal of improving women’s education, 
status in marriage, and role in the public domain. In 1928, at the first National Women’s 
Congress in Yogjakarta in which thirty-one women’s organisations from all over the 
country participated, twenty women’s organisations established an umbrella organisation 
by the same name. During the next two decades, the goal of women’s emancipation became 
increasingly entwined with efforts for national independence, leading many women’s 
organisations to support the fight against colonial rule. Rai (2002b:35-39) reminds us that 
this alignment of women’s and liberation movements did not always benefit women, as the 
independence struggle often took precedence over addressing women’s issues.
In the years following Indonesia’s independence in 1949, women’s mass organisations such 
as Gerwani (Indonesian Women’s Movement, which was aligned with the Communist 
Party) and Muslimat (the women’s wing of the mass Islamic organisation Nahdlatul 
Ulama) continued to address women’s practical and strategic interests (Indar Parawansa 
2002; Blackburn 2004). Especially Gerwani (established ini 950 as Gerwis or Movement of 
Conscious Indonesian Women) actively sought to represent poor women workers: “Unlike 
other women’s organizations, Gerwani had a clear notion of labour exploitation based on 
Marxism. It aimed to participate in women’s struggles for daily needs and for their rights” 
(Blackburn 2004:178; see also Wieringa 2002:153). Among the issues raised by Gerwani 
were women’s right to equal wages, promotion and training courses, family allowance, and 
equal share rations to men’s; and for women in informal work, the need to earn sufficient 
wages, access to credit, and lower taxes. Gerwani’s activities extended from the fulfillment 
of basic material needs to mass mobilization of women workers and political and leadership 
training (Blackburn 2004:178-9).
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Gerwani’s attention to the needs of poor women workers in both informal and formal jobs, 
together with its alliances with both trade unions and mainstream women’s organisations, 
makes it a unique organisation. Wieringa (2002) argues that it was able to form these 
alliances because it did not challenge traditional notions of women’s identity as wives and 
mothers, either in the workforce or in trade unions and other organisations, or the sexual 
division of labour in the workplace or household. Gerwani’s activism came to an abrupt 
end due to the 1965 change of regime, after which women’s issues became increasingly 
marginalised.
As part of its control over civil society under the policy of “single-vehicle interest 
representation” (Ford 2002), the New Order regime after 1966 allowed only state- 
sponsored women’s organisations to operate such as the Family Welfare Movement (PKK) 
and Dharma Wanita. As Indar Parawansa argues, “these organisations were designed to 
allow wives to further their husbands’ careers, and were an important vehicle for 
government propaganda on development” (2002:71). This reflects the dominant gender 
regime in the 1970s and 1980s that portrayed women as wives and mothers and as 
contributors to (though not main beneficiaries of) national development. This is not to say 
that women did not benefit from the activities carried out by state-sponsored organisations. 
But by reproducing patriarchal values in its policies and programmes, the New Order 
regime undermined women’s decision-making in the household and curtailed women’s role 
in economic development and in politics more broadly. While reaffirming women’s rights 
and opportunities in the public sphere, recognition in state policy of women’s double role 
(i.e. household duties and employment outside the household) in the 1980s served in large 
part to increase women’s burden (Oey-Gardiner 2002:103; Blackburn 2004:182). Although 
Sen (1998) argues that in the late New Order period women were increasingly recognised 
as producers and consumers in both the private and public sphere, the ideological expansion 
of their legitimate roles did not increase women’s decision-making power or their political 
participation.
During the 1990s, women’s organisations in Indonesia increasingly extended the scope of 
their activities from social welfare to political and economic support. In part, this extension 
is a reflection of the emergence o f independent and politically oriented women’s NGOs in
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response to the gradual weakening of the New Order regime. The late 1980s and early 
1990s saw the growth of politically oriented NGOs which allowed middle-class 
Indonesians to play a part in political and social activism (Ford 2002:15; Blackburn 
2004:183). The women’s NGOs amongst these new organisations were probably also 
influenced by growing cross-border linkages between women’s groups and the emerging 
human rights and gender discourses circulating worldwide as a result of international 
conferences and meetings. Most of the women’s NGOs active on labour issues in the 1980s 
and 1990s can be characterised as secular feminist organisations. These include: YASANTI 
(Annisa Swasti Foundation), Solidaritas Perempuan untuk Hak Asasi Manusia (Women’s 
Solidarity for Human Rights), Lembaga Bantuan Hukum -  Asosiasi Perempuan Indonesia 
untuk Keadilan (Legal Aid Institute -  Association of Indonesian Women for Justice), and 
Yayasan Perempuan Mardhika (Foundation for Independent Women).
During the 1990s (and especially in response to the violence of May 1998), the number of 
NGOs concerned with violence against women and human rights also grew quickly, as a 
further sign of women’s ongoing challenges to the New Order.5 Many of these NGOs 
actively collaborate with the state-sponsored but independent National Commission on 
Violence against Women (Komnas Perempuan). Finally, the establishment of the Women’s 
Studies Programme at the University of Indonesia in 1992 is likely to have encouraged a 
new generation of women activists in the social and political fields.
Although many women’s NGOs appear to be (or have become) professional advocacy and 
support organisations, grassroots women still play an important role in the Indonesian 
women’s movement. The Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia (Indonesian Women’s Coalition) is 
noteworthy for its grassroots membership and its insistence on weaving together of local, 
national, and global issues since its emergence in 1998. Also worth emphasising is the role 
played by the Voice of Concerned Mothers (SIP) during the 1998 protests against then 
President Suharto. SIP called attention to the government’s economic policies and their 
adverse effects on women and children. In subsequent years, SIP has continued its activities 
at the grassroots, encouraging women to see their traditional concerns in a political context 
(Bianpoen 2000a). Budianta argues that rather than a break with the past, such activism 
points to “the upsurge of grassroots processes of resistance, and strategies of evasion and
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negotiation [vis-ä-vis the New Order regime] that had been going on within the existing 
structures” (2002:36). Such resistance is continued in diverse organisational forms:
For the purposes of immediate struggle, women often use loosely formed, short-term 
alliances represented by ‘disposable’ names ... Sometimes these groups solidify into a more 
formal structure. While in the previous era, non-governmental activities generally took the 
form of yayasan (charitable foundations), women at present are more versatile in finding 
different forms that suit their different needs, such as associations, unions or federations 
(Budianta 2002:41).
In response to the rise of regional cultural identity and religious fundamentalism with 
potentially adverse effects on women, Budianta argues that women’s groups are 
increasingly emphasising religious tolerance, empowerment of women in regional contexts, 
and using the power of motherhood to mobilise women into activism. She concludes that 
“women’s activism in the post-Reformasi era has used identities not as essentialist pigeon­
holes but as strategies of cultural and political positioning” (2002:48).
Efforts at political reform since 1998 have also brought about increased collaboration 
between women’s NGOs and a variety of other movements, most noticeably about violence 
against women but also including some issues pertaining directly to women workers. Issues 
concerning sexual violence at the workplace and migrant women workers have particularly 
received their attention.6 Blackburn argues that this concern stems largely from concerns 
over morality and (in the case of overseas domestic workers) national honour: “One of the 
aspects of migrant labour which reverberates most strongly with women’s organizations is 
that which links it in their minds to sexual rather than sheer economic exploitation” 
(2004:191). She therefore concludes that “few Indonesian women’s organizations have 
addressed questions of economic exploitation” because “for middle-class and Islamic 
organizations, assumptions about men being the main income-earner prevailed, making the 
notion of exploitation rather irrelevant as far as women were concerned, unless it impinged 
on matters of sexual morality” (2004:193). More recently, however, several women’s 
organisations have become active in networks to combat both sexual and economic 
exploitation of women workers. In conclusion, the Indonesian women’s movement -  as it is 
reflected in women’s NGOs and state-sponsored institutions -  has clearly experienced a 
transformation in the 1990s by becoming more politically oriented than was previously 
allowed and by taking up issues of social and economic justice.
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Comparison
The above discussion of women’s movements reveals that the mainstream Thai women’s 
movement has throughout its history focused more prominently on issues of concern to 
elite women than on the needs of grassroots women. In Indonesia, in contrast, a more 
broad-based women’s movement emerged during the late 1980s and 1990s which 
advocated diverse social, political, and economic changes, including many concerning the 
rights and conditions of women workers. Although this brief discussion does not do justice 
to the rich history of women’s movements in both countries, it can be concluded that the 
broad-based nature of the mainstream women’s movement in Indonesia appears to hold 
greater potential for alliances than in Thailand, because it permits greater focus on cross­
cutting issues of concern to a wide range of women and women’ groups. To what extent 
women’s movements have indeed entered into alliances with or otherwise supported 
women workers’ organisations will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters.
Women in politics
The above analysis suggests that women’s movements in the two countries are substantially 
different in their outlook and alliances. One location from which women’s movements and 
their leaders have the potential to influence policies and legislation (and therefore indirectly 
the potential for women to organise) is formal politics. How have women in the two 
countries fared in formal politics in recent years? Although the number of women leaders 
in local and national politics remains low in both countries, political liberalisation together 
with increased educational attainment has helped a small number of women gain entry into 
the traditionally male reserve of formal politics. In both countries, women have had to 
overcome significant barriers to engage in politics and have increasingly combined politics 
with activism on women’s and gender issues.
Thailand
Thai women have had the right to vote or stand for election since 1932, but the first woman 
was elected to parliament in 1949. Furthermore, it was only in 1982 that women won the
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right to become village and subdistrict heads through the Local Administration Act 
(Yoddumnem-Attig et al. 1992:78). As a result of such discriminatory legislation, few 
women had gained sufficient experience in politics to be able to enter national politics 
unless with the help of a male family member. The percentage of female parliamentarians 
has not risen above 10 per cent (see Table 4.1 below), while the percentage of female 
candidates for parliamentary elections reached 15.6 per cent in 1996, according to the 
National Statistical Office (NSO). In 1999, women accounted for 2.6 per cent of provincial 
governors, 0.1 per cent of district chief officers, 8 per cent of directors of district, and (in 
1996) 1.6 per cent of village heads (NSO 2004). Clearly, public representation is still 
considered a male domain that women have only recently started to challenge.
Table 4.1 Women in parliament (House of Representatives) in Thailand, 1986-2004
Year o f  election Total num ber N um ber o f  women P ercentage o f  women
July 1986 347 12 3.5
July 1988 357 10 2.8
M arch 1992 360 12 4.2
Septem ber 1992 360 15 4.2
July 1995 391 24 6.1
N ovem ber 1996 393 22 5.6
January 2001 500 48 9.6
Source: NSO (2003b).
Pasuk (2002) observes that Thai women have taken a leading role in many recently 
emerged social movements. Groups and networks such as the Assembly of the Poor, the 
support group for sufferers of occupational diseases, and those fighting for better urban 
housing count many women in their leadership ranks. Amongst others, the extensive 
advocacy efforts by Khunying Supatra Masdit, then Minister in the Prime Minister’s Office 
for Women, in the lead-up to and during the Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women 
(1995) also helped to increase the visibility of women in politics and to call attention to 
gender issues in Thailand. Thus, while the percentage of women in formal politics remains 
relatively low, the ability and willingness of a number of women politicians to speak out 
about gender inequality suggests that these women could potentially influence the ability of 
women workers to mobilise and organise collectively.
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Indonesia
In Indonesia, women’s right to vote and to be elected is guaranteed in the 1945 
Constitution, but it was only in 1950 that the first woman was appointed to parliament. 
During the New Order years (1966-1998), the exclusionary nature of the political system 
prevented most ordinary women (i.e. those without business or family relations to the 
Suharto family or sanctioned political parties) from contesting political office. Although the 
percentage of women in parliament was relatively high during the later years of the New 
Order regime, their influence varied. Concerning women parliamentarians during the New 
Order regime, the Asia Foundation describes their presence as “based on charity rather than 
political will”, as “relating to their occupation and their husband’s career”, and as “an elite 
group promoting themselves, their party and their political career” (Soetjipto 2000:452). 
More recently, during the 2004 elections the percentage of women in parliament increased 
again to more than 10 per cent (see Table 4.2).
Table 4.2 Women in parliament (House of Representatives) in Indonesia, 1987-2004
Year o f  election Total num ber N um ber o f  women P ercentage o f  women
1987 500 65 13
1992 500 62 12.4
1997 500 54 10.8
1999 500 46 9.2
2004 550 61 11.1
Source: UNDP 2004; CETRO (quoted in Jakarta Post 8 May 2004).
Similar to Thailand, Indonesian women lead many of the most active and successful civil 
society organisations, although in this case it is NGOs rather than networks where women 
predominate. The presence of women in NGOs is in part the result of the relatively small 
number of urban and widespread social movements, which is in itself an outcome of the 
New Order regime’s stringent controls over civil society. Aside from making women- 
specific demands, women throughout Indonesia spearhead protests against evictions of 
squatter settlements, against corruption, and in favour of better urban planning.
The impact on politics of women’s activism in social movements, on the other hand, is 
becoming increasingly clear. Bianpoen (2000a) believes that Indonesian women have 
“brought new life into politics” by encouraging women to see their traditional concerns as 
closely related to politics. As is evident from their candidatures for the 2004 national and
131
local elections in Indonesia, a small number of women activists from civil society 
organisations are also aware of the possibility of pursuing their particular goals through the 
political system. Most notably, this involved advocates of women’s rights (Nursyahbani 
Katjasungkana and Eva Kusuma Sundari) and HIV/AIDS issues (Nurul Arifin). Although 
the percentage of women in parliament increased only marginally between 1999 and 20047, 
the direct and democratic election of women with experience in public activism will likely 
make a difference in the long run to the process and outcome of politics. Arguably, the 
defeat of former president Megawati Soekamoputri in the 2004 elections shows that many 
ordinary Indonesians saw her in a similar light to women parliamentarians during the New 
Order. Although the impact of recently elected women will not be known for some time, it 
will almost certainly be greater than that of the women in the previous parliaments.
Comparison
The percentage of women elected to political office is similar in Thailand and Indonesia, 
but represents a significant increase in recent decades in Thailand. In Indonesia, on the 
other hand, it is not so much the percentage but the quality and qualifications of women 
politicians that attract attention. The election of women activists to parliament could have a 
positive effect on women workers’ organising in the long run, as women workers may be 
able to count on political support for their struggles and may see women politicians as 
examples of women in public life and public activism.
Women are also taking up positions in similar kinds of social movements in the two 
countries. That women are increasingly active in these particular social movements is not 
surprising. In contrast to formal politics where women’s representation and participation is 
low and is constrained by male-biased party rules, social movement politics in many 
countries offers women opportunities to explore their managerial and leadership talents. At 
the same time, it is precisely because social movements address issues of direct (and often 
vital) importance to women that relatively large numbers of women engage in protests and 
other forms of collective action. As Kaplan (1997) argues, women around the world are 
frequently persuaded to take action when their ability as mothers and wives to provide for 
their families is threatened by the state or other actors. Although no research has been done 
yet in Thailand or Indonesia with the specific aim to investigate women’s motivation in
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social movement activism, there is no reason to assume that the above-mentioned 
incentives are not valid for Thai or Indonesian women.
The presence of these women activists in politics does not mean that all women have equal 
access to political positions. Yet, it would be too pessimistic to say, as does Saptari in the 
Indonesian context, that women’s protest is ineffectual as long as the deeper causes of 
women’s secondary social status have not been addressed (1995:172). While class barriers 
to political office remain high (for example, in the form of funding and educational 
requirements and party endorsement), political action by elite women may slowly reinforce 
the image of women belonging to and having a rightful stake in the sphere of politics and 
public policy. Furthermore, some women politicians challenge and ultimately contribute to 
changing dominant gender norms and values for all women regardless of their socio­
economic position, as the 2004 law on violence against women in Indonesia has shown. 
Thus, in both countries the emergence of new women politicians with an interest in social 
movement activism is an important development that can contribute to the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of women’s activism in the public sphere.
Trade unions
Although trade unions in Thailand and Indonesia have at times engaged in what has been 
called social movement unionism -  in other words struggles beyond material and class- 
based interests -  as institutions many are relatively powerless vis-ä-vis the state and 
employers. Trade union federations are frequently weakened by their lack of democratic 
structures or, if those exist, by the lack of implementation of democratic decision-making 
rules and regulations. This, in turn, has a negative impact on women’s mobilisation in trade 
unions. On the other hand, to some extent these serious shortcomings on the part of the 
trade union movement are themselves a reflection of the changing macro-economic 
environment that severely limits not only union opportunities for action, but also the 
bargaining power of workers in general (Thomas 1995; Munck 2000a; Hadiz 2002). Thus, 
this section argues that the obstacles facing women in trade unions originate not only in the 
political opportunity structure and economic environment, but also in the institutional 
design and culture of trade unions as mobilising structures. This section First assesses the 
strengths and weaknesses of trade unions from a numerical and institutional perspective.
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Secondly, it addresses some of the barriers within trade unions to women’s participation 
and leadership.
Thailand
At present, Thailand counts 9 formal national labour union councils (see Table 4.3 below), 
and some 11 industrial- and area-based coordination centres which do not have formal 
status with the government but function as active geographic or industry-wide networks. In 
addition to these organisations, workers have also formed a new network, the Thai Labour 
Solidarity Committee, consisting of 28 organisations from among labour unions in private 
and state enterprises and NGOs (Voravidh et al n .d .:ll). A second major network, the 
Women Workers’ Unity Group (WWUG), will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 
Six. Private sector enterprise unions include both single-enterprise and industrial unions. A 
1999 survey by the Arom Pongpangan Foundation estimates that the more than 1000 
enterprise unions in the private sector have an average membership of 257 people and cover 
2.79 per cent of all private sector employees (quoted in Brown, Bundit and Hewison 
2002:25). It should be noted that approximately only half of these unions actually exist and 
have members, as many others were established by union leaders in efforts to gain seats on 
tripartite committees involving representatives from government, workers’ and employers’ 
organisations (Brown, Bundit and Hewison 2002:24). State enterprise unions in contrast 
have an average of 3,820 members and cover 52.6 per cent of workers in this sector.
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Table 4.3: Number of formal labour organisations in Thailand (September 2003)
Type o f  organisation______
State enterprise labour union 
Private sector labour union 
Labour union federation 
Labour union council
Number o f  organisations
46
1256
19
9
Source: Department of Labour Protection and Welfare, Ministry of Labour.
The weakening power of the labour movement since the 1970s in spite o f a rapidly growing 
industrialised and concentrated labour force is not only due to effects of neo-liberal 
capitalist employment policies. Instead, trade union leadership has assisted in its own 
fragmentation by pursuing individual power and competing for lucrative positions on 
various tripartite bodies set up by the state (Brown 2004:101-5). For example, under Thai 
labour legislation each trade union (regardless o f its membership size) has one vote in the 
election o f associate labour judges and members o f tripartite labour committees. Thus, 
some 571 unions -  many o f them allegedly established by (or at the behest of) employers -  
were in early 2004 vying for 100 positions as associate judges, in contrast to 188 employer 
groups (.Bangkok Post 9 February 2004).
Such power struggles especially impact on women workers, as gender bias among leaders 
restricts their access to these and other positions. They may stimulate some women workers 
to form their own alternative organisations, while others may disengage because of their 
dislike for trade union politics. For example, many union women refuse to engage in 
protest action organised by the main trade union confederation on the occasion o f Labour 
Day because of their dislike of its leadership. Several union women in my interviews 
accuse the union movement o f having the wrong priorities and being a puppet of the 
government. These women’s grievances focus on allegations o f corruption and collusion 
with government and business leaders on the part of union leaders as well as the lack of 
transparency and democracy among the large federations. According to union women and 
NGO activists, such allegations have created an atmosphere of distrust and have resulted in 
further fragmentation o f the labour movement.
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Indonesia
With the passage of new labour legislation since 2000, restrictions imposed as part of the 
repressive, New Order industrial relations system have been largely rescinded. Direct 
interference by military or police in dispute settlement at the behest of employers is now 
largely a thing of the past, despite continued intimidation of unionised workers by hired 
thugs, according to interviews with labour leaders and as reported by Ford (2001:18). But 
despite these improvements in freedom to organise and despite the general trend towards 
democratisation, the growth of NGO advocacy on labour issues, and increasing linkages 
between trade unions and civil society around the world, the picture remains bleak. 
Indonesian trade unions generally have not expanded notably in terms of membership due 
to union fragmentation, lack of experience in advocacy and lobbying, and the lack of 
interest from political parties. Aspinall argues that the nascent working-class identity of the 
mid-1990s has been “subsumed into a broader category of rakyat, ‘the people’” (1999:22). 
He therefore envisions a protracted struggle to expand the benefits of democracy to 
workers, even though the opportunities for organisation among workers have greatly 
expanded.8
The immediate result of the passage of the Trade Union/Labour Union Act in 2000 was a 
sharp increase in the number of trade unions that sought registration with the Ministry of 
Manpower. By the end of 2000, almost 40 new federations had registered, and by early 
2003 this had increased to 66 federations at the national level and more than 11,000 
enterprise-level trade unions at local level (Quinn 2003). In addition to these official 
organisations, workers have also taken advantage of the new political freedoms to unite into 
foundations (Yayasan) or local groups or networks (Paguyuban), for which no official 
statistics are available since registration either does not specify the area of work or is not 
necessary. Many of these new unions, union federations, and workers’ groups suffer from a 
lack of knowledge, skills, and financial stability which restricts their operations, makes 
them vulnerable to political interests, and creates fears of chaos and confusion among 
employers (though some employers might find such instability more useful for their own 
purposes than unity and effectiveness among trade unions).
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As in Thailand, most female union leaders are concentrated in smaller federations, regional 
unions, and informal workers’ groups. This may be the result not only of a glass ceiling that 
keeps women from reaching top union leadership positions but also women’s reluctance to 
engage in union politics. Many union women in my interviews with them voiced 
complaints about their male leaders. Such complaints resulted from their perception that 
union leaders had personally sold out to business and state interests during labour protests 
and negotiations over labour legislation (see Chapter Five for more detail on women’s 
union leadership).
That trade union federations and confederations have not been under pressure to improve 
their governance structures and systems is largely due to the stake that both government 
and business circles have in perpetuating the labour movement’s weaknesses. In Indonesia, 
fragmentation of the movement is also a direct outcome of legislation allowing virtually 
any small group of workers to establish a union and participate in collective bargaining. 
The immediate results are a mushrooming of small trade unions and consequently a 
growing fear among employers that the process of collective bargaining becomes 
unmanageable due to the many competing groups of workers (Quinn 2003). Legislation 
also restricts the collection of dues from workers, which in turn affects the financial 
stability of unions and their ability to carry out activities.
Since the Indonesian government for decades allowed only one official trade union 
federation to operate and actively discouraged workers from forming alternative unions or 
federations, the widespread caution towards unionisation is not surprising. Even worse, 
many workers in urban as well as rural areas appear reluctant to put their trust in any 
organisation that claims to represent their interests. Observers of Indonesia note that the 
label ‘communist’ or ‘leftist’ has become an easy and often used weapon in the hands of 
leaders, from national government or village level, to prevent or subdue popular protest, 
especially labour protest (for example Saptari 1995). Thus, many union leaders and labour 
NGO activists are confronted with misconceptions about unionisation and its goals, with 
prejudice, and with doubts about the relationship of unions with the government and its 
agencies at the provincial, district, and village levels. This obstacle is especially serious 
among women workers who often have low levels of formal education and who have 
frequently been socialised not to question authority. It will most likely take several years of
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large-scale awareness-raising efforts and deepening of democracy to remove such 
apprehension and misunderstandings, though continued fears of a return to more restrictive 
legislation and treatment may be realistic in some cases. The international mobility of 
employers that characterises much of current foreign investment into Indonesia and that 
shapes a significant portion of women’s formal employment further worsens the above 
scenario. In sum, although the Indonesian state has reformed the industrial relations system 
since 1998, a conducive environment for the exercise of workers’ rights is not yet present.
Comparison
The weaknesses distinguishing trade unions in both Thailand and Indonesia are similar and 
they result in significant practical and ideological obstacles to women workers’ 
mobilisation and organisation. Not only do trade unions not represent a large number of 
workers (thus effectively excluding a large number of women workers from the 
movement), but their institutional structure and leadership patterns are at times heavily 
criticised by union women because of corruption and co-optation. It is therefore not 
surprising that many union women prefer to remain in leadership positions in small 
federations or area and regional trade unions, rather than contest national or other high- 
level positions. The absence of any domestic sources of pressure on trade union federations 
and confederations to improve their governance structures and systems is in large part due 
to the stake that both governments and business circles in the two countries have in 
perpetuating the labour movement’s weaknesses. In both countries, fragmentation of the 
movement is a direct outcome of legislation allowing virtually any small group of workers 
to establish a union and participate in collective bargaining, as well as employer 
encouragement for the establishment of rival trade unions.
But an even more powerful political obstacle to collective organising in the workforce 
arises from recent history. Here, an interactive dynamic can be observed between changes 
in political alignment and mobilising structures. Both countries are still coming to terms 
with the legacy of communist or leftist movements which in 1965-66 (Indonesia) and in 
1976 (Thailand) were violently suppressed by the armed forces. Because major trade 
unions in both cases had closely aligned themselves to the communist parties, they suffered 
heavy losses in the aftermath of the coup d’etats that wiped out the parties and their
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supporters. Thus, the organisational weakness of the trade union movement and its poor 
image in the eyes of many women workers are also related to the blows inflicted on the 
legitimacy of trade unionism in the aftermath of major shifts in political alignment.
Faced with these obstacles, Vedi Hadiz (2002) concludes that labour has not been able to 
(re)build its political space in much of Southeast Asia. The defeat of the communist and 
other leftist political movements, together with the suppression of union movements that 
followed, have left trade unions unable to make use of new opportunities presented by 
political transformations, let alone successfully respond to and fight for labour rights in the 
context of economic restructuring. Hadiz argues that the international mobility of 
employers that is the hallmark of globalisation worsens the above scenario. Although Hadiz 
appears to overlook positive local-level developments (such as the rise of regional trade 
union groups that are more directly accountable to their members) and appears to expect a 
linear model of development, he is nonetheless correct in asserting that the labour 
movement in both Thailand and Indonesia generally has been unable to capitalise on 
positive trends as described in Chapter Three.
Conclusion
This chapter has compared trade unions in Thailand and Indonesia in terms of their 
strengths and weaknesses, and in relation to social movements. It has argued that the 
obstacles faced by trade unions with regard to membership and leadership are similar in 
both countries. Restrictive legislation, fragmentation of the labour movement, internal 
rivalries and charges of corruption keep membership relatively low in the private sector 
(despite a growth in the urban formal labour force), while at the same time discouraging 
women from contesting and reaching leadership positions.
Partially in response to these weaknesses, both countries saw during the 1990s the 
emergence of campaigns and networks on labour issues that incorporated new elements 
from civil society and that pressed for more broad-based social, political and economic 
change than was previously undertaken by trade unions. This change was particularly 
noticeable in Thailand, whereas in Indonesia labour’s growing rapport with other social 
movements was perhaps bom of necessity (because of labour repression) rather than
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strategic insights into possibilities for future strengthening. As a result, in Thailand cross­
cutting alliances have been maintained over the past ten years, whereas in Indonesia 
shifting NGO priorities and the introduction of freedom of association radically altered and 
frequently put an end to alliances between trade unions and NGOs after 1998. Thus, in both 
countries, political and economic changes forced trade unions to search for new alliances 
and frame their demands within the wider struggle for democracy and political rights, 
thereby increasing their appeal to groups other than workers.
To what extent such social movement unionism has the potential to mobilise women 
workers depends in part on whether union women can engage in alliances with women’s 
movements and their organisations (see Chapters Six and Seven). This chapter has shown 
that women’s movements in Thailand and Indonesia have in recent years increasingly 
recognised the diversity among their members, supporters, and audience. During the 1990s, 
both countries witnessed a rapid increase in the number of women’s organisations engaged 
in social and political activism, as well as a widening of the issue areas. In both cases, this 
widening was partially due to international lobby activities and the growth of a global 
women’s movement, but also the result of political developments necessitating and making 
possible activism on issues of urgent concern to grassroots women, in particular violence 
against women and women’s role in politics.
Although a few women’s organisations have taken up labour issues in a broad sense, the 
mainstream women’s movement in Thailand has so far largely been silent on problems of 
women workers’ exploitation and vulnerability in the workforce and at the workplace. 
Compared to the alliances with legal and health experts necessitated by its campaigns to 
date, the Thai women’s movement appears to have engaged in few (if any) alliances with 
workers’ organisations to address women workers’ issues. The Indonesian women’s 
movement has also yet to undertake large-scale action on women workers’ issues, but 
several of its well-known member organisations are closely involved in advocacy on behalf 
of and involving women workers. Thus, the potential for building alliances with other 
movements and for creating new ‘project identities’ that could become the basis for new 
struggles is perhaps greater in Indonesia than in Thailand. How the presence in Thailand of 
an increasingly influential middle-class with its own political aspirations (for example, 
agitating in 1997 in support of the new Constitution and in 1992 for an end to military
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involvement in governance) affects this equation requires further research and cannot be 
answered here.
In summary, Chapters Three and Four have compared the influence of recent economic and 
political developments on the potential collective mobilisation and organisation of women 
workers in Thailand and Indonesia. The diversity of factors under consideration and their 
inter-related nature make any clear-cut prediction extremely difficult. On the one hand, 
workers in Thailand have greater experience in collective organising and in lobbying 
government than workers in Indonesia. This might influence their willingness and ability to 
organise, although workers in Indonesia may have greater enthusiasm for trade unionism 
given the (still recent) introduction of freedom of association and the right to collective 
bargaining. This chapter has demonstrated that Thai trade unions continue to engage in 
broad-based alliances with other social movements, whereas in Indonesia such alliances 
diminished rapidly after 1998. Yet, the mainstream women’s movement in Indonesia 
currently displays greater openness to activism on women workers’ issues than it does in 
Thailand. These opposing influences necessitate an analysis and comparison of an 
additional factor that may shape the outcome of (and women workers’ responses to) such 
political and economic forces: gender relations and gender regimes. These are the focus of 
the next chapter.
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1 Although the Thai state attempted to co-opt labour by granting some “basic industrial and other democratic 
rights and guarantees within a developing parliamentary system” (Brown 2004:90), the absence of 
enforcement of labour rights means that these developments cannot be subsumed under either the social- 
democratic or the populist models that Hadiz (1997) identifies as discussed by Brown (2004: 89-91).
2 Other struggles taken up by the trade union movement during the early 1990s were the campaign for higher 
minimum wages, for extension of social security, for reinstatement of freedom of association for state 
enterprise workers, and for paid maternity leave (Brown 2004:325).
3 A more recent example of the mainstream labour movement’s effort at branching out beyond blue-collar 
workers’ issues was evident during the May Day celebrations in Bangkok in 2004. At that occasion, Somsak 
Kosaisuk, chairman of the State Enterprises Labour Relations Confederation, demanded that the government 
“write off farmers' debts and lend money to farmers to increase productivity” {Bangkok Post 2 May 2004).
4 Ford points out that while such community-based organisations for workers might at first glance be “no 
different from labour-oriented NGOs” because of their “lack of shop-floor access and their overwhelmingly 
middle class hierarchies”, they exhibited significant differences in their self-characterisation and their 
institutional focus: “alternative unions focused their struggles on the high profile, fundamental issues of union 
recognition and workers’ rights to organise and strike”, thereby “attacking] the industrial relations system 
head-on” (Ford 2000:12).
5 These organisations include both religious and secular feminist groups, such as Kalyanamitra, Kelompok 
Perempuan Sadar (Group of Aware Women), Gerakan Anti-Kekerasan terhadap Perempuan di Indonesia 
(Indonesian Anti-Violence against Women Movement), Rifka Annisa, Convention Watch Working Group, 
and Flower Aceh. While many women’s organisations are regional or local in nature and rely on volunteers, 
others are active throughout the country and receive assistance from foreign NGOs and foundations.
6 These include the National Commission on Violence Against Women, the Legal Aid Association -  
Association of Indonesian Women, and Women’s Journal Foundation.
7 One of the reasons for the low proportion of women elected in 2004 is that, of the 13 per cent female 
candidates, political parties placed only one-third sufficiently high on the list of party candidates to have a 
chance to be elected {Jakarta Post 8 May 2004).
8 Although Indonesia has seen the establishment of several self-declared labour parties, they received only 
minimal voter support during the 1999 and 2004 elections. While Indonesian voters are generally not very 
familiar with small, new parties, it is worth noting that corruption allegations, trade union rivalries, and 
religious or ethnic allegiances have dissuaded workers from voting for these labour parties, rather than (only) 
the lack of class consciousness suggested by Aspinall (1999). Ford adds to this that the parties lacked a base 
among workers and “were largely vehicles for personal ambition or elite machinations” (2000:16). On the 
other hand, established political parties generally do not regard labour as a constituency worthy of attention, 
due to its relatively small size, its heterogeneity, and the perceived low self-identification as labourers. As 
Aspinall argues, “labour weakness is often an integral element in the early phases of democratic regimes, 
precisely because middle and dominant classes accede to democratisation only when they are confident that 
their essential interests (property rights, for instance) will be safeguarded” (1999:23).
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Chapter 5 - Comparing gender relations and gender regimes in
Thailand and Indonesia
Introduction
The previous two chapters compared economic and political factors influencing women 
workers’ ability to mobilise and organise collectively. Those chapters found that while the 
Thai industrial relations system may have given workers greater opportunities to gain 
experience in trade unions, the recent changes in labour regulation in Indonesia have 
stimulated unionisation and union activity in that country. In Thailand, several workers’ 
organisations have a history of collaboration with other social movements on social and 
economic issues, whereas in Indonesia such alliances are still relatively scarce. Such 
differences between the two countries may have both positive and negative consequences 
for women workers’ ability to organise collectively. This chapter argues that the 
consequences for workers of economic and political differences will at least in part depend 
on gender relations in general, and gender regimes in trade unions in particular.
The chapter has three aims: to analyse and compare gender relations and regimes in the two 
countries; to present a short historical background to women’s activism in the trade union 
movement in Indonesia and Thailand; and to present the available data on the position and 
roles of women in trade unions. The chapter concludes by summarising the factors that 
obstruct women’s membership and leadership in trade unions in Thailand and Indonesia.
Unequal gender relations constitute an important source of obstacles to (and impetus for) 
women workers’ mobilisation into and recognition by the labour or women’s movements in 
both countries. Such unequal relations are often reflected in the organisational structure and 
activities of trade unions, while through their practices and operations trade unions at the 
same time reproduce and sometimes intensify gender inequality. This chapter will argue 
that gender inequality in trade unions is a direct consequence of cultural beliefs (often 
supported by religious teachings) that see women’s principal social roles in the domestic 
sphere and that legitimise unequal power relations and gender interests. At the same time,
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male union leaders feel threatened by challenges to what Connell has called the “patriarchal 
dividend”: “the advantage to men as a group from maintaining an unequal gender order” 
(2002:142). However, while these factors to a varying extent hinder women’s mobilisation 
and organisation, they can also become grounds for mobilisation and self-organisation. 
Therefore, the next chapters will discuss women’s reactions to gender bias and gender 
inequality and their counter-hegemonic use of such practices and discourses for further 
mobilisation and organisation of women workers.
A short discussion of other factors that could shape women workers’ efforts to mobilise and 
organise is warranted to explain why age, religion, and locality are not foregrounded in this 
chapter. Women workers are differentiated in various ways by age, with older Indonesian 
women said to be frequently working in small, rural, and informal workplaces, while young 
women predominate in large, urban manufacturing operations due to their relatively higher 
levels of education. However, a similar distinction may not be justified in Thailand, where 
export-oriented manufacturing started earlier than in Indonesia. On average, the union 
women interviewed for this research were older in Thailand than in Indonesia. Their greater 
level of experience in trade unionism may be the result of extensive opportunities for trade 
unionism in Thailand and participation in democracy-related protests during the 1970s that 
radicalised a large number of workers.
But the possible impact of age on mobilising must be considered in conjunction with 
gender and political economy. In Indonesia, younger women may find it easier to mobilise 
collectively when they are not yet married and do not have heavy household 
responsibilities. Yet, in Thailand, many older union women never married, equally 
allowing them time for union activities. Still, many of these women are at risk of 
redundancy due to their low skill levels (or at least skill categorisation), their relatively low 
education, and the fact that they predominantly work in ‘sun-set industries’ such as the 
textile and garment sector. Thus, age has an inconclusive impact on women workers’ 
efforts at mobilising.
Likewise, it is difficult to tell how organised religion might shape women workers’ 
mobilising. Buddhist institutions in Thailand do not offer women much opportunity to 
experience organising as women, instead relegating women largely to support positions and
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allowing them to gain merit primarily indirectly (through their sons or through monetary 
contributions) rather than through direct action such as ordination (prohibited, except as 
nuns with lower status). Yet, Mills (1999) provides examples of how unions subverted 
religious symbols and practices to encourage solidarity among young workers. Jeffrey 
reminds us that while “much blame has been laid at the door of Buddhism ... for the 
second-class status of Thai women ... [s]uch an explanation confuses, for instance, 
ideological, or contextual, Buddhism with actual lived experience ... which is historically 
and regionally diverse” (2002:xviii). She concludes that “Buddhism’s explanatory power 
has been greatly overextended and applied to cultural determinist readings of Thailand” 
(2002:xxiv). The same objection could be made to assumptions about how Buddhism 
influences women workers’ activism.
In Indonesia, Islam has adapted in many different ways to local traditions, but women have 
generally had an active role in religious affairs and religious life, from Islamic boarding 
schools (pesantreri) to women’s religious study groups to the wives of religious leaders. 
The Indonesian women’s movement counts among the earliest forms of women’s activism 
the fight by women’s religious organisations (e.g. Fatayat, Nasyiatul Aisyiyah, and 
Muslimat) for girls’ right to education, women’s rights in marriage, and the nationalist 
cause (Blackburn 2004). Yet, Mather (1988) found in West Java that the involvement of 
local male religious leaders in the recruitment and management of young women in factory 
work reinforced notions of obedience and women’s subordination, thereby stifling 
opportunities for labour protest. Robinson emphasises that the relationship between gender 
differences and Islam “is by no means clear or uniform” and shows great disparity between 
official discourse and practice (2001:30).
In my interviews in Indonesia and Thailand, I found no direct evidence of the importance 
for women workers’ mobilising of such precedents, or of religion in general. In Indonesia, 
this may be due to the New Order’s attempts during the 1970s and 1980s to stymie attempts 
to use religion as a trigger for protest of a political nature. However, it could equally be 
because women workers might find religion divisive (in Indonesia where there are sizeable 
minorities of Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists, the state ideology of Pancasila calls for 
unity in diversity), unremarkable (in Thailand a large majority of the population is 
Buddhist), or not as meaningful as being a woman, a worker or any other identities.
145
There is strong evidence that migrant workers in urban industrial centres rely on networks 
based on place of origin or ethnicity to find jobs and navigate their way around their new 
surroundings (Mills 1998; Smyth and Grijns 1997). Employers in Indonesia are known to 
employ local people as managers or supervisors in order to suppress labour unrest among a 
mostly migrant workforce (Mather 1988). Yet, my interviews with union women found no 
evidence that these women have become active or mobilise other women based on 
networks of locality and ethnicity. As mentioned above in relation to religion, among the 
possible reasons are avoidance of fragmentation among union members, a strong state 
ideology of unity in diversity, and a reluctance to base one’s activism around a religious 
identity. In short, since women workers did not remark on their age, religion, and ethnicity 
or area of origin, and since the impact of these factors is not clear-cut, I will not discuss 
them in detail in this chapter.
Gender relations and identities
The gender-related obstacles experienced by women workers within their trade unions have 
their origin in the structures of trade unions and women’s position in the labour force, and 
in their overall position and role in society. Unequal gender relations can have a strong 
impact on women’s (and men’s) identities, through cultural expectations of women and 
girls, limitations to women’s leadership, and the gender division of labour. How important 
are these factors in relation to women workers’ efforts to mobilise and organise collectively 
in each of the two countries under examination here?
Thailand
Recent English-language writing on Thai women and their gendered identities tends to be 
limited in number due to the disproportionate attention of researchers and observers 
towards Thai women’s role in the prostitution industry. According to Cook and Jackson, 
“the issue of Thai modes of subjectivity, in general, and sexual and gender identity in 
particular, are poorly developed” (1999:13-15). Significantly, some of the literature has 
tended to treat gender as a binary system through which men and women are locked into 
specific and measurable roles and responsibilities. For example, women’s relatively
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important role in the formal economy, together with low fertility, high literacy, and 
matrilocal marriage traditions led Yoddumnem-Attig et al. (1992) and Bhassom 
Limanonda (2000) to proclaim Thai society to be characterised by relatively egalitarian 
relations between men and women and high levels of women’s independence. Women’s 
role in the household and their control over household resources and reproduction are said 
to offset the male dominance of the public sphere of macro-economics and village or 
national politics (Yoddumnem-Attig et al. 1992:17). Yoddumnem-Attig et al. even go so 
far as to state that as a result of declining fertility and women’s increasing foray into paid 
employment “rather than complimentary roles, wives and husbands are ... assuming roles 
based on mutual cooperation and support characterized by the joining sharing of family 
and economic responsibilities”, many of which used to be sex-specific (1992:18, emphasis 
in original). Limanonda stresses that “Buddhist teachings include principles o f ‘hierarchical 
order’, but the relative status of the individuals involved is normally defined by age rather 
than sex” (2000:249).
In practice, women’s status and possible gender identities are in flux and depend strongly 
on the specific geographical and historical context, not to mention on the question which 
particular groups of women are being discussed. For example, men continue to be the 
automatic heads of household (unless absent) and are widely regarded as the main 
breadwinners for their family even though women from diverse economic and educational 
backgrounds contribute substantially (at times earning equal incomes). At the same time, 
women continue to bear the main responsibility for child rearing and child care, though the 
presence of domestic helpers can mediate the impact of such tasks on access to work and 
public life in general. While gender roles of Thai men and women in traditional agricultural 
society were characterised by complementarity with different spheres of responsibility and 
work (Van Esterik 1999), the rapid transformation of (parts of) the Thai economy and 
society since the 1960s has radically changed many traditional tasks and responsibilities 
assigned to men and women, as well as the meanings attached to them.
Mills observes that “most Thai village ethnographies depict a variety of factors such as 
relative age, wealth, education, and occupational position as markers of social identity and 
status that are at least as significant as differential gender roles and expectations” 
(1998:18). Van Esterik also reminds us to start from the assumption “not of uniformity but
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of diversity -  of multiple contested gender statuses and ideologies rather than of a single 
hegemonic system” in Thailand (1999:276):
The rigidity that appears on the surface of Thai gender interactions is permeated by asexual 
power differentials that form the basis of gender hierarchies as of other hierarchies. What is 
fixed is the importance of power in all relationships, not sexual orientation ... Hierarchy is 
more important than gender in this and other situations. That is, gender signifies in 
combination with power (Van Esterik 1999:280).
Gender works in conjunction with other markers of difference to differentiate among 
women as much as between women and men. Thus, in Thailand gender differences may in 
some situations be less meaningful and important than other relations of power.
State visions of gender relations have also changed over the years. Although Thai women 
have throughout the centuries variously contributed to national development, their formal 
incorporation into the modem project of development started with the Fourth Five Year 
National Economic and Social Development Plan (1973-76). This plan described the need 
to promote women’s greater welfare, particularly in health, education, and family planning. 
In subsequent national plans, the move from seeing women as ‘receptors’ of development 
to enabling them to become contributors and later agents of development is visible. The 
Fifth Plan (1982-1986) stressed the expansion of social services for women, whereas the 
Sixth Plan (1987-1992) aimed at integrating women into economic development through 
the promotion of their participation in local groups such as rotating savings and credit 
groups and income-generating groups (Yoddumnem-Attig et al. 1992). More recent plans 
have specified the need for greater gender equality and gender mainstreaming, in line with 
international discourse on gender and development such as emerged around the Beijing 
Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995.
As an example of gender and age differentiation in hierarchical Thai society, a major 
difference can be observed in parents’ expectations towards their children. Whereas 
daughters are socialised by parents, peers, and teachers to accept parental authority, assume 
responsibilities, guard their moral reputation, and avoid imposing on others (kraeng ja i), 
sons are clearly more at liberty to indulge in play, sports, and adventure (pai tiaw) 
involving male friends in locations outside the immediate surroundings (Mills 1998; 
Yoddumnem-Attig et al. 1992). As such, adolescent and young adult men leam to take
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risks and to explore new communities, which puts them at an advantage in settling into a 
new workplace and confronting authority. Young women, on the other hand, from an early 
age face greater social control and limited physical mobility, resulting in obstacles to be 
overcome in assuming public roles such as in trade unions once they enter formal 
workplaces.
Incorporated into women’s dominant gender identity, feelings of indebtedness and 
obligations to parents or relatives are widespread and play an important role in women 
workers’ behavioural choices (Theobald 2002). Mills describes how Thai workers are 
simultaneously limited by the prevailing cultural perception of workers as “dependants of 
employers”:
Both the Thai state and employers commonly invoke a moral discourse of patron-clientage 
to define labor relations. They emphasize Thai cultural ideals of bun khun, asymmetrical 
exchanges between beneficent superiors and their dependants who should respond with 
loyalty, gratitude and respect (1999:176).
Although most women workers in rural settings are strongly bound to dominant gender 
regimes about women’s and men’s appropriate roles and behaviour, Ungpakom (1999) 
documented a very different situation in his small-scale research on urban women workers. 
He found that the majority of mostly well-educated and skilled women workers at a 
Bangkok multinational underwear factory (where 2,300 out of 2,800 workers were 
unionised) had relatively liberal attitudes towards gender norms. These women largely 
sanctioned sex outside of formal marriage (though a majority were themselves married), 
did not criticise fellow women for not being married, and enjoyed the financial 
independence that factory work afforded them (1999:71-5). These findings show that strict 
gender norms in relation to sexuality and women’s domestic role have weakened among 
some women in urban Thailand, and that the demand for women in the labour market 
contributes to changes in gender regimes. Yet, however far these women may be removed 
from the stereotypical image of the uneducated and passive young migrant worker facing 
exploitation in Bangkok’s factories, they are likely to form a minority, given that the 
overwhelming majority of Thai women workers cannot count on high skill-levels and 
educational attainment to protect them from intimidation and job insecurity.
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Another example of the diversity of women’s experiences of gender regimes can be found 
in education. Among Thai women aged over 15 years, 9.5 per cent are illiterate, compared 
to 5.1 per cent among men (UNDP 2004). Lack of knowledge of legal rights, in particular 
about labour laws, is a widespread theme in the literature on women workers in Southeast 
Asia (Singarimbun and Sairin 1995; Martens and Mitter 1994). The cause of this lack of 
knowledge is located at least in part in the education system which prioritises learning 
about the obligations that form part of citizenship, rather than rights and benefits as 
guaranteed by law (Mills 1999). Although improved funding and infrastructure have 
gradually expanded access to education during the past fifty years and Thailand boasts high 
levels of literacy for all age groups of women and men, substantial numbers of girls and 
boys continue to drop out of school. Some 7 per cent of Thai children enter the labour force 
before the age of fifteen, many of whom migrate to urban areas in search of low-skilled 
employment (NSO 2003b).
Based on her research in Bangkok and in a northeastern rural community, Mills (1999) 
considers the migration experience to constitute an obstacle to union organising, since 
many young migrants are ignorant of their legal rights and have little information about 
locally available support services (see also Brown and Frenkel 1993:90). In the context of 
Thailand’s reliance until recently on low valued-added manufacturing exports, there has 
been an almost constant flow of new migrant labour to urban centres in the form of young 
women with generally low levels of formal education. The availability of such a cheap 
reserve labour force dampens the potential of industrial workers to engage in collective 
action for better wages and working conditions. It also provides employers with little 
incentive to discontinue their reliance on repressive models of labour control.
Notwithstanding recent changes in state policies, it would be safe to conclude that gender 
inequalities as well as inequalities between women are perpetuated through gender regimes 
in organisations and institutions (Mills 1998; Ungpakom 1999). Such regimes reproduce 
stereotypes about particular gender identities, frequently manifested in lower risk-taking 
behaviour among young women, intense self-scrutiny and censorship especially related to 
sexuality, and feelings of gratitude or obligation towards parents. These types of behaviour 
and expectations generally impact negatively on women workers’ ability to organise, 
though they also may motivate some to mobilise collectively. In general, educational
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institutions and family life transmit and reproduce gender regimes characterised by unequal 
relations, which are only partially counterbalanced by young women’s incorporation into 
the modem, urban labour force.
Indonesia
Given the diversity of cultures and traditions in Indonesia, it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to point to one specific gender regime as shaping the responses of women workers to social 
and economic injustice. Robinson provides a brief overview of the different inteipretations 
of women’s status, observing that “ideological systems are complex and not always 
seamless” (2000:145). She concludes:
The homogenising imperative of the New Order definitions of appropriate gender roles 
mask profound differences in the patterns of gender relations and in gender ideologies 
found throughout the archipelago. They also mask the manner in which gender intersects 
with other bases of power ... [and] with other principles of social differentiation 
(2000:146).
While some practices and discourses in kinship system, household arrangements, marriage 
or family law, and education point to relative equality between women and men, it is 
equally possible to name others in decision-making, economic life, or political 
representation that show relative gender inequality. Research in Javanese Muslim village 
settings has shown that the social and religious norms governing gender roles and 
responsibilities focus largely on the husband as official head of the household, leader in the 
community and neighbourhood, main income-earner, and protector of women (LSPPA 
1999). In contrast, women are generally expected to get married in their early twenties, and 
while allowed to work outside the home, have been trained since their youth to become 
housewives whose main role is to organise the household (including household finances), 
to take care of children, and to serve their husbands.
The New Order encouraged both men and women to consider these responsibilities as part 
of women’s kodrat (god-given role) in the same way that men’s leadership abilities are 
considered innate due to their greater penchant for rationality (in contrast with women’s 
emotional nature).1 Based on her research in Tangerang in the late 1970s, Mather observed 
that through marriage, men supervise women’s sexuality, while women digressing from
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these norms are branded as immoral and are ostracised (1988:150). In the same vein, an 
NGO activist in Semarang complains that women are seen as having no soul (nyawa), 
instead following their husband’s soul: upon marriage, women are called by their husband’s 
name, and women’s actions reflect on their husband’s good name.2 Similar to Thailand, in 
Indonesia youth are generally socialised to respect and obey their elders, a cultural aspect 
of which employers make active use in their attempts to subdue labour unrest.
Changes in perceptions of women’s role and position in society can be read in references to 
women in the government’s Broad Outlines of State Policy (Garis-Garis Besar Haluan 
Negara).3 Traditional gender expectations as outlined above were encouraged by the New 
Order regime which in its early years considered women as useful conduits for achieving 
improvements in child health and family welfare, and as contributors to national economic 
development. The emphasis in the New Order’s Pancasila ideology on harmonious relations 
extended to the family and household sphere: gender was interpreted to relate to non- 
conflictual relations between the male breadwinner of the family and his wife whose 
priority was taking care of the household and children. As Robinson observes, “a gendered 
model of political authority with its origins in an imagined tradition of a patriarchal family 
is a cornerstone of the repressive ideology that has underpinned the New Order” 
(2000:141). New ‘Indonesian’ norms introduced by the national government in 1993 aimed 
to achieve a better balance between responsibilities and rights for both husband and wife. 
Yet, this new ideal o f ‘equal partnership’ (kemitrasejajaran) is only slowly starting to alter 
attitudes towards gender roles and responsibilities and its influence is likely to be strongest 
among young people (LSPPA 1999: 80).4
Furthermore, although the Pancasila system started to collapse after 1998, its legacy is 
evident in dominant discourses about women in Indonesia. For example, the 1974 law on 
marriage still sanctions the traditional division of labour and responsibilities, by proscribing 
that women’s responsibility for raising children and taking care of the household, and 
men’s role as the main income-earners and protector of the family. The government- 
sponsored Family Welfare Movement (PKK) during the 1960s and 1970s referred to 
women as pendamping suami or spouse consort. In this organisation as well as in the civil 
servants’ wives’ organisation Dharma Wanita “women’s relations in the private domain 
determine their status in the public domain” (Robinson 2000:142). The PKK’s official
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ideology listed as the Five Tasks of Women (Panca Dharma PKK) as husbands’ 
escorts/attendants, as managers of the household, as procreators and educators, as 
supplementary wage earners, and as members of society (Bianpoen 2000b: 159).
Contradictions are rife between this ideology and the reality experienced by many women. 
Dominant societal norms allow married women to earn an income, but only as long as they 
can adequately take care of the non-financial needs of their children and husband (LSPPA 
1999:81). In contrast, most single women from financially needy households are expected 
to work, either in factories or as domestic helpers in their own country or overseas as so- 
called ‘TKT (Tenaga Kerja Indonesia or Indonesian workers) or ‘TKW’ (Tenaga Keija 
Wanita or women workers). Single women from urban middle-class families will also 
frequently work for several years before getting married. While local culture and tradition 
strongly vary throughout Indonesia and in their impact on women’s work, almost all areas 
and ethnic groups are to some extent gradually influenced by national legislation and 
policy, and display elements of patriarchal gender regimes, whether based on (or justified 
by) adat (local traditions) and/or organised religion (Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, 
Hinduism, or Confucianism).5
Tradition, religion, and law frequently coalesce to produce and reproduce gender 
inequalities (Mather 1988). Making use of such traditional sources of women’s 
subordination including deference to and acceptance of structures of control, local 
employers have little difficulty in subduing protest by women workers and preventing 
unionization during the New Order. Young women workers therefore show little inclination 
to organise collectively. Similarly, with regard to status and power, Errington argues that 
“women in many [of Indonesia’s] societies are assumed to be more calculating, 
instrumental, and direct than men, and their very control of practical matters and money, 
their economic ‘power’ may be the opposite of the kind of ‘power’ or spiritual potency that 
brings the greatest prestige; it may assure them of lower rather than higher power and to 
designate it as the most important factor in high prestige is to create an optical illusion 
based on the importation of Eurocentric ideas about the relations of power and prestige” 
(1990:7). Although its practical benefits for women are undeniable, women’s growing 
participation in the industrial labour force during the past two decades should perhaps in 
some cases be seen similarly as a source of negative status rather than power.
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However, as a result of the economic crisis of the late 1990s and processes of social and 
policy reform and decentralisation, local hierarchies have shifted and society’s negative 
views of women who work outside the home have diminished. According to Rita Olivia 
from the Jakarta-based Trade Union Rights Centre, most people understand that men’s 
income is no longer enough to sustain the family.6 Dian and Ria from Unggaran, an 
industrial area in Central Java, affirm this view: when asked about local attitudes to 
women’s activism, they recount that “the community around us does not support us, but 
they do not oppress us either. They just look at us strangely, simply because we are a 
women’s group and we often stay up until early in the morning, talking about the issues”.7
It is likely that significant numbers of Indonesian women are unaware of or do not 
understand their rights in the workplace. While levels of functional literacy among youth 
have been high in urban areas since improvements in the 1980s to access to education, 
many women have grown up in rural areas where such improvements are lagging and 
where economic and human resources are scarce. According to 1999 data, illiteracy still 
affects 5.3 per cent of rural women and 2.7 per cent o f urban women between the ages of 
10 and 44 (BPS 2002), whereas UNDP data from 2002 show that 16.6 per cent of women 
but only 7.5 per cent of men older than 15 years are illiterate (UNDP 2004).8 Yet, even 
though many women in their late teens and early twenties have finished elementary school 
and lower high school, most were taught only about their responsibilities as citizens, and 
not about their rights. As Smyth and Grijns write, “[women] workers employed in large, 
urban firms ... are young and inexperienced migrants, already socialized into docility and 
as a consequence not inclined to join labor organizations” (1997:17). Most of the young 
workforce, therefore, depends for their awareness of human and labour rights, on NGOs 
and trade unions that are generally limited by budget shortages and difficult access to 
factory workers.9
How important each of these barriers is in explaining the level of organising among women 
workers is hard to say. Their relative importance depends partially on the strength of local 
cultural perceptions, but also on the particular economic history of an industrial area or 
company. Some women workers blame the various forms of labour control in their 
workplaces. In Unggaran, for example, “if no trade union exists yet in a particular factory
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in their industrial area, it is not because of a lack of interest on the part of workers, but 
because of management obstacles.”10 Others instead fault women’s lack of self-confidence 
and skills, while yet others point out that women would happily get involved in trade 
unions if only they had a chance to reach decision-making positions and to contribute their 
talents. Lastly, the adaptations and modifications of dominant gender roles and 
responsibilities as they are made within each family will heavily impact on women’s 
responses to the obstacles and opportunities they face with regard to joining a trade union 
in their workplace.
Comparison
This analysis of gender relations and gender regimes in Thailand and Indonesia shows that 
both countries are witnessing gradual changes to dominant gender regimes as a result of 
globalisation, urbanisation and/or urban migration and young women’s large-scale entry 
into the formal labour market. In Indonesia in particular, although state ideology that 
defined women mostly as mothers and wives is still strong, in reality ideals of motherhood 
and a strict division of labour in the household have always been (or are increasingly) 
untenable for large proportions of women, especially those in lower-income households. 
While there is room for some generalisations -  such as the gender norms disseminated 
through educational and religious institutions and through family values -  the above 
analysis clearly points to the existence of multiple gender identities and to resistance to 
dominant gender regimes. Gender inequality remains a strong feature of society in both 
countries but is experienced in conjunction with other markers of difference. Recognition 
of differences between women implies the need to consider gender regimes in conjunction 
with class, religion, place of origin, ethnicity, age, and other markers of difference.
Yet, although gender always operates together with such other differences, Van Esterik 
observes that it may not be the most meaningful difference. Thus, in Thailand power 
differentials based on gender may not provide adequate explanations for women’s ability or 
likelihood to mobilise and organise collectively. There is much less evidence to suggest that 
this is equally the case in Indonesia, where the authoritarian state for many years 
propagated a hegemonic ideology that emphasised gender differences, in particular separate 
spheres and different responsibilities for women and men. How important this difference
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between Thai and Indonesian gender relations and gender regimes might be for women 
workers in their efforts to mobilise and organise collectively will be considered in the next 
two chapters.
Women in trade unions: history and current status
The previous section demonstrated that gender inequalities generally remain strong in 
Thailand and Indonesia but may be reproduced and articulated in different forms and 
spaces. Chapter Four already showed that women’s movements are increasingly active in 
both countries, especially on political and social issues, and that Thailand has experienced 
an increase in women in elected political positions while there has been an increase in 
women activists in politics in Indonesia. Do we witness a similar influx of women into 
trade union leadership positions? What do we know about the numbers and roles of women 
in trade unions in Thailand and Indonesia? Contrary to popular perceptions, women 
workers have long been active alongside men in trade unions in much of Southeast Asia. 
Yet, what little data is available shows that the number of women leaders or committee 
members remains low, as does union density among women (the percentage of employed 
people who are unionised).
Thailand
Publications about Thailand’s economy and the labour movement have routinely ignored 
the role and needs of women workers as agents and as a constituency in its own right (for 
example, Lawler and Chokechai 2000; Deyo 1997; Pasuk and Baker 1995). In Thailand, 
women first took up trade unionism in the early 1930s when women dyers were the only 
group of (predominantly male) protesting workers to win their dispute (Thorbek 1987:65). 
By 1950, some 150 unions were active (Lawler and Chokechai 2000:223), with women 
mostly participating and taking action in public sector workplaces and unions but also 
conducting protests in the textile, cement, and petrochemical industries. In 1951, women 
workers even organised a separate union whose existence was, however, short-lived. 
Notwithstanding intermittent military rule, women continued their active role in trade union 
activities throughout the 1950s and 1960s, though very few reached leadership positions in 
their unions. During the pro-democracy protests between 1973 and 1976, many women
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trade unionists were visible in the street protests that were violently subdued by the armed 
forces (Ungpakom 1999).
The main response by trade unions to the increasing (and increasingly visible) presence of 
women in their midst was to call for protective legislation. As was common in many 
capitalist societies until well into the second half of the twentieth century, politicians and 
male labour activists alike (as well as some women) expected such legislation to protect 
women’s ability to fulfill traditional roles as mothers and wives, by limiting women’s work 
at night, underground, and in what they considered to be dangerous places. It was arguably 
only when women started to enter the formal workforce and unions in greater numbers 
during the growth of the light manufacturing sector (1970s-1980s) that unions gained 
greater awareness of women’s role, rights, and potential needs as women beyond the sphere 
of protection.11
Even though women’s economic activity rates have historically been high in Thailand 
compared to other countries in the region (76 per cent for women compared to 87 per cent 
for men in 199012) and women entered the factories in and around Bangkok in large 
numbers starting in the 1970s, union density among Thai women and men has been and 
remains very low. Estimates of national union density for private sector workers vary from 
1 per cent (estimate by ILO) to 5 per cent (estimate by union leaders). Figures from the 
Ministry of Labour for 2001 showed that 285,000 out of 11 million employees in private 
sector enterprises -  or 2.6 per cent -  were union members, compared to 61 per cent of state 
enterprise employees (Voravidh et al. n.d.: 8).13
In general, labour observers widely agree that reliable figures concerning unionisation are 
difficult to come by since many unions and federations inflate membership numbers for 
political reasons or to attract overseas funding. Since few unions or federations 
disaggregate membership data by sex, existing estimates for women are often even less 
reliable. According to a 1993 assessment based on unknown sources, men account for 60 
per cent of trade union members in Thailand (among 839 labour unions). However, my 
interviews indicate that women frequently are well represented among union membership 
in more ‘feminised’ sectors such as garment and textile, pharmaceuticals, and gem cutting. 
The most reliable figures come from the Arom Pongpangan Foundation, a Bangkok-based
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labour NGO which in 1999 conducted a survey about committee membership in trade 
unions and found women to be a minority at all levels of union leadership (see Table 5.1 
below).
Table 5.1: Sex-disaggregation of committee members of labour organisations in 
Thailand (1999)
Type o f  trade union Proportion o f  committee members (per cent)
Female Male
Labour union council (national) 28.31 71.69
Labour union federation 18.34 81.66
State enterprise labour union 13.95 86.05
Industrial or area-based union group 31.77 68.23
Source: Voravidh et al. (n.d.:26).
Women leaders are found in Thailand at the level of area groups and factory-based 
(enterprise) trade unions, but rarely in national bodies such as federations or congresses. 
During the past five years, no more than two women have held seats on the Labour 
Confederation Center of Thailand, one of two powerful confederations that conduct most of 
the high-level negotiations with government and employers’ organisations. More 
promisingly, many area trade unions in and around Bangkok have female coordinators who 
have risen through the ranks and have learned leadership skills through years of practice. In 
short, although there is some reason for cautious optimism in sectors dominated by a 
female workforce, women workers continue to be under-represented in union leadership as 
a whole.
Indonesia
Although Dutch socialist activists first introduced trade unionism to the then colony of the 
Dutch East Indies in the 1920s, references to Indonesian women’s activism in trade unions 
first emerge in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The inequalities suffered by women workers 
in formal employment during both the colonial period of resource extraction and the post­
independence period of slow economic recovery and later import-substitution were 
significant: “Gender both influenced the wage differentials between male and female for 
the same work and defined occupations, or tasks within an occupation, as women’s work 
for which less remuneration could be offered” (Elliott 1997:138). Women in informal
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employment, such as home-based work and cottage industries, were (and still are) not 
covered by national labour legislation. Although the number of women workers in formal 
waged employment in the period after independence was low relative to both men and the 
overall population, women nonetheless were a sufficiently significant presence in industrial 
workplaces and on plantations to warrant the establishment of a women’s section of the 
Barisan Buruh Indonesia (BBI) shortly after its founding in 1945. The women’s section one 
year later was made into an autonomous section of the BBI, tasked to “act as an educational 
and ‘go-between’ body” for women workers to formulate and convey complaints and 
requests to the trade union (Elliott 1997:134). Whether in order to win women’s support or 
to distinguish itself from its colonial predecessor, “the democratic government of the new 
Republic easily granted all sorts of legal rights to women” including the right to equal pay 
in the civil service (Blackburn 2001:2).
Yet, women had little influence in the drafting of early labour legislation after the country 
attained independence, which reflected the class and gender biases of policy-makers. The 
new legislation introduced between 1947 and 1951 limited women’s opportunities through 
“negative proscriptive” and protective clauses regarding work that might endanger 
women’s health or morality, though numerous exception clauses allowed for women to 
become a large reserve labour force (Elliott 1997:140-143). Women’s representation in 
union leadership structures in the estate, cigarette, and textile sectors was significantly 
lower than the proportion of female members in these unions (10 to 30 per cent compared 
to female membership of 45 to 65 per cent in the late 1950s; Hindley 1966:208-9 quoted in 
Elliott 1997:149). It is therefore not surprising that Elliott concludes there was “a failure on 
the part of the national leadership of organised labour and women’s groups to push for the 
recognition of women as workers in their own right, in need of, and deserving, promotional 
help for economic independence” (1997:147). Where unions and women’s organisations 
raised issues such as child care and housing, she argues that it was (at least initially) with 
the intention of reaffirming women’s roles as wives and mothers (though such practical 
measures were no doubt useful and fulfilled urgent needs for many women workers) 
(Elliott 1997:147). When the more progressive communist party and its affiliated trade 
union and women’s group GERWANI were crushed after the aborted coup of 1965, 
industrial relations and women’s role in it quickly shifted to emphasising -  at least in
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theory - women’s ideal domestic role as housewife and caretaker o f children (Wieringa
2002).
The situation in Indonesia in terms o f membership and union density levels is similar to 
that in Thailand. According to a membership (self-)verification exercise undertaken in 
2002, the three largest federations and confederations claimed a membership o f almost 8 
million out of a total formal sector labour force o f 27.3 million (CBS labour force data for 
2001; Quinn 2003). Quinn asserts that “it seems extremely unlikely that this figure is an 
accurate reflection o f the level of trade union membership, particularly as many unions lost 
a significant number o f members” since 1998 (2003:26).14 If we look specifically for data 
on women’s unionisation, Indonesian federations report that women represent up to half the 
membership in female dominated sectors such as textile and garment, pharmaceuticals and 
health, and tourism (see Table 5.2 below). Even if  true, such statements conceal the fact 
that union density among Indonesian women workers in general is not much higher than 
the level in Thailand, given the high proportion o f workplaces without trade unions. Of the 
40.2 million working women (2001 World Bank data for 1999), Table 5.2 shows that the 
major national trade union federations counted only 676,733 women as members. While 
this latter statistic does not include the significant number o f women in factory-based, small 
trade unions that are not linked to any federation, this does not make up for the fact that 
millions more women work in small and/or home-based workplaces where unions are 
rarely active.
Table 5.2: Women as a percentage of trade union membership in Indonesia (2002)
Union
federation
Men Women Total Women as % o f  
total
SBSI — — 1,700,000 ___
FNPBI 26,308 23,692 50,000 47.4
TSK 194,743 400,264 595,007 67.3
KAHUTINDO 205,916 185,205 391,121 47.4
SPMI 55,169 38,512 93,681 41.1
FARKES 7,650 9,350 17,000 55.0
KEP 136,075 19,710 154,785 12.7
Figures based on union reporting. Note: SB SI and FNPBI: multi-sectoral federations. TSK: 
garment and textile workers’ federation (now renamed SPN); KAHUTINDO: forestry and wood 
workers’ federation; SPMI: metal, electrical and electronics workers’ federation; FARKES:
health and pharmaceutical workers’ federation; KEP: chemical workers’ federation.___________
Source: ACILS 2002 internal report.
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In Indonesia, only 2 out of the 7 major federations listed in Table 5.2 (FNPBI and 
KAHUTINDO) are headed by women. It is these two women who are present at 
negotiations with the government and employers and who represent Indonesian women 
workers at meetings with the ILO. The trade union representatives on the tripartite team 
that negotiated (and agreed to) the controversial new Manpower Bill during late 2002 and 
early 2003 consisted of 5 men and only 1 woman (as head of the women and children 
committee of the SPSI-Reformasi federation this woman, Ari Sunaryati, holds a much 
lower position than the male committee members who are all chairpersons of large 
federations).
Nevertheless, some positive trends can be noted. Among the more than sixty trade union 
federations registered with the Indonesian government (Quinn 2003), at least a handful of 
smaller federations are headed by women, especially those that work with textile and 
garment workers (Serikat Buruh lndonesia-Peijuangan and Gerakan Serikat Buruh 
Indonesia are two examples, with membership ranging from a few hundred to 6000 
workers). Women also head several non-affiliated regional federations, such as the 
Independent Trade Union of Medan and the Surabaya-based Regional Trade Union. 
Although most of these women leaders have worked hard to reach and hold on to their 
current positions, lone women on important committees such as the Indonesian women 
noted above are widely regarded by both men and women as token representatives who 
have very little influence during discussions and are often forced to agree with the male 
majority, even on important issues concerning women’s rights. Nevertheless, as Chapters 
Six and Seven will show, many of these women leaders are not averse to raising women’s 
or gender issues in union circles.
Comparison
In both countries, women’s involvement in union activities increased significantly during 
the 1970s and 1980s when export-oriented industries deemed women to be particularly 
suited for their labour-intensive production lines because of their image as hard-working, 
dexterous, and obedient, and because of their construction as cheap labour (see discussion 
in Chapter One, p.31). Although the literature written by aid agencies or international 
organisations often emphasises the lack of knowledge about labour rights among these
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thousands of newly recruited women in industrial employment (the “women workers as 
victim” trope according to Ford 2003; see also Ong 1991), the role played by a minority of 
women who are union activists should not be overlooked. As happened in South Korea 
(Koo 2001), many young Indonesian and Thai female factory workers appear to have 
slowly gained an appreciation of the Marxist and socialist discourse that was in vogue with 
many NGO workers and some trade union officials. When the prohibition of independent 
labour unions in Thailand and Indonesia forced many genuine workers’ activists to conduct 
their discussions in secret, women remained active as both union organisers and members.15 
Thus, women workers were not always obedient and passive workers, as expected by their 
managers at the time. Yet, their numbers in leadership and membership in trade unions 
remain relatively low in many sectors. Even in those sectors dominated by a female 
workforce, union leadership is often in male hands.
Compared to Indonesian women, the rich history and longer experience among Thai 
women in engaging in strikes and other forms of protest in the female-dominated light 
manufacturing sector are important factors in explaining the current differences in women’s 
labour mobilisation and activism in the two countries. Strike action, by both men and 
women, became more common in Indonesia during the early 1990s (Kämmen 1997), some 
twenty years after Thai women workers started such protest against employers and 
managers (Ungpakom 1999). On the other hand, Chapter Seven will show that age 
characteristics may actually work to the advantage of Indonesian women workers’ 
organisations that count more young women without family obligations as members 
compared to their Thai counterparts. In other words, while experience and a common 
history of resistance play important roles in generating collective action among women 
workers in Thailand, the presence of young women activists willing and able to engage in 
strike action (because of the novelty of it or because of the linkages with the fight for 
democracy) can make up for the lack of experience and common history among Indonesian 
women workers.
Based on the above statistics, it can be argued that, although it is still relatively small, 
women’s membership in labour organisations has taken on an increased significance for the 
labour movement in recent years, due to sharp declines in absolute membership levels in 
sectors such as woodwork and furniture, transport, and garment and textiles manufacturing
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that were once regarded as traditional union strongholds. Since the economic crisis of the 
late 1990s which hastened the demise of the textile and garment sector where thousands of 
women and men have been unionised in both Indonesia and Thailand (ILO 1998), union 
organising efforts by both men and women in these countries have slowly begun to focus 
on women workers in home-based and outsourcing arrangements and in white-collar jobs. 
Many of the larger unions and federations have established or are establishing women’s 
committees. These developments show that there is a gradual shift of attention towards both 
potential female members and potential new sectors to be organised. In conclusion, 
although absolute numbers of women and union density among women remain low in both 
countries and although women’s leadership remains the exception rather than the norm, 
union women themselves may be becoming increasingly aware of the importance of their 
union membership and participation both to themselves and to their organisations.
Trade unions as gendered organisations
Although the unfavourable political environment and unions’ frequently undemocratic 
organisational structure undeniably pose obstacles to unionisation and mobilisation in 
general, women are differently affected by them than men because trade unions are also 
gendered organisations (Franzway 2002). As such, trade unions transmit as well as 
reproduce ideas about gender relations for their members and for society in general. My 
interviews with women union activists and NGO staff suggest that, similar to advanced 
economies and other developing economies (Razavi, 1999:669; Rowbotham and Mitter 
1994; Ledwith and Colgan 2002; Franzway 2002), many trade unions in Indonesia and 
Thailand display a lack of sensitivity and receptiveness towards women and the particular 
concerns that many women bring to their unions. This gender bias reflects the 
organisational culture of trade unions, and is part and parcel of the gender division of 
labour. However, its negative impact on women’s mobilisation works in tandem with the 
factors outlined in earlier chapters: workers’ weak economic and social position as a result 
of the global division of labour and the political circumstances that prevent trade unions 
from becoming genuine and effective mobilising vehicles for large numbers of workers. As 
this section will show, women’s reluctance to become active in unions is thus linked to 
both general obstacles to effective trade unionism as well as gender bias. Since little has 
been written specifically on women’s experiences of trade unions as gendered institutions
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in Southeast Asia and since this section relies in large part on findings from interviews with 
union women in Thailand and Indonesia, it will not be comparative in nature. Instead, it 
will describe the obstacles experienced by union women as members and as leaders in 
Thailand and Indonesia.
Membership
Gender bias in trade unions is intrinsically connected to economic inequalities among 
workers at local, national, and global levels, with the combined effect of a double 
disadvantage for women in the most vulnerable positions in the labour force (Franzway 
2002). These women are neither protected by trade unions (or legislation) nor recognised as 
workers worthy of protection. This is especially the case for workers in the informal 
economy, whom trade unions may regard as competition or a threat to hard-won rights 
(Razavi 1999). Such refusal to defend the rights of informal workers implies a refusal to 
acknowledge the gendered nature of the workforce, and results in the exclusion of large 
numbers of women from the mainstream union movement. While trade unions such as the 
Self-Employed Women’s Association in India have shown that women in the informal 
economy can be and want to be organised in unions, my interviews found that many 
(though not all) male leaders of mainstream Indonesian and Thai trade unions continue to 
view these women as little more than housewives voluntarily engaging in extra income- 
earning activities.
In some of the economic sectors where trade unions have gained a foothold, women 
constitute only a small percentage of the labour force. In such male-dominated sectors as 
transport and maritime enterprises, women may find it extremely difficult to challenge 
gender bias in trade unions. For example, when I asked her about the biggest obstacle to 
women’s union membership and leadership in her sector, Ester from the Indonesian 
seafarers union recounted difficulties in finding sufficient numbers of women who want to 
organise collectively, because women are still denied employment opportunities in her 
sector. This is mainly due to traditional beliefs that women’s rightful place is in the 
household or in workplaces considered feminine, rather than on board large ships or 
working at ports.16 As a result, women will not likely gain a substantial percentage of 
membership in the seafarers union, whereas United Nations agencies and women’s NGOs
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argue that women need to form a critical mass of at least 30 per cent to be able to make 
their voices heard (Karam 1998). Whether there are differences between union women in 
Thailand and Indonesia in this respect requires further research.
In both countries, trade unions persistently show themselves to be gendered organisations 
that reproduce gender inequalities. Similar to findings in Australia (Franzway 2002:42-44), 
household tasks and lifecycle factors such as childbirth and child rearing frequently weigh 
heavily on women in industrial work and make it difficult for them to engage in union 
activities (Oxfam 2004a). Not only do economic pressures force the majority of women 
workers in the industrial sector to spend most of their evenings and holidays doing 
overtime, learning new skills, or selling goods in order to supplement their income, but 
household tasks mean that they have very little time to engage in union activities. Tao 
(from the Bangkok plastics factory) puts it this way: “We tried to have more women active 
in negotiations with employers, but in the first year, the women said, ‘let the men do it’ 
[because] they don’t have time because of their family obligations. So now all the
1 7committee members are men!”
Women workers themselves may regard their work as a temporary pursuit until they marry, 
which perhaps gives them less incentive to struggle for better working conditions. Such 
complaints were heard more often among Indonesian union women than among those in 
Thailand, perhaps as a result of the generally younger age of the former. For example, when 
I asked them about their future plans, about half the dozen women involved in the women’s 
committee of an East Jakarta electronics manufacturing company agreed with the 
assumption that a woman will give up her job if her husband is capable of earning sufficient 
income for the family, or will at most work merely to help her husband earn money.18 The 
persistence of such perceptions is probably the result of widespread diffusion of basic 
religious teachings, Javanese and other cultural ideals, as well as state ideology. All of 
these prescribe that a husband’s responsibility is to provide a livelihood and protection for 
his family whereas a wife is supposed to take care of her household and raise the couple’s 
children.
At times, men and women continue to blame women themselves for not taking advantage 
of the opportunities offered to them by their unions and in particular by male leaders. In
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doing so, they unwittingly reproduce and reinforce gender bias. Union women in both 
countries frequently made such statements in my interviews with them. For example, when 
I asked them to explain the low proportion of women attending union activities, Suganta 
from the Rangsit area union north of Bangkok and Sulistri, head of the women and children 
department of SBSI in Jakarta, complained that many of the women in textile factories are 
not willing to become active in the union because they are lazy and do not see the purpose 
of the union. However, rather than providing explanations, such complaints may mask 
these women’s difficulties in reorienting trade union activities to make them friendlier and 
more accessible to women. Both Suganta and Sulistri appear to recognise the persistent 
economic inequalities and the organisational inflexibility that create barriers to women’s 
participation. Sulistri points out possible strategies to overcome the external obstacles to 
women’s advancement, such as holding meetings at convenient times and places, appeasing 
reluctant husbands by informing them about their wives activities in the union, and forming 
small discussion groups of around five people to discuss women’s issues in an open 
atmosphere.
Lastly, the bad image of trade unions also keeps many women from becoming union 
members. In both countries, trade unions are equated in the media and by politicians with 
trouble, violence, and anarchy.19 Tao (from the plastic wares factory in Bangkok) recounts 
that the community around her factory and her residence has a largely negative impression 
of trade unions: they try to “stay away from troublemakers.” She continues by saying that 
“women union members are distrusted ... [people] get their image from the media, from 
television, they only see the mobs and the road closures.”20 Similarly, Ester from the 
shipping union in Indonesia believes that:
many people see demonstrations as the main image of the trade unions but demonstrations 
are also seen as something [only] for factory workers (buruh pabrik) .. .Women have seen 
me on television in a demonstration, being hit by the police, so they get scared and also 
some are forbidden to join by their husbands.21
A related problem in Indonesia is the image of women factory workers as loose or immoral 
women in the eyes of the surrounding community (Tjandraningsih 2000:266). It is therefore 
not surprising that many women have difficulty obtaining permission from their parents or 
husbands to join the union or are heavily criticised by them for their union activism.
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According to my interviews, many of those who live away from their parents and 
immediate family purposely conceal their union activism or are careful about how much 
and which information to share during their visits home.
Leadership
Even where women dominate an industrial sector, it is still men who lead the national trade 
union federations in such sectors in Thailand and Indonesia. Instead, in both countries 
significant numbers of women are active in regional trade unions, in area groups of trade 
unions, and in smaller enterprise and industrial unions. Trade union activists at the factory 
or area level are frequently critical of the manipulation of the labour movement by national- 
level leaders, and these two levels must therefore be clearly distinguished (Ungpakom 
1999). Thus, it is possible that the absence of women in national union leadership positions 
reflects not only women’s numerical under-representation in unions but also their greater 
interest in staying close to workers and their rejection of self-interested politics at the 
national level. When I asked for their opinion on politics and politicians, many women 
union leaders indicated that they preferred to distance themselves from mainstream politics 
and politicians because of the negative connotations these held among women workers in 
their areas or workplaces. This is similar to Budianta’s finding about women activists in 
Indonesia deliberately refusing to enter party politics as an attempt to redefine politics 
(2002:40). If this is indeed true, then it can be said that union structure and culture at once 
exclude women from the top jobs and provide them with incentives to organise at different 
levels and using different methods, as well as to pursue linkages with other women who 
face similar disenchantment with the labour movement.
In my interviews with them, several women union activists blame the persistence of male 
leadership on men’s exploitation of unequal gender relations to discourage or outright 
forbid women from contesting leadership positions. There are extensive similarities here to 
Franzway’s discussion of ‘male clubs’ and the culture of masculinity in Australian trade 
unions (2002:45-47; Pocock 1997b)). My interviews revealed suspicions on the part of 
union women that many men feel threatened by women’s entry into unions and by their 
growing knowledge and skills. These perceived threats encourage men to try to prevent 
challenges to the leadership positions they have held for many years, or what Connell
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(2002) has referred to as the “patriarchal dividend.” According to Pocock, “for many 
[Australian union] men their masculinity is constituted by their position of union 
leadership” (1997b:21). In Indonesia, this may happen through the deliberate 
misinterpretation of religious teachings about women’s leadership.
As a clear sign of such gender-based rivalries, union women complained in interviews 
about the lack of recognition they receive and their lack of access to independent and 
reliable information. For example, Vera and Haryati who are on the central decision­
making body of the Indonesian Metal Workers Federation, recount the frequency with 
which invitations addressed to them -  in their capacity as committee members -  somehow 
never reach them. Their federation chairman has even prohibited them from participating in 
some internal union activities, according to Vera and Haryati in an apparent sign of 
fearfiilness of the challenge they represent to him. “ Pomthip from the state-owned 
Telecommunications of Thailand office in Bangkok explains that men believe they should 
be in front as leaders and women should follow, because labour is men’s work and men 
have the strong personality needed for leadership. When I asked her about the attitude of 
men in unions towards women, Umi from Yogjakarta relates that men are not yet ready to 
accept women’s participation in politics or society, not so much because of fear of 
competition but because of the fact that they do not want women in their midst.24 Although 
union women in my interviews in both countries commonly reported the persistence of 
such a culture of masculinity and the denigration of femininity, many women union leaders 
actively challenge these facets of trade unionism and sought to reshape gender relations in 
trade unions by contesting leadership positions and resisting the need to become like their 
male union colleagues. Yet, even women union leaders cannot put women’s or gender 
issues on the union agenda without strong support from women members.
Similar to ordinary members, women leaders in both countries face resistance from their 
parents and husbands. Because of cultural and gender characteristics in Thailand and 
Indonesia, this obstacle is much more serious than experienced by union women in 
Australia (Franzway 2002:43). For example, it is considered inappropriate for women to go 
out on their own late at night to public places. Suganta from Bangkok spoke to me of the 
dirty process of internal union elections where false accusations towards women candidates 
are rife -  only because they are women who are threatening the status quo.25 Because in
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Thailand such accusations often contain allusions to women’s deviant sexuality and sexual 
behaviour, women are even more reluctant to engage in leadership contests in their trade 
union (see Jeffrey 2002:134 for a similar observation regarding Thai women in politics).
Pearson and Theobald have commented on the difficulties encountered by young women in 
Northern Thailand in their efforts to organise, due to ‘the conflation made between 
women’s work in the factories, their ‘out of place’ situation as young women living without 
male/family protection, and the connections made between their single working status and 
sexual activity, promiscuity and disease” (1998:989-990). Thus, a common theme in my 
interviews in Thailand was the degree to which contesting leadership positions requires 
union women to subject themselves to intense scrutiny about their personal lives. It is not 
immediately clear why such scrutiny did not feature in my interviews with union women in 
Indonesia. The position of some of them as heads of women’s and children’s departments 
may have offered some measure of legitimacy and protection, though others may have 
considered allusions and allegations about their sexual behaviour so commonplace or trivial 
that they were not worth remarking upon.
Because of cultural expectations that women become mothers and because of union 
women’s class positions (in other words, frequently unable to afford paid domestic help), 
men often use women’s childbearing and child rearing responsibilities as an excuse to keep 
them out of union leadership. According to Amin from the Indonesian women workers 
NGO Yasanti, unions select male shop stewards because the male leadership considers 
women too preoccupied with domestic duties. Tao (from the Bangkok plastic wares 
factory) describes how union women who have left their children in the care of a family 
member (often in their rural area of origin), find their inability to care for the child blamed 
on their union participation. Many of their female factory friends and relatives apparently 
believe that these women should spend their free time instead with their child.27 Strangely, 
such criticism does not appear to apply to middle-class working women who leave their 
children in the care of domestic helpers, revealing a class bias that heightens gender 
inequalities.
Being responsible for children also brings with it practical obstacles, according to my 
interviews with women leaders. Wilaiwan, an area union leader working near Bangkok,
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believes that “if women leaders do not have their own family, are still single and have no 
children, they tend to be better problem-solvers ... because they can educate themselves, 
they have time to get training or improve their own ability” . She concludes that such 
women without attachment “tend to be a better leader than men”. In effect then, women 
union activists and leaders who do not live up to these ideals are doubly faulted: for not 
being good union activists and for falling short o f societal ideals of motherhood and 
domestic happiness. Sofiati, the president of the wood workers federation in Indonesia, 
reflects this realisation when she complains that “women are clearly easily faulted for what 
they do, and are belittled [by men] ... if  women are not twice as good and working twice as 
hard as men, they will not be given a chance to compete for leadership positions, due to the
29patriarchal culture around them”.
But women themselves also uphold gender stereotypes that they have internalised, as Pik, a 
former textile worker now working with a Bangkok labour NGO, recounts:
I think our weakness is that we still believe in [traditional] gender roles. We as workers still 
believe that our leader must be a man. We still have the old impression about the aggressive 
style of struggle led by male leaders. It takes a lot of understanding to see that women can 
be good leaders too.30
Whether and how women leaders might be different from their male colleagues will be 
analysed in Chapters Six and Seven. But the reproduction o f gender stereotypes and gender 
inequalities by women themselves extends to personal and family issues. For example, 
Sulistri in Jakarta is reluctant to ask her husband to share in family responsibilities that are 
traditionally seen as women’s domain, although in practice she and other leaders with 
children have no choice but to rely somewhat on their husbands, extended family, or (if 
they can afford them) domestic helpers for household support.31 Thus, many women 
activists and leaders find it difficult to implement in their own lives the changes they 
promote with respect to their union’s women members. Suganta from Bangkok concludes:
In my opinion, if you want to be a woman leader you first of all have to have high self- 
confidence and be decisive about what you want to do, but in the same way you have to be 
careful about your image [in terms of sexuality]. For my divorce, Thai society cannot see 
that I dumped my husband but [they say that] he dumped me ... because I am aggressive. I 
do not care about what people think. I am trying to prove that a woman can work on her 
own, without a man ... [but] men cannot accept women as their leader.32
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The above examples reflect the ways in which union women -  both as members and as 
leaders -  experience and contest the male-dominated nature of the union movement which 
reflects the local and global gender division of labour and dominant gender regimes. 
Whereas the women quoted here believe that they have a legitimate reason to engage in 
collective action, their male union colleagues largely dispute this on the basis of their 
understanding of appropriate womanhood and the gender privileges (and power) that this 
entails for them.
Conclusion
In both Indonesia and Thailand, women experience serious obstacles in their efforts to 
become active in trade unions, though independent (regional or area) unions offer a more 
conducive environment than official (nation-wide or sector-affiliated) unions and 
federations. Gender regimes within trade unions and in society in general keep many 
women from developing an interest in trade unions, based on popular beliefs that trade 
unions do not represent women workers’ interests and that women’s rightful place is 
primarily in the private as opposed to the public sphere. As the data presented in this 
chapter show, even when women do become union members, they have little chance of 
breaking through the glass ceiling operating in the mostly male-dominated and male- 
oriented trade unions due to both gender stereotypes about leadership and the precarious 
economic situation of most working women. In this regard, the situation is similar to that of 
trade unions in developed countries in the 1990s before diversity and equality became 
keywords in these unions’ attempts to transform from monolithically class-based to more 
flexible and broad-based social movements. But although trade unions in Thailand and 
Indonesia are perhaps trying to transform themselves to face the threats of globalisation and 
economic restructuring, they have so far shown little inclination to increase the number of 
women among their membership and in their leadership ranks.
The only exceptions to this picture of patriarchal trade union culture are regional and area- 
based trade unions in both countries which are generally small in membership, relatively 
democratic in nature, predominantly female in membership, and of recent origin (after 1998 
in Indonesia and after 1992 in Thailand). Several of these organisations have strong ties 
with NGOs and operate without formal registration, which perhaps also explains their
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relatively greater openness to female leadership. It is in these organisations, and in the 
women’s committees of the large national federations, that most women leaders are located.
Although solidarity among women workers cannot be assumed to arise from a common 
position or common experiences in the production process, the structural obstacles they 
encounter and the patriarchal culture in which they operate imply potential bases for 
solidarity. The union women quoted above indicate that gender roles and expectations of 
women are slowly changing in their societies. Yet, these union women are active in support 
and advocacy groups that have been established by and for women workers, demonstrating 
that they do feel some affinity with other women or commonalities in their struggles. With 
increasing numbers of women leaders in the trade union movement, the visibility of women 
workers’ struggle -  and of the obstacles they encounter -  is gradually growing stronger. As 
a result, union women have embarked on a variety of initiatives to overcome these 
obstacles and to increase women’s participation and representation in trade unions. These 
initiatives are analysed in Chapters Six and Seven.
This chapter has argued that unequal gender relations are continually reproduced through 
hegemonic gender regimes and that these continue to be serious obstacles to organising 
among women workers. Yet, women workers also challenge such gender regimes through 
their practices and through counter-hegemonic discourses. Can we predict the strength and 
success of such challenges based on analysis of gender regimes and gender relations in the 
two countries? While this chapter has found many similarities between the two countries in 
terms of the obstacles facing women in unions, it is worthwhile re-emphasising some of the 
differences in gender relations and gender regimes in relation to labour.
Whereas Thai women have traditionally been active in a variety of economic sectors, in 
Indonesia the legacy of state ideology defining women as mothers and wives is still 
relatively strong. In Thailand, women’s large-scale entry into the urban formal labour 
market occurred earlier than in Indonesia and has weakened strict gender norms with 
respect to sexuality and marriage more extensively than has been observed in urban 
Indonesia. Yet, recent political changes have led to a sharp increase in the number and in 
the scope of activities of women’s organisations in Indonesia, and the percentage of women 
in formal political positions is higher in Indonesia than in Thailand, thus potentially
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offering sources of support for women workers’ activism. In terms of gender regimes, then, 
one might expect to see more public activism by women (workers) in Thailand, whereas the 
political environment on the other hand might seem more conducive to women’s activism 
in Indonesia. Yet, what may strongly influence women workers is the strength of 
hegemonic gender identity (common motherhood) in Indonesia in contrast to the absence of 
one such hegemonic identity in Thailand, as a result of the interaction between gender and 
other forms of hierarchy. In conclusion, it is difficult to predict on the basis of an analysis 
and comparison of gender regimes and gender relations the extent and success of women 
workers’ collective mobilising and organising. The next two chapters will explore the 
cultural meanings, uses, and potential politicisation of the diverse identities that women 
bring to the process of unionisation and to the organisational settings of their activism.
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Chapter 6 - Collective mobilisation of women workers in
Thailand
Introduction
As described in Chapter Two, the 1990s saw a gradual merging of behavioural and 
structural perspectives in social movement theories, just at a time when some observers 
argued that traditional interest-based social movements were being replaced by those built 
on identities whose study appeared to require an all-together new approach. Tarrow’s 
model of contentious action (1998) recognised the importance of social networks as a basis 
for collective action and of the existing political opportunity structure as a trigger for 
mobilisation. Other social movement analysts added factors such as transnational advocacy 
networks’ use of language and values that cross borders (Keck and Sikkink 1998); 
emotions and contestations around their meaning (Taylor 1995, 2000); and the importance 
of taking a life-cycle approach (Roth 2000) while reaffirming the importance of framing of 
issues and demands.
Simultaneously, analysts of so-called new social movements have called attention to the 
processes whereby such movements create and give meaning to collective identities, 
whether they be legitimising identity, resistance identity, or project identity (Castells 
1997:7-8). The main aim of new social movement theories has been to divert attention 
away from static conceptions of interest as the basis for movement towards the construction 
of collective identity that organises meaning for social actors. Based on these theories, 
Chapter Two argued that attempts to explain mobilisation and self-organisation by women 
workers in developing countries would be best served by examining their investments in 
collective identity. This would require an analysis of the (re-)construction of collective 
identity, the meanings and social goals it takes on, possible contestations of this identity by 
other groups, as well as its projection (through framing and emotions) to adversaries. 
Because women workers unite in the face of gender differences between women and men, 
as well as differences between women, Chapter Two suggested that the identities they act 
upon vary according to political, economic, historical, and cultural context.
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Chapters Three to Five compared elements of these contexts in relation to Thailand and 
Indonesia and found that differences not only in labour regulation but also in gender 
regimes in these respective societies possibly shaped the ability of women workers to 
mobilise and organise collectively. This chapter describes how Thai women workers have 
contested and used particular local and global identities related to gender and work. 
Although women workers experience multiple subject positions and therefore do not all 
experience the same processes of mobilisation, this chapter demonstrates how mobilisation 
of women workers is strongly shaped by a society’s dominant gender regimes and the 
justification for women’s political and organisational representation that these regimes 
provide. Where women workers build solidarity and construct a common purpose with the 
aim of collective action, they build on the identities available to them in their societies but 
contest these and perhaps give them a different meaning. Whether the category ‘women’ or 
‘women workers’ is regarded as a political interest group worthy of representation will 
strongly influence the process and outcomes of mobilisation. This influence of identity 
shows us the extent to which women’s collective mobilisation is embedded in local and 
global but ever-changing gender regimes.
This chapter presents findings from research conducted in and around Bangkok. The first 
section gives a short background on the women workers’ organisations encountered in 
Bangkok. This is followed by an examination of women workers’ mobilising, structured 
around the four factors Tarrow describes as being essential for social movements. The first 
concerns mounting collective challenges: the political opportunity structure and repertoires 
of contention. Because the issues raised by women workers are a central aspect of their 
collective movement, they require a separate section for discussion. The next section 
discusses how Thai women union leaders and activists attempt to construct a common 
purpose through creating boundaries based on dominant gender regimes. Tarrow’s property 
of building solidarity subsequently leads to issue framing. Lastly, the chapter reviews how 
Thai women workers sustain their movement through coalitions with other movements, in 
which the question whether to affiliate with national federations or to engage in separate 
organising becomes central.
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For each of these properties, this chapter questions whether women workers consider 
gender or class identity as ‘seriality’ or whether they act upon it by mobilising and 
organising collectively. It finds that union women mobilise women workers on the basis of 
a workers’ identity more often than a gender identity. However, as gender difference is 
situational (Connell 2002:13), many union women opt for tactical expressions of gender 
identity and at times utilise its multiple meanings for mobilising depending on context, aim, 
and interlocutor. The heterogeneity of Thai women workers means that not all of them 
regard gender as ‘seriality’ and that many of them consider gender and class interests to be 
intertwined. Thus, the sometimes contradictory and changing ways in which these women 
workers mobilise and organise collectively demonstrate the centrality of gender and 
economic regimes in the construction and contestation of women workers’ collective 
identity.
Women workers’ organisations
As Chapters Four and Five demonstrated, Thai women workers have been organising 
collectively in trade unions and in informal associations for decades, especially in the light 
manufacturing sector. They have been members of state-owned enterprise unions, industrial 
factory-based unions, area groups, home-based workers’ groups, and self-help groups in 
both rural and urban areas. But their marginalised position in society and the labour market, 
together with unions’ inability or unwillingness to defend women workers’ rights mean that 
many more cannot or do not want to join trade unions. Ostensibly to address these obstacles 
and to struggle for women workers’ rights, some Thai and Indonesian women workers’ 
activists during the 1980s and 1990s began to establish workers’ organisations that assist 
either existing women mid-level leaders or women who would like to learn about trade 
unionism.
Among the informal or formal organisations in Thailand that have sprung up to unite 
formal-sector women workers and to represent their interests, two organisations stand out 
because of their membership numbers and/or the continuity and nature of their activities. 
They also offer a good opportunity to contrast an activist group oriented towards women 
leaders with a grassroots-focused group that aims to unionise women workers. The Women 
Workers Unity Group (WWUG) and the Women Workers Liberation Group (WWLG)
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were established in 1992 and 1993 respectively in Bangkok and its surrounding industrial 
areas where women workers predominate in light manufacturing industries.
According to its pamphlets and newsletters, the WWUG is an advocacy and pressure group 
whose purpose is to increase awareness of women’s issues among female trade union 
members at all levels. This increased awareness aims to make women workers understand 
and solve their own problems, and to increase women leaders’ ability to play a key role in 
the labour movement and to stimulate policy reform. Meeting approximately once every 
two months, its membership consists of women leaders and committee members of some 
nine major federations and sectoral unions who attend in their personal capacity rather than 
as representatives of organised labour. Most are from private enterprises in the industrial 
manufacturing sector, although several representatives from state-owned enterprises and 
semi-professional sectors such as education and health also frequently attend. The group 
officially comprises about fifty members, but if counting those who are mobilised but do 
not pay dues this number rises to several hundred.1
The WWLG was established in 1993 by the Center for Labour Information, Services, and 
Training (CLIST), a Bangkok-based NGO. In contrast to the WWUG, it prefers to 
implement activities directly targeted at women workers at the factory level with support 
from its full-time staff at CLIST. Its founder, Somyod, states that organising women 
workers and educating them about class and gender issues are the group’s central 
objectives: “[We aim to] promote gender equality, to mainstream gender in the labour 
movement, and to help protect women’s rights, campaigning against sexual violations and 
harassment in the workplace.”2 After several years of operation, the group ceased to be 
active during the mid-1990s before rebounding, thanks to renewed interest among former 
members and a new coordinator at CLIST. At the time of my research, the group claimed 
about 40 paying members who are not affiliated to any trade union or federation and an 
additional estimated 200 who cannot afford to pay dues or prefer association only, rather 
than membership. Internationally, it collaborates with established women’s NGOs such as 
the Committee of Asian Women and the UK-based Women Working Worldwide, but in its 
domestic activities, it is an autonomous group. The existence of these two groups is 
testimony to the emergence of Thai women as union leaders and activists and to their 
activism both as part of trade unions and in independent organisations. Both women
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workers’ groups were founded with the specific purpose in mind of increasing the 
organisational strength of women union leaders and improving their strategic vision.
Mounting collective challenges
What can we learn about the collective identities of women workers in these two groups if 
we focus on the collective challenges they formulate? This section discusses the processes 
through which women workers have built their own social movement organisations and 
continue to attract attention from members and opponents alike. It considers how changes 
in political opportunities relate to the types of action in which women workers engage. It is 
useful to consider the repertoires of action that women workers undertake in conjunction 
with political and economic circumstances. However, while political opportunity structure 
alerts us to the multiple factors that influence the groups’ choice of strategies, partners and 
actions, it does not explain mobilisation and organisation despite adverse conditions since 
the late 1990s.
Political opportunities
Although women workers had been active in trade unions for several decades, the start of 
their movement dates from the early 1990s when opportunities for organising collectively 
emerged in the wake of democratisation processes in Thailand. When the military coup of 
1991 not only banned unions in the public sector but also curtailed trade unions’ rights in 
the private sector, workers’ activism gained a new focus after years of in-fighting and 
increasing fragmentation (see Chapter Three, p.86). The return to democracy in 1992 
provided workers with another boost when political parties started to woo previously 
neglected groups of voters, including workers, during their election campaigns. It was in 
this setting that the WWUG and the WWLG first emerged on the political scene, although 
many of its individual members had already been active for many years. The WWUG’s 
first collective act (arguably the actual trigger for establishment of the group in 1992) was 
to demand ninety days maternity leave for women working in both the public and private 
sectors. Their campaign clearly benefited from the return to democracy, as it deliberately 
capitalised on efforts by political parties to please voters. When asked to describe factors
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that helped the group in its campaign, Arunee, the group’s first president, captured the 
moment in the following words:
[The campaign] was very successful because we had the same interests [as the public], 
especially during that period after the May 1992 [political] crisis. All the politicians wanted 
to buy ... votes, so that’s why they were very alert and cooperative with any issue that rose
4up.
In addition to the changing political landscape, the emergence of the maternity leave 
campaign also coincided with the favourable economic climate of the early 1990s, when 
women workers seemed to have little difficulty finding jobs in the booming manufacturing 
sector and therefore did not fear dismissal as much as they have done since the mid-1990s. 
The maternity leave campaign was thus launched at a politically and economically 
opportune moment which was critical to the emergence and success of the WWUG: after 
several years of campaigning maternity leave was included in the labour law in 1993.
In contrast, the WWLG did not emerge through a single campaign issue, but was formed by 
women union activists who believed the time to be ripe for women workers to collectively 
pursue their goals. When asked in interviews to describe the origins of their group, activists 
mentioned that informal education classes had, over the course of several years, created a 
network of committed young workers. These men and women spread information about 
labour rights and strategies for protest to other workers in their geographic areas. This 
gradual approach to collective action did not involve a formal organisation until the early 
1990s when sufficient local leadership became available to sustain the transformation of an 
informal network into a formal organisation. Intensive involvement by local women 
workers during significant periods of time meant that this group was not dependent on 
dramatic changes in the political or economic environment for its transformation from 
individual to collective activism.
But if we applied the political opportunity structure model to the development of these two 
women workers’ groups during recent years, an interesting contradiction emerges. The 
economic crisis of the late 1990s presented the Thai labour movement with one of its 
greatest challenges: to sustain membership and activism in the face of unprecedented levels 
of unemployment and dismissals. Three years later, the Thai government under Thaksin 
Shinawatra was transformed from a centralised benefactor into a business-oriented
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government catering to the interests of a “domestic capital class” (Brown 2004: xii) 
combined with populist measures to support the poor. As mentioned in Chapter Three, 
NGO activists and social observers have noted the subsequent narrowing of space for civil 
society, through shifting of government support to conservative organisations and a rise in 
public discourse labelling NGOs as unnecessary and unaccountable intruders. While these 
developments could have provided disincentives for women workers’ activism, the 
experiences of both women workers’ groups suggest the opposite. The WWUG was able to 
continue its activities despite heavy job losses in manufacturing since 1997. Although its 
membership has fluctuated during the past ten years, it did not decrease dramatically during 
or after the economic crisis. The WWLG did not suffer significantly from the economic 
crisis either (though it has remained very small), and expects workers to be radicalised -  
rather than disenchanted -  as a result of the economic crisis. This is primarily attributed to 
strong criticism by NGOs such as CLIST concerning the government’s handling of the 
crisis and its aftermath, in particular the questionable strategies imposed by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).5 But it also bears witness to the resistance that 
negative aspects of globalisation and restructuring can engender among ordinary people, 
even when such resistance puts their jobs and their personal safety at risk.
In conclusion, changes in political opportunities constitute only one of many factors in the 
puzzle of how or why women workers will mobilise collectively despite seemingly adverse 
circumstances. For the WWUG, despite pessimism about possibilities for mobilisation in 
the context of the neo-liberal and anti-trade union Thaksin government and the aftermath of 
the crisis, membership has not decreased significantly, while the WWLG sees these 
developments as stimuli for workers to become active in the labour movement.
Repertoires o f contention
What forms of activism do women workers engage in to mount collective challenges? The 
two organisations discussed here demonstrate the importance of donor relations and 
ideology in determining what “repertoires of contention” (Tarrow 1998) are used. 
However, it also draws attention to the economic realities of Thai workers and the 
organisational structures of these groups (to be discussed later in this chapter).
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In both a technical and a financial sense, the WWUG is loosely affiliated with the German 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), which is in turn an offshoot of the German Social 
Democratic Party. FES focuses on political issues of relevance to workers in developing 
countries, but does not advocate a radical type of unionism where strikes and work 
stoppages are readily employed. Its preference for negotiations and achieving political 
influence is clearly stimulated by global economic developments of the past decade which 
have seen trade unions increasingly unable to use strikes as a weapon. These developments 
include the growing presence of subcontractors with precarious work contracts, the absence 
of legislation protecting striking workers from dismissal, and most importantly the ease 
with which employers are able to shift their labour-intensive production lines to other 
countries when costly labour disputes occur.
The influence of this thinking on the WWUG and its choices of strategies is evident from 
interviews with long-time members. For example, when asked about effective union 
strategies, Suganta from Rangsit (north of Bangkok) states: “I would not suggest any 
protest like stopping our work, until the end of a case. I would try everything possible to 
negotiate with the employer first.” 6 Keeping in mind the need for co-existence of employer 
and worker and recognising the dangers of union activism, the WWUG appears to focus its 
activities on improving skills and knowledge among leaders and shop stewards with several 
years of experience. During its earlier campaign for maternity leave, the group still engaged 
in innovative forms of protest such as staging a march of pregnant women. However, 
almost ten years after its establishment, the WWUG works primarily to increase 
institutionalisation of women workers’ struggles, by negotiating with employers and 
government and avoiding the use of more disruptive or violent means of protest. But as a 
consequence, many potential members have the impression that the WWUG has been co­
opted by the Thai government and therefore is incapable of pushing for the dramatic 
reforms seemingly needed to raise the welfare and living standards of workers.
In sharp contrast, the WWLG practises collective action that is clearly influenced by a 
radical leftist ideology. Somyod Pruksakasemsuk, the head of CLIST who started the 
WWLG, expresses his anti-business sentiments without hesitation. His explanation for the 
need to establish a women’s group rests on radical Marxist (or perhaps Trotskyist) inspired 
ideals of class-based struggle and the urgency of overthrowing a capitalist and patriarchal
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elite that is unable and unwilling to work in the interest of workers. Somyod asserts that 
“Thai capitalists are able to go on golf vacations in other countries, while we assemble 
electronic pieces in the factories as our bosses yell insults like, ‘hurry up, Buffalo, work 
faster! ”’(TLC 2001). He calls on the labour movement to use radical action such as factory 
take-overs, shut-outs and strikes, rather than negotiations with employers that are bound to 
fail and to perpetuate the interests of the ruling class.7
WWLG members are therefore encouraged to compare their wages to the price of the 
products they produce for the export market, leading them to realise that their wages are
o
unfair and motivating them to engage in protests. Although such radical actions are not 
enacted by all WWLG members, they are nevertheless a clear indication of the perspective 
that informs the group’s efforts and the target of its contention (employers). While this 
group was never involved in general public protests like the WWUG, its members have 
ample experience in organising and leading strikes, lock-out action and other forms of 
disruptive protests, as well as more moderate activities such as support for fellow factory 
workers on strike and workers’ education for radical change in the future.
The WWLG aims most of its mobilisation work towards young women workers who may 
already be union members but not leaders and whose knowledge of the labour movement 
and analysis of the causes of poverty and oppression are still minimal. Prospective 
members are approached through discussion about their immediate needs and problems, 
most often related to family, finances, and friendships in and around the factory. Extensive 
discussion of these topics results in a degree of confidence and mutual trust in these study 
groups which allows organisers to broach topics such as global capitalism and labour 
rights, and the connections between these and ‘the personal’.9 Not surprisingly, according 
to my interviews with them, many WWLG members see their position in the production 
process as an indication of the injustices to which marginalised groups are subjected in 
Thailand. Rather than pursuing a strong negotiating position at the institutional level, 
WWLG organisers at the factory level therefore focus on forming new unions or 
strengthening existing unions through training and advice, especially among women 
workers. In carrying out such activities, the WWLG enjoys a relatively independent 
position, since its affiliation is limited to a few small but committed international NGOs (as 
mentioned in Section Two).
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These two trajectories demonstrate that the choice of repertoires of contention may be 
related to the prevailing political and economic environment, but that it cannot be predicted 
by this environment. Instead, it is factors such as ideology, donor relations, and 
organisational structure that configure the potential for mobilisation of women workers in 
Thailand. Clearly, WWUG members are encouraged to educate their peers about the 
importance of negotiations rather than strike, whereas in contrast ideology drives the 
WWLG to take a radical path through disruptive action and alternative means of education. 
In each case, as this chapter will demonstrate, gender identity plays a crucial role.
Collective challenges: Issues for mobilisation
With respect to Thai women’s activism, Varapom Chamsanit argues that because of their 
multiple and urgent basic needs, “grassroots women cannot afford to focus on a single issue 
such as gender equality” (1998:56). Although it could be argued that gender equality is 
never a single issue, does Varapom’s finding also hold for collective, urban industrial 
protest? Are gender issues raised in women workers’ protests and do they provide women 
workers with sufficient motivation to join trade unions? Answering these questions would 
give important insights into whether gender identity motivates women workers to undertake 
collective action.
Practical issues
When we examine the issues raised by the two Thai women workers’ groups, it 
immediately becomes clear that the demands they put forward to the government or to the 
larger public are substantially different from the issues around which union women try to 
mobilise fellow women workers on a day-to-day basis. Among the WWUG, the former in 
2001-3 consisted of four issues: government funding for child care centres in factories, a 
higher proportion of women in decision-making on labour issues, unemployment insurance, 
and an independent occupational safety and health institute for Thai workers.10 The 
WWLG, in contrast, has a more general platform of unionising workers to fight against 
neo-liberal capitalism and globalisation. But when it comes to mobilisation efforts,
186
members of the WWUG and WWLG alike direct most of their attention towards wages, 
working conditions, and industrial relations disputes.
The promise of solving practical problems and improving working conditions usually forms 
the starting-point for union organisers in their appeals to members. For example, Daeng 
from northern Bangkok recounts in an interview with me how her factory’s trade union lost 
many members when she as the union’s president unsuccessfully demanded a salary rise for 
all workers. A few years later, however, she managed to introduce a loan fund for union 
members, leading to a huge influx of new members.11 The importance of addressing urgent 
practical problems is also shown by Theobald (1997) who found women workers in 
Lampang (northern Thailand) mobilising around health hazards. Generally, my interviews 
suggest that when faced with a case of injustice or inequality which has an immediate 
impact on their lives, workers realise that they cannot solve the case as individuals but 
instead need to unite and form a trade union. If presented with new resources or new types 
of support, as in the case of Daeng’s union, workers are evidently willing to sign up for 
union membership.
However, not only wage and health issues but also women’s issues may trigger protests by 
women workers, particularly when they coincide with life-cycle stages that put extra 
demands on them. For example, when asked if her union’s agenda includes women’s 
issues, Tao (from a plastic wares factory) complains that women workers do not see 
women’s issues as their priorities until they are directly confronted with them: “It’s only 
when they get pregnant that they come to us, otherwise they don’t care” about women’s 
issues.12 In another example, Thai Airways women workers in 2001 urged their company to 
institute a policy against sexual harassment and in the early 1990s demanded the same 
retirement age for men and women, but have at other times mobilised around wage issues 
and job security more generally.13 According to Tew, a former factory worker now with 
CLIST and the WWLG, mainstream unions are “just concerned about unemployment 
benefits, they just care about economic issues ... but we have some demands for pregnant 
women” such as provision of child care facilities, child support benefits and leave with pay 
for pregnant workers.14 Thus, women workers appear to agitate around clusters of work and 
gender-related issues rather than single issues. What influences the choice of issues and 
how is this related to collective identities in social movements?
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Given the frequency with which workers mobilise around practical issues, it can perhaps be 
argued that, similar to Australian workers, according MacManus (1997), Thai women 
workers follow a service model of trade unionism, instead of being attracted to collective 
organising based on ideological affinity. Indeed, it is a common complaint by Thai labour 
leaders and observers that if workers are not shown results by the union, they have little 
concern for unity in their union and will not readily pay dues. In the words of Bundit, a 
highly respected labour researcher from the private Arom Pongpangan Foundation: “In 
Thailand, we don’t really have strong ideals for fighting: we don’t have strong workers’ 
consciousness, an ideology of workers.” 15
Yet, perhaps Bundit and his male colleagues overlook a crucial variable that explains why 
many women workers focus on practical issues. Writing about women’s grassroots 
movements worldwide, Kaplan (1997) argues that women are more involved than men in 
practical community action because the gender division of labour assigns them greater 
responsibility for household welfare. This leads them to act for survival and enables them 
to make demands for the benefit of their families and communities. Based on this view, it 
would seem that in accordance with the grievance perspective, women will support and join 
social movement organisations such as trade unions when the survival and well-being of 
their family or community is threatened. In other words, women may organise not (only) 
because of ideological commitment but in order to fulfill their practical gender roles (cf. 
Molyneux 1985). A clear example is the severe environmental threat and damage to their 
sources of livelihood that have compelled women (and men) living in poverty in the 
Northeast of Thailand to join the Assembly of the Poor, an advocacy and lobby network on 
poverty and environment issues (Missingham 2003).16 Another example is the support and 
advocacy group that has been established with help from Bangkok-based NGO Friends of 
Women by women workers from the manufacturing sector who are suffering from 
occupational diseases (CAW 2000; Brown 2001).
Nevertheless, not all union women have personally experienced such threats to their 
practical gender roles and not all women who have experienced them have joined social 
movements. Thus, personal life experiences or grievances alone offer only a partial 
explanation for women workers’ activism in social movements and the identities and
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interests that unite them. Furthermore, Thai unions are not always successful in winning 
concessions for their members, yet despite such failures many still retain their core 
membership. It is therefore likely that union members are motivated by a combination of 
idealism, practical concerns, and identifications that arise from conscious attempts to make 
them feel part o f the movement.
In reality, practical concerns cannot be neatly separated into either gender or work/workers’ 
interests, since work issues necessarily have a gender dimension. Low wages become a 
women’s issue because -  as union women point out to me -  women often carry the main 
financial responsibility for their households. Similarly, the shift to subcontracting affects 
women workers more than men, since women are often (classified as) less skilled and thus 
more easily replaced by temporary workers or asked to continue production from their 
homes (Oxfam 2004a). In response to my question what are women’s issues for her, Tew 
from the WWLG talks about the women she works with:
In their opinion, workers’ problems are women’s issues. They will prioritise the problems 
by themselves. I cannot point out which problem is a woman’s issue and which one a labour 
issue, since some male workers would say that I do not care about workers’ issues. I 
understand that it should go together, solving women’s problems and workers’ problems ... 
But [with an issue like child care centers] we first have to make [the men] understand that it 
is a workers’ issue, not only a women’s problem. Men usually say, why do we have to 
demand child care centers? Mostly they think that this is a family issue, so it has nothing to 
do with the employers. Some men even said, why should employers take responsibility for 
this issue, because they did not make those women workers pregnant! But women can see 
that the family burden links to their work ability, because they have to spend time on 
household work, so they have less time to earn a living.17
Similarly, Pearson and Theobald write of women workers in Northern Thailand:
While [they] express considerable anxiety about the forms of control and sexualized 
management practices in Japanese and American owned factories these workers’ main 
concerns are for their wages and working conditions in the factories, their safety and 
comfort in their dormitories, their homesickness and separation from their families and very 
significantly, the impact of working in electronics factories on their health and reproductive 
futures (1998:989).
Although workers’ issues can thus be interpreted as women’s issues and vice versa, 
mainstream trade unions are not always receptive to this continuum of gender-related needs 
and interests expressed by women workers and its impact on the trade union. For example, 
Somyod of CLIST complains that many male union leaders do not see the connection
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between seemingly non-labour issues such as domestic violence and the union: “Some 
wives got beaten up by their husbands, and they came to the union to ask for help, but the 
union said, just leave that issue alone because it’s not really a union issue.” Instead, he 
and his colleagues argue that it is precisely a labour and union issue because of its impact 
on productivity, on women’s attendance at union activities, and on women’s potential 
capacity for union leadership.
Thus, the issues raised by Thai women workers defy categorisation as either 
women’s/gender interests or workers’ (economic) issues. Rather than single issues, it is 
clusters of practical issues that women workers agitate around, in conjunction with idealism 
and threats to their well-being and livelihoods. However, whether these practical issues 
resonate with movement members and how (and how many) members act on them are 
determined in part by how union leaders and activists construct them to create a common 
purpose.
Mobilising around interests or identity?
If we examine the interpretation and attribution of social problems put forward by the 
WWUG, we hear at times a distinct affirmation of the need to represent women’s interests, 
but at other times a rejection of using women’s separate interests as a mobilising strategy. 
WWUG members do not project consensus about whether or when to utilise women’s 
interests as a mobilising strategy.
As mentioned earlier, there are indeed recognisable women’s demands that could give rise 
to sufficient feelings of injustice to result in collective mobilisation. The WWUG mobilised 
thousands of women workers around the need for maternity leave, and tried to do the same 
with the need for child care during its 2001-2002 campaigns. But consider Wilaiwan, the 
current president of the WWUG, who in an interview with me states that there is no need to 
bring up any separate women’s issues on May Day, because men and women “are all 
workers.” The WWUG is therefore “concerned about every type of labour issue, and not 
only about women’s issues.” When asked how she wants to be remembered, she responds: 
“as a worker who has fought for the rights and well-being of other workers and for the good 
of society.”19 However, on a different occasion she states that:
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Women have more burden than men ... We have to look at the root of women’s problems 
... Those issues that we worked in the past are workers’ issues, but right now we aim to 
focus on women’s issues. We are a women’s group so we have to focus more on our issues 
Because we are workers and we are a big group in society, we need to have our own 
representative ... We women workers have been violated sexually all the time, but nobody 
can speak out for us.20
Wilaiwan is by no means exceptional in her refusal to valorise women’s interests as the 
primary means of mobilisation. Wanpen, a former WWUG president, states that there are 
no specific problems for women workers, and that the focus of the group’s work should be 
on strengthening the labour movement as a whole, since all of the workers are concerned 
about rising unemployment.21 A fifty-seven-year old female member of the (majority 
female) Thai Krieng Durable factory union told me more generally: “I take part in this 
strike action [against our dismissal] because I fight for our own rights and benefits as 
workers, and for the next generation to have better rights.” Thus, although the WWUG 
unites women workers and at times highlights women’s superior leadership qualities and 
women’s life experiences in order to stimulate mass mobilisation, it often refuses to base its 
mobilisation efforts on the notion of distinct women’s interests. This situation raises 
questions about the meanings ascribed by the WWUG to the term ‘women.’
One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that in times of declining strength, the 
trade union movement makes it difficult for these women workers to claim an active voice 
based on a politicised gender identity. To do so would mean firstly to be accused of adding 
to the fragmentation of the movement. Secondly, this pressure to appear in consensus about 
the goal of the movement also informs the naming of women activists themselves. 
Certainly, most women activists would consider the label ‘feminist’ to be damaging to their 
reputations, hence the framing of issues as being in the general interest. For example, 
although (or perhaps because) she is arguably the most senior woman in the union 
movement, Arunee does not want to call herself a feminist, since this would be interpreted 
as fighting only for women’s rights. To the contrary, she professes: “I am a real worker, 
that is in my blood.” 23 Similarly, Tew from the WWLG says, “the goal is not only for 
women workers, the goal is to liberate the workers in general ... if you choose only the 
women’s issues, some men are going to claim discrimination.” 24
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The intense pressure to avoid internal conflicts and increase the effectiveness of the labour 
movement as a whole are significant reasons for the legitimacy accorded to union women if 
they mobilise workers around a workers’ -  rather than a gender -  identity. Chantana, a 
trade union activist in northern Bangkok working for an ACILS project on child care 
centres, recognises this dilemma. When asked if she defines herself as a feminist, she 
replies: “I personally want to fight for the workers in general, but in some part I want to 
emphasise only the women’s issues, because I am a woman, so I see the trouble we face.”25 
It is likely that these union women are aware of the importance of their legitimacy as 
workers, as they try to gain access to decision-making structures. Although they do not 
sacrifice women’s or gender issues to further their own goals, they do appear to adjust their 
mobilisation strategies according to the likely response from male union leadership.
Thus, context and audience influence how union women frame and name their issues. 
When trying to expand factory-based membership and to appeal for collective action, they 
speak about gender inequality and respond to women’s complaints, for example about 
maternity leave or child care. Yet, among leaders and activists, women workers’ interests 
are not privileged and instead are articulated as the same as men’s. Indeed, a clear majority 
of the women leaders and activists interviewed for this research want to be recognised by 
society as workers’ activists and do not claim an active voice as women per se. Rather than 
indicating an acceptance of hegemonic discourse that privileges men’s interests or a lack of 
gender consciousness, this refusal to privilege women’s interests perhaps points to the 
difficulties facing union women in balancing women’s and worker identities at institutional 
and leadership levels.
Such navigating between identities and interests brings us back to Jonasdottir’s and 
Phillips’ arguments (see pp.62-66) that women’s interests in a political sense can be 
conceptualised as consisting of ‘being among’ those making decisions (the form aspect or 
‘politics of presence’) and of particular, expressed needs (the content aspect). Mobilisation 
of women workers into trade unions in Thailand appears to aim for recognition and is 
largely based on achieving a ‘politics of presence’. In other words, union women construct 
feelings of solidarity and common purpose among women workers so that their numerical 
strength, rather than their particular issues, can persuade trade union leaders to take women 
seriously as leaders and members in the movement.
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By and large, Thai union women appear to expect potential women members to act upon 
their sense of being workers rather than of being women, although they also attempt to 
make a new women worker identity available and relevant. The collective identity 
expressed by these union women has a greater basis in a workers’ identity than in a gender 
identity. Although gender training could help activate gender identity as a meaningful 
platform for collective action, as a few Thai union women stated in interviews with me, 
limited funds mean that NGOs offering such training have only been able to reach a small 
group of union women. Thus, while Thai women workers experience (and express) 
interests both as women and as workers, their membership in the collective of women is 
passive and “defined by routine practices and habits” (Young 1995:110). They therefore 
identify with other women based on common experiences only to a limited extent. In 
contrast, union women experience bonds of solidarity with other workers and being a 
worker is ostensibly “a badge of pride and identity” rather than passive membership in a 
collectivity or “a social facticity about the material conditions of one’s life” (Young 
1995:113).
Although many Thai union women experience gender largely as ‘seriality’ and thus do not 
act upon it collectively as frequently as they act upon their worker identity, gender identity 
is nevertheless important in myriad indirect ways. That women workers frequently do not 
act upon the discrimination they observe and experience as women may be because of their 
reluctance to be identified as feminists or as part of the mainstream women’s movement 
that is often regarded as elitist (see pp. 123-5). It may also be because typically feminine 
qualities are frequently devalued in Thai society or remain unrewarded, as the next section 
will show. Thus, it is worthwhile to examine the various strategies employed by union 
women to build and sustain their movement for further insights concerning the importance 
of identity in women workers’ mobilising.
Drawing on common purpose
Women union leaders and activists must be capable of attracting movement members and 
supporters, for membership distinguishes individual protest from sustained, contentious 
action on a large scale with an oppositional goal. Tarrow writes that “it is in struggle that
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people discover which values they share, as well as what divides them” (1998:122), 
although this process is by no means an automatic outcome of mounting collective 
challenges. How do women workers employ the above-mentioned practical issues to create 
resonance with potential and actual members? The process of transforming the emotions 
and feelings at the root of people’s willingness to act collectively into recognition of 
common goals shows specific characteristics for women and involves identities, yet does 
not necessarily involve appeals or challenges to gender identity.
Emotions
Interviews with activists in the greater Bangkok area show that women workers’ motivation 
to engage in activism arises from sources as diverse as life-cycle events, family situation, 
and personal political opinions. This heterogeneity in motivation is a reminder of the 
different social and economic locations of women workers. Yet, one common factor 
articulated by these union women is their strong emotional engagement in relation to the 
issues at stake, whether these are economic, political, or social. As Taylor asserts with 
reference to the American lesbian movement, emotions are the “site for articulating the 
links between cultural ideas, structural inequality, and individual action” (1995:227). 
Similarly, the WWUG and the WWLG turn emotions into concrete motivation for activism 
by women workers.
Emotions may emerge from the personality of movement members, as argued by the 
dispositional perspective of social movement theory. For example, Daeng, a local union 
leader in the northern industrial areas of Bangkok in her thirties, describes herself as “a 
crazy woman who wants to fight”, a trait she has shown since her teenage years.27 She 
joined the union because she saw a connection between her own disposition and the union’s 
fight for better working conditions. Women activists and leaders like Daeng are attracted to 
the union because of strongly held ideals which may range from general perceptions of 
justice (or more frequently questioning the occurrence of injustice) to dreams of a society 
characterised by gender equality. Individuals imbued since childhood with such strong 
dispositions are more likely than those without such dispositions to search for a place 
where they can contribute to a larger struggle (Snow and McAdam 2000). The women
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workers’ movement thus becomes a place that gives positive meaning to their identity as a 
fighter.
Others are stimulated into action by the injustices they experience or observe around them, 
which somewhat corresponds to the classical ‘grievance’ perspective in social movement 
theory. For example, Oy, a former union leader in a textile factory, became so enraged by 
her employer’s frequent and blatant disregard of labour laws that she joined the union. 
Similarly, Suganta from the northern outskirts of Bangkok strives for a better and fairer 
world through trade union activism, a claim that was repeated by many other union 
women.29 As noted Thai academic Pasuk has observed with respect to Thai social 
movements more generally, these women workers mobilise around “universally acceptable 
concepts” (2002:16) such as social justice and fairness in order to explain their activism and 
get others involved.
Thus, in the majority of cases the strong feelings that union women bring to their activism 
are predicated on general concepts and dispositions rather than a particular gender identity. 
This use of “universally applicable concepts” has also been noted by academic Pasuk 
Phongpaichit in relation to Thai social movements (see p.115). An exception are the few 
women workers who were stimulated to engage in social activism because of traditional 
feelings of obligation and “repayment of merit.” For example, Tao from Bangkok “feel[s] 
more worth” because as a union member she is “working for others” while at the same time 
“getting more money” for her relatives.30 Other women union leaders mention that their 
social standing in their immediate surroundings has increased as a result of their activism, 
despite initial resistance by parents and friends. Since women have fewer opportunities than 
men to gain spiritual merit because they are denied the chance to become monks (or a fully- 
fledged equivalent), some have turned to social justice work to satisfy their need for merit. 
Still, while these feelings are brought on by a particular gender identity (of women who are 
socialised to feel good about serving others), only very few women mentioned them in my 
interviews as their motivation for involvement in trade unions.
Few women workers interviewed for this research explicitly declare having strong 
emotions about gender equality. Yet, does this mean that women workers care little about 
unequal gender relations in and outside the workplace? The possibility that women workers
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choose not to speak about gender inequality as their motivation for collective action, for 
fear o f being labelled ‘feminist’ or trespassing boundaries of what is culturally acceptable, 
was noted earlier. Because the previous section demonstrated that women workers in 
practice agitate around a combination o f w orkplace) and gender issues, perhaps Thai 
women workers consider gender inequality to be part of a broader system of hierarchy.31 It 
is worthwhile repeating Van Esterik’s observation:
The rigidity that appears on the surface of Thai gender interactions is permeated by asexual 
power differentials that form the basis of gender hierarchies as of other hierarchies. What is 
fixed is the importance of power in all relationships, not sexual orientation ... Hierarchy is 
more important than gender in this and other situations. That is, gender signifies in 
combination with power (1999:280).
Thus, although women workers are perhaps different from their male colleagues in being 
motivated by strong emotions, gender is not necessarily central in these emotions. Rather, 
these emotions are stimulated by a concern for social justice and human rights and as such 
consider gender inequality in close relation to other inequalities in Thai society.
Group construction and recognition
In the face of persistent hostility and distrust from many male union leaders, how do 
women workers create feelings of togetherness among the women they try to mobilise? If, 
as Tarrow (1998) suggests, group recognition -  both among members and by the wider 
public -  is one o f the crucial properties o f social movements, then we need to ask how it is 
constructed and what role subjectivities and identity play in this process. Taylor and 
Whittier (1992) and Taylor (1995) argue that creating boundaries and distinctions between 
in-group and outsiders is an important strategy to heighten collective identification by 
members and to increase feelings o f belonging, When we consider how women union 
leaders and activists create boundaries to distinguish their members and to build feelings of 
common purpose, a potential link between common purpose and identity emerges. Among 
women from both the industrial and service sector unions, creating boundaries occurs on a 
regular basis through a lively and widespread discourse extolling women’s qualities as 
trade unionists. This discourse not only reinforces these women’s conviction that they are 
needed (and have a legitimate place) in the wider union movement, but also justifies 
organising as women and with other women. In the process, they navigate precariously and
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carve out a niche between a dominant gender identity of women as inferior and not 
belonging in the public sphere, and workers’ (and union) identity that is decidedly 
masculine and often linked to violence and unrest.
Though at times they may constitute signs of the performative aspects of identity, women’s 
superior qualities as trade unionists -  and often also as human beings in general -  are 
evidently felt based on the answers by many Thai union women to questions about the 
differences between male and female union leaders. Their statements encompassed a range 
of qualities: women are more honest than men, less aggressive and therefore more capable 
of planning and coordinating, better at listening to members and responding to their needs, 
and more persistent than male trade unionists. Daeng, a union leader from an animal feed 
factory, believes that “men have less sense of responsibility: they just love to socialise and 
drink.” 32 Sanae, a former worker and now a member of the Young Christian Workers/ 3 
considers that although “men are more decisive, get to the point and make decisions”, 
“women leaders have more understanding of the situation and of the problem, and they do 
not only see money and financial issues; they see the problem in detail, they see the health 
issues, and they are concerned about the condition of the workplace.” 34
On account of their persistence, their dedication to their tasks, and their more intimate 
relations with workers, women leaders are said to be better able to attract members. 
According to labour organiser Bandith from the Bangkok-based NGO Friends of Women 
(FoW) who works with industrial women workers around Bangkok and in the South, there 
are generally stronger feelings of solidarity among women than among men, because 
women are more willing to sacrifice and stick together. Such skills are of wider 
importance for the union movement. Numerous women interviewed for this research stated 
that the effectiveness of negotiations with management -  traditionally one of the most 
important union activities -  improved with the presence of women in the team. From 
seeking quick deals with management to stubbornly refusing to compromise on relatively 
trivial matters, most women union leaders could readily recount examples of men failing 
their unions during negotiations. Finally, these women considered women generally to be 
better at solving problems because they tend to examine the issues from various angles, 
including based on their own experiences outside their workplace.
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The allegedly superior qualities of women union leaders extend to the issue of corruption. 
Former WWUG president Arunee states that women workers are more honest:
I have seen so many male leaders being bribed but I have never heard of women leaders 
accepting bribes. If male leaders are offered money, they will be selfish and receive it. They 
will think that the owner does not like them anyway, so why not take the money and leave? 
They do not consider the members who are waiting outside the negotiation room.36
Bandith from FoW sees women’s diverging concept of power as the reason for these 
differences: while groups of male workers may initially be strong in terms of organisation, 
men’s quest for individual power and their greater involvement or interest in politics causes 
many of these groups to succumb to bribery. In contrast, women are said not to search for 
power for themselves, because they have less pride.
Whether these qualities really exist and if so, what causes them is difficult to say with 
certainty. Thai women are certainly socialised to be polite and acquiescent, and to control 
their emotions, and these skills can be used in negotiations to mask their strong 
determination with conciliatory gestures (Van Esterik 1999). Arunee, the former president 
of the WWUG and the Thai Krieng factory union, recounts her successful experiences in 
negotiating with her former employer. In the early 1990s, the female members of the 
negotiation team in the Thai Krieng garment factory decided to approach the elderly 
Chinese owner of the factory like “daughters asking their father for more money ... That 
changed the [atmosphere of the] meeting and changed the negotiations, it became easier
'y o
and better.” It thus appears that union women may employ a number of gendered 
characteristics or tactics that society assigns to them, when they expect it to work to their 
advantage. In the process, they also create boundaries and define who belongs to the 
movement.
Such differentiation between women and men does not necessarily constitute 
essentialisation of women’s identity. Women workers’ social support networks, as well as 
women activists’ own experiences in daily life, in particular their efforts to combine often 
heavy household responsibilities with union activism, enable them to understand and have 
empathy for the situation of other women in their workplace. Recognizing the link between 
what are widely perceived to be ‘just women’s issues,’ such as the need for child care or 
reproductive health, and working conditions or quality of work, these women activists are
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well placed to respond to women’s concerns. Men, on the other hand, are frequently 
accused by women activists of overlooking such linkages and refusing to acknowledge, for 
example, employers’ shared responsibility for child care facilities or the impact of women’s 
household burden on their work productivity.
It is also possible that women leaders develop such problem-solving skills and commitment 
through their long experience with juggling multiple tasks in the household, the workplace, 
and the community. Alternatively, arguably only the strongest and most capable women 
make it to the higher echelons of the union structure, thereby potentially skewing the 
general picture of Thai union women. Whichever is the case, this discourse of female 
superiority shows that group recognition by members is built on values that are considered 
typically female and/or assigned to women by substantial sections of Thai society.
Introducing these values to trade unions constitutes a useful means to create a sense of 
belonging for women, and to create a justification for women’s activism in trade unions. 
Daeng (from the animal feed factory in Rangsit) offers a glimpse of how such discourse of 
women’s leadership qualities contributes to solidarity among women. While men may think 
they are smarter than women and that women “should keep quiet and be listeners,” She 
says that the women themselves demonstrate that such qualities will work to women’s 
advantage in mobilising other women and addressing women’s personal problems. Thus, 
these union women play up women’s traditional gender roles as caretaker of the family and 
household, as financial manager, and as pillar of support for the family. By making the 
skills of negotiation and planning, which are so often honed in the household, relevant to 
the trade union setting, women union leaders encourage women workers to feel part of an 
exclusive group and to contribute to society and the social good. Through articulation of a 
distinctly new women worker identity, they aim to give these women a voice in the labour 
movement, thereby creating possibilities for re-envisioning union activism in Thailand, 
distinct from its current association with corruption, co-optation, and general 
ineffectiveness.
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Building solidarity
Group cohesion and the success of collective action depend in part on solidarity between 
members. Social movement leaders must therefore not only tap into emotions and feelings 
of group membership but also construct and employ meanings that will resonate with 
movement members. In all of these actions, there is a clear distinction between efforts to 
mobilise ever greater numbers of women workers into the movement organisations, and 
attempts to improve women union leaders’ position vis-ä-vis male leaders. But in both 
these ‘internal’ and ‘outward’ mobilisation efforts Thai women workers’ groups must take 
account of dominant gender identities and workers’ identities. The following examples of 
framing show how women workers at times make selective use of dominant gender 
identities and at other times challenge gender and/or economic regimes. Such efforts may 
involve influential actors such as academics, and may employ international human rights 
language.
Framing
In Tarrow’s words, framing refers to the process o f “inscribing grievances in overall frames 
that identify an injustice, attribute the responsibility for it to others, and propose solutions 
to it is a central activity of social movements” (1998:111). How has the WWUG framed its 
issues over the years? With reference to the WWUG’s maternity leave campaign, former 
president and union leader Arunee observes that “the three most important parts to make 
any campaign successful are the topic, the presentation and the public having a joint 
benefit.”40 If this is the case, then perceptions of women’s interests in Thai society and 
economy can explain a great deal about the presentation of issues, in other words, the 
frames used by women union leaders and activists to legitimise their campaigns and to 
attract supporters. Women workers use frames to construct meaning about events and 
situations, but in doing so are tied in various ways to gender identity and gender roles. How 
do they position themselves in relation to dominant gender and economic regimes as 
described in Chapters Four and Five, and (how) can they utilise these regimes to generate 
new meanings?
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If we contrast the early WWUG campaign on maternity leave with the group’s more recent 
demands for child care centres, the importance of considering framing in the context of 
gender and economic regimes becomes clear. The campaign on maternity leave during the 
late 1980s and early 1990s clearly benefited from the non-threatening nature of the issue, 
which was widely seen as a right befitting all ‘proper’ (i.e. married) women. The 
involvement of doctors, female civil servants, and academics in the public debates on the 
need for maternity leave emphasised the serious nature of the issue, and their alliance with 
women workers strengthened the impression that women workers were ‘respectful women.’ 
Moreover, it was important to represent maternity leave as a public benefit, rather than an 
individual right. As Wanpen, a former WWUG president puts it, “how important it is to 
breast-feed children, that’s what all the employers cannot argue about ... we focus on the 
children, the better quality [of life] of the child.”41 In interviews for this research, several 
union women involved in the campaign stressed that if they had advocated for maternity 
leave as an individual right, they would have risked the withdrawal of such a right during 
times of economic hardship or its denial for women deemed ‘not deserving’ (such as 
unmarried mothers or women from low-income backgrounds having a large number of 
children).
The equally public nature of the demand for child care centres is underlined by Jaded, a 
labour activist from Friends of Women:
I see this issue as a follow-up to our campaign on maternity leave ... We have to show the 
public that it is a societal benefit, not an individual but a public interest issue ... If there is 
no daycare, what will happen to the children?42
Clearly, by portraying this as a public issue, Jaded hopes to draw more attention from all 
sectors of society in a similar way as was done in the maternity leave campaign. He 
highlights his strategy of putting forward generally phrased demands for the labour 
movement such as child care centres or expansion of the social security system, which will 
facilitate the formation of a broad-based labour coalition but will especially benefit women 
workers.
Similarly, Wilaiwan (the current WWUG president) positions child care within a broader 
concern about the future of Thai society:
201
[Child care] is also society’s problem ... Children without parents will grow up to be 
aggressive and will become social problems later. If sent up-country, they will not pay 
respect to their parents, that will destroy the family culture ... and they will be a social 
burden for this society ... Actually the labour movement should prioritize this issue as well, 
since this is a woman’s issue and most of the workers are women. If women workers have 
the centre to take care of their children, this will benefit the children, the workers in general, 
and the union’s work. After we won maternity leave, we started to think about the next step 
of new-born babies. Babies need a guardian but their mothers need to go to work. If babies 
are sent up-country, it is not good for their physical and psychological health. They need 
milk from their mother at least one year ... [If they breastfeed] the children will not be 
aggressive, they will have a good brain, they will have a good relationship with their 
parents.43
However, it can be argued that the WWUG is perhaps not successful in its demand for child 
care centres as a result o f the new economic regime that now dominates. This regime is 
characterised by the centrality of neo-liberal economic policies in Thailand that 
paradoxically advocate individual responsibility while counting on families to support 
unemployed or dismissed workers and workers’ dependents. As feminists have pointed out 
elsewhere (Brodie 1994; Marchand and Runyan 2000), this economic regime is gendered, 
as it assumes amongst other things a gender division o f labour in which women engage in 
unpaid caring work. Thus, the articulation and naming o f particular injustices and 
grievances take place against the backdrop o f particular societal and economic norms and 
values pertaining to women’s and m en’s roles and responsibilities.
The case of dismissed Thai Krieng (Durable) factory workers provides another clear 
example of the complexities o f framing in the context o f gender and workers’ identities. 
The language used on the Thai Labour Campaign website to document the struggle of the 
Thai Krieng Union is remarkable for its use o f gender ‘imagery’. The background 
information about the case emphasises repeatedly that the women workers fired without 
compensation are ‘middle-aged’ and have no employment options left due to blacklisting, 
though many still have to support their families:
One of the things that the company underestimates is the tight relationships of these women 
workers. Most are over 40 years old and 30% are single. Considering that many of these 
workers have been working for Thai Durable Textile for more than 20 years, seeing each 
other every day and sleeping in the same quarters, the company is like a home to them and 
the union like family. They have sacrificed many of their life’s opportunities for the 
company’s growth. Many have not been able to get married due to working 12 hours a day 
for twenty years in a mostly female environment. It is difficult to have the energy to go out 
and socialize after long strenuous work days (TLC 2001).
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This personalised discourse of suffering fits well with cultural expectations presented in 
Chapter Five, according to which women will sacrifice their own happiness to repay their 
debt of gratitude to their parents and, by extension, equally to their employers for the 
economic benefits obtained through their employment. Yet in this case it has become a 
source of strength in the face of labour oppression: “It is due to these life sacrifices that 
workers have made, their close friendship to each other, and their belief in work with 
dignity and fairness, and the understanding of the importance of the Thai Krieng Union in 
the Thai labour movement that they continue their struggle” (TLC 2001). Similarly, some 
of the Thai Krieng Union members during their strike called for support from the larger 
public in the name of their families. One woman who had worked for twenty-nine years 
with the factory appealed by saying: “Please think of our children. Because it was not only 
us who face the impact [of the dismissal] but it also involves our children” (TLC 2001, 
report on press conference held on 29 September 2000).
This NGO’s efforts at legitimising women workers’ demands correspond clearly with 
dominant Thai cultural notions of appropriate womanhood that should be rewarded with 
justice and kindness, rather than oppression and exploitation.44 The WWUG, on the other 
hand, attempted to increase the appeal of maternity leave and child care by describing them 
as public rather than private issues, thus challenging traditional notions of motherhood as a 
private responsibility. A very different example is provided by current WWUG president 
Wilaiwan who argues that women should become more active in decision-making. 
However, she promotes this idea not on the basis of women’s special needs, but through the 
use of national and international language on gender equality:
I think [the need for women’s representation] is not hard to explain since we can see so 
much discrimination against women. We can make claims based on the [1997] 
constitutional law and also many international conventions. We can say this is an issue of 
gender equality.45
Thus, as Keck and Sikkink (1998) have pointed out, concepts and language concerning 
human rights and gender that circulate transnationally can help local groups to frame their 
issues in socially acceptable ways or can help increase the legitimacy of demands.
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These cases show that, while “the ‘text’ of movement messages relates to the context of 
interests and conflicts in play” (Tarrow 1998:107) it also relates to dominant economic and 
gender regimes at the local, national, and international level. When women workers feel 
unable to challenge these dominant regimes, they may choose to co-opt the identities that 
flow from them and use them strategically for their own benefit, as has been shown by 
feminists with regard to motherhood in Latin America in particular (Radcliffe 1993).
Sustaining the movement
Once a movement has been established, has gained recognition from members and 
opponents alike, and has found and selected issues that compel large numbers to undertake 
contentious collective action, the challenge becomes how to keep this momentum going. 
Tarrow writes:
It is only by sustaining collective action against antagonists that a contentious episode 
becomes a social movement. Common purposes, collective identities, and identifiable 
challenges help movements to do this; but unless they can maintain their challenge, they 
will either evaporate into the kind of individualistic resentment that James Scott calls 
‘resistance’ (1985), harden into intellectual or religious sects, or retreat into isolation 
(Tarrow 1998:3).
Although organisational structure is also of importance in generating solidarity, I discuss it 
here because the current choice facing Thai union women -  between autonomy and 
affiliation -  reflects one of the most challenging aspects of sustaining their movement. The 
ongoing debate regarding the advantages and disadvantages of organisational autonomy 
versus affiliation with mainstream unions can tell us much about how women workers look 
at themselves, their movement, and other social movements. In discussing their options, 
union women (especially those from the WWUG) show clearly how they are constrained 
but at the same time guided by their identity as women and as workers.
Autonomy or affiliation?
At the time of its establishment, gender interests were clearly on the minds of the women 
leaders who initiated the WWUG. Organising around the demand for maternity leave in the 
formal sector meant that the alliance crossed class divisions, with women factory workers 
participating side by side with public servants and seeking advice from medical experts,
204
academics, and lawyers. The choice of demand and the language used to articulate it 
highlighted women’s roles as responsible mothers and their role in ensuring a healthy and 
successful society. Judging by the large number of women workers mobilised in street 
rallies and protests, the campaign struck a cord among women factory workers and 
motivated them to act on their identity as women and as workers.
In 2002 -  a decade later -  the WWUG broadened its demands by including two general 
workers’ issues: the establishment of an independent occupational safety and health (OSH) 
institute and unemployment insurance for dismissed workers. While these issues are very 
relevant for Thai women workers and have a clear gender angle, in their speeches and 
media statements WWUG leaders portray these as general workers’ issues rather than 
gender and workers’ issues. In contrast, the other two issues more directly concern gender 
equality: the establishment of child care centres and measures to increase the participation 
of women in leadership and decision-making. WWUG leaders thus appear to be reticent 
about pointing out the gender dimensions of their demands and to be intent on emphasising 
that their organisation is concerned with workers’ issues.46
This broadening of demands and the integrated nature of women’s and workers’ issues 
remind us that the WWUG perhaps does not consider itself as a women’s organisation at all 
or in the same way that outsiders and observers might do. Women do not necessarily form a 
predetermined constituency, and groups or organisations that outsiders might see as 
women’s groups, might not name themselves as such for a variety of reasons. Yet through 
its very name, the WWUG identifies itself as a women’s group, and as such it is worthwhile 
examining what this means both in theory and in practice according to its members.
The current debates about the organisational structure of the WWUG offer useful insights 
into how its members think about themselves and their organisation. Because the 
organisation is affiliated with national trade union federations and members participate in 
WWUG meetings in their capacity as federation officials or members, many members 
express confusion about the organisation’s purpose. Does it champion workers’ rights in 
general or women workers’ rights? Or are the two actually one and the same? 
Organisational structure thus becomes a stage where differences over principles and 
objectives are discussed.
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On the one hand, many union women suspect that women in decision-making in unions or 
elsewhere will not necessarily be sensitive to the concerns o f other women. Unless they 
also receive gender training, these women will only conform to the patriarchal leadership 
environment, since trade unions are based on a top-down hierarchical system that requires 
women to adapt to the environment and structure. When asked if an increase of women in 
high-level positions in the labour movement would lead to discussion o f different issues, 
one male union organiser from Friends of Women, which funds the WWUG, questions at 
what level the WWUG should target its assistance. He replies:
We see that the National Labour Congresses [peak union bodies] are male dominated. Even 
if we have some women in the Congresses, they cannot yet make any changes now. What I 
am worried about is whether it is useful or necessary to have women at the Congress level. 
Maybe it is better if [the WWUG] focuses on women who work at the grassroots level ... 
The women who are working in the Congresses do not have a clear understanding about 
gender or women’s issues. If they are not clear about what they want to present or what 
they stand for, they are too weak to resist the Congress system.47
When asked if  trade unions respond better to complaints of sexual violence if  there are 
more women members and leaders, former WWUG president Arunee similarly cautions:
I do not say that all women are good and all men are bad. There are exceptions ... Being a 
woman does not mean that a female leader knows about gender issues ... women leaders 
should have some type of gender training, otherwise they are going to think like men.48
Speaking about autonomous, women-only groups, she warns:
If women do not have a clear idea about gender, they may be used by men ... People say 
we have more women involved in politics but it will be useless if those women are not 
thinking about women’s issues, like women in minorities or the prostitution issue.49
In other words, WWUG efforts to increase the number o f women union leaders could 
possibly contribute to union women’s claims to decision-making based on their right to ‘be 
among’, but would not necessarily lead to discussion of any particular women’s interests 
(the ‘content’ aspect).
A contrasting approach is taken by Suganta, the president o f an area union group and a 
WWUG member, who makes gender identity central in her efforts to mobilise women at
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the local union level. Her focus is on strengthening women’s factory-level leadership but at 
the same time transforming it so as to benefit other women workers through greater gender 
sensitivity (in other words, focus on the ‘content’ aspect). Such a push from below will 
probably not have immediate effects on the Thai union movement, but it increases the 
potential for transformative union politics in the long run. This strategy at the time of the 
research was under consideration by several WWUG members (and already being 
implemented by the WWLG).
Suganta’s approach raises the question which women and whose interests the women 
workers’ movement aims to represent and with what justification it does so. The above 
discussion shows that some prefer to focus on workers’ issues in general, while others 
support a particular focus on women workers. During the WWUG’s 2002 annual meeting, 
these difficulties became increasingly clear. One former president of the group opined that 
“we started to solve women’s problems in general; now ... we should focus on women 
workers’ demands, but their main problems are workers’ problems.”50 Meanwhile, another 
senior member of the WWUG objected: “We need cooperation among women workers’ 
groups; that should be our focus, because it is clearer than general issues. ‘Women 
generally’ is too broad.’01 The request for WWUG membership by a Thai man in 2003 
exacerbated these disagreements, with some women emphasising the need to remain a 
women-only group while others believed the WWUG to be ready to start cooperating more 
with male workers.
The WWUG has no easy solution to these basic difficulties of determining the direction of 
the organisation. On the one hand, women workers’ reluctance to add to the fragmentation 
of the labour movement encourages them to remain affiliated with mainstream trade 
unions. Former WWUG president Arunee recounts that the WWUG decided against a 
separate national labour congress with only women members: “As a labour group, we 
should get together all male and female workers, all together. We should not discriminate 
against men, because they are labour too.”52 While this has made the WWUG less 
vulnerable to criticism by mainstream male union leaders and has likely increased its 
leaders’ influence in the labour movement as a whole, this strategy has perhaps weakened 
the WWUG’s capacity of offering a viable alternative to the unions.
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On the other hand, mainstream Thai trade unions have often proved ineffective in solving 
problems experienced by women workers, such as those related to reproductive rights, 
sexual violence, and discrimination based on gender stereotypes. Many WWUG members 
in my interviews with them express awareness of these issues and of the need for trade 
unions to address these problems. In what is perhaps a sign of the group’s success at 
balancing women’s and workers’ issues and identities, the 2004 International Women’s 
Day rally organised by the WWUG focused on a variety of issues, including assistance to 
HIV/AIDS sufferers and the unemployed, community-based daycare centres, revision of 
laws pertaining to women, the initiation of a campaign calling for a law on domestic 
violence, and an end to discrimination against women in the workplace (Bangkok Post 9 
March 2004).
Thus, affiliation and autonomy each have specific advantages and disadvantages for 
WWUG members. Although the WWUG remains affiliated to mainstream unions and its 
members attend in their capacity as union members, their demands vary with their 
willingness to be closely associated with the trade union movement. To some extent the 
future direction taken by the WWUG will be influenced not so much by its mobilising 
potential towards women workers, but by the coalitions and networks in which the WWUG 
engages.
Coalitions and networks
If over time, social movements diffuse into society and become institutionalised to a point 
where their original goals have become forgotten or have changed, then one of the major 
challenges of successful social movements is to balance the need for adequate 
organisational infrastructure with the autonomy (or freedom) required to launch strategic 
forms of action which can mobilise members. These members are often from submerged 
networks who are part of a movement’s constituency (Melucci 1988) but may also be from 
like-minded groups with whom a movement can build alliances around particular issues to 
expand its membership (Tarrow 1998:134). A central element in achieving this balance is 
for social movements to develop a degree of formal organisation while simultaneously 
maintaining informal ties with other groups that share similar goals.
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The WWUG may not lack grass-roots supporters for large-scale events, but few of its 
members pay dues and attend meetings regularly. In this sense, the WWUG is compelled to 
seek alliances with social movement or movement organisations to promote its goals. 
Which organisations it approaches provides useful insights into the identities around which 
WWUG members mobilise and organise collectively.
Although a women’s movement has been active in parts of Thailand since at least the 1930s 
(see p.123), women’s groups have so far not been able to mobilise on a scale seen 
frequently in Western countries and in South Korea, India, and the Philippines. Some 
observers of the Thai women’s movement consider class divisions as the paramount cause 
for this anomaly. According to Cook (1998) and Jeffrey (2002), class cleavages to a
significant degree shape agendas and influence which issues are termed problematic and
53which are not, and how they are presented.
Similarly, Sanitsuda Ekachai, Assistant Editor of the English-language daily Bangkok Post, 
in my interview with her, notes that the dependence of middle-class Thai women on the 
system of inequality to maintain their own socio-economic position, and their implication 
in the oppression of women factory workers and domestic workers, make it extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, for the Thai women’s movement to support the labour 
movement in a genuine and concrete manner.54 Women’s movement observer Dr 
Chalidapom Songsamphan of Thammasat University in my interview with her furthermore 
states that “the older pioneers of the women’s movement have a condescending attitude 
towards other women, such as sex workers, agricultural workers, and lower-class women; 
they do not listen to these women.”55 Thus, class identity impacts on the dominant 
perception by the Thai women’s movement of labour issues.
In fact, Sanitsuda in my interview urges observers and academics not to blame women 
workers for what they have not been able to do, but instead to turn their attention towards 
those who should be collaborating with women workers because of similar gender interests. 
Such potential collaboration, however, depends very much on whether women can discern 
similarities as women and with which women in their community or society. Because most 
union women have publicly affiliated themselves with the labour movement (through their 
organisations), women’s NGOs often do not see a coalescence of gender identity and
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interests with union women. The organisations belonging to the Thai women’s movement, 
in turn, have frequently prioritised issues with little immediate relevance for women 
workers, such as women’s right to keep their maiden name after marriage, legislation on 
sex work, and the formal guarantee of gender equality in the 1997 Thai constitution. While 
not denying the importance of these issues for all Thai women, my interviews with women 
trade unionists show that they consider these issues much less crucial to their own lives 
than wages, working conditions, and substantial and practical legal protection. Some 
women trade union leaders furthermore complained to me about the treatment they had 
received from upper- and middle-class Thai women’s activists which ranged from being 
used for purposes of publicity to being utterly ignored during public events.56 Not 
surprisingly, as a result many union women turn for mutual support and collaboration in 
collective action to the labour movement with which they share common concerns and feel 
more affinity, despite the hindrances many experience at the hands of male leaders.
Despite misgivings about power differentials,57 union women increasingly collaborate with 
labour NGOs. One area in which union women engage in such a coalition concerns the 
informal economy where women face dire circumstances in the face of cost-cutting 
measures resulting from economic crisis and globalisation. Many older women from 
garment and textile factories who had been laid-off during the past five years, have taken 
up subcontracting or manufacturing the same items at home that they used to make in the 
factory, but without the same level of wages or benefits. Recognising the resulting decrease 
in membership and the clear continuum between factory workers and home-based workers, 
the WWUG in 2002 made protection for informal workers its fourth agenda point.58 As 
such, it works with HomeNet, a Bangkok-based NGO for informal and home-based 
workers, as well as directly with women from communities near industrial parks. WWUG 
president Wilaiwan’s rationale for this new focus shows that the interconnected nature of 
women’s and work issues is an important reason for this new collaboration:
We see [the informal economy] as one of our group’s problems too, because we usually see 
that most of these workers are women. Most of them got fired because they got old. One of 
our demands is to include those informal workers in the union. We try to support those 
workers to have welfare according to the labour law. Because we are women, this is one of 
our problems. We know that normally women have a burden of taking care of their family 
more than men. Women care more about the well-being of family members. If they are 
unemployed it will make the burden too much for them.59
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Such attempts to promote protection for informal workers is one example of the new 
networks that women workers are trying to build, based on a shared identity as women and 
as workers. The common purpose behind such action is clear: “to point out that if we do not 
help those workers to have protection, in the future we will be laid off and the owner will 
only hire those workers without providing any welfare ... and we will be one of them.”60 
This example shows that, for Thai union women, establishing and utilising a network of 
informal connective structures is a function of the collective identity on which these women 
have built their organisations, in this case a particular identity as women workers and as 
members of working-class communities. This is similar to Beckwith’s finding that female 
coalminers and the wives of coalminers during a particular strike were “externally 
identified as ‘women’ but identified themselves as “members of striking families and of 
working-class communities” (Beckwith 1998:151). With respect to the main Thai women’s 
movement, in contrast, union women do not perceive a shared identity as women that could 
form the basis for a coalition.
Conclusion
The two women workers’ groups that have emerged in recent years in and around Bangkok 
provide insights into efforts by union women in urban formal sector workplaces to mobilise 
and organise collectively. In their interactions with women workers, many union women 
focus on practical issues, recognising that women workers may be most preoccupied about 
questions of survival and redistribution. In their dealings with government and employers, 
on the other hand, union women raise distinct gender interests in both recognition and 
redistribution, such as the need for child care centres and for greater involvement of women 
workers in labour-related decision-making. Field work findings show clearly that the choice 
and framing of these issues depends strongly on political and economic circumstances at 
each particular point in time. Issue framing is therefore tactical and situational for these 
union women.
For them, gender and work interests are closely intertwined. In their mobilising efforts, 
union women therefore navigate carefully between emphasising gender identity and worker 
identity or a broader identity as members of working-class communities. They often 
motivate women workers to join unions by pointing out the contributions they can make
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through their special skills and characteristics, and include several gender interests among 
their demands. But at the same time, many union women refuse to valorise gender interests 
and gender identity as the primary means of mobilisation.
Although workers’ identity becomes central in many mobilising efforts, this does not imply 
that union women do not challenge dominant gender identities in Thai society. In fact, they 
continuously do so through their activism in the public sphere as leaders and as organisers. 
It is worth recalling here, as mentioned in Chapter Three, that other relations of power 
overlay seemingly egalitarian relations between the sexes in Thailand, creating “multiple 
contested gender statuses and ideologies rather than of a single system” (Van Esterik 
1999:276). Hierarchies based on class, age, education, and rural or urban background come 
to mind here. It is therefore likely that Thai union women do not conceptualise their 
organisations as women’s groups based on common characteristics as women, but rather 
see gender and class together as defining their identity and leading to “self-conscious bonds 
of solidarity” (Young 1995:113). In other words, union women find their gender identity 
sufficiently meaningful to become a platform for collective action demanding recognition 
as a group (and therefore accept external characterisation as women) but only in 
conjunction with other relations of power that they experience in the workplace, in the 
community, and at home.
In their quest for increased representation of women and women’s perspectives in trade 
unions, the union women interviewed for this research draw on a variety of interests and 
identities to legitimise their presence. Class divisions have evidently hindered the formation 
of alliances with women’s organisations, whereas a common worker identity has 
encouraged linkages between women workers and groups such as the urban poor, workers 
suffering occupational diseases, and farmers. Given the strength of dominant gender and 
economic regimes that entail individual responsibility for welfare and income-earning for 
both men and women, union women may also have experienced that challenges to 
dominant gender identity and efforts to produce more equitable gender relations have been 
relatively unsuccessful. This shows how the particular forms and expressions of mobilising 
and organising among union women in Thailand are contingent on the constellations of 
power produced by gender and economic regimes, as well as other axes of power that affect 
women workers. For many Thai union women, gender may be no more than ‘seriality’
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whereas class, together with age and education differences, may lead to specific and shared 
attributes that can provoke mobilisation and organisation.
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Chapter 7 - Collective mobilisation of women workers in
Indonesia
Introduction
The previous chapter suggested that Thai union women navigate precariously between 
affiliation and identification with the labour movement and an urge to address women’s 
issues and thus mobilise women workers into alternative collective action. Although Thai 
union women recognised gender interests and saw these as intertwined with their workers’ 
interests, they largely experienced gender as ‘seriality’ (Young 1995). In other words, they 
did not act collectively upon their gender identity and were more frequently motivated by 
an identity as workers or as women workers to undertake protests against employers, the 
government, or male trade union leaders. As women, they therefore appeared to claim 
proportional participation and representation in unions based on the similarity of their 
interests as workers and their contributions as workers rather than on any specific gender 
interests. This points to the importance of understanding local and global gender and 
economic regimes that combine to produce particular power relations. As such, these 
regimes force union women to formulate situational responses to suit particular audiences 
in their struggle to mobilise women and to increase women’s participation and 
representation in public fora.
This chapter presents findings from Indonesia, with the aim of comparing the experience of 
union women in the two countries. While there are many similarities in economic and 
industrial development, the countries’ countries’ historical, political, cultural, and religious 
differences mean that women workers approach self-organisation and representation in very 
different ways, under different circumstances, and through different partnerships. Can the 
gender and industrial relations regimes in the two countries explain the differences in the 
ways in which Indonesian and Thai women workers build and manage their movements? 
This chapter will argue that many Indonesian union women tend to recognise and act upon 
gender interests that encompass both women’s and workers’ issues. Since Indonesian 
society often perceives women’s needs and demands to be intrinsically different from 
men’s, women workers have argued this requires greater participation and representation by
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women in leadership and governance in a wide variety of institutions. This gives union 
women scope to frame their demands as both women’s and workers’ issues.
Similar to Chapter Six, this chapter starts by offering a brief background of the 
organisational context of women workers’ organising in Indonesia and the women workers’ 
organisations whose members were interviewed for this research. The chapter focuses on 
leaders and activists from the Forum of Women Leaders and Activists in the greater Jakarta 
area, but also gives examples from union women in Surabaya, Yogjakarta, Semarang 
(Unggaran), and Medan. The chapter continues to structure its discussion of union women’s 
mobilising and organising around Tarrow’s four properties of social movements. It closes 
with a discussion of the debate on quotas in politics and in trade unions, to highlight the 
significance of the New Order gender regime and its continuing influence on how union 
women contest and act upon collective identities.
Women workers’ organising
Chapter Five noted how in recent years a new generation of women entered into mid-level 
management positions in progressive Indonesian trade unions such as FNPBI, SBSI, and 
several regional independent unions. While not large in number compared to the 
predominantly male leadership of then existing trade unions, this new cohort together with 
NGO activists took advantage of international support and pressure to argue for the 
establishment of women’s departments and bureaux. As a result of their advocacy, between 
1998 and 2002 almost all large trade union federations (SBSI, SPSI-Reformasi, FARKES, 
PAR, KPI etc) dedicated space (and in some cases a budget) for women’s activities. 
Activists from these women’ departments and bureaux also took advantage of this overseas 
support, the climate of political change in the late 1990s and the greater freedom for trade 
unions and political organisations, to establish in 2001 the Indonesian Forum of Women 
Leaders and Activists (hereafter called the Forum).
With assistance from the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS), the 
international arm of the AFL-CIO trade union federation in the United States, this Forum 
has evolved to become the main organisation by and for women workers in Indonesia. The 
group consists of over 200 women members, of whom some 30 meet regularly in Jakarta
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and are engaged in training, education, and lobbying activities as well as public protests; 
the remainder live mostly in and around Jakarta, although the group is trying to expand its 
base beyond the capital, with associate members in Medan (North Sumatra), Semarang 
(Central Java), Yogjakarta, Solo (Central Java), and Surabaya (East Java). Although most 
members come from large national federations, several dozens come from the education 
and advocacy departments of smaller local unions. As evident from pamphlets and public 
speeches, the Forum sees its role as advocating for gender equality in trade unions and 
stimulating women’s leadership. Its members state that their main activities concern 
training and education programmes for women union members, ranging from new members 
to heads of women’s departments and officials in central union committees. The group also 
engages in advocacy, for example writing letters to relevant international organisations and 
Indonesian ministries, to promote policy change in the fields of labour and women’s issues.
The results of an informal survey I carried out in 2003 confirmed that a clear majority of 
Forum members and sympathisers (those women workers who were invited to the 
conference but who were not yet officially members) have become active in trade unions 
since 1998.1 This concentration of new activists is explained by the fact that many veteran 
union women are members of the SPSI or SPSI-Reformasi, which were not invited to join 
in the Forum due to their (perceived) conservative nature and collusion with the 
government. The largest proportion of Forum members comes from the textile, garment, 
and footwear sector, which is also the largest industrial sector in terms of women’s 
employment in Indonesia. Many other members are from the pharmaceutical and health 
industry, the metal and electronics sector, and the service sector, with the remainder from 
the chemical, seafarers’ and construction sectors. The absence from the Forum of the 
banking sector is discussed in more detail later in this chapter in relation to union women’s 
alliances beyond sector and type of work.
My survey revealed that the majority of Forum members who are workers have higher 
vocational or technical education while several have specialised (post-high school) 
diplomas. Those who work as full-time union organisers more frequently are well- 
educated, middle-class women who have a university degree, and this at times sets them 
apart from the women workers in the Forum. The majority of Forum members are between 
25 and 35 years old and not married; this may be because the obstacles faced by married
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women are too great (hence few married women can be active in the Forum) or because the 
Forum members perhaps have less interest in marriage or have not found a suitable partner 
who will allow them to continue their activism after marriage.
Forum members occupy diverse positions in their trade unions. According to my survey, 
the largest proportion are shop stewards at the workplace level who work full-time but take 
on regular union tasks such as negotiating the collective bargaining agreement, handling 
cases and complaints, and sustaining the organisation at the factory or office level. A 
number of these shop stewards also hold positions in the central or provincial leadership 
committees of their federation, while a small proportion are full-time union workers at the 
central leadership level. Between 20 and 25 per cent of Fomm members are regular trade 
union members without any leadership position. It is important to take note of the fact that 
a large number of Fomm members are in workplaces where women constitute a majority, 
but where the trade union committee is dominated numerically by men. For most Fomm 
members, the head of their enterprise union or federation is a man. It is in this context of 
male-dominated trade unions that the Forum has been carrying out its education and 
advocacy work since around 2000.
Aside from the above-mentioned informal survey and interviews with Fomm members, this 
chapter also builds on writings by Indonesian women activists and NGOs and on interviews 
with union women in a network of regional trade union federations that is active throughout 
industrial centres in Indonesia. This Syndicate of the Indonesian Labour Movement was 
founded in 1998 and consists of Yasanti, a women workers’ NGO in Yogjakarta, and 
regional federations or informal groupings located in Medan, the greater Jakarta area, 
Semarang, Surabaya, and Makassar. While it is not officially a women’s organisation, the 
majority of its members and leaders are women.
One of its member organisations, the Independent Medan Trade Union (SMBI), was 
founded in 2001 through the merger of four local workers’ groups and has some 2000 
members in furniture, seafood, and plastics factories. The Regional Trade Union of 
Surabaya (SBR) was started in the mid-1990s and similarly was formalised after 
Indonesia’s recognition of freedom of association in 1998. Both groups consist mostly of 
women workers, and leadership positions are dominated by women, according to my
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interviewees. This is also the case in the Inter-Factory Learning Group (KPAP), an 
independent, self-funded, informal group in the Unggaran industrial area near Semarang, 
made up of a few dozen women from thirteen factories in the area (including several home- 
based workers), whose aim is to educate women workers about their right to organise. 
Members share a commitment to peace and labour solidarity, labour struggle, and gender 
equality. While not an official federation, the syndicate is an informal network that hopes in 
the future to become a progressive labour movement with activities throughout Indonesia. 
For now, the network concentrates on facilitating information sharing and attempts to 
streamline the approaches of each member.
What is unique about the Syndicate is its active commitment not only to labour struggle but 
to the overall democratisation and development of the country. Because of this goal, the 
Syndicate tries to overcome the divisions that have been created by decision-makers and 
rulers between workers and farmers, fishing folk, and students, and between white-collar 
and blue-collar workers. Most of its member organisations do not receive funding from any 
outside organisation, instead relying on membership dues and voluntary contributions from 
friends and local supporters. While this limits the reach of activities carried out by the 
member organisations, it also provides them with flexibility and independence in terms of 
deciding their priorities and strategies. As will become clear in this chapter, Syndicate 
member organisations have as a result of this independence and their local focus developed 
different approaches to women’s mobilisation than the Jakarta-based Forum.
Mounting collective challenges
The previous chapter suggested that although shifts in the political environment (regarding 
systems, parties, and elites) could explain many aspects of a movement’s emergence and 
decline, it did not adequately account for mobilising in political and economic 
circumstances considered adverse for collective action. The case of Indonesia shows the 
same argument in reverse: changes in political opportunities resulted in what could be 
considered opportune circumstances for social movements, yet in many localities and 
among many groups of workers large-scale mobilisation did not materialise. Thus, 
grievances, idealism, and a social movement’s internal politics are additional factors to be 
considered in explaining members’ motivation for contentious collective action.
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Nevertheless, this section will show that political and economic circumstances can 
significantly influence the repertoires of contention that Indonesian union women employ 
in their collective struggles against the state and business interests.
Political opportunities
As previously noted, for almost three decades the New Order government did not allow 
independent organising outside the state-sanctioned trade union federation. In order to 
further its business interests, the government structured its industrial relations system after 
the national Pancasila state ideology. Employ er-worker relations were portrayed as family 
relations and dispute settlement was aimed at consensus rather than allowing for open 
conflict (Ford 2001). As a result, workers became not only depoliticised at a personal level 
but also politically neutralised as a movement. It was in this context that Saptari (1995) 
noted that rural women workers in the cigarette industry in East Java were not interested in 
organising collectively through unions. Even where urban workers displayed increasing 
tendencies towards labour militancy, these tendencies could not be institutionalised through 
trade unions and thus were channeled into short-lived wildcat strikes (Hadiz 1997). After 
the fall of the New Order regime in 1998, however, the political and legal reforms and the 
rapid increase in the number of trade unions led many union activists to expect a surge in 
labour activism by both women and men. To what extent do these circumstances explain 
the emergence of the Forum for Women Leaders and Activists in 2001 and the Syndicate of 
the Indonesian Labour Movement in 1998?
If regarded from a legal and organisational perspective, the establishment of both these 
organisations owes much to the increasing freedom to establish workers’ organisations after 
May 1998. Improved ability among workers to communicate with each other, labour 
NGOs, and overseas trade unions through the advent of free press and the Internet also 
contributed to the rise of new workers’ groups. As well, the perceived success of student 
protests in ousting the New Order regime may have increased expectations among workers 
concerning the ability of civil society organisations to influence national and local politics, 
including on labour issues. Thus, the emergence of these two women workers’ groups 
reflects in many ways workers’ response to rapid changes in political, legal, and financial 
resources.
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If, however, we look beyond the emergence of women workers into the union movement 
and consider the nature of their organisations, their expressions of discontent, and their 
general growth, changes in political opportunities appear to have less explanatory power. 
As will be shown later in this chapter, at least several women workers’ organisations lack 
formal registration (either as trade unions or as charitable organisations). This could be due 
either to the particular types of organising preferred among women and resistance from 
male trade union leaders or to any perceived difficulties in registration and dangers of 
repression by employers and the state. Furthermore, the economic crisis is a major threat to 
workers’ organising throughout Southeast Asia, because of the risk of job loss and the 
decreasing numbers of formal sector workers that have the potential to organise (Hadiz 
2002). Leaders of the Forum and the Syndicate, however, revealed in interviews with me 
that this did not become a major obstacle to their efforts to expand and sustain membership. 
In this respect, the limitations of political opportunity structure in explaining the particular 
form and expression of women workers’ protest become evident.
Repertoires o f contention
An examination of the types of action in which Indonesian women workers engage must 
take into account the difference between contentious actions by workers (who are 
sometimes union members) in or near the workplace and action by union members, leaders, 
or activists in other locations. While strikes are a relatively new phenomenon for many 
Indonesian workers (Kämmen 1997), the economic crisis in the late 1990s has seen their 
number decrease even further (by 20 per cent in 1998-2002 compared to the preceding five 
years according to Quinn [2003:50]). Yet, this still translates into an average of more than 
200 strikes per year since 1998. The print media also frequently reports workers’ 
involvement in street rallies or marches to local government offices where workers hope to 
meet with legislators or law enforcement officials to demand immediate intervention in 
labour disputes. Smyth and Grijns mention, furthermore, with regard to women workers, 
‘‘the display of posters; singing and dancing; banging on doors or equipment; refusing to 
work; and sit-downs or sleep-ins at the offices of the local Department of Manpower” 
(1997:20).
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Contentious action by workers is therefore diverse and changes with political and economic 
circumstances. Women workers throughout industrialised areas are no different from men 
in this respect, frequently joining and leading strikes and marches despite disapproval from 
family and friends and regardless of affiliation with a union. Union leaders and activists, in 
contrast, tend to have developed experience in a wider array of actions, as a result of their 
longer engagement in labour activism, their association and collaboration with NGOs, and 
their access to information and funding from overseas. Their repertoire of contention covers 
marches to government offices, actions to attract public attention, petitions demanding 
access to and negotiations with decision-makers, and performances of workers’ theatre.
As in Thailand, the ideological leanings of advisors and sponsors at times leave a strong 
imprint on workers’ organisations and their repertoires of contention. In the case of the 
Forum, its funding relationship with ACILS leads its members to focus on practical and 
feasible activities with mid-level activists and leaders, such as training on labour rights, 
negotiation, and lobbying. According to my interviews with ACILS programme officers, 
ACILS’ preference for educational activities that gradually build the strength of the labour 
movement means that few Forum members advocate strikes, lock-outs, or other relatively 
far-reaching action. ACILS funding appears to have made a significant difference, as it has 
allowed the Forum to focus more on long-term investments in training and education than 
most mainstream trade unions are able to do. Many mainstream trade unions that depend on 
dues -  which are generally low as well as difficult to collect -  have effectively been turned 
into service organisations: members only pay dues when they see results that make it 
worthwhile for them to pay, forcing union leadership to focus on ‘bread and butter issues.’ 
In contrast, the Forum has so far been free to pursue its own goals, without having to rely 
on membership dues or short-term achievements to sustain its membership. How the end of 
ACILS funding in late 2004 will influence the Forum remains to be seen.
Using this relative freedom, the Forum has engaged in popular education to discuss 
political economy issues such as the 2004 national and local elections, the country’s 
international debt through IMF loans, and Indonesia’s role in the global trade system. 
Participant observation showed that potential Forum members and supporters are 
approached not through participation in standard protest actions for Labour Day and 
International Women’s Day, but rather through training and educational activities.
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According to the Forum’s annual reports, these cover topics such as organising workers, 
lobbying and advocacy vis-ä-vis local government, negotiating with employers, and 
promoting electoral candidates who accommodate women workers’ demands. Those same 
reports indicate that these educational activities have resulted in a clear increase in 
membership, mainly through the selection of younger and less experienced union women as 
participants. Hence, the Forum prioritises improving the skills of mid-level union women 
rather than mass mobilisation of industrial women workers into trade unions.
While financing difficulties play a role in limiting the type of activities union women are 
able to carry out, political and legal considerations also influence their repertoire of 
contention. Recognition of freedom of association in 1998 was followed by an increase in 
the number of trade unions and a shift from internal enterprise regulations to collective 
bargaining agreements between trade unions and employers (though the extent of genuine 
worker participation in these agreements is not always clear) (Quinn 2003:34). Most 
importantly, while workers were previously forced to carry out education efforts out of 
sight and in secret meeting places, they now can do so more or less openly and on a much 
larger scale. Thus, aside from funding limitations, the industrial relations system also 
influences the repertoires of contention available to women workers.
Collective challenge: Issues for mobilisation
Do Indonesian union women, like their Thai counterparts, mobilise largely around clusters 
of issues that are both women’s and workers’ issues? What can their demands tell us about 
the identities around which they mobilise? This section examines whether gender and 
workers’ issues are equally important to motivate women workers to become active in 
unions.
Women workers in Indonesia who organise collectively generally reveal experiences far 
removed from those of the women workers interviewed by Hancock in rural West Java. 
The latter considered their work “fun, a relief from their tedious life in the villages, and a 
far better alternative to outside work” in the rice paddies (Hancock 2000:8). However, 
similar to the situation in Thailand, Indonesian union women recognise that many women 
workers, when faced with a case of injustice or an unsolved labour dispute in their
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workplace, easily shed the above perception of factory work (if they ever had it) and are 
motivated to mobilise in groups. This view is shared by Tjandraningsih (1995:54; 
2000:264-5) based on her research in factories in and around Bandung (West Java). But this 
raises the question, what kinds of cases provide adequate motivation for mobilisation into 
collective action? What meaning do women workers give to the instances of injustice they 
encounter?
As in Thailand, my interviews reveal that collective action in urban industrial Indonesia 
revolves around clusters of workers’ and women-related issues but that the choice of issues 
depends on the audience. Women union leaders frequently protest against gender 
inequalities (such as their double burden and the family obligations that limit their union 
activities), but when they try to mobilise other women they strike a different chord. For 
example, Vera, an activist in the metalworkers’ federation, raises topics as diverse as 
menstruation leave and the position of women in the federation during her monthly 
discussion groups for women workers in the electronics sector. This selection of topics is 
based on her belief that the class struggle waged by workers cannot be successful without 
also fighting simultaneously for gender equality. However, Vera blames opposition from 
the male leadership for her difficulties in trying to raise within the metalworkers’ federation 
any issues that could be construed as women’s issues. But when she approaches new or 
potential members, she focuses on problems that young women workers can easily relate 
to, such as wages and working hours.3
Similarly, Umi from the textile and garment federation asserts that the trade union 
movement in Yogjakarta even takes issues as difficult as intimidation and sexual 
harassment against women seriously as rallying points. In this sense, the movement is 
perhaps influenced by the post-New Order women’s movement which has repeatedly 
emphasised violence against women as a vital area of struggle. But although Umi observes 
that most demands in her sector concern workers’ welfare, allowances, and social security, 
she objects to these demands being called ‘general’ or ‘gender-blind.’ Instead, she cautions 
that “wages are also about discrimination, because especially women frequently earn below 
the minimum wage and are given a lower bonus.”4 In Semarang, two leaders of the Inter- 
Factory Learning Group (KPAP) blame union men for not acknowledging women’s 
problems: “Male union leaders only talk about money, whereas women workers only talk
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about getting rest!” In their eyes, clearly the unequal division of tasks in the household is to 
blame for this gap in perceptions of workers’ needs and demands.5
As in Thailand, union women (and men) therefore agree that women’s issues cannot easily 
be separated from workers’ issues. Sulistri, head of the SBSI women’s department and 
coordinator of the Forum, contends that women “tend to be active because they are 
workers, because the problems hit them in the workplace and those tend to be labour 
problems.” However, they soon experience problems as women in the workplace, be it 
sexual harassment, unequal wages and benefits, differential tax rates, shortcomings in 
maternity leave provisions, or challenges posed by men in the workplace.6 Parto, a male 
activist from SBI-Peijuangan observes that, “if [women workers] do not obey their boss, 
they are first of all blamed by their boss, but secondly also by the wider community; their 
problems must therefore be seen not only as those of workers but also those of women.”7 
Similarly, in Semarang, members of the Inter-Factory Learning Group (KPAP) call 
attention not only to their status as contract workers and their low wages, but also to their 
low public profile as women.8 They explicitly want to be treated equally to men, in the 
sense of not being subject to discrimination and societal prejudices about their capabilities 
and obligations.
How do these findings relate to previous research about the identities around which women 
workers mobilise? In her research during the 1980s on East Javanese women workers in the 
cigarette industry, Saptari found the dominant expressions of protest to be concerned with 
‘bread and butter’ issues such as wages, bonuses, and production levels. This finding led 
her to conclude that unions and union women, to the extent they existed, did not raise 
gender issues such as sexual harassment, job discrimination, and a family wage for women 
(1995:218-20). Saptari notes that “even though consciousness may be about female 
identity, resistance is never really a protest against the denigration of this identity; it is more 
about survival and social justice” (1995:229). Her explanations for this phenomenon centre 
on the marginal but meaningful improvements in status and independence that factory work 
gives these women, the absence of stark contrasts between male and female opportunities 
and benefits, and the perpetuation of differentiation among women themselves.9 Similarly, 
Smyth and Grijns note that “women’s strategies as workers are a response not only to forms 
of labor control but also to gender-related domination” yet they conclude that “women’s
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resistance [in the Javanese context] is not directed against gender-related domination in the 
same way that poor peasants resist the rich and powerful” (1997:16). Thus, previous 
research points to the predominance of ‘bread and butter’ issues as the motivation for 
women workers’ protest.
Whereas Saptari concluded that “resistance is about survival and social justice” and Smyth 
and Grijns asserted that resistance is not directed at gender oppression, my interviews show 
that some Indonesian women workers in a range of workplaces nowadays raise demands 
that can clearly be labeled as women’s issues. For example, the achievements of the Inter- 
Factory Learning Group (KPAP) in Semarang show that when awareness raising takes 
locally identified priorities as its starting point, women workers are very interested in 
discussing gender issues and including them in their collective bargaining agreement. 
According to an activist from the Legal Aid Institute who provides technical assistance and 
advice to the KPAP, the key to attracting women workers to any collective organisation is 
to start from their individual experience as women or men in the workforce and the 
community. Organisers subsequently relate these individual experiences gradually to the 
larger environment of the district, the province, and the country in which they function. 
This enables group members to connect ‘the personal’ such as household and family issues 
to the gender division of labour nationally and globally.10
Since Saptari’s and Smyth and Grijns’ findings are based on research carried out during the 
New Order government and in particular locations, the findings reported here may very 
well reflect greater integration into global markets, regional differences, and a shift over 
time in consciousness and the perceived dangers of organising. The latter can be attributed 
to Reformasi, in particular to greater freedom of association and of speech and the re- 
emergence of independent women’s organisations that use participatory teaching methods 
reminiscent of GERWANI, the progressive women’s organisation of the 1950s and 1960s 
(Wieringa 2002).
Women workers elsewhere in Indonesia also act upon both their gender and workers’ 
identity. For example, Ati, a plant-level activist in an electronics factory in East Jakarta, 
and her female union colleagues state that it is important to identify themselves as workers 
with common experiences. Ati, however, says it is equally important to identify as women,
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but they must seek to be a new type of woman who is not oppressed by men either at home 
or in the workplace. This involves shedding traditional Javanese (and widespread) gender 
roles of obedience, shyness, and acceptance of hierarchy, because these roles are the direct 
opposite of what is expected of union members. Ati is certainly not shy or obedient towards 
either her male colleagues or her managers, and has established an informal women’s group 
within the factory’s union in order to mobilise other women to raise women’s issues.11
This acting upon both gender and workers’ identity is thus evident among women union 
leaders and activists, as it sustains their activism, forges unity amongst them, and shapes 
their internal struggles within their organisations. As in Thailand, such an articulation of 
class and gender is less directly evident in the strategies used by union women to mobilise 
other women. At this level, ‘bread and butter’ issues predominate in the discussions 
organised at the enterprise level, although groups like the KPAP in Semarang consciously 
employ participatory adult learning techniques that use personal experiences as their 
starting point. Discussion and awareness-raising activities by the KPAP and the Forum 
frequently result in a broader definition of women workers’ issues beyond practical gender 
interests.
In conclusion, while Saptari concluded that women workers in the 1980s continued to fit 
their issues into the space allowed to them by the state, the union women quoted above act 
upon their gender and workers’ identity. Some of them also encourage ordinary women 
workers to look beyond practical gender interests. By raising issues such as violence 
against women in the workplace and in the family, they challenge dominant gender notions 
of obedience and of the family and household as personal domains. It is precisely to 
represent women and to defend their practical and strategic gender interests that ordinaiy 
women workers are encouraged to join trade unions or women workers’ groups. Union 
women, however, realise the need to adjust their mobilising strategies to fit with the 
immediate priorities of these women, if they are to build feelings of common purpose and 
solidarity.
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Building common purpose
As noted in Chapter Two, the removal of obstacles to collective action does not 
automatically guarantee that women will join trade unions (Lawrence 1994). In the context 
of Indonesia, the traditional Marxist expectation of collective action arising out of 
commonality of work experiences or position in relations of production runs into trouble 
with regard to women workers. Amongst the reasons pointed out in Chapters Three and 
Four are history particularities (suppression of leftist movements and independent trade 
unionism), culture (acceptance of hierarchy), industrial relations (obstacles to unionisation), 
labour control (deliberate differentiation among women workers), and economic 
development (relatively recent entry into formal work). Even where women workers have 
common experiences as workers which can provide them with “certain dispositions”, this is 
not sufficient to assume the emergence of collective action or to “dictate the types of action 
that come into practice” (Saptari 1995:201). Even if individual women realise that they 
cannot solve a workplace problem on their own, there is still a wide gap between asking a 
friend for help and forming a collective entity to tackle the issue at hand. Thus, in order to 
make the most of workers’ feelings of discontent, union organisers must construct feelings 
of group cohesion, solidarity, and common purpose.
As Chapter Six showed with respect to Thailand, such group cohesion generally does not 
arise without the active involvement of leaders who can channel emotions into productive 
inputs and support, and who can encourage feelings of common identification. Such 
involvement is similarly observed among feminist and many other organisations. Whereas 
the case of Thailand highlighted emotional engagements and the construction and definition 
of the group as two means to build feelings of common purpose, this section concentrates 
on the efforts of union women to reintroduce the concept of collective action for political 
purposes. Whereas Indonesian women union leaders and activists show a relatively high 
level of political awareness, their mobilisation efforts towards women workers require 
awareness raising and education about the potential of collective movement before 
emotional engagements can be put to use for any movement. This difference between the 
two countries results from Indonesia’s history of repression of independent political 
organisations during the New Order regime: while leaders and activists might have been 
encouraged by the recent political changes, most workers remain relatively unaware of the
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possibilities or fearful of reprisals. The section continues by describing the efforts at group 
construction and recognition, which — while similar to those noted in Thailand — take on a 
more culturally influenced character.
Reintroducing collective movement
Collective mobilising by trade unions generally reflects a strongly held belief in the ability 
to change one’s (immediate) environment through large-scale activism. Yet in New Order 
Indonesia, collective organising was for decades subject to government control through 
strict rules of hierarchy and limitations on activities independent of state-sanctioned 
organisations. Thus, NGOs and trade unions are currently faced with the challenge of (re- 
)introducing workers (and society in general) to the possibility and the potential benefits of 
collective action. In many cases, this requires explicit political education about past 
government efforts at suppression of the labour movement and about the role of workers in 
the global capitalist economy.
Indonesian women face the additional difficulty that experience in organising women 
collectively comes mainly from the field of social welfare, due to the destruction of 
independent women’s organisations such as GERWANI after the 1965 transfer of power 
(Wieringa 2002). Social welfare organisations at the local and national level (such as those 
noted in Chapter Five) were carefully controlled by the government. They were used to 
define women as domestic and to channel women’s initiatives and their drive to organise 
towards socially acceptable goals such as family planning, social welfare, and children’s 
education (Sunindyo 1996; Suryakusuma 1996). Furthermore, as Ida Budiarti from the 
Indonesian Women’s Coalition in Semarang relates, “women have never been encouraged 
to think, so we need a long time to make them aware of their needs beyond saving through 
an arisan [rotating communal savings fund] and earning money.” This in fact applies not 
just to women but also to many other sections of the population whom the government 
discouraged from becoming politically active or politically educated. Finally, since women 
are often responsible for management of household income (and for the entire well-being of 
the family), it is not surprising that many are reluctant to risk their livelihood to engage in 
collective action with uncertain outcomes. For many women, therefore, politicised civil 
society organisations are either unknown or regarded with distrust.
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The emergence among women workers of consciousness and knowledge about labour 
activism often requires deliberate efforts by activists to build a common purpose among 
potential movement members. Activists must demonstrate an understanding of the life 
experiences of women workers and of the meanings they give to these experiences. One 
group that has been particularly successful at drawing together women workers through 
feelings of common purpose is the Inter-Factory Learning Group (KPAP) in Semarang.
Dian and Ria, two of the group’s leaders, recount that they have had to win the trust of each 
worker who joined the group by first helping her overcome obstacles related to her role in 
the family and household. This usually involves convincing a worker’s husband of the 
benefits of group membership, followed by a period of responding to the individual needs 
and demands of prospective members. In one case this involved nursing a female worker 
without family back to health after an accident, and in another it required the KPAP to take 
action against domestic violence. “We have a very personal approach,” they say. “We ask 
new members to talk about their personal issues, and we introduce ourselves fully to these 
new members ... At first it is a bit strange but then it gets easier, when the women 
understand their own position as women in the factory.” 14 Now all members are said “to 
have a strong will to learn” from each other. Such strategies are reminiscent of the grass­
roots organising carried out by GERWANI, the progressive women’s organisation affiliated 
to the communist party in the 1950s and 1960s (Wieringa 2002) and perhaps of the feminist 
principle that “the personal is political.”
What do KPAP members expect to gain from unionisation or self-organisation? According 
to Dian and Ria, the main answer is to increase their knowledge in order to help 
themselves. Through discussion groups, KPAP members come to realise that they have few 
career opportunities and face multiple tasks at home, and they are keen to learn more about 
the causes of their common situation. For example, they learn that women are not 
considered for positions involving management or supervision in their factories because 
managers consider women ‘"unable to control other women.”15 But the essence of this 
learning process is that women conclude that they themselves are not to blame for their 
inferior status in the workforce and at home, and that they can change their situation 
through collective action. Through the ability to connect the personal with wider political
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patterns at all levels, women workers are empowered to have a more positive concept of 
self and to view their position in the family, workplace, and society as inter-related. 16
This example of the KPAP shows women union leaders providing incentives and taking 
women’s experiences in daily life as their starting point, because they sense opposition 
among women workers to the concept of collective action. The other regional groups in the 
Syndicate of the Indonesian Labour Movement, and various NGOs throughout Indonesia, 
follow a similar approach of explaining and demonstrating the inter-relatedness of personal 
circumstances with political and economic developments. Through the process of 
discussing and solving small personal issues, women workers learn to recognise their 
common interests as women and as workers, and to translate this into a common purpose
17for their movement.
Had these leaders raised economic interests such as minimum wages or working hours from 
the start, they might not have succeeded in mobilising women workers because of a lack of 
mutual trust among the community (especially towards outsiders). Instead, Dian and Ria 
fostered feelings of common purpose by locating the source of these workers’ problems in 
their identity as workers and as women. These identities are experienced not only directly 
in the household, community, and workplace through the division of labour based on 
gender, age, and economic capacity, but also as they are imposed by others through 
stereotypes and misconceptions. 18 In such a context, women workers’ groups can function 
as safe places where they learn to formulate common goals and strategies for collective 
action both as women and as workers. Thus, the process of building a common purpose 
among women workers not only must be grounded in historical, political, and economic 
contexts, but also must respond to the gender and economic needs of potential participants, 
and in particular their circumstances as women or men in their household and larger 
community.
Group construction and recognition
Part of the creation of a common purpose is the development of a shared definition and a 
common vision of ‘who we are.’ Some sociological approaches to social movements hold 
that membership in a social group will be more meaningful than membership in a social
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category. For example, Stryker argues that “people do not live in categories, they live in 
groups” where their relationships are based on task interdependence rather than 
“interdependence of fate based on shared characteristics” (2000:5). From a feminist 
perspective, Young (1995) has argued for a distinction between passive ‘seriality’ in a 
social collective and group membership with an internalised identity expressed through 
solidarity. With respect to Thailand, it has been argued that, because of a gender regime 
that comparatively speaking “signifies in conjunction with [...] asexual power differentials” 
(Van Esterik 1999:280), many women workers will see womanhood as a category or 
collective in which membership is not chosen and which does not reflect personal 
commitments. Since Thai society promotes feelings of a shared destiny as workers, women 
workers therefore less often claim recognition as women based on gender difference than as 
workers based on class difference. In Indonesia, however, we find clear signals of 
‘interdependence of fate’ between women, meaning that gender is a relatively important 
signifier in the lives of women workers, resulting in claims of gender difference.
Consistent with Saptari’s (1995) finding that women workers are conscious of their female 
identity, most contemporary union women in Indonesia (even those with little exposure to 
gender issues) in my interviews with them readily identified themselves as first and 
foremost women rather than as workers. This is at least partially related to women’s more 
recent entry into large-scale manufacturing employment compared to Thailand and to 
official discourses sanctioning women’s activities as women workers or TKW (Tenaga 
Keija Wanita).19 Where women have entered into paid employment outside the household 
(and country) only during the past one or two decades, as is generally the case among rural 
migrants in industrial areas around large cities, their self-identification as workers is likely 
to be relatively weak. Furthermore, similar to the case of Thailand, identification as worker 
or labourer generally carries negative overtones of coarseness and lack of sophistication 
which many women workers want to escape (as evident in the Indonesian term for blue- 
collar worker, buruh kasar, which literally means ‘rough worker’) (see Chapter Three).
A more important explanation for the difference between Thailand and Indonesia is that 
women workers interviewed for this research in Indonesia frequently refer to a shared 
destiny among women, based on the God-given (defined) nature or role (kodrat) and a 
similar internal spirit (inyawa) shared by all women. Rather than based on common
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oppression and discrimination, instead the New Order normative ideology of ibuism 
defined women first and foremost as mothers and caretakers of the household and used the 
concept of kodrat as a justification (Robinson 1997, 2000). Sofiati from the Indonesian 
Wood Workers Union Federation illustrates the persistent impact of this discourse when in 
my interview she says that as a woman she has to protest the treatment of overseas migrant 
women workers by recruitment and sending agencies and the lack of action by the 
Indonesian government to protect these women.20 Although their educational background 
differs significantly from that of Sofiati, Vera and Haryati, officers of the Central 
Committee of the Metalworkers’ Federation (SPMI) voice similar beliefs. They state that, 
although their priorities and interests could differ, women workers would know and 
recognise their common interest with other women, based on their common spirit 
(nyawa).21 This suggests that women union leaders and activists feel some degree of 
closeness with other women beyond sympathy or pity.
Commentators have linked the existence and wide circulation in Indonesia of a '‘kodrat 
wanita’ (women’s role defined by God’s will) to perceptions in patriarchal cultures in 
Indonesia of a common fate shared by all women and to New Order discourse of common 
womanhood (Tiwon 1996; Robinson 1997). This common fate usually refers to a woman’s 
destiny to become a wife and mother (or her duty to fulfill this obligation to her parents or 
to society), and her ‘natural’ task to raise children and run the household. Meanwhile, her 
husband would ensure the financial aspects of household management (in theory at least). 
As noted before, in reality women’s roles and responsibilities are beset by contradictions. 
Nevertheless, this ideology has perhaps encouraged many Indonesian women to consider 
the category ‘women’ as more than passive ‘seriality.’ Instead, womanhood approaches the 
status of a group and therefore encourages feelings of collective self-identification as 
women.
A practical example of women workers acting on their self-identification as women is 
found in perceptions surrounding menstruation and menstruation leave. Indonesia is one of 
the few Asian countries (not including Thailand) where women workers by law are entitled 
to two days rest during their menstruation. During the revision of the labour law that 
resulted in a new law being passed in February 2003 (Law 13/2003), the Indonesian 
government appeared ready to give in to pressure from the business community to
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withdraw this right, which according to employers resulted in excessively high labour 
costs. Union women protested vociferously against these plans, basing their arguments not 
only on the need for rest for factory workers who lack hygienic facilities in their 
workplaces and adequate nutrition to fight anaemia.23
What was also important was union women’s strong opinion that women from all economic 
sectors should be allowed to let their reproductive ‘instruments’ (alat) rest for two days, 
whether or not these women actually felt ill. According to my interviews, this discourse 
extends to those experienced union women whose view of women’s kodrat differs from the 
official discourse in that it encompasses only women’s reproductive functions (i.e. 
menstruation, pregnancy and childbirth, and breastfeeding). The findings of my survey 
among Forum members also reflect this discourse: a large majority of respondents thought 
of menstruation leave as a right that must be used, in other words not only taken when ill. 
Thus, because of the physical and the cultural construction of womanhood, large numbers 
of women both in manufacturing jobs and in pink-collar and white-collar office jobs felt 
that they had a common nature as women, which required protection through legislation.
In conclusion, Indonesian women workers are generally likely to act upon their self- 
identification as women and to engage in collective action with other women because of 
strong recognition that they share a common nature and purpose as women. Unlike in 
Thailand, where women workers perceive of their gender identity mostly as ‘seriality’ that 
is experienced passively, Indonesian women workers’ groups actively incorporate such 
feelings of self-identification as women to make claims for recognition as women and to 
mobilise women workers. Such feelings among their members are culturally inspired rather 
than organisationally constructed. Thus, the Indonesian case demonstrates the importance 
of gender and gender identity when considering how group members build a common 
purpose.
Building solidarity at grassroots level
Do strong feelings of common self-identification among women translate into successful 
mobilising efforts among union women? Although we know that women workers at times 
act militantly in their planned and spontaneous protests, little of the research done on
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Indonesian women workers and their resistance against exploitation speaks about the 
strength and sources of women workers’ solidarity. Yet, solidarity is an important 
ingredient in the formation of sustained contentious action and the social movements that 
can flow from such action. On the one hand, Tjandraningsih found with reference to 
women workers in West Javanese factories that “[the] feeling of unity and solidarity [is] of 
a short-term nature and usually dissolves when workers’ demands are met” (2000:265). On 
the other hand, the relative success of the Forum and regional trade unions in attracting 
women to their campaigns and activities seems to indicate women workers’ considerable 
interest in mobilising collectively over longer periods of time. This section shows how 
women workers’ groups in Indonesia have made efforts to build solidarity among women 
workers by framing issues so that they resonate with prospective movement members and 
by building consensus among members regarding the group’s interests and the meanings 
attached to these interests. Both strategies indicate that union women simultaneously 
reproduce and challenge gender and workers’ identities in the process of building 
solidarity.
Framing
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, collective organisation involves careful framing 
of the issue or goal around which movement members mobilise. For union women, such 
framing of their issues is an important means to show members the common concerns they 
have as women and as workers. What issues motivate women workers to undertake 
collective action, and how do union women frame them?
Saptari (1995) argues that during the late 1980s and early 1990s women’s issues were never 
able to gamer sufficient attention from the media and public in general. Particular women’s 
issues such as sexual harassment, if raised publicly at all, were “never very strongly 
grounded in the daily protest of workers or the demands that were raised in public 
discussion on the plights of the workers” (1995:57). She concludes from this that “at the 
national level discussions concerning the specific problems faced by women workers have 
become marginalised by the broader issue of workers’ exploitation” (1995:57). She gives 
the example of the Marsinah murder in 1993 which generated a large public outcry 
regarding military involvement in the case, rather than regarding the gender-specific
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aspects. This leads her to conclude that NGOs and activists in Indonesia have made gender 
issues subordinate to general labour concerns.
According to women who were labour activists at the time, however, the gender dimension 
of the Marsinah case was not as easily forgotten as Saptari assumes. Instead, the portrayal 
of the case in local media and among activists was subject to protracted struggles in which 
feminist activists attempted to give a different meaning to the case than the general image 
of a political murder that was put forward by activists from politically oriented labour and 
legal NGOs and trade unions.24 According to my interviews, it was not women’s fear of 
weakening the fledgling movement by raising divisive women’s issues (as Saptari 
suggests), but rather an inability and unwillingness on the part of male leaders of the labour 
movement to grasp the gender-dimensions of Marsinah’s case that led the movement to 
focus on political violence and the role played by the military.
Non Andriyani, formerly active with Yayasan Perempuan Mardhika, an NGO working 
with women workers in Jakarta and East Java, states that the women workers in her 
discussion groups were aware that women union leaders were especially vulnerable to 
violence because they transgressed gender norms. She reminded me that Marsinah was 
raped by security forces: “Women are attacked as women, it’s a form of punishment 
because women workers were supposed to be docile, this was a message that they should 
shut up.” But although Nori and her fellow NGO workers could clearly identify this 
gender angle, they did not “strongly emphasise it, because we thought [more] about the 
workers’ issue, because Marxist ideology was very much alive at the time.” In the end, the 
Marsinah case was framed as an issue of state violence and interference in labour dispute 
settlement, rather than as a gender issue. Ford also found the gender-impact of the case to 
be significant:
The link between female labour activism and Marsinah’s murder, whilst reinforcing the 
image of ‘factory daughter as victim’, fed also into a much more positive discourse amongst 
politically-aware workers and labour activists in which the ‘factory daughter’ became also 
‘empowered activist’. Marsinah’s death became a cause celebre, and challenged the widely 
held perception that women workers were all docile, biddable and obedient. Furthermore, it 
raised awareness that, while organised labour opposition remained predominantly male, 
there were many female worker activists in Indonesia (Ford 2003:90).
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Thus, although the ‘class versus gender’ debate that Saptari alludes to does exist, it appears 
to be alive only at a rather abstract level among NGO activists. What was and still is at 
stake for union women (outside NGOs) is rather a feminist struggle to put women’s issues 
on the agenda of the Indonesian labour movement. Ten years on, my interviews with young 
union women reveal that they still strongly identify with Marsinah whom they believe was 
killed because she was both a woman and an activist. Because of the risks of gender- 
specific violence, the Marsinah case is yet another reminder for them of their gender 
identity.
The above examples of demands for menstruation leave and of the framing of issues such 
as the Marsinah murder case suggest that gender identity is an important component of 
mobilisation efforts among women workers in Indonesia. On a practical level, framing of 
women workers’ demands must take as its starting point their own experience of problems, 
often leading union women to start their awareness-raising efforts with reference to 
economic issues of immediate concern. For sustainable mobilisation into collective action, 
however, it does not take long for gender issues to arise, both in terms of their actual 
workplace experiences and in mobilisation efforts such as described above. While solidarity 
does not arise automatically among women workers any more or less than it does among 
men, the union women I interviewed are well aware that feelings of common womanhood 
provide a potential basis for building solidarity.
On a conceptual level, my interviews demonstrate that Marsinah’s case did not so much 
highlight the contradictions between activism on the basis of class or gender but rather 
called attention to the gender aspects of her case. Contrary to Saptari’s findings, many 
women activists at the level of union leadership or in NGOs appear to have been well aware 
of the importance of the case for women workers. They have subsequently tried to utilise it 
to build solidarity among (and support for) women factory workers. Thus, the Marsinah 
case highlights the patriarchal resistance from mainstream trade unions rather than an 
abstract ‘class versus gender’ struggle. This indicates that for many union women, gender 
identity is a subtle yet crucial aspect of efforts to build solidarity.
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Consensus mobilisation through identities
Notwithstanding this discourse of common womanhood and common fate, my interviews 
suggest that essentialist notions of women’s qualities do not figure strongly in Indonesian 
women workers’ claims for recognition. The union women interviewed for this research, 
like their counterparts in the women’s movement, appear careful not to reify widespread 
cultural and religious notions of women as incapable and irrational. Unlike in Thailand, 
they usually do not consider women as better and more effective leaders than men. For 
example, Umi believes that while some women work harder, are more thorough, and are 
more courageous in their union activities than men, this is not the case among all women 
but depends on individual character.26 Similarly, Arum from the Women’s and Children’s 
Bureau of SPSI-Reformasi believes that women and men have the same ability, but 
Indonesian culture directs women to the domestic sector, which makes them more frank 
and open in expressing their opinions. She believes that women have to work harder to 
prove themselves, which makes those who succeed appear superior to men.27 Thus, 
whereas Thai women union activists try to build solidarity by encouraging women to 
contribute their distinct skills to the union movement, the Indonesian union women I 
interviewed appear to take a different approach.
Compared with the WWUG in Thailand, members of both the Forum and regional trade 
unions in Indonesia voice much less uncertainty concerning the character and objective of 
their collective action and their organisations. They considered their goal to be both to 
assist and empower women workers and to promote gender equality in trade unions. But 
they recognise that many women workers find it difficult to change their position in the 
household and family, or may derive some satisfaction from their traditional roles and 
responsibilities as women (which also encompass a strong economic dimension). This 
recognition requires union women to navigate carefully between contesting and 
accommodating hegemonic gender identities in their mobilisation efforts. Educational 
activities for prospective women union members therefore speak about both a common 
womanhood based on needs, responsibilities, and characteristics different from men, and a 
newly constructed identity as union member who defends women workers’ interests and 
rights.
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Such attempts to integrate hegemonic and counter-hegemonic identities can result in 
contradictions for the women workers in question but respond to the diversity among 
women workers. Consider, for example, the responses from women workers in Ati’s 
electronics factory in East Jakarta, who were asked during a women-only gender 
awareness-raising workshop to describe in a drawing what type of woman they wanted to 
become. Approximately half of the thirty-five participants drew a woman wearing the 
Islamic headscarf and full-length clothing, often with children by the side. Their 
explanatory comments mentioned their desire to be a role-model for their children, a good 
wife or “successful homemaker” loved by their husbands, as well as a good Muslim with a 
clean conscience. However, only a few of these participants indicated a desire to stop 
working after marriage.
In a further display of contrast, the other half of the participants had dreams of pursuing a 
career as a policewoman, accountant, or journalist, or of becoming “a useful woman for the 
nation.”28 What all of these women had in common were their employer (a medium-sized 
plastic manufacturing company with 80 per cent female workforce) and their voluntary 
attendance at this union workshop. By the end of 2003, these women had fought for and 
obtained paid menstruation and maternity leave, family allowance for both male and female 
workers, and discontinuation of the use of six-month contracts beyond the legal limit (a 
complaint heard particularly frequently among female staff). These achievements show 
that women workers felt sufficiently motivated by the enterprise union’s respect for their 
varying roles and needs to engage in collective action.
The amalgamation of traditional and new gender and worker identities may have grown out 
of the potential for mobilising Indonesian women based on their gender roles and interests 
as mothers and wives. The relative success of this strategy was clearly shown during the 
1998 uprising against the Suharto government, when a group of women (who were 
journalists, activists and academics) established Suara Ibu Peduli (Voice of Concerned 
Mothers or SIP). This organisation began to sell affordable baby milk, considered a basic 
need for most families, and held its first peaceful demonstration on 23 February 1998 
(Budianta 2002; Bianpoen 2000a). Because their traditional role as mothers was threatened, 
SIP quickly attracted thousands of ordinary women who had never engaged in public
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protest but who were willing to join women in similar circumstances. More than six years 
on, the group still counts hundreds of lower middle-class women in Jakarta as its members.
How this kind of collective action utilising traditional roles should be regarded is a matter 
of diverse interpretation, with some likely to criticise the reification of traditional gender 
stereotypes and others praising the mothers for taking public action when their voices 
needed to be heard. In a more nuanced assessment, Bianpoen (2000a) believes that the 
women who initiated SIP consciously used motherhood as a cover for their political 
activities, though she implies that the group’s long-term support emanated from 
housewives, a majority of whom presumably acted on the basis of their traditional identity 
rather than to a call for greater democracy (though the two are of course not incompatible). 
But she maintains that “while SIP persisted in the mother’s role, they also continued to 
support political aspirations, playing a key role in the supply of survival food for the 
students who protested at the Parliament building, pursuing the fall of Soeharto” 
(2000a:287).
Similarly, Budianta (2002) and Robinson (2002) see SIP’s strategic use of motherhood as 
an attack on the “familist ideology of the New Order” (Robinson 2002:146). Robinson 
argues that “while state practices intensify women’s association with mothering, in a 
counter-hegemonic move women’s activism on the basis of motherhood makes use of this 
available political space” (2002:145). Thus, SIP successfully mobilised women based on 
practical gender interests that for some became a symbol for strategic gender interests such 
as political participation and protest against the New Order hierarchy.30
Similarly, women’s activist Nori Andriyani considers this strategy of using traditional roles 
to be intrinsically political. If confronted with criticism that it does not change women’s 
position in society, she retorts that “the strategy needs to be seen in the light of the 
difficulty to change things in Indonesia, and as long as at the local level it matters, it can be 
meaningful.”31 When asked if Indonesian women can be seen as a clear interest group, Nori 
answers, “Yes, because they have particular interests that need to be fought for at different 
levels.” Her statement is backed by the results of a 2003 Asia Foundation survey of the 
Indonesian electorate, which found that 61 per cent of male and 59 per cent of female 
respondents viewed women as a group with “common needs ... that should be expressed in
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politics and elections” (Asia Foundation 2003:134). Thus, women appear to consider 
themselves “a reasonable social category expressing a certain kind of social unity” (Young 
1995:114) which can lead them to group “self-consciously as women and on the basis of 
their gendered condition” (122).
If Indonesian women define themselves by a common identity as women and struggle for 
recognition as a group, does this also apply for women workers and union women? My 
interviews with union women strongly suggest that many union women in their struggles at 
times define themselves as women and other times as workers. A common theme in these 
interviews is the inability of union men to relate to women’s needs and interests. 
Consequently, many union women speak about the need to represent women workers’ 
common needs and interests that are articulated through their collective action. Such 
thinking is exemplified by Yuni from the finance sector in Jakarta and head o f the ASPEK 
women’s committee, who when asked if  women’s interests can be represented by men 
responds with the following example:
At the micro level of the union, men do not want to think about maternity leave ... once in a 
workshop when a woman suggested asking permission for her husband to take child care 
leave, all the male participants laughed at her. Men are also opposed to the extension of 
time to breastfeed from four to six months ... in fact they believe that four months is 
already too long. If this way of thinking occurs at the union level, then what can we expect 
at the level of politics?32
Sofiati, head o f the Indonesian woodworkers’ federation complains:
[Men until now] have neglected to mention women’s reproductive God-given role (kodrat) 
and have portrayed women’s demands as exaggerations ... Men cannot know women’s 
interests because they cannot feel them.33
According to Umi from Yogjakarta, the garment and textile sector tries to organise women 
workers by telling them that:
If women do not participate their needs will not be known. Women themselves know their 
needs ... Women’s welfare will also increase if they participate, not only the welfare of
34men.
Ester from the Seafarers’ Union similarly considers union m en’s reluctance to fight on 
behalf o f women workers an incentive for women workers to act on their gender identity. In
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her response to my question about men representing women’s interests, she strategically 
(but indirectly) employs discourse about common womanhood (kodrat) to argue for 
women’s collective action:
If women do not want to defend their fate (‘nasib’), then how can the union help? Women 
have to defend their rights and do this through getting together, not men ... it is not possible 
to have men defend women’s interest ... When discrimination against women happens, the 
action must come from women. Men are welcome to help but women must be given the 
opportunity [to take action]. Perhaps elsewhere it’s possible [for men to defend women’s 
interests] but not in Indonesia!35
These statements suggest that union women in Indonesia see the neglect of women’s 
interests by union men as an additional reason to mobilise and organise as women. They 
make strategic use of hegemonic gender identity for mobilising purposes when they refer to 
women’s inherently common nature and common interests based on their kodrat. However, 
they also articulate the need to fight for gender interests that may go against the interests of 
their husbands and male union colleagues. This requires union women to represent their 
own demands and fight for their own rights as women workers.
Yet, this balancing of two different identities reveals some disagreements over women 
workers’ rights and needs in a globalising economy and a changing society. For example, in 
my interview with Sulistri (female) and Firman (male) of the SBSI’s women’s department, 
a heated discussion arose concerning the potential need for protection of women workers 
and their exclusion from particular types of workplaces. Sulistri recognises the difficulties 
in determining how much protection and special treatment women require. For example, 
night work for women is frequently not a free choice but something imposed by employers 
or through economic necessity. Sulistri therefore advocates special protection measures so 
that women do not suffer from the burden of night work.36 On the other hand, Firman takes 
a more liberal attitude, believing that the decision whether or not to take up this work 
should depend on the individual capacity and will of each woman, providing that it is safe 
work. Sulistri in response protests that women would still have to (or want to!) do the 
household chores and take care of their children during the day, instead of getting sleep like 
male workers would be able to without questioning.
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This discussion on night work encapsulates the difficulties facing the Indonesian women 
workers’ movement. Claims by Forum members for special treatment, in the form of a 
quota in unions for representation of their distinct gender interests, frequently run counter 
to the simultaneous expectation by many union men and women that women should be 
treated equally to men, in the name of gender equality and common interests as workers. 
By emphasising women workers’ common womanhood, union women may be able to 
activate their gender identity for collective action. Yet, they also run the risk that sexual 
difference becomes overemphasised by their male union colleagues. As Amin, executive 
director of Yasanti (an NGO dealing with women workers in Yogjakarta, Central Java) 
observes, many unions have women’s divisions but these are seen as separate entities: “it’s 
not about gender but only about women’s issues.”'
However, in a context where women workers still have to fight for the right to participate in 
trade union affairs and to get a slice of the budget, perhaps conflation of gender issues with 
women’s issues is not such a bad thing in the short run. At the very least, it may call 
attention to women workers’ practical gender interests. Nevertheless, such a focus on 
practical gender interests may pose future problems: even if the number of women in 
decision-making positions starts to increase significantly, these women may continue to be 
excluded from decision-making on ‘hard’ issues such as budgets, policies, and strategies 
regarding economic and political development. Since this discussion mirrors the discussion 
in Indonesia in 2002-2004 concerning the quota for women in politics, it is worthwhile 
reflecting in the next section on the implications and the lessons to be learned by union 
women from this policy initiative.
Sustaining the movement
Women workers may launch a carefully worded, large-scale protest against injustice, be 
recognised as a collective and be united in their determination, but will their movement 
outlive the cause that triggered it? Oppositional movements are often co-opted by 
governments, pacified with promises, or die a quiet death after their demands have been 
met or their issues defeated or forgotten (Tarrow 1998). This section considers the fourth of 
Tarrow’s properties of social movements: how collective movements can sustain their 
challenge. This is of particular importance, since -  compared to Thailand -  the Indonesian
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women workers’ groups are of more recent origin and have not yet achieved prominence or 
significant results that could motivate other women to join the existing organisations. As in 
Thailand, two factors crucial to a movement’s sustainability are its organisational structure 
and its ability to form networks and work through coalitions. In both cases, gender identity 
and worker identity play important roles in explaining the path taken by these women 
workers and their groups. The Indonesian case differs from Thailand in that discussions 
about sustainability touch on quotas and separate structures for women workers and 
Indonesian women generally emphasise the need for women’s representation based on their 
reclaiming of gender identity.
A quota system for women in politics?
If women have distinct gender needs and interests, then women’s participation in politics is 
required. Should women be able to represent their needs and interests in public through a 
system of quota? In Indonesia, these questions have taken on special significance among 
women workers since the start around 2000 of public discussions about a women’s quota in 
politics and especially since the passing in February 2003 of legislation establishing a 
voluntary 30 per cent quota for women in political party candidacy lists.39
Some women workers disagree with the quota for women in politics. Those who doubt the 
efficacy of a quota in political parties say it detracts attention away from the quality of the 
candidates. Yanti from ABGTeks, for example, points out that, although she supports the 
quota, it does not guarantee the entry of different women into politics, in other words, poor 
‘working class’ women who would not otherwise be able to enter formal politics. Because 
she is aware of class differences between women, Yanti questions what women 
parliamentarians have been able to accomplish so far for Indonesian women, but hopes that 
the quota will be a useful means to ensure gender-sensitive legislation.40 Vera from the 
Metal Workers’ Federation similarly wants to see more women workers participating in 
politics, rather than women from the “upper classes.”41 Yuni from the banking sector, on 
the other hand, is pessimistic because she believes it will be difficult to attract qualified 
women.42 She is also “not convinced that women can make a difference simply by being 
women.”43 In short, many women workers are not opposed in principle to a quota but rather 
doubt its efficacy, implementation, and intended consequences.
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Yet, many union women perceive that women can and should claim their gender interests 
as a justification for their presence and participation in decision-making bodies. They agree 
at least in part with the quota because they believe that women are a political interest group 
who should represent their own gender and worker interests. The urgency of women 
representing their own interests, be they physical or conceptual, is a common theme among 
contemporary Indonesian women activists. TV star Nurul Arifm, who in mid-2003 
announced her (failed) candidacy for the 2004 parliamentary elections, justified her entry 
into politics, and the 30 per cent quota, with the following words:
My body is owned by my body, and my spirit is a part of my body. I myself know best what 
my needs are. I myself know best what my desires are. Because of this, it is women who 
can decide about the needs and interests of women. Appoint a minimum of thirty per cent 
women as policy-makers. (In CETRO women and elections brochure, 2003).
The different arguments in favour of the 30 per cent quota recounted in the media and in 
my interviews mirror those mentioned by Phillips (1995). Although it is perhaps the easiest 
to employ, the economic or demographic argument of women constituting 50 per cent of 
the population is not often heard. Instrumentalism is more common in certain official 
circles. The United Nations Development Programme in Indonesia, for example, in its 
public presentation of research on the role of women in politics referred to the importance 
of women’s participation and gender equality as a contribution towards good governance. 
The UNDP representative justified the organisation’s attention to women in politics by 
quoting World Bank research findings that a rise in the number of women in parliament 
would result in a reduction of corruption (Kompas 10 March 2003). One female 
parliamentarian argued that, “with an increase in the number of women representatives as 
decision-makers at the legislative level, there will be a good result for improvement of 
living standards of the nation in general” (Aisyah Amini in Kompas 28 April 2003:39). 
Another one stated that since few voters believed that caring about women’s issues was an 
important requirement for a leader, women candidates should focus on how they could 
improve the economic, political, and security situation of the country (Noviantika Nasution 
in Kompas 28 April 2003:37).
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While such pragmatic and instrumentalist arguments are perhaps important for international 
organisations and seasoned Indonesian politicians seeking re-election, many Indonesian 
women activists state a very different motivation, focusing more often on women’s 
different gender needs and interests and their different capabilities. For example, in my 
interview with her, Masruchah (since January 2004 secretary-general of the Indonesian 
Women’s Coalition, a large women’s organisation with chapters throughout the country) 
bases her approval of the quota on her observation that men do not voice the needs of 
women: “only if women participate can women’s needs be known.” She believes that trade 
unions welcome the quota for women in political parties, “because they expect more just 
policies about workers from women candidates.”44
Ida Budiarti, head of the Indonesian Women’s Coalition in Semarang similarly argues that 
the quota is needed not only because women make up half the population, but moreover 
because they have different needs, for example better protection for women workers of 
their reproductive rights: “If there are no women in the DPR [Indonesian parliament] then 
how can they change the law?”45 Ani Soetjipto from CETRO (Centre for Electoral Reform) 
voices the expectation that “with [the quota] we can fight for a better life for women” 
(.Kompas 28 April 2003:36). Elsewhere Soetjipto states that, although “the number of 
women being more than half of the population is the most legitimate criteria for equal 
gender representation” (2000:449), her emphasis is actually on the importance of women’s 
participation and representation for the realisation of meaningful politics in Indonesia.
Similarly, Maria Ulfah Anshor (until 2004 head of the Nahdlatul Ulama’s women’s wing 
Fatayat) states her hope that the quota can lead to a decrease in policies and legislation that 
are gender biased (Kompas 24 February 2003:36). The belief that women can make a 
difference to politics because of their gender interests and their different characteristics is 
also reflected in findings of an 2003 Asia Foundation electoral survey: almost half of those 
respondents who preferred a female over a male representative in the parliament (only 13 
per cent of the total sample) did so because women were considered better suited for certain 
issues, more responsive to needs of society, more ethical or more responsible (Asia 
Foundation 2003:140).46
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These views are parallel to Jonasdottir’s (1988) argument in defence of representation of 
women’s interests, namely that women’s interests emerge from different experiences and 
activities in life than men’s. Many Indonesian women activists thus claim a voice based on 
the ‘content’ aspect of participation. The belief that gender interests and needs are more 
meaningful for women than are their common experiences with men based on identities 
other than gender becomes an entry-point for women’s claim for representation in decision­
making. In contrast, Chapter Six showed that Thai women workers recognise gender 
interests but act more commonly on their identity as workers. Such allusions to gender 
interests and identity as outweighing other bases of interest and identity pose the risk of 
Indonesian women leaders being associated exclusively with women’s and family issues.47 
However, few of the women politicians or women workers who wanted recognition as 
women (according to their statements in my interviews or newspaper articles) voiced 
worries that women would be pigeon-holed in such ways.48
A quota system for women in trade unions?
Women workers’ predominantly positive reception of the women’s quota in political 
parties begs the question of the possibility or desirability of a similar quota in trade unions. 
If women indeed have different needs that cannot or should not be represented by men, then 
would women workers not also require a quota in their own organisations? Because of the 
longstanding fear of further dividing and therefore weakening the labour movement, union 
women may be uncertain about affirmative action in the form of quotas or even separate 
organising through women’s departments. In addition, as Briskin (1999) has observed in 
trade unions in developed countries, women’s quotas give women a space to experiment 
and learn the ropes but also heighten the risk of women being perceived as weaker, in need 
of special assistance, and only concerned about women’s issues (see also Enloe 1990 on 
women home-based workers in Mexico-City). Because of these risks and because of their 
different views on potential politicisation of gender identity, union women have a variety of 
opinions on the matter of women’s quotas in trade union structures.
Those Indonesian union women who have doubts about the quota in political parties not 
surprisingly oppose a quota for women in trade unions, let alone the establishment of 
separate structures for women. For example, Yanti of ABGTeks states in an interview with
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me that the ability to represent other people’s interests depends on character or disposition 
rather than being of the same sex. She therefore does not want to establish a separate 
organisation for women workers, in order to avoid women being seen as a separate group, 
removed from men. In the same way that she dislikes workers being removed from other 
social groups, women should be building alliances with many different groups in society 49 
From a different angle, Yuni from the banking sector agrees with the women’s quota in 
political parties though she is not sure that they will make a difference simply because they 
are women. She strongly believes, however, that women should not form their own trade 
union structures, because they are still embedded in their trade union, as women and as 
workers.50 For these women, gender identity does not need to be politicised in order to 
mobilise additional women workers into trade unions.
The SBSI, on the other hand, in 2003 established internal quotas of 30 per cent for women 
in all officer positions, delegations, and decision-making positions, and allocated 20 per 
cent of the educational budget to women. According to Sulistri, head of its women’s 
department, SBSI women handled men’s opposition to the quota by promising in return 
that all SBSI activities should include at least 30 per cent men.51 Thus, not just women’s 
but also men’s gender identity became politicised. Sofiati, as president of the woodworkers’ 
federation, failed to institute a quota of 30 per cent in her federation as a result of resistance 
from male leaders. Her federation therefore now relies on appeals by international and 
regional donors and partners for a balance between male and female participants in 
meetings, workshops, and study tours: “if male union leaders are not forced from outside,
c y
they will never do it on their own.”
On a more individual level, many union women are uncertain whether to privilege gender 
or worker identity in their own lives and what that means for the fight for gender equality in 
their unions. When I asked her about a quota for women in unions, Umi from the garment 
and textile sector perceived a dilemma between wanting special treatment and mobilising 
women workers based on their gender interests but not wanting to be seen as exclusive or 
separate from male workers. Irma, a nurse with the FARKES health and pharmaceutical 
union federation, recounts a similar dilemma. She wants to be treated equally to men, does 
not want to call unnecessary attention to her femaleness, but also acknowledges that her 
household responsibilities (which she does not want to change) will inevitably impact on
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her workplace role and performance.5' The question for these women thus becomes how to 
balance two meaningful identities around which they mobilise.
Some women workers, however, favour not only a quota but even a separate structure for 
women. For example, Vera and Haryati from the metalworkers’ federation in my interview 
with them, spontaneously mentioned their hope that women would one day join a separate 
women’s union. Such a union would present a more unified response to women’s issues 
and increase women’s strength. They believe that a women’s union would have to start 
from a basic agreement on common issues, with members free to pursue their own 
individual issues beyond that. In essence, their dream is akin to Mohanty’s (1997) 
conception of a women’s movement made up of individuals and groups with diverse 
allegiances who come together based on a common understanding of the gendered 
structures in which they live. This in turn reflects Young’s idea of group membership in 
which gender attributes constitute members’ identity and are the basis for their collective 
activism. Because not all women respond to such politicisation of the gender structures in 
which union women work, realisation of their dream is unlikely in the short-term in 
Indonesia, though the seeds have been sown through the establishment of women workers’ 
organisations.
Such views confirm the appeal and importance of perceptions of gender identity in 
decisions about organisational structure. The debate on women’s quotas and separate 
structures points to broader issues in the women workers’ movement, which are similarly 
felt in the mainstream women’s movement. To what extent can women appeal to a 
politicised gender identity in order to create solidarity? When does this (perhaps 
unconscious) strategy benefit women and when is it potentially harmful to their movement? 
Indonesian union women’s use of the discourse of gender interests and gender identity to 
make claims about representation perhaps arises from the government ideology of ‘ibuism’ 
that emphasised women’s role as mother and wife. Perhaps it arises at this particular point 
in time because women’s movements, including organised women workers, have sufficient 
political space to politicise gender identity. Their organisations have thus succeeded in 
igniting discussion about women’s gender identity, and are starting to challenge (in terms 
of laws and policies, religious discourse, community traditions, etc.) hegemonic and 
essentialist notions of women as mothers and wives. By doing so, they show that solidarity
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based on gender identity can result in mobilisation and organisation of some Indonesian 
women workers.
Coalitions and networks
If such dilemmas confront women both in the women’s movement and in the labour 
movement, how much overlap is there between the Indonesian women workers’ movement 
and the mainstream women’s movement? As Tarrow (1998) points out, to ensure their 
continuation, social movements with relatively few members must seek alliances with 
movement organisations that share similar goals. Do union women have similar perceptions 
of a politicised gender identity as the women’s movement?
Much has been written about the important role played by NGOs in the Indonesian labour 
movement during the 1990s (Hadiz 1997; Ford 2001). Although trade unions since 1998 
have flourished (at least in numbers mobilised for demonstrations), the topic of NGOs still 
draws mixed reactions from trade union leaders and activists. Similar to Thailand, many 
union women interviewed for this research criticise NGOs for taking away funding from 
trade unions, negotiating where they have no power or mandate to do so, not understanding 
workers’ issues, lacking a clear vision, and even setting up their own unions. These 
findings are confirmed by Hadiz who writes that, although NGOs have offered much help 
to workers during the 1990s, personal competition between NGO activists creates internal 
conflict within trade unions and between workers (Sedane 2003:38).
Some union women extend these points of criticism with regard to women’s NGOs. For 
example, Yanti from a textile and garment union federation in Jakarta criticises women’s 
NGOs for not focusing on women workers’ issues. Each has their own community, be it 
housewives, domestic workers, or students, because of class issues.54 Roma, a student 
activist formerly with the FNPBI, calls the women’s movement (and the organisations that 
are part of it) somewhat “exclusive.”55 Yuni from the finance sector in Jakarta also laments 
that few NGOs are concerned with women workers’ interests, except for migrant workers.56 
Such criticism overlooks the actual contributions of the women’s movement to the 
struggles of women workers. These union women appear to have little or no contact with 
women’s NGOs such as Yasanti in Yogjakarta and Solidaritas Perempuan in various cities.
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Both these NGOs carry out extensive awareness raising, advocacy, and organising work 
with women workers, though they do not necessarily work with or through trade unions.
Unlike in Thailand, Indonesian women’s groups from all walks of life have participated in 
protest marches and rallies side-by-side with women from offices, factories, and shops. The 
large-scale protests against increases in the cost of basic household items such as cooking 
oil and milk provide a compelling example of this solidarity between women. The first such 
protest was initiated in February 1998 by the aforementioned Jakarta-based Voice of 
Concerned Mothers (SIP). Although the group’s leaders were mostly middle-class women, 
they focused attention on women’s role as mothers of small children who needed sufficient 
nutrition. Their framing of the cost of living issue was such that they generally received 
warm support from women workers who could identify with the plight of urban 
housewives.
This form of social protest was repeated in early 2003 when the government announced a 
series of price hikes concerning household cooking oil, and electricity and telephone rates. 
When thousands of Jakarta women took to the streets during the first week of 2003, groups 
of women factory workers (organised by their union) marched alongside a women’s group 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a neighbourhood group of mothers with small 
children (based on participant observation). Thus, as much as union women distrust and 
criticise NGOs and the Indonesian women’s movement in general, they do at times find 
common ground with groups of women from different backgrounds than their own. This 
intermittent collaboration shows that a common gender identity and gender interests exist, 
but in each case need to be activated in order to bring union women together with other 
groups of women.57
Violence against women is one issue that motivates diverse groups of women to act on their 
gender identity. For example, Yasanti, an NGO working with women workers in 
Yogjakarta, attempts to introduce women workers in its discussion groups to other 
women’s organisations in the area, for example to Rifka Annisa, the women’s crisis center 
that handles violence against women, including sexual harassment. Also, on the occasion of 
International Women’s Day in 2003, Yasanti collaborated with other women’s 
organisations, selecting polygamy and violence against women as their main issues of
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focus.58 The women’s movement in Yogjakarta agreed on these issues in consultation with 
union women, ensuring that violence against women was defined in its widest possible 
meaning. Thus, violence against women incorporated issues of low wages and bad working 
conditions such as long working hours, and was not confined to women workers. Similarly, 
Masruchah who (at the time of my interview with her) headed the Yogjakarta chapter of the 
Indonesian Women’s Coalition wants to see the term ‘workers issues’ broadened to include 
informal, domestic, and migrant women workers.59 Women’s activists and organisations 
therefore try to point out the overlap between gender and workers’ interests. Such efforts 
stimulate union women to find common purpose and build solidarity with women across 
socio-economic and educational divides.
The collaboration between various women’s and women workers’ organisations for 
International Women’s Day in 2003 points to the existence of some commonalities between 
these women. Yet, several women union leaders did not participate because they saw the 
event as being too scattered in its focus. For example, the head of the women’s department 
of ASPEK, a large banking, finance and service sector union, argued:
If there are too many issues, which issue should receive priority? Because of the low level 
of awareness at the factory level, activities such as this long march should concentrate on 
basic issues. The majority only follows out of solidarity, not because they understand the 
issues.60
This example shows clearly the danger of assuming that common action across the 
women’s movement means understanding of a common purpose.
Furthermore, there are significant barriers between union women from different types of 
workplaces (such as factory and office) and different economic sectors (manufacturing 
versus finance). When asked if her federation collaborates with ASPEK, the finance and 
banking sector federation, Arum, a full-time organiser with SPSI-Reformasi blames the 
different work environments for the lack of collaboration between factory and office 
workers:
In the banking sector, it is difficult to get women to get together, because they are more 
individually minded, whereas in the factories [there is more solidarity because] there is 
more communication between workers because of their work environment.61
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Yuni from ASPEK’s women’s department in Jakarta agrees that organising finance workers 
is difficult because they are in a ‘comfort zone,’ feeling safe from the economic 
developments and being relatively secure in their tenure. Somewhat differently, Siti, an 
administrative worker in a shipping company until dismissed because she complained of 
sexual harassment, believes that office workers shy away from unions because they 
associate unions with factory workers and believe themselves to be “a step above this, of a 
different class.” 63 In short, even though they might want to act upon a common gender 
identity, many union women from manufacturing and office workplaces face difficulties in 
overcoming class differences and anti-union prejudice.64
In conclusion, Indonesian union women at times join with the mainstream women’s 
movement when their gender interests coincide. Although the existence of feelings of 
shared gender interests and a shared gender identity provides a useful starting point, the 
above examples show that women generally act on these interests and this identity when 
triggered by outside (usually political) developments. However, sustaining such collective 
mobilisation is more difficult. Class-based differences between types of workplaces can 
create feelings of distrust that prevent solidarity from being activated into collective 
mobilisation. Nevertheless, the union women interviewed for this research show that they 
attempt to mobilise women workers by making their identity both as women and as 
workers meaningful. Depending on the circumstances, this can elicit feelings of common 
purpose with other social movements or organisations and can thus broaden and strengthen 
women workers’ collective action.
Conclusion
This chapter has traced contemporary efforts by women workers’ groups to mobilise 
Indonesian urban women workers into unions and other workers’ organisations. Based on 
examples of union women’s activism, it argued that many union women recognise their 
gender interests (practical or strategic, or both) as well as the interests as workers that they 
have in common with men. As in Thailand, workers’ and women’s issues are clearly 
intertwined. Indonesian union women, however, perceive a stronger common identity as 
women compared with Thai women workers. This gender identity derives from New Order 
ideology that attempted to define women through their roles as mothers and wives. Thus,
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when mobilising women workers to engage in collective action, many union women 
recognise the importance of making both gender identity and workers’ identity meaningful 
for collective action. They do so by introducing from the start issues relating directly to 
women workers’ experiences as women and as workers. Such experiences are a primary 
means to stimulate women workers to think about solidarity and a common purpose, 
whether between industrial women workers or with other groups of women.
If we accept that women workers’ movements are embedded in diverse cultural, economic, 
and political structures and gender regimes at local, national and global levels, it is not 
surprising that union women turn to these structures and regimes to justify their calls for 
recognition and representation in trade unions. Like their Thai counterparts, Indonesian 
union women grapple with the tensions between recognising gender differences and 
wanting to be treated as equal to men. They therefore frame their issues as both gender and 
workers’ issues. But unlike Thai union women, who tend to speak of their common 
interests as workers and their contributions to the mainstream labour movement, Indonesian 
union women frequently assert their gender identity (and gender difference) to claim a 
presence.
Building solidarity and common purpose among women workers is done through 
emphasising that women’s gender needs and interests cannot be represented by men, 
making it vital for women to gain a seat in trade union leadership at all levels. In general, 
union women support quotas for women in political parties because women are perceived 
to share with each other particular gender needs and interests, regardless of the class, 
regional, and other differences among women. The importance of gender identity for these 
women workers justifies their organisations being called part of a new social movement.
My fieldwork findings point to the active politicisation of gender identity and of women’s 
gendered experiences, which is used to invoke women as a group with chosen membership 
rather than as a ‘serial collective.’ Indonesian women workers interviewed for this research 
thus believe in a common womanhood that has significance beyond conditioning their 
actions and that defines their sense of being and the basis on which they are willing to 
engage in collective action. At the local level but also increasingly in the national 
Indonesian context, this sense of collective gender identity has enabled the emergence of
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intermittent “coalition politics” (Young 1995:123) between union women and other women 
across barriers of class.
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1 This informal survey consisted of 25 questions concerning personal background, trade union experience, 
opinion about women’s rights and roles, and opinion about the roles and priorities of trade unions. Of the 200 
participants at the second Forum conference in Puncak who received the questionnaire, 64 returned it fully 
answered.
2 Because it is funded mainly by ACILS, some union women view the Forum with suspicion. For example, 
one textile union leader has not joined the Forum because she believes the work and vision of ACILS do not 
reflect her political priorities. The organisation’s linkages with the American political establishment worry 
her: “ACILS just represents the interests of America ... it is a tool for the Americans to control the labour 
movement in Indonesia and to keep the trade unions within a small circle that they cannot break out o f’ 
(personal interview Emilia Yanti, Jakarta 11 March 2003). ACILS is the international arm of the American 
trade union federation AFL-CIO which until recently saw the relocation of jobs overseas as the biggest threat 
to the American labour movement. It is therefore conceivable that the AFL-CIO aimed to protect American 
jobs through raising labour costs in developing countries rather than to empower workers in Indonesia for a 
sustainable future. La Botz (2001) notes, however, that globalisation of trade and labour has led the AFL-CIO 
to reconsider its role in the world and attempt to build genuine partnerships with trade unions overseas.
3 Personal interviews Diana Rieveira (Vera), Jakarta, 6 January 2003 and 27 August 2003.
4 Personal interview Umi Akhiroh, Yogjakarta, 4 August 2003.
5 Personal interview Dian and Ria (not real names), Unggaran, 31 January 2004.
6 Personal interview Sulistri, Jakarta, 27 August 2003.
7 Personal interview Parto, Jakarta, 24 October 2002.
8 Personal interview Dian and Ria (not real names), Unggaran, 31 January 2004.
9 It is worthwhile to point out here that the gender issues that Saptari expects Javanese women workers to 
raise include equal wages and sexual harassment. These issues during the late 1980s were not yet successfully 
addressed by trade unions or workers’ groups even in most industrialised countries, although they were 
certainly on the agenda of women’s movements. This makes it all the more surprising that Saptari does not 
refer to the absence of a feminist or progressive women’s movement in Indonesia (or its relative distance from 
rural areas) as one reason why gender issues were not raised by this particular group of women workers.
10 Personal interview Hendro Agung Wibowo, Semarang, 29 January 2004.
11 Personal interviews with Ati (not real name), Jakarta (Bekasi), 18 May 2003 and 29 June 2003, and group 
interview with Ati and nine members of the women's group, 7 March 2003.
12 Sunindyo lists the aims of the Dharma Wanita as follows: “To strengthen national unity, to secure the 
loyalty of government employees, to increase political stability, to concentrate all the energy of the civil 
service on assisting the economic development plan, and to encourage the wives of the government 
employees to support their husbands’ careers and responsibilities. Other goals of this organization formulated 
by the New Order government included: giving guidance in promoting and strengthening women’s 
consciousness and responsibility toward the nation, promoting the channeling of ‘sisterly’ sentiments under 
one national banner, mobilizing all wives’ organizations in the direction of service to the nation” (1996:124 
ftn 14).
13 Personal interview Ida Budiarti, Semarang, 1 February 2004
14 Personal interview Dian and Ria (not real names), Unggaran. 31 January 2004.
15 KPAP members consider Indonesian managers and supervisors to be marginally better and easier to get 
along with than those from Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea who maintain a strict hierarchy and are said to be 
often involved in sexual harassment (personal interview Hendro Agung Wibowo, Semarang, 29 January 2004 
and personal interview Dian and Ria (not real names), Unggaran, 31 January 2004). This contrasts with views 
that women workers might be better off working for multinational companies than in national (and especially 
family-owned) businesses (Lim 1990). The potential differences in mobilisation and organisation between 
internationally and nationally managed and/or owned workplaces require further research.
16 For a useful introduction to empowerment and participation, see for example Parpart, Rai and Staudt
( 2002). ‘
17 KPAP leaders encourage group members to translate this new self-awareness into more effective trade 
unionism. Most KPAP members are also members of whatever trade union exists in their factory, but these 
are usually so-called ‘yellow unions’ that have been set up by the management and are not particularly 
committed to defending workers’ rights. Yet, each member is expected to use her new knowledge to try to 
represent workers’ issues in her union and fight for better treatment of women workers. Thus, rather than 
individual empowerment, the group aims for improvement in the representation of women’s interests in and 
through trade unions in Unggaran.
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18 Similarly, Amin Muftiyanah from Yasanti points out that women workers need to be aware that workers’ 
issues are not just about workers but also about domestic work, fees for housing, and the village or 
neighbourhood community: “As workers, they work only some hours, but most of their time they spend in the 
community. Their issues are more complex than those of other women” (personal interview, Yogjakarta, 1 
August 2003).
19 The presence since the early 1930s of women workers in the cigarette industry in East Java is an important 
exception, as noted by Saptari (1995).
20 Personal interview Sofiati Mukadi, Jakarta, 11 March 2003.
21 Personal interviews Diana Rieveira (Vera) and Haryati, Jakarta, 20 January 2003.
22 This aspect of the labour law is a legacy from colonial days, when Dutch legislation granted menstruation 
leave for female plantation workers. Menstruation leave was again advocated by (amongst others) GERWANI 
activists who succeeded in including it in Indonesia’s labour legislation soon after the nation’s independence.
23 The issue of menstruation leave was also raised during May Day celebrations in 2003, organised by the 
Coalition of Indonesian Women (KPI).
24 Personal interviews Nori Andriyani, Jakarta, 3 October 2003 and Myra Diarsi, Jakarta, 29 October 2002.
25 Personal interview Nori Andriyani, Jakarta, 3 October 2003. This view coincides with that of Indonesian 
playwright Ratna Sarumpaet who wrote a play about Marsinah and commented that “the way Marsinah was 
treated, her raped and mutilated body simply discarded in a forest, symbolised the deep, trivialising contempt 
which men, especially powerful men, feel towards women who dare to speak out” (quoted in Robinson 
2000:152).
26 Personal interview Umi Akhiroh, Yogjakarta, 1 August 2003.
27 Personal interview Arum, Jakarta (Depok), 2 October 2002.
28 Group discussion at Ati’s factory, Jakarta (Bekasi), 16 March 2003.
29 Personal interview Ati, Jakarta (Bekasi), 18 January 2004. Unfortunately, by mid-2004 the factory’s 
management had failed to implement many of these provisions, even though they had been included in the 
collective bargaining agreement signed between company management and union leadership. Ati has 
subsequently been fired from her job in what appears to be a case of unfair dismissal because of union 
activities.
30 Bianpoen’s (2000a) analysis of the re-emergence of women’s mobilisation in 1998 also shows that women 
in Jakarta quickly moved beyond economic grievances to engage in much more political mobilisation and 
awareness raising as a result of the large-scale violence against women of Chinese descent in May 1998. The 
government’s denial and refusal to allow independent investigations prompted increased awareness of and 
action concerning violence against women (Robinson 2000). The upsurge in women’s activism and 
mobilisation also resulted in women activists organising the second women’s congress in Yogjakarta in 
December 1998 and establishing the Indonesian Women’s Coalition for Justice and Democracy (KPI) with 
the objective to unite women from all walks of life.
31 Personal interview Nori Andriyani, Jakarta, 3 October 2003.
32 Personal interview Wachyuni Mustani, Jakarta, 10 March 2003.
33 Personal interview Sofiati Mukadi, Jakarta, 11 March 2003.
34 Personal interview Umi Akhiroh, Yogjakarta, 4 August 2003.
35 Personal interview Ester Tuange, Jakarta, 10 October 2003.
36 Personal interview Sulistri, Jakarta, 27 August 2003.
3/ Although the story is difficult to verify, the Forum of Women Leaders and Activists seems to have 
protested in late 2002 against proposals by the new Confederation of Indonesian Trade Unions (KSPI) to ban 
night work for all women in the new Labour Code under discussion at that time. The Forum argued that all 
women except for pregnant women should be allowed to undertake nightwork in order to increase their 
wages. The KSPI in response to this argument demanded that the new Labour Code include a clause requiring 
women to ask permission from their husbands before being allowed to take up night work. The Forum 
immediately rejected this demand, and it has not been taken up in the 2003 Labour Code. Several of the 
women who negotiated on behalf of the Forum have told me that they felt as if they were bargaining with 
their employers while discussing these and other women’s issues with the KSPI.
38 Personal interview Amin Muftiyanah, Yogjakarta, 1 August 2003.
39 The quota legalised through election legislation (Law 12/2003 Article 65 Subsection 1) specifies that “each 
political party that participates in the elections may propose candidates for the national, local, provincial and 
district parliaments for each area of election, giving attention to minimally 30 per cent representation of 
women.” The inclusion of the word ‘may’ has given rise to widespread criticism from women’s activists and
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women’s NGOs that the quota is only voluntary, and the law does not specify sanctions against parties that do 
not meet the quota. For a good background on women in political parties, see Francisia Seda (2002).
40 Personal interview Emilia Yanti, Jakarta (Depok), 11 March 2003.
41 Personal interview Diana Rieveira (Vera), Jakarta, 27 August 2003.
42 In practice, this has not been the main obstacle according to women’s activists, women politicians or 
candidates, and involved NGOs. All agree that the main difficulty has been the lack of willingness of political 
parties to place women candidates sufficiently high on their electoral lists that they stand a chance of being 
elected. Furthermore, many women candidates are shifted to lower places because of their inability to meet 
their party’s demands for financial support of the campaign. Lastly, only those political parties with women’s 
divisions or aligned with large social or religious movements have made serious efforts to search for qualified 
candidates (Ani Soetjipto from CETRO during September 2003 Forum conference, and various reports from 
Kompas and Media Indonesia newspapers).
43 Personal interview Wachyuni Mustani, Jakarta, 10 March 2003.
44 Personal interview Masruchah, Yogjakarta, 1 August 2003.
45 Personal interview Ida Budiarti, Semarang, 1 February 2004.
46 The remainder of the sample gave as reasons for preferring women in parliament: to give a voice to women 
(37 per cent) and for women’s equality (28 per cent). Because these answers are open to interpretation, they 
are not linked here to either the form or the content argument for women’s representation.
47 For example, by religious-based political parties; see for example comments by the head of the Islamic 
Prosperous Welfare Party (PKS) who recognises the need for women’s representation in parliament because 
“the country faces many problems related to women, children and the institution of the family” in an Islamic- 
oriented national newspaper (.Republika 23 December 2003).
48 An opinion poll by Kompas newspaper in February 2003 found that among the 954 (presumably highly 
educated) respondents, 64 per cent of women and 67 per cent of men believed that current women 
parliamentarians were not representing the interests of fellow women (perhaps believing that they should do 
so), while 70 per cent of the total believed that women’s voices would receive more attention if more women 
were elected to the parliament (Kompas 24 February 2003:8). These findings indicate that certain segments of 
the population express ample support for women legislative candidates, based on the hope that they would 
better represent women’s needs and interests than the current parliamentarians.
49 Personal interview Emelia Yanti, Jakarta (Depok), 11 March 2003.
50 Personal interview Wachyuni Mustani, Jakarta, 10 March 2003.
51 Personal interview Sulistri, Jakarta, 27 August 2003.
52 Personal interview Sofiati Mukadi, Jakarta (Depok), 11 March 2003.
53 Personal interview Irma (not real name), Jakarta, 13 February 2004.
54 Personal interview Emelia Yanti, Jakarta (Depok), 11 March 2003.
55 Personal interview Roma, Jakarta, 28 September 2002.
56 Personal interview Wachyuni Mustani, Jakarta, 10 March 2003.
57 Yet, the participation of women from different walks of life does not always result in a lasting women’s 
movement. The case of Indonesia is reminiscent of the Anti Price Rise Movement in Bombay in the 1970s as 
described by Gandhi: “Horizontal linkages are difficult to establish. There was little time or space for getting 
to know the women. By and large they walked into the rallies as passive participants. They remember the 
novelty of the experience, the excitement, and a sense of collective strength. But it was not ‘their’ movement. 
The local mobilizers on the other hand had formed strong relations with each other on the basis of a common 
socio-economic background, involvement in politics, and their common ties with the leaders” (1995:224). 
Thus, although the protest action in Jakarta grouped together women across socio-economic class and 
employment sector, perhaps only its leaders felt part of (and ownership in) the movement.
58 Personal interview Amin Muftiyanah, Yogjakarta, 1 August 2003.
59 Personal interview Masruchah, Yogjakarta, 4 August 2004.
60 Personal interview Wachyuni Mustani, Jakarta, 10 March 2003.
61 Personal interview Arum, Jakarta (Depok), 2 October 2002.
62 Persorial interview Wachyuni Mustani, Jakarta, 10 March 2003.
63 Personal interview Siti (not real name), Yogjakarta, 1 August 2003.
64 Yet, there are some small steps towards building relations. Vera from the metalworkers credits the Forum 
with exposing her to other sectors, acquainting her with women from the office and service sectors, and 
stimulating greater discussion among women from different backgrounds (personal interview Diana Rieveira 
(Vera), Jakarta, 27 August 2003).
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Conclusion
This thesis has addressed the question of the extent to which identity plays a role in women 
workers’ attempts to mobilise and organise collectively, and if it does, which identities 
matter. Through its focus on processes of organising, this thesis has in particular analysed 
efforts at identity construction by small women workers’ organisations that have been 
established in recent years in urban Thailand and Indonesia. The central argument has been 
that mobilising and organising efforts by women workers are shaped by both gender and 
economic regimes. Women workers at times demand recognition as workers and at other 
times as women, emphasising class or gender differences in accordance with their audience, 
political and economic circumstances, and potential alliances with other movements and 
organisations.
Case studies of union women in Thailand have shown that even when their protest does not 
revolve explicitly around gender interests, gender regimes in trade unions and in society 
and economy more broadly shape the construction of their collective identity. If, however, 
women workers’ claims for recognition and redistribution explicitly raise common gender 
interests, as they do in Indonesia (though gender interests might very well be a trigger to try 
to satisfy other, non-gender related needs), their collective mobilising and organising 
efforts might make strategic use of gender identities. In other words, claims for recognition 
and redistribution cannot tell us in a straightforward manner if and how women workers act 
based on a politicised gender identity.
As foreshadowed in Chapters Three to Five, the main factors that appear to account for the 
differences between these two countries are their dominant gender and economic regimes, 
including their systems of industrial relations. While both regimes are characterised by an 
infinite number of variations depending on place and time, I believe we can still speak of 
‘regimes’ because of the pervasive nature of common ideology that is spread through mass 
communication, educational systems, legal systems, and state structures. Other factors 
mentioned in Chapter Four, such as religion, age, and locality may also have been 
influential in shaping the responses of some women workers to the state, their employers 
and managers, and male trade unionists. My interviews with union women in both countries
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strongly suggest, however, that gender and economic regimes are the dominant influences 
in response to which women workers have mobilised and organised collectively.
Firstly, even when women workers do not mobilise around gender identity and do not make 
claims regarding gender issues, gender plays an important role in shaping the possibilities 
and constraints under which they operate and to which they respond. As Smyth and Grijns 
note, “gender norms define social acceptability of particular forms of resistance” (1997:17). 
More importantly, ideology and discursive practices significantly influence whether women 
and men will experience gender as seriality or as group membership.
For example, the New Order state ideology that for decades propagated a common 
womanhood among Indonesian women differs markedly from the gender regime in 
Thailand, where patriarchal gender norms are most meaningful and most strongly 
experienced in conjunction with other forms of hierarchy such as age and class. Women 
workers in Thailand do not necessarily feel strongly about their gender identity, whereas in 
Indonesia women workers appear to find gender identity meaningful. In turn, this 
difference helps explain why many union women in Thailand politicise their workers’ 
identity for collective mobilising, while in Indonesia union women mainly appear to appeal 
to, and construct, a common gender identity. The difference between these countries is also 
a reminder that consciousness raising among women workers may vary in its outcomes. 
Where women workers do not affirm gender or feminist identities, this should not 
necessarily be taken as a lack of consciousness about women’s rights and gender equality 
(Yuval-Davis 1994).
Secondly, while the industrial relations systems in both countries aimed to achieve the 
exclusion of labour from state-employer relations, the two countries differed in their 
methods of achieving this goal. The New Order regime’s suppression of independent 
unionisation in Indonesia through both practical (and often violent) measures and 
discursive practices rendered politicisation of workers’ identity difficult. Before 1998, the 
legal vulnerability of independent unions and union organisers (as well as the few more 
genuine (F)SPSI units) also forced many workers (both male and female) to organise under 
banners other than the trade union movement. Thailand, on the other hand, experienced 
several periods of genuine freedom of association in recent decades which gave workers
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greater opportunity to challenge dominant constructions of worker identity. Struggles by 
women workers over meanings and exclusions implicit in the term ‘worker’ currently 
revolve not only around gender but also around the problem of homeworkers and the 
unemployed. The legitimacy accorded to trade unionism under Thai laws may also have 
contributed to shaping an environment in which workers could contest industrial relations 
policy and practice more broadly.
What broader conclusions can be drawn from this research? Union women in Thailand 
provide a first hint with their refusal to validate gender identity as the main impetus for 
mobilising. Although at times they strategically use women’s allegedly superior qualities to 
encourage women to mobilize in groups, these union women make claims for recognition 
and redistribution not only as women within trade unions but also, and more vocally, as 
workers in Thai society. Women workers’ organisations may therefore be established by 
women and have women as their members, but this does not automatically make them 
‘women’s organisations’, let alone feminist organisations.
Secondly, what collective claims for recognition women make has implications for how 
outsiders regard women’s participation in social movements. Although Castells warns us 
that “social movements are who they say they are” (1997:69-70), their expressions of 
collective identity vary with time, place, and audience and are framed accordingly towards 
potential members, opponents, allies and supporters, observers, and media. Framing is one 
of the tools at the disposal of a collective movement for attracting support and motivating 
its members to take action. Reading protest as partially symbolic and shaped by the need to 
frame issues to attract support (from inside a movement or from other movements or 
supporters) might lessen confusion and misunderstanding about the seemingly different 
stages and forms of feminist consciousness among women workers. It cautions against 
deducing from women workers’ forms of protest their level of feminist consciousness 
and/or their consciousness about strategic gender needs and interests. Instead, protest can 
be regarded as an expression and an outcome of collective mobilisation, in which framing 
will frequently be used as a tool to construct a common goal and to strengthen feelings of 
common identity.
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As such, mobilisation may make use of conventional identities that are authorised and 
constructed through hegemony, such as motherhood, but may alternatively (or even 
simultaneously) challenge such identities and attempt to replace them or infuse them with 
new meanings. This may similarly be the case in efforts to establish alliances with other 
groups and movements. While outsiders may consider them to be women’s movements, 
women workers’ groups may reject such labels, regarding their worker identity as more 
meaningful and more effective for mobilising purposes than their gender identity. White 
(1999) for example observes a tendency among development practitioners influenced by 
the Women-in-Development paradigm to group women by sex without having ascertained 
what shared sense of identity -  if any -  can motivate those women to act together. She 
reminds us that “repeated emphasis on the differences of women to men ... fails to question 
how ideas of the ‘general’ interest by class or ethnicity may be implicitly male gendered or 
the way in which these interests are interrelated” (1999:131). Caution is therefore called for 
when outsiders attempt to interpret the demands and claims made by social movements.
Thirdly, this research affirms the possibility of collective action by women as women that 
avoids validating essentialist or universalising identities. Young’s (1995) conceptualisation 
of gender as seriality allows us to think of women as passively sharing gender structures 
that do not necessarily define their individual or group identity. Nor do those structures 
constitute them as members of a group with common attributes. The Thai union women 
described in this thesis provide a practical example of gender as seriality. Even though they 
may have gathered in a women-only organisation, these women workers may not identify 
themselves primarily as women because they experience their womanhood as ‘seriality’ 
rather than as chosen membership in a group defined by common oppression or common 
discrimination. Indonesian union women, in contrast, experience class as seriality, but want 
to be recognised as a distinct group of women with equal rights to participation and 
representation. Women workers put their claims for recognition in both universal and 
particular terms, and refer at times to gender differences but at other times to class or other 
differences. They do so in order to challenge the circumstances in which they live these 
differences, rather than to reaffirm them.
What practical implications does the apparent centrality of identity hold for women workers 
in developing countries? Identities of gender or work are necessarily partial in that they
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unite in action only those women workers for whom that particular politicised identity is 
meaningful. As Young emphasises, “groupings of women will always be partial in relation 
to the series ... because a group will have particular objectives or purposes that cannot 
encompass or even refer to the totality of the condition of women as a series” (1995:123). 
The same applies to workers, some of whom may unite as women but others by profession, 
skill, workplace, age, or ethnic origin.
The partial nature of collective identities necessitates the forming of alliances and coalitions 
with others beyond the group, and hence adjustment or broadening of the identities that 
motivate collective mobilisation. In Thailand, we observed the growing presence during the 
1990s of cross-sectoral alliances on a variety of issues. This was made possible by the 
alarming weakening of the trade union movement during the 1980s and was encouraged by 
a broadening of definitions of worker, work, and workplace. This broadening of workers’ 
identity has recently allowed union women to form alliances with home-based workers and 
unemployed women in communities near industrial areas. Yet, alliances with the 
mainstream women’s movement and its organisations have proved difficult for women 
workers to initiate, given their strong self-identification as workers and perceptions of 
discriminatory treatment at the hands of middle- and upper-class Thai women who lead 
most organisations in the mainstream women’s movement.
In Indonesia, union women perceive common gender interests and a common gender 
identity with the mainstream women’s movement. This can be seen from their participation 
in protest actions organised by self-identified women’s organisations as well as in the 
International Women’s Day celebrations. At these occasions, gender interests such as the 
campaign to combat violence against women and the rising cost of living are defined 
sufficiently broadly to enable diverse groups of women to unite in protest. Notwithstanding 
some distrust of NGOs, many union women report collaboration with a number of 
women’s NGOs and some have approached state structures for women, such as the State 
Ministry for Women’s Empowerment, for assistance. There is little evidence, however, of 
Indonesian union women seeking coalitions with other groups of workers with grievances, 
such as migrant workers and workers in state-owned enterprises facing privatisation or 
down-sizing. These case studies show how collective identity shapes the alliances made 
possible between different groups of women, workers, and women workers.
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Recognising the multiplicity of gender identities, the differences between women, and their 
consequences for alliances for collective action, we may also begin to look to other groups 
of women to defend the rights of women workers. Gender interests are not unitary and may 
create divisions among women, as they do in Thailand where middle-class women have an 
interest in the perpetuation of other women’s cheap labour. Alliances between women 
therefore require not only the politicisation of a common (gender) identity, as occurred in 
Indonesia where the New Order state ideology circulated discourses of shared gender 
attributes. These alliances must also be built on an awareness of the situational nature of 
this common gender identity and of the fact that it is built on the tactical and partial 
expression of particular goals. Thus, women (workers) may unite as a group across class, 
race, age, etc when their interests are framed as part of a common response to the gendered 
structures that they experience in daily life.
It is likely that, as politicised identities for mobilisation become more broadly defined and 
more inclusive, alliances equally become broader in scope and encompass a greater variety 
of groups. This may make it easier for women workers to argue for recognition of their 
equal rights as citizens and for a politics of presence, based on their identity rather than on 
their (potentially) different needs and interests. Such alliances may, however, also become 
increasingly ad-hoc and short-term because they are more difficult to sustain, unless new 
instruments for mobilising and organising become available.
Two types of movements stand out as potential alliance partners for women workers’ 
groups: labour movements and women’s movements. As the labour movement is slowly 
regaining its strength in parts of the world but is in decline in other parts, the potential 
power of alliances may depend in large part on the directions taken by women’s 
movements and by women politicians who can support such movements in formal political 
spheres. The opportunities for women’s movements to align themselves with women 
workers clearly require that women’s organisations acknowledge the class bias that guided 
many of their past efforts, and embrace strategies that build up their membership at the 
grass-roots level in a manner that shows accountability and democratic leadership. In the 
absence of constructions of common womanhood, whether indigenous or crafted through 
state ideology, women’s organisations can enter into strong and lasting alliances with
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women workers if they show themselves to be democratic and open to addressing issues of 
labour exploitation and challenging dominant economic regimes. In Indonesia, such a re­
orientation of women’s organisations could build on efforts at grassroots campaigns against 
economic and sexual exploitation by Gerwani, the mass women’s organisation of the 1950s 
and 1960s. For women’s organisations to emulate Gerwani’s strategies, however, would 
likely require the social and political rehabilitation of Gerwani, whose history and legacy 
are still regarded with suspicion due to its alignment with the Indonesian communist party 
in the lead-up to the 1965 coup d’etat.
Like elsewhere in industrialising Southeast Asia, economic restructuring in Thailand and 
Indonesia is gradually changing the nature of production processes, increasing the 
importance of information and networking across sectors and across borders for both 
employers and workers alike. Such changes are calling for increasingly multi-layered forms 
of protest, using a variety of strategies, instruments, and identities, some of which are no 
longer tied to territorial interests. Although transnational mobilisation of women workers 
has not been the focus of this thesis, it is important to draw out the similarities in obstacles 
to local and transnational coalition building. Information has gained in importance as an 
instrument for workers mobilising and organising protest action (such as consumer boycotts 
or action to prevent factory relocation), yet access to information is partially subject to 
forming alliances with other workers’ organisations and NGOs, both locally and across 
borders. The need for timely and accurate information creates a mutual incentive for both 
women workers’ groups and domestic and transnational labour groups to explore alliances. 
Awareness of, and respect for, the identities around which women workers mobilise and 
organise in particular locations would help labour movements to build sustainable alliances 
as equal partners with women workers’ groups.
As women workers in Thailand and Indonesia continue to challenge dominant gender and 
worker identities assigned to them by business and political elites, what are the prospects 
for their future? Both countries continue to be drawn further into global markets, but new 
investment frequently is not labour intensive in nature while many manufacturing industries 
have relocated overseas or are planning to do so. The end, in January 2005, of the Multi- 
Fibre Accord and its import quotas for textile and garment products from developing 
countries signals the likely shrinking of this sector in Thailand and Indonesia -  unless
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government and business make substantial investments to improve productivity and 
upgrade machinery. These changes will undoubtedly affect union women in both countries, 
as the largest share of women union members (as well as the most experienced unionists) 
come from the textile and garment sector. Furthermore, the increasing informalisation of 
production -  from registered factories to home-based, informal workplaces -  will see many 
union women lose their right to union membership, unless national legislation governing 
unions is changed radically to make unionisation in the informal economy possible. Such 
macro-economic changes bode ill for union women.
However, union women are learning fast from their own experiences and from other 
countries and sectors, as communication methods facilitate the spread of information and 
NGOs and trade union federations increasingly bring women workers together in 
conferences and workshops. Resistance by male union leaders and members is still 
widespread and this thesis has demonstrated some of its potential consequences for union 
women who transgress gender norms through their activism. Greater learning experiences, 
however, increase union women’s awareness of the importance of their group identity not 
as unitary and exclusive but as subject to revision and as a potential bridge to other groups 
and movements. Identities are continuously contested and reconstructed. Although these 
processes most frequently occur in opposition to the state and employers, women workers 
equally acknowledge their heterogeneity and challenge each other, as they engage in the 
formation of collective action and, in some cases, social movements.
As the women workers’ organisations examined in this thesis try to sustain their activities, 
they are inevitably faced with difficult questions regarding direction, structure, and funding. 
If they grow larger in membership over the coming years and if they cannot secure 
sufficient funding, it is questionable whether they will be able to retain their egalitarian 
nature while functioning optimally in the face of strong resistance. Yet, this egalitarianism 
forms one of the major points of attraction for many members, who feel that it enables them 
to learn and share experiences freely with fellow union women, in contrast to their male- 
dominated and mostly undemocratic federations. The preference of some of the smaller 
regional groupings to remain unregistered and informal may also come under pressure, if 
their membership increases and their prominence grows.
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Whether they can remain women-only organisations also requires further investigation. 
Some members of the Thai Women Workers’ Unity Group interpreted the request in 2003 
by a man to become a member as an attempt by male union leaders to infiltrate and slowly 
take over the group. In such instances, increasing attention from male union leaders and 
attempts at ‘sabotage’ may indeed be a sign of being taken seriously as competitors 
(Aspinall 1999). From government ministries and agencies, however, such recognition is 
still lacking, implying that women workers’ struggles for recognition will not become 
institutionalised any time soon in regular fora such as tripartite labour negotiations. In the 
short-term, it is more likely that such struggles for recognition will awaken women workers 
to the possibility' of political action, not only on workplace issues but also in other areas of 
their lives. Their main challenge remains to stimulate other women, whether workers or 
not, to transform their individual and spontaneous protest into sustained collective action 
that has the potential to become a social movement in the longer-term.
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